The interaction of public and private insurance: Medicaid and the long-term care insurance market
"We show that the provision of even incomplete public insurance can substantially crowd out private insurance demand. We examine the interaction of the public Medicaid program with the private market for long-term care insurance and estimate that Medicaid can explain the lack of private insuran...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2004
|
| Schriftenreihe: | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series
10989 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | "We show that the provision of even incomplete public insurance can substantially crowd out private insurance demand. We examine the interaction of the public Medicaid program with the private market for long-term care insurance and estimate that Medicaid can explain the lack of private insurance purchases for at least two-thirds and as much as 90 percent of the wealth distribution, even if comprehensive, actuarially fair private policies were available. Medicaid's large crowd out effect stems from the very large implicit tax (on the order of 60 to 75 percent for a median wealth individual) that Medicaid imposes on the benefits paid from private insurance policies. Importantly, Medicaid itself provides an inadequate mechanism for smoothing consumption for most individuals, so that its crowd out effect has important implications for overall risk exposure. An implication of our findings is that public policies designed to stimulate private insurance demand will be of limited efficacy as long as Medicaid continues to impose this large implicit tax"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. |
| Beschreibung: | 56 S. graph. Darst. |
Internformat
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| index_date | 2024-07-02T22:41:27Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:25:10Z |
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| physical | 56 S. graph. Darst. |
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| series | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| series2 | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| spelling | Brown, Jeffrey R. 1968- Verfasser (DE-588)124510701 aut The interaction of public and private insurance Medicaid and the long-term care insurance market Jeffrey R. Brown ; Amy Finkelstein Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2004 56 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 10989 "We show that the provision of even incomplete public insurance can substantially crowd out private insurance demand. We examine the interaction of the public Medicaid program with the private market for long-term care insurance and estimate that Medicaid can explain the lack of private insurance purchases for at least two-thirds and as much as 90 percent of the wealth distribution, even if comprehensive, actuarially fair private policies were available. Medicaid's large crowd out effect stems from the very large implicit tax (on the order of 60 to 75 percent for a median wealth individual) that Medicaid imposes on the benefits paid from private insurance policies. Importantly, Medicaid itself provides an inadequate mechanism for smoothing consumption for most individuals, so that its crowd out effect has important implications for overall risk exposure. An implication of our findings is that public policies designed to stimulate private insurance demand will be of limited efficacy as long as Medicaid continues to impose this large implicit tax"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. Ökonometrisches Modell Insurance, Long-Term Care United States Long-term care insurance United States Econometric models Medicaid Economic aspects Medicaid economics USA Finkelstein, Amy 1973- Verfasser (DE-588)128781688 aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 10989 (DE-604)BV002801238 10989 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w10989.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Brown, Jeffrey R. 1968- Finkelstein, Amy 1973- The interaction of public and private insurance Medicaid and the long-term care insurance market National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series Ökonometrisches Modell Insurance, Long-Term Care United States Long-term care insurance United States Econometric models Medicaid Economic aspects Medicaid economics |
| title | The interaction of public and private insurance Medicaid and the long-term care insurance market |
| title_auth | The interaction of public and private insurance Medicaid and the long-term care insurance market |
| title_exact_search | The interaction of public and private insurance Medicaid and the long-term care insurance market |
| title_exact_search_txtP | The interaction of public and private insurance Medicaid and the long-term care insurance market |
| title_full | The interaction of public and private insurance Medicaid and the long-term care insurance market Jeffrey R. Brown ; Amy Finkelstein |
| title_fullStr | The interaction of public and private insurance Medicaid and the long-term care insurance market Jeffrey R. Brown ; Amy Finkelstein |
| title_full_unstemmed | The interaction of public and private insurance Medicaid and the long-term care insurance market Jeffrey R. Brown ; Amy Finkelstein |
| title_short | The interaction of public and private insurance |
| title_sort | the interaction of public and private insurance medicaid and the long term care insurance market |
| title_sub | Medicaid and the long-term care insurance market |
| topic | Ökonometrisches Modell Insurance, Long-Term Care United States Long-term care insurance United States Econometric models Medicaid Economic aspects Medicaid economics |
| topic_facet | Ökonometrisches Modell Insurance, Long-Term Care United States Long-term care insurance United States Econometric models Medicaid Economic aspects Medicaid economics USA |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w10989.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
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