Constraining managers without owners: governance of the not-for-profit enterprise
"In the absence of owners, how effective are the constraints imposed by the state in promoting effective firm governance? This paper develops state-level indices of the legal and reporting rules facing not-for-profits and examines the effects of these rules on not-for-profit behavior. Stronger...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2005
|
| Schriftenreihe: | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series
11140 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | "In the absence of owners, how effective are the constraints imposed by the state in promoting effective firm governance? This paper develops state-level indices of the legal and reporting rules facing not-for-profits and examines the effects of these rules on not-for-profit behavior. Stronger non-distribution constraints are associated with greater charitable expenditures and foundation payouts while more stringent reporting requirements are associated with lower insider compensation. The paper also examines how governance influences an alternative metric of not-for-profit performance -- the provision of social insurance. Stronger governance measures are associated with intertemporal smoothing of resources and greater activity in response to negative economic shocks"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. |
| Beschreibung: | 37, [2] S. |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nam a2200000zcb4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV023591341 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 20100222 | ||
| 007 | t | ||
| 008 | 051020s2005 xxu |||| 00||| eng d | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)58045449 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV023591341 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 044 | |a xxu |c XD-US | ||
| 049 | |a DE-521 |a DE-19 | ||
| 050 | 0 | |a HB1 | |
| 082 | 0 | |a 330.072 | |
| 100 | 1 | |a Desai, Mihir A. |d 1968- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)128956798 |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Constraining managers without owners |b governance of the not-for-profit enterprise |c Mihir A. Desai ; Robert J. Yetman |
| 264 | 1 | |a Cambridge, Mass. |b National Bureau of Economic Research |c 2005 | |
| 300 | |a 37, [2] S. | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 1 | |a National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |v 11140 | |
| 520 | 3 | |a "In the absence of owners, how effective are the constraints imposed by the state in promoting effective firm governance? This paper develops state-level indices of the legal and reporting rules facing not-for-profits and examines the effects of these rules on not-for-profit behavior. Stronger non-distribution constraints are associated with greater charitable expenditures and foundation payouts while more stringent reporting requirements are associated with lower insider compensation. The paper also examines how governance influences an alternative metric of not-for-profit performance -- the provision of social insurance. Stronger governance measures are associated with intertemporal smoothing of resources and greater activity in response to negative economic shocks"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Recht | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Corporate governance | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Nonprofit organizations |x Law and legislation | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Yetman, Robert J. |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)130466379 |4 aut | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Online-Ausgabe |
| 830 | 0 | |a National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |v 11140 |w (DE-604)BV002801238 |9 11140 | |
| 856 | 4 | 1 | |u http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11140.pdf |z kostenfrei |3 Volltext |
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016906671 | ||
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804138248586395648 |
|---|---|
| adam_txt | |
| any_adam_object | |
| any_adam_object_boolean | |
| author | Desai, Mihir A. 1968- Yetman, Robert J. |
| author_GND | (DE-588)128956798 (DE-588)130466379 |
| author_facet | Desai, Mihir A. 1968- Yetman, Robert J. |
| author_role | aut aut |
| author_sort | Desai, Mihir A. 1968- |
| author_variant | m a d ma mad r j y rj rjy |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV023591341 |
| callnumber-first | H - Social Science |
| callnumber-label | HB1 |
| callnumber-raw | HB1 |
| callnumber-search | HB1 |
| callnumber-sort | HB 11 |
| callnumber-subject | HB - Economic Theory and Demography |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)58045449 (DE-599)BVBBV023591341 |
| dewey-full | 330.072 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 330 - Economics |
| dewey-raw | 330.072 |
| dewey-search | 330.072 |
| dewey-sort | 3330.072 |
| dewey-tens | 330 - Economics |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| discipline_str_mv | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| format | Book |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>02242nam a2200385zcb4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV023591341</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20100222 </controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">051020s2005 xxu |||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)58045449</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV023591341</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="044" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">xxu</subfield><subfield code="c">XD-US</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-521</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-19</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="050" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">HB1</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">330.072</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Desai, Mihir A.</subfield><subfield code="d">1968-</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)128956798</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Constraining managers without owners</subfield><subfield code="b">governance of the not-for-profit enterprise</subfield><subfield code="c">Mihir A. Desai ; Robert J. Yetman</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Cambridge, Mass.</subfield><subfield code="b">National Bureau of Economic Research</subfield><subfield code="c">2005</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">37, [2] S.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series</subfield><subfield code="v">11140</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1="3" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">"In the absence of owners, how effective are the constraints imposed by the state in promoting effective firm governance? This paper develops state-level indices of the legal and reporting rules facing not-for-profits and examines the effects of these rules on not-for-profit behavior. Stronger non-distribution constraints are associated with greater charitable expenditures and foundation payouts while more stringent reporting requirements are associated with lower insider compensation. The paper also examines how governance influences an alternative metric of not-for-profit performance -- the provision of social insurance. Stronger governance measures are associated with intertemporal smoothing of resources and greater activity in response to negative economic shocks"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Recht</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Corporate governance</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Nonprofit organizations</subfield><subfield code="x">Law and legislation</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Yetman, Robert J.</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)130466379</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Erscheint auch als</subfield><subfield code="n">Online-Ausgabe</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="830" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series</subfield><subfield code="v">11140</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-604)BV002801238</subfield><subfield code="9">11140</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="1"><subfield code="u">http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11140.pdf</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016906671</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV023591341 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T22:41:28Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:25:10Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016906671 |
| oclc_num | 58045449 |
| open_access_boolean | 1 |
| owner | DE-521 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM |
| owner_facet | DE-521 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM |
| physical | 37, [2] S. |
| publishDate | 2005 |
| publishDateSearch | 2005 |
| publishDateSort | 2005 |
| publisher | National Bureau of Economic Research |
| record_format | marc |
| series | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| series2 | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| spelling | Desai, Mihir A. 1968- Verfasser (DE-588)128956798 aut Constraining managers without owners governance of the not-for-profit enterprise Mihir A. Desai ; Robert J. Yetman Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2005 37, [2] S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 11140 "In the absence of owners, how effective are the constraints imposed by the state in promoting effective firm governance? This paper develops state-level indices of the legal and reporting rules facing not-for-profits and examines the effects of these rules on not-for-profit behavior. Stronger non-distribution constraints are associated with greater charitable expenditures and foundation payouts while more stringent reporting requirements are associated with lower insider compensation. The paper also examines how governance influences an alternative metric of not-for-profit performance -- the provision of social insurance. Stronger governance measures are associated with intertemporal smoothing of resources and greater activity in response to negative economic shocks"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. Recht Corporate governance Nonprofit organizations Law and legislation Yetman, Robert J. Verfasser (DE-588)130466379 aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 11140 (DE-604)BV002801238 11140 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11140.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Desai, Mihir A. 1968- Yetman, Robert J. Constraining managers without owners governance of the not-for-profit enterprise National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series Recht Corporate governance Nonprofit organizations Law and legislation |
| title | Constraining managers without owners governance of the not-for-profit enterprise |
| title_auth | Constraining managers without owners governance of the not-for-profit enterprise |
| title_exact_search | Constraining managers without owners governance of the not-for-profit enterprise |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Constraining managers without owners governance of the not-for-profit enterprise |
| title_full | Constraining managers without owners governance of the not-for-profit enterprise Mihir A. Desai ; Robert J. Yetman |
| title_fullStr | Constraining managers without owners governance of the not-for-profit enterprise Mihir A. Desai ; Robert J. Yetman |
| title_full_unstemmed | Constraining managers without owners governance of the not-for-profit enterprise Mihir A. Desai ; Robert J. Yetman |
| title_short | Constraining managers without owners |
| title_sort | constraining managers without owners governance of the not for profit enterprise |
| title_sub | governance of the not-for-profit enterprise |
| topic | Recht Corporate governance Nonprofit organizations Law and legislation |
| topic_facet | Recht Corporate governance Nonprofit organizations Law and legislation |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11140.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT desaimihira constrainingmanagerswithoutownersgovernanceofthenotforprofitenterprise AT yetmanrobertj constrainingmanagerswithoutownersgovernanceofthenotforprofitenterprise |