Complementarities and collusion in an FCC spectrum auction:
"We empirically study bidding in the C Block of the US mobile phone spectrum auctions. Spectrum auctions are conducted using a simultaneous ascending auction design that allows bidders to assemble packages of licenses with geographic complementarities. While this auction design allows the marke...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2005
|
| Schriftenreihe: | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series
11671 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | "We empirically study bidding in the C Block of the US mobile phone spectrum auctions. Spectrum auctions are conducted using a simultaneous ascending auction design that allows bidders to assemble packages of licenses with geographic complementarities. While this auction design allows the market to find complementarities, the auction might also result in an inefficient equilibrium. In addition, these auctions have equilibria where implicit collusion is sustained through threats of bidding wars. We estimate a structural model in order to test for the presence of complementarities and implicit collusion. The estimation strategy is valid under a wide variety of alternative assumptions about equilibrium in these auctions and is robust to potentially important forms of unobserved heterogeneity. We make suggestions about the design of future spectrum auctions"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. |
| Beschreibung: | 49 S. Kt., graph. Darst. |
Internformat
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| index_date | 2024-07-02T22:41:28Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:25:11Z |
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| language | English |
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| spelling | Bajari, Patrick L. 1969- Verfasser (DE-588)128636211 aut Complementarities and collusion in an FCC spectrum auction Patrick Bajari ; Jeremy T. Fox Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2005 49 S. Kt., graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 11671 "We empirically study bidding in the C Block of the US mobile phone spectrum auctions. Spectrum auctions are conducted using a simultaneous ascending auction design that allows bidders to assemble packages of licenses with geographic complementarities. While this auction design allows the market to find complementarities, the auction might also result in an inefficient equilibrium. In addition, these auctions have equilibria where implicit collusion is sustained through threats of bidding wars. We estimate a structural model in order to test for the presence of complementarities and implicit collusion. The estimation strategy is valid under a wide variety of alternative assumptions about equilibrium in these auctions and is robust to potentially important forms of unobserved heterogeneity. We make suggestions about the design of future spectrum auctions"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. United States. Federal Communications Commission Auctions United States Cell phone systems United States USA Fox, Jeremy T. Verfasser (DE-588)131426869 aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 11671 (DE-604)BV002801238 11671 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11671.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Bajari, Patrick L. 1969- Fox, Jeremy T. Complementarities and collusion in an FCC spectrum auction National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series United States. Federal Communications Commission Auctions United States Cell phone systems United States |
| title | Complementarities and collusion in an FCC spectrum auction |
| title_auth | Complementarities and collusion in an FCC spectrum auction |
| title_exact_search | Complementarities and collusion in an FCC spectrum auction |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Complementarities and collusion in an FCC spectrum auction |
| title_full | Complementarities and collusion in an FCC spectrum auction Patrick Bajari ; Jeremy T. Fox |
| title_fullStr | Complementarities and collusion in an FCC spectrum auction Patrick Bajari ; Jeremy T. Fox |
| title_full_unstemmed | Complementarities and collusion in an FCC spectrum auction Patrick Bajari ; Jeremy T. Fox |
| title_short | Complementarities and collusion in an FCC spectrum auction |
| title_sort | complementarities and collusion in an fcc spectrum auction |
| topic | United States. Federal Communications Commission Auctions United States Cell phone systems United States |
| topic_facet | United States. Federal Communications Commission Auctions United States Cell phone systems United States USA |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11671.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
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