Hard targets: theory and evidence on suicide attacks
"Who chooses suicide attacks? Though rebels typically target poor countries, suicide attacks are just as likely to target rich democracies. Though many groups have grievances, suicide attacks are favored by the radical religious. Though rebels often kill coreligionists, they seldom use suicide...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2005
|
| Schriftenreihe: | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series
11740 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | "Who chooses suicide attacks? Though rebels typically target poor countries, suicide attacks are just as likely to target rich democracies. Though many groups have grievances, suicide attacks are favored by the radical religious. Though rebels often kill coreligionists, they seldom use suicide attacks to do so. We model the choice of tactics by rebels, bearing in mind that a successful suicide attack imposes the ultimate cost on the attacker and the organization. We first ask what a suicide attacker would have to believe to be deemed rational. We then embed the attacker and other operatives in a club good model which emphasizes the function of voluntary religious organizations as providers of benign local public goods. The sacrifices which these groups demand solve a free-rider problem in the cooperative production of public goods. These sacrifices make clubs well suited for organizing suicide attacks, a tactic in which defection by operatives (including the attacker) endangers the entire organization. The model also analyzes the choice of suicide attacks as a tactic, predicting that suicide will be used when targets are well protected and when damage is great. Those predictions are consistent with the patterns described above. The model has testable implications for tactic choice of terrorists and for damage achieved by different types of terrorists, which we find to be consistent with the data"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. |
| Beschreibung: | 39 S. graph. Darst. |
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| 490 | 1 | |a National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |v 11740 | |
| 520 | 3 | |a "Who chooses suicide attacks? Though rebels typically target poor countries, suicide attacks are just as likely to target rich democracies. Though many groups have grievances, suicide attacks are favored by the radical religious. Though rebels often kill coreligionists, they seldom use suicide attacks to do so. We model the choice of tactics by rebels, bearing in mind that a successful suicide attack imposes the ultimate cost on the attacker and the organization. We first ask what a suicide attacker would have to believe to be deemed rational. We then embed the attacker and other operatives in a club good model which emphasizes the function of voluntary religious organizations as providers of benign local public goods. The sacrifices which these groups demand solve a free-rider problem in the cooperative production of public goods. These sacrifices make clubs well suited for organizing suicide attacks, a tactic in which defection by operatives (including the attacker) endangers the entire organization. The model also analyzes the choice of suicide attacks as a tactic, predicting that suicide will be used when targets are well protected and when damage is great. Those predictions are consistent with the patterns described above. The model has testable implications for tactic choice of terrorists and for damage achieved by different types of terrorists, which we find to be consistent with the data"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. | |
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| id | DE-604.BV023591756 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T22:41:29Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:25:11Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016907086 |
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| physical | 39 S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 2005 |
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| series | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| series2 | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| spelling | Berman, Eli 1960- Verfasser (DE-588)128833289 aut Hard targets theory and evidence on suicide attacks Eli Berman ; David D. Laitin Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2005 39 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 11740 "Who chooses suicide attacks? Though rebels typically target poor countries, suicide attacks are just as likely to target rich democracies. Though many groups have grievances, suicide attacks are favored by the radical religious. Though rebels often kill coreligionists, they seldom use suicide attacks to do so. We model the choice of tactics by rebels, bearing in mind that a successful suicide attack imposes the ultimate cost on the attacker and the organization. We first ask what a suicide attacker would have to believe to be deemed rational. We then embed the attacker and other operatives in a club good model which emphasizes the function of voluntary religious organizations as providers of benign local public goods. The sacrifices which these groups demand solve a free-rider problem in the cooperative production of public goods. These sacrifices make clubs well suited for organizing suicide attacks, a tactic in which defection by operatives (including the attacker) endangers the entire organization. The model also analyzes the choice of suicide attacks as a tactic, predicting that suicide will be used when targets are well protected and when damage is great. Those predictions are consistent with the patterns described above. The model has testable implications for tactic choice of terrorists and for damage achieved by different types of terrorists, which we find to be consistent with the data"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. Ökonometrisches Modell Suicide bombings Econometric models Laitin, David D. 1945- Verfasser (DE-588)122143310 aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 11740 (DE-604)BV002801238 11740 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11740.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Berman, Eli 1960- Laitin, David D. 1945- Hard targets theory and evidence on suicide attacks National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series Ökonometrisches Modell Suicide bombings Econometric models |
| title | Hard targets theory and evidence on suicide attacks |
| title_auth | Hard targets theory and evidence on suicide attacks |
| title_exact_search | Hard targets theory and evidence on suicide attacks |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Hard targets theory and evidence on suicide attacks |
| title_full | Hard targets theory and evidence on suicide attacks Eli Berman ; David D. Laitin |
| title_fullStr | Hard targets theory and evidence on suicide attacks Eli Berman ; David D. Laitin |
| title_full_unstemmed | Hard targets theory and evidence on suicide attacks Eli Berman ; David D. Laitin |
| title_short | Hard targets |
| title_sort | hard targets theory and evidence on suicide attacks |
| title_sub | theory and evidence on suicide attacks |
| topic | Ökonometrisches Modell Suicide bombings Econometric models |
| topic_facet | Ökonometrisches Modell Suicide bombings Econometric models |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11740.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT bermaneli hardtargetstheoryandevidenceonsuicideattacks AT laitindavidd hardtargetstheoryandevidenceonsuicideattacks |