Why are some public officials more corrupt than others?:
"Using detailed Peruvian data measuring bribery, I assess which types of public official are most corrupt and why. I distinguish between the bribery rate and the size of bribes received, and seek to explain the variation in each across public institutions. The characteristics of officials'...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2005
|
| Schriftenreihe: | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series
11595 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | "Using detailed Peruvian data measuring bribery, I assess which types of public official are most corrupt and why. I distinguish between the bribery rate and the size of bribes received, and seek to explain the variation in each across public institutions. The characteristics of officials' clients explain most of the variation for bribery rates, but none for bribe amounts. A measure of the speed of honest service at the institution explains much of the remaining variation for both bribery rates and amounts. The results indicate that the bribery rate is higher at institutions with bribe-prone clients, and that bribery rates and bribe amounts are higher where clients are frustrated at slow service. Faster and better service would reduce corruption. Overall, the judiciary and the police are by far the most corrupt institutions"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. |
| Beschreibung: | 30, [10] S. graph. Darst. |
Internformat
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| index_date | 2024-07-02T22:41:28Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:25:11Z |
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| language | English |
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| physical | 30, [10] S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 2005 |
| publishDateSearch | 2005 |
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| publisher | National Bureau of Economic Research |
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| series | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| series2 | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| spelling | Hunt, Jennifer Verfasser (DE-588)12931224X aut Why are some public officials more corrupt than others? Jennifer Hunt Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2005 30, [10] S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 11595 "Using detailed Peruvian data measuring bribery, I assess which types of public official are most corrupt and why. I distinguish between the bribery rate and the size of bribes received, and seek to explain the variation in each across public institutions. The characteristics of officials' clients explain most of the variation for bribery rates, but none for bribe amounts. A measure of the speed of honest service at the institution explains much of the remaining variation for both bribery rates and amounts. The results indicate that the bribery rate is higher at institutions with bribe-prone clients, and that bribery rates and bribe amounts are higher where clients are frustrated at slow service. Faster and better service would reduce corruption. Overall, the judiciary and the police are by far the most corrupt institutions"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. Ökonometrisches Modell Bribery Peru Political corruption Peru Econometric models Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 11595 (DE-604)BV002801238 11595 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11595.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Hunt, Jennifer Why are some public officials more corrupt than others? National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series Ökonometrisches Modell Bribery Peru Political corruption Peru Econometric models |
| title | Why are some public officials more corrupt than others? |
| title_auth | Why are some public officials more corrupt than others? |
| title_exact_search | Why are some public officials more corrupt than others? |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Why are some public officials more corrupt than others? |
| title_full | Why are some public officials more corrupt than others? Jennifer Hunt |
| title_fullStr | Why are some public officials more corrupt than others? Jennifer Hunt |
| title_full_unstemmed | Why are some public officials more corrupt than others? Jennifer Hunt |
| title_short | Why are some public officials more corrupt than others? |
| title_sort | why are some public officials more corrupt than others |
| topic | Ökonometrisches Modell Bribery Peru Political corruption Peru Econometric models |
| topic_facet | Ökonometrisches Modell Bribery Peru Political corruption Peru Econometric models |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11595.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT huntjennifer whyaresomepublicofficialsmorecorruptthanothers |