Three essays on information and incentives:
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
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Format: | Abschlussarbeit Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Aachen
Shaker
2003
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Schriftenreihe: | Berichte aus der Volkswirtschaft
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Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
Beschreibung: | II, 118 S. |
ISBN: | 3832213333 |
Internformat
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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adam_text | BERICHTE AUS DER VOLKSWIRTSCHAFT JURGEN BIERBAUM THREE ESSAYS ON
INFORMATION AND INCENTIVES SHAKER VERLAG AACHEN 2003 CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 1 1 INFORMATION ACQUISITION AND RISK MANAGEMENT 5 1.1 THE
MODEL 10 1.2 FULL OBSERVABILITY 14 1.3 MORAL HAZARD AND HIDDEN
INFORMATION 16 1.3.1 OPTIMAL IMPLEMENTATION OF GIVEN EFFORT 17 1.3.2
AGENCY COSTS AND OPTIMAL EFFORT 26 1.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 28 1.5
APPENDIX 30 2 REPEATED MORAL HAZARD UNDER LIMITED LIABILITY 47 2.1
THEMODEL 51 2.2 OPTIMAL CONTRACTS 53 2.2.1 ONE-PERIOD CONTRACTS 53 2.2.2
NON-CONTINGENT TWO-PERIOD CONTRACTS 55 2.2.3 CONTINGENT TWO-PERIOD
CONTRACTS 59 2.3 COMBINATIONS OF CONTRACTS 63 2.4 AN EXTENSION:
LEARNING BY DOING 65 2.5 LONG-TERM VS. SHORT-TERM CONTRACTING 68 2.6
CONCLUDING REMARKS 71 2.7 APPENDIX 73 2.7.1 AN EXTENSION OF CHAPTER 1 73
2.7.2 PROOFS 75 3 SELLING SHARES TO RETAIL INVESTORS: AUCTION VS. FIXED
PRICE 81 3.1 THE MODEL 84 3.2 UNIFORM PRICE AUCTION 86 3.3 FIXED PRICE
PLUS PROPORTIONAL RATIONING 88 3.3.1 THE GAME 89 3.3.2 BEST RESPONSE 91
II CONTENTS 3.3.3 EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS 92 3.3.4 COMPARATIVE STATICS 97
3.4 AUCTION VERSUS PROPORTIONAL RATIONING 98 3.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 102
3.6 APPENDIX 104 FINAL REMARKS 111 REFERENCES 113 ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 117
|
adam_txt |
BERICHTE AUS DER VOLKSWIRTSCHAFT JURGEN BIERBAUM THREE ESSAYS ON
INFORMATION AND INCENTIVES SHAKER VERLAG AACHEN 2003 CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 1 1 INFORMATION ACQUISITION AND RISK MANAGEMENT 5 1.1 THE
MODEL 10 1.2 FULL OBSERVABILITY 14 1.3 MORAL HAZARD AND HIDDEN
INFORMATION 16 1.3.1 OPTIMAL IMPLEMENTATION OF GIVEN EFFORT 17 1.3.2
AGENCY COSTS AND OPTIMAL EFFORT 26 1.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 28 1.5
APPENDIX 30 2 REPEATED MORAL HAZARD UNDER LIMITED LIABILITY 47 2.1
THEMODEL 51 2.2 OPTIMAL CONTRACTS 53 2.2.1 ONE-PERIOD CONTRACTS 53 2.2.2
NON-CONTINGENT TWO-PERIOD CONTRACTS 55 2.2.3 CONTINGENT TWO-PERIOD
CONTRACTS 59 2.3 COMBINATIONS OF CONTRACTS 63 2.4 AN EXTENSION:
"LEARNING BY DOING" 65 2.5 LONG-TERM VS. SHORT-TERM CONTRACTING 68 2.6
CONCLUDING REMARKS 71 2.7 APPENDIX 73 2.7.1 AN EXTENSION OF CHAPTER 1 73
2.7.2 PROOFS 75 3 SELLING SHARES TO RETAIL INVESTORS: AUCTION VS. FIXED
PRICE 81 3.1 THE MODEL 84 3.2 UNIFORM PRICE AUCTION 86 3.3 FIXED PRICE
PLUS PROPORTIONAL RATIONING 88 3.3.1 THE GAME 89 3.3.2 BEST RESPONSE 91
II CONTENTS 3.3.3 EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS 92 3.3.4 COMPARATIVE STATICS 97
3.4 AUCTION VERSUS PROPORTIONAL RATIONING 98 3.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 102
3.6 APPENDIX 104 FINAL REMARKS 111 REFERENCES 113 ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 117 |
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discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
discipline_str_mv | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
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isbn | 3832213333 |
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series2 | Berichte aus der Volkswirtschaft |
spelling | Bierbaum, Jürgen Verfasser aut Three essays on information and incentives Jürgen Bierbaum Aachen Shaker 2003 II, 118 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Berichte aus der Volkswirtschaft Zugl.: Berlin, Humboldt-Univ., Diss., 2003 Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 gnd rswk-swf Anreiz (DE-588)4133767-0 gnd rswk-swf Mathematisches Modell (DE-588)4114528-8 gnd rswk-swf Moral Hazard (DE-588)4322425-8 gnd rswk-swf Kontrakttheorie (DE-588)4128260-7 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4113937-9 Hochschulschrift gnd-content Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 s Anreiz (DE-588)4133767-0 s Kontrakttheorie (DE-588)4128260-7 s Moral Hazard (DE-588)4322425-8 s Mathematisches Modell (DE-588)4114528-8 s DE-604 GBV Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016848716&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
spellingShingle | Bierbaum, Jürgen Three essays on information and incentives Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 gnd Anreiz (DE-588)4133767-0 gnd Mathematisches Modell (DE-588)4114528-8 gnd Moral Hazard (DE-588)4322425-8 gnd Kontrakttheorie (DE-588)4128260-7 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4126353-4 (DE-588)4133767-0 (DE-588)4114528-8 (DE-588)4322425-8 (DE-588)4128260-7 (DE-588)4113937-9 |
title | Three essays on information and incentives |
title_auth | Three essays on information and incentives |
title_exact_search | Three essays on information and incentives |
title_exact_search_txtP | Three essays on information and incentives |
title_full | Three essays on information and incentives Jürgen Bierbaum |
title_fullStr | Three essays on information and incentives Jürgen Bierbaum |
title_full_unstemmed | Three essays on information and incentives Jürgen Bierbaum |
title_short | Three essays on information and incentives |
title_sort | three essays on information and incentives |
topic | Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 gnd Anreiz (DE-588)4133767-0 gnd Mathematisches Modell (DE-588)4114528-8 gnd Moral Hazard (DE-588)4322425-8 gnd Kontrakttheorie (DE-588)4128260-7 gnd |
topic_facet | Agency-Theorie Anreiz Mathematisches Modell Moral Hazard Kontrakttheorie Hochschulschrift |
url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016848716&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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