Public finance and individual preferences over globalization strategies:
"In the absence of distortionary tax and spending policies, freer immigration and trade for a country would often be supported by similar groups thanks to similar impacts on labor income. But government policies that redistribute income may alter the distributional politics. In particular, immi...
Gespeichert in:
Hauptverfasser: | , , |
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Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2005
|
Schriftenreihe: | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series
11028 |
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
Zusammenfassung: | "In the absence of distortionary tax and spending policies, freer immigration and trade for a country would often be supported by similar groups thanks to similar impacts on labor income. But government policies that redistribute income may alter the distributional politics. In particular, immigrants may pay taxes and receive public services. Imports, obviously, can do neither of these. This suggests quite different political coalitions may organize around trade and immigration. In this paper we develop a framework for examining how pre-tax and post-tax cleavages may differ across globalization strategies and also fiscal jurisdictions. We then apply this framework to the case of individual immigration and trade preferences across U.S. states. We have two main findings. First, high exposure to immigrant fiscal pressures reduces support for freer immigration among natives, especially the more-skilled. Second, there is no public-finance variation in opinion over trade policy, consistent with the data that U.S. trade policy has negligible fiscal-policy impacts. Public-finance concerns appear to be crucial in shaping opinions towards alternative globalization strategies"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. |
Beschreibung: | 46 S. graph. Darst. |
Internformat
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520 | 3 | |a "In the absence of distortionary tax and spending policies, freer immigration and trade for a country would often be supported by similar groups thanks to similar impacts on labor income. But government policies that redistribute income may alter the distributional politics. In particular, immigrants may pay taxes and receive public services. Imports, obviously, can do neither of these. This suggests quite different political coalitions may organize around trade and immigration. In this paper we develop a framework for examining how pre-tax and post-tax cleavages may differ across globalization strategies and also fiscal jurisdictions. We then apply this framework to the case of individual immigration and trade preferences across U.S. states. We have two main findings. First, high exposure to immigrant fiscal pressures reduces support for freer immigration among natives, especially the more-skilled. Second, there is no public-finance variation in opinion over trade policy, consistent with the data that U.S. trade policy has negligible fiscal-policy impacts. Public-finance concerns appear to be crucial in shaping opinions towards alternative globalization strategies"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. | |
650 | 4 | |a Globalisierung | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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id | DE-604.BV023588784 |
illustrated | Illustrated |
index_date | 2024-07-02T22:41:24Z |
indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:25:05Z |
institution | BVB |
language | English |
oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016904116 |
oclc_num | 57569430 |
open_access_boolean | 1 |
owner | DE-521 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM |
owner_facet | DE-521 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM |
physical | 46 S. graph. Darst. |
publishDate | 2005 |
publishDateSearch | 2005 |
publishDateSort | 2005 |
publisher | National Bureau of Economic Research |
record_format | marc |
series | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
series2 | National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series |
spelling | Hanson, Gordon H. 1964- Verfasser (DE-588)12873325X aut Public finance and individual preferences over globalization strategies Gordon H. Hanson ; Kenneth F. Scheve ; Matthew J. Slaughter Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2005 46 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 11028 "In the absence of distortionary tax and spending policies, freer immigration and trade for a country would often be supported by similar groups thanks to similar impacts on labor income. But government policies that redistribute income may alter the distributional politics. In particular, immigrants may pay taxes and receive public services. Imports, obviously, can do neither of these. This suggests quite different political coalitions may organize around trade and immigration. In this paper we develop a framework for examining how pre-tax and post-tax cleavages may differ across globalization strategies and also fiscal jurisdictions. We then apply this framework to the case of individual immigration and trade preferences across U.S. states. We have two main findings. First, high exposure to immigrant fiscal pressures reduces support for freer immigration among natives, especially the more-skilled. Second, there is no public-finance variation in opinion over trade policy, consistent with the data that U.S. trade policy has negligible fiscal-policy impacts. Public-finance concerns appear to be crucial in shaping opinions towards alternative globalization strategies"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. Globalisierung Migration Politik Commercial policy Emigration and immigration Government policy Globalization Political aspects Scheve, Kenneth F. Verfasser (DE-588)12455217X aut Slaughter, Matthew J. Verfasser (DE-588)128733276 aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series 11028 (DE-604)BV002801238 11028 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11028.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
spellingShingle | Hanson, Gordon H. 1964- Scheve, Kenneth F. Slaughter, Matthew J. Public finance and individual preferences over globalization strategies National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.>: NBER working paper series Globalisierung Migration Politik Commercial policy Emigration and immigration Government policy Globalization Political aspects |
title | Public finance and individual preferences over globalization strategies |
title_auth | Public finance and individual preferences over globalization strategies |
title_exact_search | Public finance and individual preferences over globalization strategies |
title_exact_search_txtP | Public finance and individual preferences over globalization strategies |
title_full | Public finance and individual preferences over globalization strategies Gordon H. Hanson ; Kenneth F. Scheve ; Matthew J. Slaughter |
title_fullStr | Public finance and individual preferences over globalization strategies Gordon H. Hanson ; Kenneth F. Scheve ; Matthew J. Slaughter |
title_full_unstemmed | Public finance and individual preferences over globalization strategies Gordon H. Hanson ; Kenneth F. Scheve ; Matthew J. Slaughter |
title_short | Public finance and individual preferences over globalization strategies |
title_sort | public finance and individual preferences over globalization strategies |
topic | Globalisierung Migration Politik Commercial policy Emigration and immigration Government policy Globalization Political aspects |
topic_facet | Globalisierung Migration Politik Commercial policy Emigration and immigration Government policy Globalization Political aspects |
url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11028.pdf |
volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
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