Social security privatization with elastic labor supply and second-best taxes:
"This paper shows that many common methods of privatizing social security fail to reduce labor market distortions when taxes are second best, challenging a key reason to privatize. Ironically, providing "transition relief" to workers alive at the time of the reform, in an effort to pr...
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
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Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2005
|
Schriftenreihe: | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series
11101 |
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | kostenfrei |
Zusammenfassung: | "This paper shows that many common methods of privatizing social security fail to reduce labor market distortions when taxes are second best, challenging a key reason to privatize. Ironically, providing "transition relief" to workers alive at the time of the reform, in an effort to protect their previous contributions, undercuts potential efficiency gains. Chile's reform -- the first major privatization that also served as a model for other countries -- actually increased labor market distortions. It is then shown that privatization with limited transition relief can reduce labor market distortions and produce gains to current and future generations without hurting initial retirees, i.e., a Pareto gain, even with second-best taxes"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. |
Beschreibung: | 26 S. |
Internformat
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650 | 4 | |a Soziale Sicherheit | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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author | Smetters, Kent A. |
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id | DE-604.BV023591316 |
illustrated | Not Illustrated |
index_date | 2024-07-02T22:41:28Z |
indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:25:10Z |
institution | BVB |
language | English |
oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016906646 |
oclc_num | 57702882 |
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physical | 26 S. |
publishDate | 2005 |
publishDateSearch | 2005 |
publishDateSort | 2005 |
publisher | National Bureau of Economic Research |
record_format | marc |
series | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
series2 | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
spelling | Smetters, Kent A. Verfasser (DE-588)12408429X aut Social security privatization with elastic labor supply and second-best taxes Kent Smetters Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2005 26 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 11101 "This paper shows that many common methods of privatizing social security fail to reduce labor market distortions when taxes are second best, challenging a key reason to privatize. Ironically, providing "transition relief" to workers alive at the time of the reform, in an effort to protect their previous contributions, undercuts potential efficiency gains. Chile's reform -- the first major privatization that also served as a model for other countries -- actually increased labor market distortions. It is then shown that privatization with limited transition relief can reduce labor market distortions and produce gains to current and future generations without hurting initial retirees, i.e., a Pareto gain, even with second-best taxes"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. Soziale Sicherheit Ökonometrisches Modell Social security Finance Econometric models Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 11101 (DE-604)BV002801238 11101 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11101.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
spellingShingle | Smetters, Kent A. Social security privatization with elastic labor supply and second-best taxes National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series Soziale Sicherheit Ökonometrisches Modell Social security Finance Econometric models |
title | Social security privatization with elastic labor supply and second-best taxes |
title_auth | Social security privatization with elastic labor supply and second-best taxes |
title_exact_search | Social security privatization with elastic labor supply and second-best taxes |
title_exact_search_txtP | Social security privatization with elastic labor supply and second-best taxes |
title_full | Social security privatization with elastic labor supply and second-best taxes Kent Smetters |
title_fullStr | Social security privatization with elastic labor supply and second-best taxes Kent Smetters |
title_full_unstemmed | Social security privatization with elastic labor supply and second-best taxes Kent Smetters |
title_short | Social security privatization with elastic labor supply and second-best taxes |
title_sort | social security privatization with elastic labor supply and second best taxes |
topic | Soziale Sicherheit Ökonometrisches Modell Social security Finance Econometric models |
topic_facet | Soziale Sicherheit Ökonometrisches Modell Social security Finance Econometric models |
url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11101.pdf |
volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT smetterskenta socialsecurityprivatizationwithelasticlaborsupplyandsecondbesttaxes |