Optimal fines and auditing when wealth is costly to observe:
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2004
|
| Schriftenreihe: | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series
10760 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Beschreibung: | 17 S. |
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| index_date | 2024-07-02T22:41:27Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:25:10Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
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| publishDate | 2004 |
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| publisher | National Bureau of Economic Research |
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| series | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| series2 | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
| spelling | Polinsky, Alan Mitchell 1948- Verfasser (DE-588)128956313 aut Optimal fines and auditing when wealth is costly to observe A. Mitchell Polinsky Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2004 17 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 10760 Mathematisches Modell Costs (Law) Mathematical models Criminal justice, Administration of Fines (Penalties) Economic aspects Wealth Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 10760 (DE-604)BV002801238 10760 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w10760.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Polinsky, Alan Mitchell 1948- Optimal fines and auditing when wealth is costly to observe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series Mathematisches Modell Costs (Law) Mathematical models Criminal justice, Administration of Fines (Penalties) Economic aspects Wealth |
| title | Optimal fines and auditing when wealth is costly to observe |
| title_auth | Optimal fines and auditing when wealth is costly to observe |
| title_exact_search | Optimal fines and auditing when wealth is costly to observe |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Optimal fines and auditing when wealth is costly to observe |
| title_full | Optimal fines and auditing when wealth is costly to observe A. Mitchell Polinsky |
| title_fullStr | Optimal fines and auditing when wealth is costly to observe A. Mitchell Polinsky |
| title_full_unstemmed | Optimal fines and auditing when wealth is costly to observe A. Mitchell Polinsky |
| title_short | Optimal fines and auditing when wealth is costly to observe |
| title_sort | optimal fines and auditing when wealth is costly to observe |
| topic | Mathematisches Modell Costs (Law) Mathematical models Criminal justice, Administration of Fines (Penalties) Economic aspects Wealth |
| topic_facet | Mathematisches Modell Costs (Law) Mathematical models Criminal justice, Administration of Fines (Penalties) Economic aspects Wealth |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w10760.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT polinskyalanmitchell optimalfinesandauditingwhenwealthiscostlytoobserve |