The irony of reform: did large employers subvert workplace safety reform, 1869 to 1930?
"Between 1869 and the early 1900s state governments regulated safety in mines and factories and reformed the liability for accidents. Reformers sought to reduce workers' risks and ensure that those involved in accidents received reasonable medical care and compensation for lost earnings. Y...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2005
|
| Schriftenreihe: | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series
11058 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | "Between 1869 and the early 1900s state governments regulated safety in mines and factories and reformed the liability for accidents. Reformers sought to reduce workers' risks and ensure that those involved in accidents received reasonable medical care and compensation for lost earnings. Yet large employers often wielded significant clout. This paper explores the extent to which large employers, measured by average number of employees, subverted the safety reform process, including the adoption of safety legislation, its scope, and the resources devoted to enforcement. The findings vary by industry. In coal mining large employers followed a defensive strategy, limiting the breadth of regulation, pressing for regulations that were enforced more against workers than against employers, and weakening enforcement. In manufacturing, on the other hand, safety regulations were introduced earlier in states with larger average establishment sizes. Reformers may have succeeded in imposing regulations on large manufacturing employers. However, the finding is also consistent with large firms working to raise rivals' costs and the analytical narratives suggest that manufacturing employers at times shaped the legislation to their benefit and that the regulations were often poorly enforced"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. |
| Beschreibung: | 53 S. |
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| id | DE-604.BV023591249 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T22:41:28Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:25:10Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
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| spelling | Fishback, Price 1955- Verfasser (DE-588)121940608 aut The irony of reform did large employers subvert workplace safety reform, 1869 to 1930? Price Fishback Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2005 53 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 11058 "Between 1869 and the early 1900s state governments regulated safety in mines and factories and reformed the liability for accidents. Reformers sought to reduce workers' risks and ensure that those involved in accidents received reasonable medical care and compensation for lost earnings. Yet large employers often wielded significant clout. This paper explores the extent to which large employers, measured by average number of employees, subverted the safety reform process, including the adoption of safety legislation, its scope, and the resources devoted to enforcement. The findings vary by industry. In coal mining large employers followed a defensive strategy, limiting the breadth of regulation, pressing for regulations that were enforced more against workers than against employers, and weakening enforcement. In manufacturing, on the other hand, safety regulations were introduced earlier in states with larger average establishment sizes. Reformers may have succeeded in imposing regulations on large manufacturing employers. However, the finding is also consistent with large firms working to raise rivals' costs and the analytical narratives suggest that manufacturing employers at times shaped the legislation to their benefit and that the regulations were often poorly enforced"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. Geschichte Unternehmen Business enterprises Political activity United States History Industrial safety United States History USA Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 11058 (DE-604)BV002801238 11058 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11058.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Fishback, Price 1955- The irony of reform did large employers subvert workplace safety reform, 1869 to 1930? National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series Geschichte Unternehmen Business enterprises Political activity United States History Industrial safety United States History |
| title | The irony of reform did large employers subvert workplace safety reform, 1869 to 1930? |
| title_auth | The irony of reform did large employers subvert workplace safety reform, 1869 to 1930? |
| title_exact_search | The irony of reform did large employers subvert workplace safety reform, 1869 to 1930? |
| title_exact_search_txtP | The irony of reform did large employers subvert workplace safety reform, 1869 to 1930? |
| title_full | The irony of reform did large employers subvert workplace safety reform, 1869 to 1930? Price Fishback |
| title_fullStr | The irony of reform did large employers subvert workplace safety reform, 1869 to 1930? Price Fishback |
| title_full_unstemmed | The irony of reform did large employers subvert workplace safety reform, 1869 to 1930? Price Fishback |
| title_short | The irony of reform |
| title_sort | the irony of reform did large employers subvert workplace safety reform 1869 to 1930 |
| title_sub | did large employers subvert workplace safety reform, 1869 to 1930? |
| topic | Geschichte Unternehmen Business enterprises Political activity United States History Industrial safety United States History |
| topic_facet | Geschichte Unternehmen Business enterprises Political activity United States History Industrial safety United States History USA |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11058.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT fishbackprice theironyofreformdidlargeemployerssubvertworkplacesafetyreform1869to1930 |