Socially optimal districting:
"This paper provides a welfare economic analysis of the problem of districting. In the context of a simple micro-founded model intended to capture the salient features of U.S. politics, it studies how a social planner should allocate citizens of different ideologies across districts to maximize...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2005
|
| Schriftenreihe: | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series
11462 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | "This paper provides a welfare economic analysis of the problem of districting. In the context of a simple micro-founded model intended to capture the salient features of U.S. politics, it studies how a social planner should allocate citizens of different ideologies across districts to maximize aggregate utility. In the model, districting determines the equilibrium seat-vote curve which is the relationship between the aggregate vote share of the political parties and their share of seats in the legislature. To understand optimal districting, the paper first characterizes the optimal seat-vote curve which describes the ideal relationship between votes and seats. It then shows that under rather weak conditions the optimal seat-vote curve is implementable in the sense that there exist districtings which make the equilibrium seat-vote curve equal to the optimal seat-vote curve. The nature of these optimal districtings is described. Finally, the paper provides a full characterization of the constrained optimal seat-vote curve and the districtings that underlie it when the optimal seat-vote curve is not achievable"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. |
| Beschreibung: | 51, [6] S. graph. Darst. |
Internformat
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| 490 | 1 | |a National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |v 11462 | |
| 520 | 3 | |a "This paper provides a welfare economic analysis of the problem of districting. In the context of a simple micro-founded model intended to capture the salient features of U.S. politics, it studies how a social planner should allocate citizens of different ideologies across districts to maximize aggregate utility. In the model, districting determines the equilibrium seat-vote curve which is the relationship between the aggregate vote share of the political parties and their share of seats in the legislature. To understand optimal districting, the paper first characterizes the optimal seat-vote curve which describes the ideal relationship between votes and seats. It then shows that under rather weak conditions the optimal seat-vote curve is implementable in the sense that there exist districtings which make the equilibrium seat-vote curve equal to the optimal seat-vote curve. The nature of these optimal districtings is described. Finally, the paper provides a full characterization of the constrained optimal seat-vote curve and the districtings that underlie it when the optimal seat-vote curve is not achievable"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| geographic | USA |
| geographic_facet | USA |
| id | DE-604.BV023591568 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T22:41:28Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:25:11Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016906898 |
| oclc_num | 61195501 |
| open_access_boolean | 1 |
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| owner_facet | DE-521 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM |
| physical | 51, [6] S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 2005 |
| publishDateSearch | 2005 |
| publishDateSort | 2005 |
| publisher | National Bureau of Economic Research |
| record_format | marc |
| series | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| series2 | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| spelling | Coate, Stephen 1957- Verfasser (DE-588)128866926 aut Socially optimal districting Stephen Coate ; Brian Knight Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2005 51, [6] S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 11462 "This paper provides a welfare economic analysis of the problem of districting. In the context of a simple micro-founded model intended to capture the salient features of U.S. politics, it studies how a social planner should allocate citizens of different ideologies across districts to maximize aggregate utility. In the model, districting determines the equilibrium seat-vote curve which is the relationship between the aggregate vote share of the political parties and their share of seats in the legislature. To understand optimal districting, the paper first characterizes the optimal seat-vote curve which describes the ideal relationship between votes and seats. It then shows that under rather weak conditions the optimal seat-vote curve is implementable in the sense that there exist districtings which make the equilibrium seat-vote curve equal to the optimal seat-vote curve. The nature of these optimal districtings is described. Finally, the paper provides a full characterization of the constrained optimal seat-vote curve and the districtings that underlie it when the optimal seat-vote curve is not achievable"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. Ökonometrisches Modell Apportionment (Election law) United States Econometric models USA Knight, Brian G. Verfasser (DE-588)128637358 aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 11462 (DE-604)BV002801238 11462 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11462.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Coate, Stephen 1957- Knight, Brian G. Socially optimal districting National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series Ökonometrisches Modell Apportionment (Election law) United States Econometric models |
| title | Socially optimal districting |
| title_auth | Socially optimal districting |
| title_exact_search | Socially optimal districting |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Socially optimal districting |
| title_full | Socially optimal districting Stephen Coate ; Brian Knight |
| title_fullStr | Socially optimal districting Stephen Coate ; Brian Knight |
| title_full_unstemmed | Socially optimal districting Stephen Coate ; Brian Knight |
| title_short | Socially optimal districting |
| title_sort | socially optimal districting |
| topic | Ökonometrisches Modell Apportionment (Election law) United States Econometric models |
| topic_facet | Ökonometrisches Modell Apportionment (Election law) United States Econometric models USA |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11462.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT coatestephen sociallyoptimaldistricting AT knightbriang sociallyoptimaldistricting |