Categorial redistribution in winner-take-all markets:

This paper constructs a simple model of pair-wise tournament competition to investigate categorical redistribution in winner-take-all markets. We consider two forms of redistribution: category-sighted, where employers are allowed to use categorical information in pursuit of their redistributive goal...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Hauptverfasser: Fryer, Roland G. Jr. 1977- (VerfasserIn), Loury, Glenn C. 1948- (VerfasserIn)
Format: Buch
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2003
Schriftenreihe:National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 10104
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Zusammenfassung:This paper constructs a simple model of pair-wise tournament competition to investigate categorical redistribution in winner-take-all markets. We consider two forms of redistribution: category-sighted, where employers are allowed to use categorical information in pursuit of their redistributive goals; and category-blind, where they are not. It is shown that the equilibrium category-sighted redistribution scheme involves a constant handicap given to agents in the disadvantaged category. Equilibrium category-blind redistribution creates a unique semi-separating equilibrium in which a large pool of contestants exerts zero effort, and this pool is increasing in the aggressiveness of the redistribution goal.
Beschreibung:26 S. graph. Darst.

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