The effect of joint and several liability under Superfund on brownfields:
"In response to claims that the threat of Superfund liability deters the acquisition of potentially contaminated sites or "brownfields" for redevelopment, the federal government and the states have enacted laws or adopted programs to protect purchasers from liability. This protection...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2005
|
| Schriftenreihe: | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series
11667 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | "In response to claims that the threat of Superfund liability deters the acquisition of potentially contaminated sites or "brownfields" for redevelopment, the federal government and the states have enacted laws or adopted programs to protect purchasers from liability. This protection may be unwarranted, however, if sellers can simply adjust the price of contaminated property downward to compensate buyers for the liabilities associated with the property. We present a formal model of joint and several liability under Superfund that allows us to distinguish four different reasons that Superfund liability may discourage the purchase of contaminated property despite the tendency for land prices to reflect the expected transfer of liability to the buyer. The previous literature has overlooked the four effects that we identify, which all arise because a sale may increase the number of defendants in a suit to recover cleanup costs. First, a sale may increase the share of liability that a seller and a buyer may expect to pay as a group. Second, a sale may increase the amount of damages that the government can expect to recover from the defendants at trial. Third, a sale may increase the total litigation costs that a buyer and a seller may face as a group. Fourth, game theory suggests that a sale may increase the amount that the government can expect to extract from defendants in a settlement"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. |
| Beschreibung: | 25 S. |
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| 490 | 1 | |a National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |v 11667 | |
| 520 | 3 | |a "In response to claims that the threat of Superfund liability deters the acquisition of potentially contaminated sites or "brownfields" for redevelopment, the federal government and the states have enacted laws or adopted programs to protect purchasers from liability. This protection may be unwarranted, however, if sellers can simply adjust the price of contaminated property downward to compensate buyers for the liabilities associated with the property. We present a formal model of joint and several liability under Superfund that allows us to distinguish four different reasons that Superfund liability may discourage the purchase of contaminated property despite the tendency for land prices to reflect the expected transfer of liability to the buyer. The previous literature has overlooked the four effects that we identify, which all arise because a sale may increase the number of defendants in a suit to recover cleanup costs. First, a sale may increase the share of liability that a seller and a buyer may expect to pay as a group. Second, a sale may increase the amount of damages that the government can expect to recover from the defendants at trial. Third, a sale may increase the total litigation costs that a buyer and a seller may face as a group. Fourth, game theory suggests that a sale may increase the amount that the government can expect to extract from defendants in a settlement"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. | |
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| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T22:41:28Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:25:11Z |
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| spelling | Chang, Howard F. Verfasser (DE-588)131426397 aut The effect of joint and several liability under Superfund on brownfields Howard F. Chang ; Hilary Sigman Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2005 25 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 11667 "In response to claims that the threat of Superfund liability deters the acquisition of potentially contaminated sites or "brownfields" for redevelopment, the federal government and the states have enacted laws or adopted programs to protect purchasers from liability. This protection may be unwarranted, however, if sellers can simply adjust the price of contaminated property downward to compensate buyers for the liabilities associated with the property. We present a formal model of joint and several liability under Superfund that allows us to distinguish four different reasons that Superfund liability may discourage the purchase of contaminated property despite the tendency for land prices to reflect the expected transfer of liability to the buyer. The previous literature has overlooked the four effects that we identify, which all arise because a sale may increase the number of defendants in a suit to recover cleanup costs. First, a sale may increase the share of liability that a seller and a buyer may expect to pay as a group. Second, a sale may increase the amount of damages that the government can expect to recover from the defendants at trial. Third, a sale may increase the total litigation costs that a buyer and a seller may face as a group. Fourth, game theory suggests that a sale may increase the amount that the government can expect to extract from defendants in a settlement"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. Brownfields Prices United States Liability for environmental damages United States USA Sigman, Hilary 1964- Verfasser (DE-588)129563706 aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 11667 (DE-604)BV002801238 11667 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11667.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Chang, Howard F. Sigman, Hilary 1964- The effect of joint and several liability under Superfund on brownfields National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series Brownfields Prices United States Liability for environmental damages United States |
| title | The effect of joint and several liability under Superfund on brownfields |
| title_auth | The effect of joint and several liability under Superfund on brownfields |
| title_exact_search | The effect of joint and several liability under Superfund on brownfields |
| title_exact_search_txtP | The effect of joint and several liability under Superfund on brownfields |
| title_full | The effect of joint and several liability under Superfund on brownfields Howard F. Chang ; Hilary Sigman |
| title_fullStr | The effect of joint and several liability under Superfund on brownfields Howard F. Chang ; Hilary Sigman |
| title_full_unstemmed | The effect of joint and several liability under Superfund on brownfields Howard F. Chang ; Hilary Sigman |
| title_short | The effect of joint and several liability under Superfund on brownfields |
| title_sort | the effect of joint and several liability under superfund on brownfields |
| topic | Brownfields Prices United States Liability for environmental damages United States |
| topic_facet | Brownfields Prices United States Liability for environmental damages United States USA |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11667.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT changhowardf theeffectofjointandseveralliabilityundersuperfundonbrownfields AT sigmanhilary theeffectofjointandseveralliabilityundersuperfundonbrownfields |