Institutions as the fundamental cause of long-run growth:

ctive constraints on power-holders, and when there are relatively few rents to be captured by power-holders. We illustrate the assumptions, the workings and the implications of this framework using a number of historical examples.

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Hauptverfasser: Acemoglu, Daron 1967- (VerfasserIn), Johnson, Simon 1963- (VerfasserIn), Robinson, James A. 1960- (VerfasserIn)
Format: Buch
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2004
Schriftenreihe:Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research 10481
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Zusammenfassung:ctive constraints on power-holders, and when there are relatively few rents to be captured by power-holders. We illustrate the assumptions, the workings and the implications of this framework using a number of historical examples.
Beschreibung:Literaturverz. S. 81 - 92
Beschreibung:92, [17] S. graph. Darst. 22 cm

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