Matching and price competition:

"We develop a model in which firms set impersonal salary levels before matching with workers. Salaries fall relative to any competitive equilibrium while profits rise by almost as much, implyinglittle inefficiency. Furthermore, the best firms gain the most from the system while wages becomecomp...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Hauptverfasser: Bulow, Jeremy (VerfasserIn), Levin, Jonathan 1972- (VerfasserIn)
Format: Buch
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2005
Schriftenreihe:National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 11506
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Zusammenfassung:"We develop a model in which firms set impersonal salary levels before matching with workers. Salaries fall relative to any competitive equilibrium while profits rise by almost as much, implyinglittle inefficiency. Furthermore, the best firms gain the most from the system while wages becomecompressed. We discuss the performance of alternative institutions and the recent antitrust caseagainst the National Residency Matching Program in light of our results"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Beschreibung:31 S. graph. Darst.

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