Matching and price competition:

"We develop a model in which firms set impersonal salary levels before matching with workers. Salaries fall relative to any competitive equilibrium while profits rise by almost as much, implyinglittle inefficiency. Furthermore, the best firms gain the most from the system while wages becomecomp...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Bulow, Jeremy (Author), Levin, Jonathan 1972- (Author)
Format: Book
Language:English
Published: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2005
Series:National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 11506
Subjects:
Online Access:Volltext
Summary:"We develop a model in which firms set impersonal salary levels before matching with workers. Salaries fall relative to any competitive equilibrium while profits rise by almost as much, implyinglittle inefficiency. Furthermore, the best firms gain the most from the system while wages becomecompressed. We discuss the performance of alternative institutions and the recent antitrust caseagainst the National Residency Matching Program in light of our results"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Physical Description:31 S. graph. Darst.

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