A theory of takeovers and disinvestment:

"We present a real-options model of takeovers and disinvestment in declining industries. As product demand declines, a first-best closure level is reached, where overall value is maximized by shutting down the .rm and releasing its capital to investors. Absent takeovers, managers of unlevered f...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Lambrecht, Bart M. (Author), Myers, Stewart C. 1940- (Author)
Format: Book
Language:English
Published: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2005
Series:National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 11082
Subjects:
Online Access:Volltext
Summary:"We present a real-options model of takeovers and disinvestment in declining industries. As product demand declines, a first-best closure level is reached, where overall value is maximized by shutting down the .rm and releasing its capital to investors. Absent takeovers, managers of unlevered firms always abandon the firm's business too late. We model the managers' payout policy absent takeovers and consider the effects of golden parachutes and leverage on managers' shut-down decisions. We analyze the effects of takeovers of under-leveraged firms. Takeovers by raiders enforce first-best closure. Hostile takeovers by other firms occur either at the first-best closure point or too early. We also consider management buyouts and mergers of equals and show that in both cases closure happens inefficiently late"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Physical Description:42 S. graph. Darst.

There is no print copy available.

Interlibrary loan Place Request Caution: Not in THWS collection! Get full text