Choosing electoral rules: theory and evidence from US cities
This paper studies the choice of electoral rules, in particular, the question of minority representation. Majorities tend to disenfranchise minorities through strategic manipulation of electoral rules. With the aim of explaining changes in electoral rules adopted by US cities (particularly in the So...
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| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
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| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2005
|
| Schriftenreihe: | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series
11236 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | This paper studies the choice of electoral rules, in particular, the question of minority representation. Majorities tend to disenfranchise minorities through strategic manipulation of electoral rules. With the aim of explaining changes in electoral rules adopted by US cities (particularly in the South), we show why majorities tend to adopt "winner-take-all" city-wide rules (at-large elections) in response to an increase in the size of the minority when the minority they are facing is relatively small. In this case, for the majority it is more effective to leverage on its sheer size instead of risking to concede representation to voters from minority-elected districts. However, as the minority becomes larger (closer to a fifty-fifty split), the possibility of losing the whole city induces the majority to prefer minority votes to be confined in minority-packed districts. Single-member district rules serve this purpose. We show empirical results consistent with these implications of the model. |
| Beschreibung: | 46, [18] S. |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Choosing electoral rules |b theory and evidence from US cities |c Philippe Aghion ; Alberto Alesina ; Francesco Trebbi |
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| 490 | 1 | |a National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |v 11236 | |
| 520 | 3 | |a This paper studies the choice of electoral rules, in particular, the question of minority representation. Majorities tend to disenfranchise minorities through strategic manipulation of electoral rules. With the aim of explaining changes in electoral rules adopted by US cities (particularly in the South), we show why majorities tend to adopt "winner-take-all" city-wide rules (at-large elections) in response to an increase in the size of the minority when the minority they are facing is relatively small. In this case, for the majority it is more effective to leverage on its sheer size instead of risking to concede representation to voters from minority-elected districts. However, as the minority becomes larger (closer to a fifty-fifty split), the possibility of losing the whole city induces the majority to prefer minority votes to be confined in minority-packed districts. Single-member district rules serve this purpose. We show empirical results consistent with these implications of the model. | |
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| id | DE-604.BV023591404 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T22:41:28Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:25:10Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
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| physical | 46, [18] S. |
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| series2 | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| spelling | Aghion, Philippe 1956- Verfasser (DE-588)124546706 aut Choosing electoral rules theory and evidence from US cities Philippe Aghion ; Alberto Alesina ; Francesco Trebbi Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2005 46, [18] S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 11236 This paper studies the choice of electoral rules, in particular, the question of minority representation. Majorities tend to disenfranchise minorities through strategic manipulation of electoral rules. With the aim of explaining changes in electoral rules adopted by US cities (particularly in the South), we show why majorities tend to adopt "winner-take-all" city-wide rules (at-large elections) in response to an increase in the size of the minority when the minority they are facing is relatively small. In this case, for the majority it is more effective to leverage on its sheer size instead of risking to concede representation to voters from minority-elected districts. However, as the minority becomes larger (closer to a fifty-fifty split), the possibility of losing the whole city induces the majority to prefer minority votes to be confined in minority-packed districts. Single-member district rules serve this purpose. We show empirical results consistent with these implications of the model. Wahlsystem / Kommunalwahl / USA Alesina, Alberto 1957-2020 Verfasser (DE-588)125845804 aut Trebbi, Francesco 1976- Verfasser (DE-588)122928474 aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 11236 (DE-604)BV002801238 11236 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11236.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Aghion, Philippe 1956- Alesina, Alberto 1957-2020 Trebbi, Francesco 1976- Choosing electoral rules theory and evidence from US cities National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series Wahlsystem / Kommunalwahl / USA |
| title | Choosing electoral rules theory and evidence from US cities |
| title_auth | Choosing electoral rules theory and evidence from US cities |
| title_exact_search | Choosing electoral rules theory and evidence from US cities |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Choosing electoral rules theory and evidence from US cities |
| title_full | Choosing electoral rules theory and evidence from US cities Philippe Aghion ; Alberto Alesina ; Francesco Trebbi |
| title_fullStr | Choosing electoral rules theory and evidence from US cities Philippe Aghion ; Alberto Alesina ; Francesco Trebbi |
| title_full_unstemmed | Choosing electoral rules theory and evidence from US cities Philippe Aghion ; Alberto Alesina ; Francesco Trebbi |
| title_short | Choosing electoral rules |
| title_sort | choosing electoral rules theory and evidence from us cities |
| title_sub | theory and evidence from US cities |
| topic | Wahlsystem / Kommunalwahl / USA |
| topic_facet | Wahlsystem / Kommunalwahl / USA |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11236.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
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