"Few empirical strategies have been developed that investigate public provision under majority rule while taking explicit account of the constraints implied by mobility of households. The goal of this paper is to improve our understanding of voting in local communities when neighborhood quality...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Bibliographische Detailangaben

Format:	Buch
Sprache:	English
Veröffentlicht:	Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2005
Schriftenreihe:	National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 11720
Schlagworte:	Mathematisches Modell Community development > Mathematical models Migration, Internal > Mathematical models Public goods > Mathematical models Voting > Mathematical models
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
Zusammenfassung:	"Few empirical strategies have been developed that investigate public provision under majority rule while taking explicit account of the constraints implied by mobility of households. The goal of this paper is to improve our understanding of voting in local communities when neighborhood quality depends on peer or neighborhood effects. We develop a new empirical approach which allows us to impose all restrictions that arise from locational equilibrium models with myopic voting simultaneously on the data generating process. We can then analyze how close myopic models come in replicating the main regularities about expenditures, taxes, sorting by income and housing observed in the data. We find that a myopic voting model that incorporates peer effects fits all dimensions of the data reasonably well"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Beschreibung:	55 S. graph. Darst.