Institutions as the fundamental cause of long-run growth:
ctive constraints on power-holders, and when there are relatively few rents to be captured by power-holders. We illustrate the assumptions, the workings and the implications of this framework using a number of historical examples.
Gespeichert in:
Hauptverfasser: | , , |
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Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2004
|
Schriftenreihe: | Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research
10481 |
Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
Zusammenfassung: | ctive constraints on power-holders, and when there are relatively few rents to be captured by power-holders. We illustrate the assumptions, the workings and the implications of this framework using a number of historical examples. |
Beschreibung: | Literaturverz. S. 81 - 92 |
Beschreibung: | 92, [17] S. graph. Darst. 22 cm |
Internformat
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245 | 1 | 0 | |a Institutions as the fundamental cause of long-run growth |c Daron Acemoglu ; Simon Johnson ; James Robinson |
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490 | 1 | |a Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research |v 10481 | |
500 | |a Literaturverz. S. 81 - 92 | ||
520 | |a ctive constraints on power-holders, and when there are relatively few rents to be captured by power-holders. We illustrate the assumptions, the workings and the implications of this framework using a number of historical examples. | ||
700 | 1 | |a Johnson, Simon |d 1963- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)128759240 |4 aut | |
700 | 1 | |a Robinson, James A. |d 1960- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)128970006 |4 aut | |
776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Online-Ausgabe |
810 | 2 | |a National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.> |t NBER working paper series |v 10481 |w (DE-604)BV002801238 |9 10481 | |
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author | Acemoglu, Daron 1967- Johnson, Simon 1963- Robinson, James A. 1960- |
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id | DE-604.BV023590856 |
illustrated | Illustrated |
index_date | 2024-07-02T22:41:27Z |
indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:25:09Z |
institution | BVB |
language | English |
oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016906186 |
oclc_num | 249608110 |
open_access_boolean | 1 |
owner | DE-521 |
owner_facet | DE-521 |
physical | 92, [17] S. graph. Darst. 22 cm |
publishDate | 2004 |
publishDateSearch | 2004 |
publishDateSort | 2004 |
publisher | National Bureau of Economic Research |
record_format | marc |
series2 | Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research |
spelling | Acemoglu, Daron 1967- Verfasser (DE-588)124929575 aut Institutions as the fundamental cause of long-run growth Daron Acemoglu ; Simon Johnson ; James Robinson Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2004 92, [17] S. graph. Darst. 22 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research 10481 Literaturverz. S. 81 - 92 ctive constraints on power-holders, and when there are relatively few rents to be captured by power-holders. We illustrate the assumptions, the workings and the implications of this framework using a number of historical examples. Johnson, Simon 1963- Verfasser (DE-588)128759240 aut Robinson, James A. 1960- Verfasser (DE-588)128970006 aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.> NBER working paper series 10481 (DE-604)BV002801238 10481 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w10481.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
spellingShingle | Acemoglu, Daron 1967- Johnson, Simon 1963- Robinson, James A. 1960- Institutions as the fundamental cause of long-run growth |
title | Institutions as the fundamental cause of long-run growth |
title_auth | Institutions as the fundamental cause of long-run growth |
title_exact_search | Institutions as the fundamental cause of long-run growth |
title_exact_search_txtP | Institutions as the fundamental cause of long-run growth |
title_full | Institutions as the fundamental cause of long-run growth Daron Acemoglu ; Simon Johnson ; James Robinson |
title_fullStr | Institutions as the fundamental cause of long-run growth Daron Acemoglu ; Simon Johnson ; James Robinson |
title_full_unstemmed | Institutions as the fundamental cause of long-run growth Daron Acemoglu ; Simon Johnson ; James Robinson |
title_short | Institutions as the fundamental cause of long-run growth |
title_sort | institutions as the fundamental cause of long run growth |
url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w10481.pdf |
volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT acemogludaron institutionsasthefundamentalcauseoflongrungrowth AT johnsonsimon institutionsasthefundamentalcauseoflongrungrowth AT robinsonjamesa institutionsasthefundamentalcauseoflongrungrowth |