Theosophy: 1 The problem of ontology being-as-one
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
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Durham
Rosmini House
2007
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| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | XXVI, 752 S. 22 cm |
| ISBN: | 9781899093755 |
Internformat
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804137904692264960 |
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| adam_text | CONTENTS PREFACE. SELF-EVIDENT IDEOLOGIE AL PRINEIPLES REEEIVE, IN
THEOSOPHY, FURTHER EXPLANATION WHEN SEEN FOUNDED IN SUBSISTENT BEING 1
I. TWO PARTS OF METAPHYSICS: PSYCHOLOGY AND THEOSOPHY 2 11. THEOSOPHY IS
PURE SCIENCE, NOT PRACTICAL SCIENCE 3 111. IMMODERATE SPECULATION 6 IV.
THEOSOPHICAL PHILOSOPHY STANDS ON ITS OWN, TAKES NOTH- ING FROM OTHER
SCIENCES AND EXCLUDES EVERY HYPO THESIS 8 V. HOW THEOSOPHY DIFFERS FROM
OTHER SEIENCES 9 VI. HOW THEOSOPHY DIFFERS FROM OTHER PHILOSOPHIE AL
SCI- ENCES. REGRESSIVE AND PROGRESSIVE PHILOSOPHY 10 VII. THREE
PRINCIPLES OF WHAT IS HUMANLY KNOWABLE: THE IDEAL, THE MATERIAL, AND THE
ABSOLUTE PRINCIPLES 11 VIII. HEGEL S ERROR IN METHOD WAS TO BEGIN FROM
THE MATERIAL PRINCIPLE, WHICH HE GRATUITOUSLY MADE THE ABSOLUTE
PRINCIPLE 13 IX. PHILOSOPHY AND THE SYSTEM OF WHAT IS KNOWABLE MUST
BEGIN FROM THE IDEAL PRINCIPLE 14 X. BEFORE WE BEGIN TO PHILOSOPHISE,
OUR STATE IS ONE OF ORDIN- ARY KNOWLEDGE AND METHODICAL IGNORANCE, NOT
OF DOUBT 16 XI. PHILOSOPHY DOES NOT BEGIN WITH REASONING, BUT WITH
OBSERVATIONAL REFLECTION, THAT IS, WITH TOTALLY DIRECT KNOW- LEDGE
WITHOUT ANY SUPPOSITION 17 XII. IDEOLOGY IS THE SCIENCE WHICH
ESTABLISHES THE STARTING POINT; PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC FURNISH THE
MATERIAL AND FOR- MAL CONDITIONS OF THEOSOPHY 18 XIII. PHILOSOPHICAL
SCIENCES PRIOR TO THEOSOPHY USE DIRECT REASONING; THEOSOPHY USES
CIRCULAR BUT NOT VICIOUSLY CIRCU- LAR REASONING 19 XIV. CONTINUATION -
THE THREE PARTS OF THEOSOPHY: ONTO- LOGY, THEOLOGY, COSMOLOGY 20 XV.
PRIOR SCIENCES CAN BE CALLED COMMON SCIENCES; THEOSOPHY, ARCANE SCIENCE
23 XIV CONTENTS PART ONE ONTOLOGY THE PROBLEM OF ONTOLOGY A SINGLE BOOK,
SERVING AS INTRODUCTION TO ONTOLOGY PREAMBLE 33 CHAPTER 1. THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ONTOLOGY AND RATIONAL THEOLOGY, EOSMOLOGY AND
IDEOLOGY ARTICLE 1. ONTOLOGY PREEEDES AND MUST BE DISTINGUISHED FROM
RATIONAL THEOLOGY 34 ARTICLE 2. ONTOLOGY MUST PRECEDE COSMOLOGY BECAUSE
IT IS NEC- ESSARY FOR THE PERFEET KNOWLEDGE OF FINITE ENS 35 ARTICLE 3.
THE CHARACTERISTIC DIFFERENCE BETWEEN IDEOLOGY AND ONTOLOGY RELATIVE TO
THE MATTER OF THESE TWO SCIENCES 37 ARTICLE 4. THE CHARACTERISTIC
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ONTOLOGY AND RATIONAL THEOLOGY RELATIVE TO THE MATTER
OF THESE TWO SCIENCES 38 CHAPTER 2. THE FIRST FORM OF THE ONTOLOGICAL
PROBLEM: HOW TO REEONCILE THE APPARENT MODES OF ENS WITH THE EONEEPT OF
BEING . AT WHAT STAGE OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT DOES THIS PROB- LEM PRESENT
ITSELF TO THE MIND? 42 CHAPTER 3. THE SEEOND FORM OF THE ONTOLOGIEAL
PROBLEM IS: TO FIND THE SUFFICIENT REASON FOR THE VARIOUS
MANIFESTATIONS OF ENS ARTICLE 1. WHY THE UNDERSTANDING REQUIRES A
SUFFICIENT REASON FOR THE DIFFERENT MANIFESTATIONS OF ENS 46 ARTICLE 2.
THE SUFFICIENT REASON FOR THE MANIFESTATIONS OF ENS MUST, IF IT IS TO
SATISFY OUR UNDERSTANDING, BE ONE, NECESSARY AND OBJECTIVE 47 CHAPTER 4.
THE THIRD FORM OF THE ONTOLOGIE AL PROBLEM: TO FIND AN EQUATION BETWEEN
INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE AND KNOW- LEDGE BY PREDICATION 52 CHAPTER 5. THE
FOURTH FORM OF THE ONTOLOGIE AL PROBLEM IS: HOW TO REEONCILE THE
ANTINOMIES APPARENT IN HUMAN THOUGHT ARTICLE 1. WHENEVER INTUITIVE AND
PREDICATIVE KNOWLEDGE ARE CONTENTS XV NOT SEEN TO FORM AN EQUATION, AN
ANTINOMY REMALNS IN ONTOLOGY 54 ARTICLE 2. WE FIND THE ONTOLOGICAL
PROBLEM IN THE REAL WORLD, THE IDEAL WORLD AND THE MORAL WORLD 58
CHAPTER 6. THE FIFTH FORM OF THE ONTOLOGICAL PROBLEM: WHAT IS ENS AND
WHAT IS NON-ENS? 61 CHAPTER 7. SUMMARY OF THE FORMULAE IN WHICH THE
ONTOLO- GICAL PROBLEM IS PRESENTED 63 CHAPTER 8. THE POSSIBILITY OF
PROVIDING ONTOLOGY WITH A LOGICAL START 65 CHAPTER 9. THE STRUCTURE OF
REASONING USED BY THE STUDENT OF ONTOLOGY 68 CHAPTER 10. ONTOLOGICAL
REASONING PROCEEDS IN A CIRCLE, BUT NOT A VICIOUS CIRCLE 73 CHAPTER 11.
DIVISION OF ONTOLOGY 77 ONTOLOGY 79 BOOKONE THE CATEGORIES CHAPTER 1.
THE DIFFICULTY OF FINDING A CLASSIFICATION WHICH INCLUDES ALL THE
VARIETIES OF BEING 86 CHAPTER 2. THE ANCIENTS WERE IN PART FAMILIAR WITH
THE ABOVE DIFFICULTY, WHICH THEY ENCOUNTERED IN THE COURSE OF THEIR
SPECULATIONS ARTICLE 1. THE FIRST FORM IN WHICH THE DIFFICULTY APPEARED
TO THE ANCIENTS: THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN WHAT IS REAL AND WHAT IS IDEAL
HAS NO PLACE IN THE GENERA OF ENTIA 92 ARTICLE 2. THE SECOND FORM OF THE
SAME DIFFICULTY FOR THE ANCIENTS: DID THE CATEGORIES CLASSIFY THE
PRINCIPLES OF ENTIA OR THE ENTIA THEMSELVES? 93 ARTICLE 3. THE THIRD AND
MORE DIRECT FORM IN WHICH THE DIFFI- CULTY WAS SEEN: ENS IS OUTSIDE
EVERY GENUS 97 XV! CONTENTS CHAPTER 3. THE NAME CATEGORIES 100 CHAPTER
4. SOME RELEVANT QUESTIONS INSUFFICIENTLY DISTIN- GUISHED BY THE ANCIENT
PHILOSOPHERS 104 CHAPTER 5. THE QUESTION CONCERNING PRINCIPLES OR CAUSES
OF ENTITIES 106 CHAPTER 6. QUESTION CONCERNING ELEMENTS 109 CHAPTER 7.
QUESTION CONCERNING THE GENERA OF ENTIA 111 CHAPTER 8. QUESTION
CONCERNING THE CLASSES OF ENTIA 114 CHAPTER 9. QUESTION CONCERNING THE
PRIMAL FORMS OF BEING 117 CHAPTER 10. HOW THE FIRST CLASSES OF ENS, THAT
IS, THE FIRST PRINCIPLES, FIRST ELEMENTS AND FIRST GENERA, ARE REDUCED
TO THE THREE FORMS 119 CHAPTER 11. THE THREE FORMS OF BEING TRULY
PROVIDE THE CAT- EGORIES OF BEING 121 CHAPTER 12. REFUTATION OF THE
UNITARIANS; CONFIRMATION OF WH AT HAS BEEN SAID 123 CHAPTER 12
(CONTINUED). REFUTATION OF THE UNITARIANS; CON- FIRMATION OF WHAT HAS
BEEN SAID 128 CHAPTER 13. THE FALSE ROAD TAKEN BY SOME PHILOSOPHERS TO
SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF ONTOLOGY 138 CHAPTER 14. THE SUFFICIENT REASON FOR
THE THREE CATEGORIES AND FORMS OF BEING 140 CHAPTER 15. OBJECTIONS
ARTICLE 1. FIRST OBJECTION: DISTINCTIONS CAN BE FOUND ONLY IN THE BEING
WE KNOW 145 ARTICLE 2. SECOND OBJECTION: RATIONAL ENTIA DO NOT SEEM TO
BE INCLUDED IN THE THREE CATEGORIES 148 ARTICLE 3. THIRD OBJECTION: IT
WOULD SEEM THAT THE THREE FORMS OF BEING CANNOT BE CATEGORIES OF BEING
ITSELF 149 CHAPTER 16. THE ERROR OF PHILOSOPHERS WHO RANK SPACE AND TIME
AMONG THE CATEGORIES 151 CONTENTS XVLL CHAPTER17. HOW ONE FORM OF BEING
IS DISTINGUISHED FROM THE OTHER. THE RECIPROCAL INSESSION OF THE THREE
FORMS 153 CHAPTER18. THE TEACHING ABOUT CONTAINER AND CONTENT, UNI-
VERSALLY SPEAKING 156 CHAPTER19. WHY THE TRINITY OF SUPREME FORMS DOES
NOT REMOVE THE UNITY OF BEING 160 CHAPTER20. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THIS
BOOK AND THOSE THAT FOLLOW: THE TRINITY IS THE BASIS AND MYSTERIOUS
FOUNDA- TION OF THEOSOPHY ARTICLE 1. CONNECTION WITH THE BOOKS THAT
FOLLOW 161 ARTICLE 2. THE THREE FORMS OF BEING ARE NOT THE DIVINE
TRINITY BUT SOMETHING WHICH IS ANALOGICALLY REFERRED TO IT 161 ARTICLE
3. THE TEACHING ABOUT THE DIVINE TRINITY CAN AND MUST BE ACCEPTED IN
PHILOSOPHY 163 ARTICLE 4. POSTULATES NECESSARY FOR THE PHILOSOPHICAL
INVESTIGA- TIONS OF THE BOOKS THAT FOLLOW 165 BOOKTWO BEING-AS-ONE
PREAMBLE SECTION ONE THE LANGUAGE OF ONTOLOGY 169 CHAPTER1. THE NEED TO
DISTINGUISH ACCURATELY THE MEANING OF SOME WORDS USED IN ONTOLOGY 173
CHAPTER2. THE DIALECTICAL CAUSES OF THE MULTIPLE MEANINGS OF BEING ,
AND OF OTHER WORDS REFERRING TO BEING 175 CHAPTER3. THE MEANINGS OF
BEING AND OF OTHER WORDS USED IN ONTOLOGY ARTICLE 1. DEFINITIONS 179
ARTICLE 2. BEING OF INTUITION, VIRTUAL BEING, INITIAL, ABSTRACT AND
IDEAL BEING 179 ARTICLE 3. THE MEANINGS OF ENS 182 ARTICLE 4. THE
MEANING OF ENTITY AND THING 185 ARTICLE 5. THE MEANING OF ESSENCE
186 ARTICLE 6. THE MEANING OF SUBJECT AND PREDICATE 192 XV111
CONTENTS SECTION TWO THE SYSTEM OF DIALECTICAL UNITY CHAPTER 1. THE NEED
WHICH HUMAN INTELLIGENCE HAS TO REDUCE ALL THAT IS KNOWABLE TO ONE
PRINCIPLE, AND HOW THE FAIL- URE TO DEFINE SUFFICIENTLY THE MEANING OF
WORDS HAS RESULTED IN MANY ERRONEOUS SYSTEMS ARTICLE 1. THE ANTINOMY
BETWEEN THE UNITY AND PLURALITY OF BEING IS SOLVED ONLY BY A DIALECTICAL
DISTINCTION OF CONCEPTS 194 ARTICLE 2. THE ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS AND THE
PROBLEM OF THE UNITY AND PLURALITY OF BEING 195 ARTICLE 3. WHY FICHTE
WAS UNABLE TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF THE UNITY AND PLURALITY OF BEING 196
ARTICLE 4. SCHELLING S TREATMENT OF THE PROBLEM OF THE UNITY AND
PLURALITY OF BEING § 1. SCHELLING POSITS THE PROBLEM INCORRECTLY 197 §2.
SCHELLING POSITS INCORRECTLY THE CONDITIONS FOR THE SOLU- TION OF THE
PROBLEM 201 §3. FICHTE S AND SCHELLING S SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM IS NOT
SATISFACTORY 208 ARTICLE 5. HOW TO SATISFY THE MIND S NEED FOR UNITY 214
ARTICLE 6. EXPLANATION OF THE ERRORS OF SCHELLING AND HIS DIS- CIPLE,
HEGE! 218 CHAPTER 2. SYSTEM OF DIALECTICAL IDENTITY ARTICLE 1. BRIEF
EXPOSITION OF THE SYSTEM 223 ARTICLE 2. HOW BEING IS THE FIRST
DETERMINABLE, THE COMMON DETERMINANT AND THE ULTIMATE DETERMINATION OF
EVERY ENTITY 228 ARTICLE 3. INITIAL BEING IS THE PRINCIPLE OF WHAT IS
KNOWABLE, AND THE DIALECTICAL BEGINNING OF ALL THINGS 231 ARTICLE 4. THE
PART OF ENS WHICH CORRESPONDS WITH INITIAL BEING 236 §1. THE QUESTION IS
RESOLVED RELATIVE TO CONTINGENT ENS 237 §2. THE QUESTION IS RESOLVED
RELATIVE TO NECESSARY ENS 240 ARTICLE 5. IMPORTANT COROLLARIES. THREE
IMPORTANT COROLLARIES FROM WHAT HAS BEEN SAID §1. FIRST COROLLARY, THE
APRIORI DEMONSTRATION OF THE EXIST- ENCE OFGOD (NE, 3: 1456-1460;
SISTEMA, 178) 244 §2. SECOND COROLLARY: THE APRIORI DEMONSTRATION OF
CREATION 248 §3. THIRD COROLLARY: THE IMPERFECT GRASP OF THE CREATIVE
ACT ON THE OCCASION OF INTELLECTIVE PERCEPTION 253 ARTICLE 6. PLATO S
DIALECTIC 256 CONTENTS SECTION THREE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
BEING-AS-ONE AND ITS TERMS IN GENERAL XIX CHAPTER 1. THE INVESTIGATION
TO BE CARRIED OUT IN THIS BOOK AND THE NEXT ABOUT THE MULTIPLICITY OF
BEING ARTICLE 1. DEFINITION OF BEING IN ITSELF AS OPPOSED TO DIALECTICAL
BEING 259 ARTICLE 2. THE PRINCIPLE OF THE THEORY OF BEING-AS-ONE 260
ARTICLE 3. THE PRINCIPLE OF THE THEORY OF TRINE BEING 261 ARTICLE 4.
WHAT REMAINS TO BE DONE TO COMPLETE THE INVESTIGA- TIONS CARRIED OUT IN
THIS BOOK 262 ARTICLE 5. A COMMENT ON ONTOLOGICAL METHOD 263 CHAPTER 2.
AN INVESTIGATION ABOUT THAT WHICH BEING CONFERS ON ITS TERMS FROM THE
POINT OF VIEW OF ABSOLUTE, INFINITE ENS 265 CHAPTER 3. THE INVESTIGATION
ABOUT THAT WHICH BEING CON- FERS ON ITS TERMS FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF
FINITE ENTIA. THE ANALYSIS OF THIS INVESTIGATION 270 CHAPTER 4. THAT
WHICH IN BEING IS INCOMMUNICABLE TO FINITE REAL THINGS ARTICLE 1. THE
ORIGIN OF THE INCOMMUNICABILITY OF CERTAIN PROPERTIES OF BEING TO FINITE
REAL THINGS 271 ARTICLE 2. SIX FIRST INCOMMUNICABLE PROPERTIES OF BEING
271 ARTICLE 6. SIX OTHER PROPERTIES OF BEING, INCOMMUNICABLE TO FINITE
REAL THINGS: 1. UNIVERSALITY; 2. NECESSITY; 3. IMMUTABILITY; 4.
ETERNITY; 5. ABSOLUTE SIMPLICITY; 6. ABSOLUTE PRIMALITY 274 ARTICLE 4.
THE TWOFOLD RELATIONSHIP OF BEING TO CONTINGENT THINGS: ONE RELATIONS
HIP ARISES FROM THE COMMUNICABLE PROPERTIES, THE OTHER FROM THE
INCOMMUNICABLE PROPERTIES OF BEING 277 ARTICLE 5. THE INCOMMUNICABLE AND
COMMUNICABLE PROPERTIES OF BEING RELATIVE TO THE ESSENCES OF FINITE
THINGS 277 CHAPTER 5. THE NATURE OF THE COMMUNICATION AND CONJUNC- TION
OF BEING WITH REAL THINGS ARTICLE 1. TRIPIE RELATIONSHIP OF BEING WITH
THE REAL 279 ARTICLE 2. THE RELATIONSHIP OF IDENTITY 279 ARTICLE 3. THE
DIRECT AND INDIRECT REIATIONSHIP OF ACT-CAUSE 281 ARTICLE 4. THE DIRECT
RELATIONSHIP OF ACT-CAUSE, OR ENTIFICATION 283 ARTICLE 5. THE ANTINOMIES
FOUND BY PLATO IN HIS MEDITATION ON ENTIFICATION. A CRITIQUE OF THEM 284
XX CONTENTS ARTICLE 6. THE INDIRECT RELATIONSHIP OF ACT-CAUSE OR ACTION
295 ARTICLE 7. THE RELATIONSHIP OF SUBJECT-CAUSE 297 CHAPTER 6. DOES
BEING RECEIVE NOTHING FROM ITS CONJUNCTION WITH FINITE REAL THINGS? 298
CHAPTER7. THE PROPERTIES OF BEING, COMMUNICABLE TO FINITE REAL THINGS,
AND PREDICABLE OF THEM 303 SECTION FOUR WHAT SUBJECTIVE BEING
COMMUNICATES TO FINITE REAL THINGS CHAPTER 1. THE FIRST PROPERTY
COMMUNICATED TO FINITE REAL THINGS BY INITIAL, ACTUATING BEING IS
EXISTENCE ARTICLE 1. EXISTENCE 312 ARTICLE 2. DURATION 313 CHAPTER 2.
THE SECOND PROPERTY: INITIAL, ACTUATING BEING COMMUNICATES TO FINITE
REAL THINGS THE ACT OF THEIR ACTS 314 ARTICLE 1. CONCEPT OF POTENCY AND
ACT 314 ARTICLE 2. CONCEPT OF VIRTUALITY 315 ARTICLE 3. CLASSIFICATION
OF POTENCIES POTENCIES IN THE PROPER SENSE OF THE WORD, AND IN THE
DIALECTICAL SENSE 343 ARTICLE 4. BEING CONSIDERED AS DIALECTICAL POTENCY
343 §1. !F AND HOW BEING, CONSIDERED AS THE FIRST DETERMINABLE, IS
DIALECTICAL POTENCY - TEACHING ABOUT THE POSSIBLE 344 §2. !F AND HOW
BEING, CONSIDERED AS DETERMINANT CAUSE, IS POTENCY 348 §3. WHETHER
BEING, CONSIDERED AS ULTIMATE DETERMINATION, ISPOTENCY - THE QUESTION
CONCLUDED 351 ARTICLE 5. IS THE VIRTUALITY OF INITIAL BEING A
LIMITATION? 353 CHAPTER3. CONTINUATION - TEACHING ABOUT POSSIBLE BEING
ARTICLE 1. THE STATE OF THE QUESTION: HOW CAN BEING, AS FIRST
DETERMINABLE, BE POTENCY? 354 ARTICLE 2. GENERAL SOLUTION OF THE
QUESTION 354 ARTICLE 3. POSSIBILITY OF ENS - TEN GENERA OF POTENCIES 355
ARTICLE 4. THE POSSIBLE PREDICATE OF UNDETERMINED BEING RELA- TIVE TO
ITS PROPER AND IMPROPER TERMS 356 CONTENTS XXI ARTICLE 5. THE POSSIBLE,
PREDICATED OF THE TERMS OF BEING - ARE POSSIBLE FINITE THINGS SOMETHING
POSITIVE? LOGICAL POSSIBILITY AND METAPHYSICAL POSSIBILITY OF THESE
FINITE THINGS: THE TWO- FOLD NECESSITY OF ABSOLUTE BEING AND OF POSSIBLE
FINITE THINGS 359 CHAPTER 4. CONTINUATION. - ACT CONSIDERED IN UNDETER-
MINED BEING ARTICLE 1. A SUMMARY OF WHAT HAS BEEN SAID, AND ITS CONNEC-
TION WITH WHAT FOLLOWS 368 ARTICLE 2. HOW OPINIATIVE DIALECTICAL POTENCY
IS RECONCILED WITH THE ACTUALITY PROPER TO BEING 369 ARTICLE 3. HOW
IDEAL DIALECTICAL POTENCY IS RECONCILED WITH THE ACTUALITY OF BEING 372
ARTICLE 4. THE SENSE IN WHICH WE HAVE CALLED BEING UNIVERSAL MATTER ,
THAT IS, THE FIRST DETERMINABLE 380 CHAPTER5. IMPORTANT COROLLARIES
FROM THE PREVIOUS TEACHING 396 ARTICLE 1. FIRST COROLLARY: THE
ONTOLOGICAL REASON FOR THE PRIN- CIPLE: ONLY WHAT IS CONCEIVABLE CAN
EXIST 396 ARTICLE 2. SECOND COROLLARY: ONLY THAT CAN REALLY EXIST WHICH
IS NOT ONLY CONCEIVABLE, BUT CONCEIVED BY SOME MIND 397 ARTICLE 3. THIRD
COROLLARY: CREATION CANNOT BE CARRIED OUT EXCEPT BY GOD 398 ARTICLE 4.
FOURTH COROLLARY: THE CONCEPT AND NECESSARY EXIST- ENCE OF DIVINE
FREEDOM 399 ARTICLE 5. FIFTH COROLLARY: EMANATISM IS AN ERRONEOUS SYSTEM
400 ARTICLE 6. SIXTH COROLLARY: PANTHEISM IS AN ERRONEOUS SYSTEM 400
ARTICLE 7. SEVENTH COROLLARY: DESCRIPTION OF CREATION 401 ARTICLE 8.
EIGHTH COROLLARY: THE EXEMPLAR OF THE WORLD IS NOT THE DIVINE WORD,
ALTHOUGH THE EXEMPLAR IS FOUND IN TWO MODES IN THE WORD: 1. EMINENTLY,
2. CONSEQUENTLY 412 ARTICLE 9. NINTH COROLLARY: THE CREATED REAL IS NOT
THE DIVINE REAL 426 ARTICLE 10. THE TENTH COROLLARY: THE REAL OF FINITE
ENTIA, AS PROPER TO THEM AND PERTAINING TO THEIR SUBJECTIVE (OR
EXTRASUBJECTIVE) EXISTENCE, IS OUTSIDE GOD; BUT IT EXISTS EMI- NENTLY IN
ABSOLUTE, OBJECTIVE BEING AS OBJECT OF THE CREATING, INTELLECTIVE ACT
427 ARTICLE 11. ELEVENTH COROLLARY: IDEAL BEING, THE LIGHT OF THE HUMAN
MIND, IS NOT THE DIVINE WORD, NOR THE DIVINE ESSENCE, BUT AN
APPURTENANCE OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE . 440 ARTICLE 12. TWELFTH COROLLARY -
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INITIAL BEING AND THE REAL, THE TWO ELEMENTS OF THE
WORLD 443 XXL1 CONTENTS CHAPTER 6. THE THIRD PROPERTY WHICH BEING
COMMUNICATES TO FINITE REAL THINGS: THE INTELLIGIBILITY OF AFFIRMATION
452 SECTION FIVE WHAT OBJECTIVE BEING COMMUNICATES TO FINITE REAL THINGS
CHAPTER1. THE FINITE FORM WHICH BEING COMMUNICATES TO THE REAL IN THE
MIND, BEFORE FINITE ENS CAN EXIST WITH AN EXISTENCE OF ITS OWN ARTICLE
1. THE FINITE REAL CANNOT RECEIVE EXISTENCE UNLESS IT IS FULLY
DETERMINED 456 ARTICLE 2. HOW IDEAL BEING CONTAINS THE PRINCIPLE OF
DETERMIN- ATION OF THE FINITE REAL 461 ARTICLE 3. IN THE UNIVERSE THERE
IS SOMETHING WHICH PERTAINS TO THE CREATOR S CHOICE, AND SOMETHING WHICH
IS A NECESSARY CONSEQUENCE 471 ARTICLE 4. THE SUPREME GENERA OF MATTER,
THAT IS, OF REALITY, WHICH MAKE UP THE WORLD 471 ARTICLE 5. HOW THE
DIVINE MIND WAS ABLE TO FIND IN THE UNLIM- ITED REAL THE SUPREME GENERA
OF THE REALITIES WHICH MAKE UP THE WORLD 473 ARTICLE 6. THE NUMBER OF
ELEMENTS MAKING UP THE FORM OF THE FINITE REAL 474 ARTICLE 7.
DETERMINATIONS COMMON AND NOT COMMON TO EVERY FINITE ENS 476 CHAPTER 2.
CONTINUATION - THE FIRST ELEMENT OF THE FINITE FORM COMMON TO EVERY
FINITE ENS: SUPREME GENERIC QUALITY 478 CHAPTER3. CONTINUATION - THE
SECOND ELEMENT OF THE FINITE FORM COMMON TO EVERY FINITE ENS: OBJECTIVE
INTELLIGIBILITY 479 CHAPTER 4. CONTINUATION - THE THIRD ELEMENT OF THE
FINITE FORM COMMON TO EVERY FINITE ENS: DETERMINED QUANTITY ARTICLE 1.
ORIGIN OF THE INFINITY AND UNIVERSALITY OF IDEAS 482 ARTICLE 2.
DEFINITION OF QUANTITY 483 ARTICLE 3. ONTOLOGICAL QUANTITY 484 ARTICLE
4. ABSTRACT ONTOLOGICAL QUANTITY 487 CONTENTS XXLLL ARTICLE 5.
CONTINUATION - DISCRETE QUANTITY - ABSTRACT ONE IS ABSOLUTELY MEASURE;
IT IS NOT MEASURED; ALL OTHER MEASURES ARE MEASURABLE AND RECEIVE
BEING-MEASURES FROM ABSTRACT ONE 488 ARTICLE 6. COSMOLOGICAL QUANTITY
490 ARTICLE 7. CONTINUATION - THE CONCEPT OF QUALITY 505 ARTICLE 8.
PHYSICAL QUANTITY, THAT IS, THE FINITE REAL IN ITSELF §1. QUANTITY OF
THE DETERMINED FINITE REAL, CONSIDERED IN THE FULL SPECIES 511 §2.
QUANTITY OF FINITE REAL CONSIDERED IN DIFFERENT FINITE REAL THINGS
COMPARED WITH EACH OTHER 515 CHAPTER 5. CONTINUATION - UNITY, THE FOURTH
ELEMENT OF THE FINITE FORM COMMON TO EVERY FINITE ENS 532 ARTICLE 1.
UNIVERSAL DEFINITION OF UNITY AND ONE 532 ARTICLE 2. VARIOUS MEANINGS OF
ONE , ALL OF WHICH ADMIT OF THE ABOVE DEFINITION 532 ARTICLE 3. ARE ONE
AND ENS INTERCHANGEABLE? 534 ARTICLE 4. ORIGIN OF THE CONCEPT OF COMMON
ONE 534 ARTICLE 5. ONE PREDICATED OF A SINGLE SUBJECT AND PREDICATED
AS COMMON TO MANY SUBJECTS - THE CONCEPT OF PLURALITY AND NUMBER 536
ARTICLE 6. IS IDEAL BEING ONE? 539 ARTICLE 7. THE CONCEPTS INDIVIDUAL
AND COMMON 541 CHAPTER 6. [THE CONCEPTS WH OIE , DIVISION AND
PARTS ] 545 ARTICLE 1. THE CONCEPT WHOIE 545 ARTICLE 2. THE CONCEPTS
DIVISION AND PARTS 547 CHAPTER 7. THE CONCEPT SIMPLE ARTICLE 1.
THE ANTINOMY BETWEEN ENS-AS-ONE AND COMPOSITE ENS 550 ARTICLE 2. A
CERTAIN KIND OF SIMPLICITY IS ESSENTIAL TO EVERY ENS 550 ARTICLE 3. THE
CONCEPTS COMPOSITION AND COMPOSITE 551 ARTICLE 4. THE DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN OBJECTIVE COMPOSITES, DIALEC- TICAL COMPOSITES AND REAL
COMPOSITES 552 ARTICLE 5. TO KNOW WHETHER AN ENS IS SIMPLE OR COMPOSITE,
AND IN WHAT SENSE, WE NEED TO CONSIDER IF MANY ENTITIES COMPOSE THE
SUBJECT OF THE ENS, THAT IS, THE SUBJECTIVE ENS 554 ARTICLE 6.
SIMPLICITY AND MULTIPLICITY CONSIDERED IN OBJECTS AS OBJECTS, THAT IS,
IN IDEAS . 556 ARTICLE 7. SIMPLICITY AND DIALECTICAL COMPOSITION 566
ARTICLE 8. DIANOETICAL COMPOSITION 568 ARTICLE 9. SIMPLICITY AND
COMPOSITION IN REAL THINGS 570 XXIV CONTENTS ARTICLE 10. CONTINUATION:
THE TEACHING ABOUT THE BASE AND APPENDICES OF ENTIA 576 CHAPTER8. THEORY
OF IDENTITY ARTICLE 1. THE FORMATION OF THE CONCEPT OF IDENTITY.
IDENTITY AS THE OPPOSITE OF THE CONCEPT OF DIALECTICAL DIFFERENCE, AND
AS THE OPPOSITE OF THE CONCEPT OF OBJECTIVE DIFFERENCE 582 ARTICLE 2.
THE DIFFICULTY ENCOUNTERED IN JUDGMENTS ABOUT THE IDENTITY OF ENTIA; THE
SEAT OF IDENTITY; DOUBLE KIND OF THESE JUDGMENTS 584 ARTICLE 3. IDENTITY
RELATIVE TO EXTRINSIC VARIATION 586 ARTICLE 4. IDENTITY RELATIVE TO
INTRINSIC VARIATION 595 ARTICLE 5. THE CONCEPT BECOMING 600 ARTICLE 6.
THE RICHNESS AND DIGNITY OF ENTIA 634 ARTICLE 7. THE SIMPLICITY OF
ABSOLUTE BEING AND OF UNDETER- MINED BEING. 635 ARTICLE 8. THE CONCEPT
OTHER 637 ARTICLE 9. RECAPITULATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF ONE 639
CHAPTER9. THE DOCTRINE OF LIMITS ARTICLE 1. INTRODUCTION TO THE
DISCUSSION 641 ARTICLE 2. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN LIMITED AND
UNLIMITED IS A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ENTIA 641 ARTICLE 3. THE ONTOLOGICAL
ORIGIN OF LIMITATION 642 ARTICLE 4. INFINITE REALITY IS LIMITABLE ONLY
AS KNOWN; ITS IMITABILITY 644 ARTICLE 5. CONCEPTS SIMILAR TO THE CONCEPT
OF LIMITATION 645 ARTICLE 6. THE DEFINITION OF LIMITATION: ITS DOUBLE
MEANING EXPLAINED 646 ARTICLE 7. ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE LIMIT; THEIR
MEASUREMENT 647 ARTICLE 8. ANALYSIS OF THE DEFINITION OF LIMIT;
DEDUCTION OF THE DIFFERENT GENERA OF LIMITS 648 ARTICLE 9. THE FIRST
CLASS OF GENERA OF LIMITS, ARISING FROM THE DIVERSITY OF SUBJECTS OF THE
LIMITATIONS §1. THERE ARE SIX SUPREME GENERA OF THE FIRST DASS 649 §2.
THE LIMITATION OF BEING 649 §3. THE LIMITATION OF CATEGORICAL FORMS AND
OF MENTAL ENTI- TIES 650 §4. THE LIMITATION OF ENTIA 651 ARTICLE 10.
CONTINUATION: REAL FINITE ENTIA; ENTITATIVE LIMIT, TRAN- SCENDENT LIMIT
AND ESSENTIAL LIMIT 652 ARTICLE 11. CONTINUATION: SUBJECTIVE
TRANSCENDENT LIMIT AND OBJECTIVE TRANSCENDENT LIMIT; SECONDARY LIMITS
653 CONTENTS XXV ARTIDE 12. THE SECOND DASS OF GENERA OF LIMITS, ARISING
FROM THE DIFFERENT NATURE OF THE LIMITS THEMSELVES 655 ARTIDE 13. THE
THIRD DASS OF GENERA OF LIMITS HAVE THEIR FOUN- DATION IN THE DIFFERENT
CONJUNCTION BETWEEN THE LIMIT AND THE ENTITY WHICH IS THE SUBJECT OF THE
CONJUNCTION 656 §1. THE LIMITS WHOSE SUBJECT IS A PREVIOUSLY CONCEIVED,
REAL, INDIVIDUAL ENS 657 §2. CONTINUATION: THE SOURCE OF THE INDEFINITE,
AND WHY CERTAIN LIMITS CAN ALWAYS BE DIMINISHED WITHOUT BEING
ANNIHILATED 659 §3. CONTINUATION: THE INHERENCE OF SECONDARY LIMIT 665
§4. THE LIMITS PRIOR TO WHICH SOME ENTITIES, BUT NO REAL ENS, ARE
CONCEIVED 667 §5. LIMITS PRIOR TO WHICH NO ENS IS CONCEIVED NOR ANY
ENTITY WHICH CAN BE SUBJEET OF LIMITATION 673 §6. CONTINUATION: UNITY,
OR VAGUE ONE, ISPRESENT IN THE FIRST, UNDETERMINED FINITE REALITY IN THE
DIVINE MIND 683 §7. CONTINUATION: CISTHE NUMBER OF POSSIBLE FINITE ENTIA
FIN- ITE OR INFINITE? 684 §8. CONTINUATION: THE COMPOSITE OF POSSIBLE
FINITE ENTIA IS AS SUCH ORDERED 686 ARTIDE 14. THE QUIDDITY OF FINITE
ENS IS CONSTITUTED BY ITS LIM- ITS, NOT BY WHAT IT HAS POSITIVELY 688
ARTIDE 15. DOES THE PRIMAL FINITE REALITY, BEFORE RECEIVING EXISTENCE IN
ITSELF, NEED TO BE DETERMINED BY A CONSTANT SERIES OF GENERIC AND
SPECIFIC DETERMINATIONS, OR CAN IT OBTAIN A FULL DETERMINATION WITH A
NUMBER (SOMETIMES GREATER, SOMETIMES SMALLER) OF SUCCESSIVE DIFFERENCES?
690 CHAPTER 10. RECAPITULATION AND CONCLUSION 692 APPENDIX 1. THE
NEOPLATONISTS TEACHING ABOUT IMAGES 694 2. SUBSISTENT BEING IN ST.
THOMAS AND CAJETAN 695 3. ARISTOTLE S DEFINITION OF POTENCY 697 4. IDEAS
AND REAL ENTIA IN ARISTOTLE AND PLATO 698 5. ARISTOTLE: THE MIND IS IN
SOME WAY ALL THINGS 699 6. ST. THOMAS ON IDEAS IN GOD 701 7. ST. THOMAS
ON GOD S UNDERSTANDING IN CREATION 702 8. THE GENERATION OF THE DIVINE
WORD 704 9. ACT AND RELATIONSHIPS IN THE BLESSED TRINITY 706 10. ST.
THOMAS ON DIVISION AND UNITY 707 XXVI CONTENTS ORIGINAL LANGUAGE
REFERENCES INDEX OF PERSONS GENERAL INDEX 709 725 727
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CONTENTS PREFACE. SELF-EVIDENT IDEOLOGIE AL PRINEIPLES REEEIVE, IN
THEOSOPHY, FURTHER EXPLANATION WHEN SEEN FOUNDED IN SUBSISTENT BEING 1
I. TWO PARTS OF METAPHYSICS: PSYCHOLOGY AND THEOSOPHY 2 11. THEOSOPHY IS
PURE SCIENCE, NOT PRACTICAL SCIENCE 3 111. IMMODERATE SPECULATION 6 IV.
THEOSOPHICAL PHILOSOPHY STANDS ON ITS OWN, TAKES NOTH- ING FROM OTHER
SCIENCES AND EXCLUDES EVERY HYPO THESIS 8 V. HOW THEOSOPHY DIFFERS FROM
OTHER SEIENCES 9 VI. HOW THEOSOPHY DIFFERS FROM OTHER PHILOSOPHIE AL
SCI- ENCES. REGRESSIVE AND PROGRESSIVE PHILOSOPHY 10 VII. THREE
PRINCIPLES OF WHAT IS HUMANLY KNOWABLE: THE IDEAL, THE MATERIAL, AND THE
ABSOLUTE PRINCIPLES 11 VIII. HEGEL'S ERROR IN METHOD WAS TO BEGIN FROM
THE MATERIAL PRINCIPLE, WHICH HE GRATUITOUSLY MADE THE ABSOLUTE
PRINCIPLE 13 IX. PHILOSOPHY AND THE SYSTEM OF WHAT IS KNOWABLE MUST
BEGIN FROM THE IDEAL PRINCIPLE 14 X. BEFORE WE BEGIN TO PHILOSOPHISE,
OUR STATE IS ONE OF ORDIN- ARY KNOWLEDGE AND METHODICAL IGNORANCE, NOT
OF DOUBT 16 XI. PHILOSOPHY DOES NOT BEGIN WITH REASONING, BUT WITH
OBSERVATIONAL REFLECTION, THAT IS, WITH TOTALLY DIRECT KNOW- LEDGE
WITHOUT ANY SUPPOSITION 17 XII. IDEOLOGY IS THE SCIENCE WHICH
ESTABLISHES THE STARTING POINT; PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC FURNISH THE
MATERIAL AND FOR- MAL CONDITIONS OF THEOSOPHY 18 XIII. PHILOSOPHICAL
SCIENCES PRIOR TO THEOSOPHY USE DIRECT REASONING; THEOSOPHY USES
CIRCULAR BUT NOT VICIOUSLY CIRCU- LAR REASONING 19 XIV. CONTINUATION -
THE THREE PARTS OF THEOSOPHY: ONTO- LOGY, THEOLOGY, COSMOLOGY 20 XV.
PRIOR SCIENCES CAN BE CALLED COMMON SCIENCES; THEOSOPHY, ARCANE SCIENCE
23 XIV CONTENTS PART ONE ONTOLOGY THE PROBLEM OF ONTOLOGY A SINGLE BOOK,
SERVING AS INTRODUCTION TO ONTOLOGY PREAMBLE 33 CHAPTER 1. THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ONTOLOGY AND RATIONAL THEOLOGY, EOSMOLOGY AND
IDEOLOGY ARTICLE 1. ONTOLOGY PREEEDES AND MUST BE DISTINGUISHED FROM
RATIONAL THEOLOGY 34 ARTICLE 2. ONTOLOGY MUST PRECEDE COSMOLOGY BECAUSE
IT IS NEC- ESSARY FOR THE PERFEET KNOWLEDGE OF FINITE ENS 35 ARTICLE 3.
THE CHARACTERISTIC DIFFERENCE BETWEEN IDEOLOGY AND ONTOLOGY RELATIVE TO
THE MATTER OF THESE TWO SCIENCES 37 ARTICLE 4. THE CHARACTERISTIC
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ONTOLOGY AND RATIONAL THEOLOGY RELATIVE TO THE MATTER
OF THESE TWO SCIENCES 38 CHAPTER 2. THE FIRST FORM OF THE ONTOLOGICAL
PROBLEM: 'HOW TO REEONCILE THE APPARENT MODES OF ENS WITH THE EONEEPT OF
BEING'. AT WHAT STAGE OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT DOES THIS PROB- LEM PRESENT
ITSELF TO THE MIND? 42 CHAPTER 3. THE SEEOND FORM OF THE ONTOLOGIEAL
PROBLEM IS: 'TO FIND THE SUFFICIENT REASON FOR THE VARIOUS
MANIFESTATIONS OF ENS' ARTICLE 1. WHY THE UNDERSTANDING REQUIRES A
SUFFICIENT REASON FOR THE DIFFERENT MANIFESTATIONS OF ENS 46 ARTICLE 2.
THE SUFFICIENT REASON FOR THE MANIFESTATIONS OF ENS MUST, IF IT IS TO
SATISFY OUR UNDERSTANDING, BE ONE, NECESSARY AND OBJECTIVE 47 CHAPTER 4.
THE THIRD FORM OF THE ONTOLOGIE AL PROBLEM: 'TO FIND AN EQUATION BETWEEN
INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE AND KNOW- LEDGE BY PREDICATION' 52 CHAPTER 5. THE
FOURTH FORM OF THE ONTOLOGIE AL PROBLEM IS: 'HOW TO REEONCILE THE
ANTINOMIES APPARENT IN HUMAN THOUGHT' ARTICLE 1. WHENEVER INTUITIVE AND
PREDICATIVE KNOWLEDGE ARE CONTENTS XV NOT SEEN TO FORM AN EQUATION, AN
ANTINOMY REMALNS IN ONTOLOGY 54 ARTICLE 2. WE FIND THE ONTOLOGICAL
PROBLEM IN THE REAL WORLD, THE IDEAL WORLD AND THE MORAL WORLD 58
CHAPTER 6. THE FIFTH FORM OF THE ONTOLOGICAL PROBLEM: 'WHAT IS ENS AND
WHAT IS NON-ENS?' 61 CHAPTER 7. SUMMARY OF THE FORMULAE IN WHICH THE
ONTOLO- GICAL PROBLEM IS PRESENTED 63 CHAPTER 8. THE POSSIBILITY OF
PROVIDING ONTOLOGY WITH A LOGICAL START 65 CHAPTER 9. THE STRUCTURE OF
REASONING USED BY THE STUDENT OF ONTOLOGY 68 CHAPTER 10. ONTOLOGICAL
REASONING PROCEEDS IN A CIRCLE, BUT NOT A VICIOUS CIRCLE 73 CHAPTER 11.
DIVISION OF ONTOLOGY 77 ONTOLOGY 79 BOOKONE THE CATEGORIES CHAPTER 1.
THE DIFFICULTY OF FINDING A CLASSIFICATION WHICH INCLUDES ALL THE
VARIETIES OF BEING 86 CHAPTER 2. THE ANCIENTS WERE IN PART FAMILIAR WITH
THE ABOVE DIFFICULTY, WHICH THEY ENCOUNTERED IN THE COURSE OF THEIR
SPECULATIONS ARTICLE 1. THE FIRST FORM IN WHICH THE DIFFICULTY APPEARED
TO THE ANCIENTS: THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN WHAT IS REAL AND WHAT IS IDEAL
HAS NO PLACE IN THE GENERA OF ENTIA 92 ARTICLE 2. THE SECOND FORM OF THE
SAME DIFFICULTY FOR THE ANCIENTS: DID THE CATEGORIES CLASSIFY THE
PRINCIPLES OF ENTIA OR THE ENTIA THEMSELVES? 93 ARTICLE 3. THE THIRD AND
MORE DIRECT FORM IN WHICH THE DIFFI- CULTY WAS SEEN: ENS IS OUTSIDE
EVERY GENUS 97 XV! CONTENTS CHAPTER 3. THE NAME 'CATEGORIES' 100 CHAPTER
4. SOME RELEVANT QUESTIONS INSUFFICIENTLY DISTIN- GUISHED BY THE ANCIENT
PHILOSOPHERS 104 CHAPTER 5. THE QUESTION CONCERNING PRINCIPLES OR CAUSES
OF ENTITIES 106 CHAPTER 6. QUESTION CONCERNING ELEMENTS 109 CHAPTER 7.
QUESTION CONCERNING THE GENERA OF ENTIA 111 CHAPTER 8. QUESTION
CONCERNING THE CLASSES OF ENTIA 114 CHAPTER 9. QUESTION CONCERNING THE
PRIMAL FORMS OF BEING 117 CHAPTER 10. HOW THE FIRST CLASSES OF ENS, THAT
IS, THE FIRST PRINCIPLES, FIRST ELEMENTS AND FIRST GENERA, ARE REDUCED
TO THE THREE FORMS 119 CHAPTER 11. THE THREE FORMS OF BEING TRULY
PROVIDE THE CAT- EGORIES OF BEING 121 CHAPTER 12. REFUTATION OF THE
UNITARIANS; CONFIRMATION OF WH AT HAS BEEN SAID 123 CHAPTER 12
(CONTINUED). REFUTATION OF THE UNITARIANS; CON- FIRMATION OF WHAT HAS
BEEN SAID 128 CHAPTER 13. THE FALSE ROAD TAKEN BY SOME PHILOSOPHERS TO
SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF ONTOLOGY 138 CHAPTER 14. THE SUFFICIENT REASON FOR
THE THREE CATEGORIES AND FORMS OF BEING 140 CHAPTER 15. OBJECTIONS
ARTICLE 1. FIRST OBJECTION: DISTINCTIONS CAN BE FOUND ONLY IN THE BEING
WE KNOW 145 ARTICLE 2. SECOND OBJECTION: RATIONAL ENTIA DO NOT SEEM TO
BE INCLUDED IN THE THREE CATEGORIES 148 ARTICLE 3. THIRD OBJECTION: IT
WOULD SEEM THAT THE THREE FORMS OF BEING CANNOT BE CATEGORIES OF BEING
ITSELF 149 CHAPTER 16. THE ERROR OF PHILOSOPHERS WHO RANK SPACE AND TIME
AMONG THE CATEGORIES 151 CONTENTS XVLL CHAPTER17. HOW ONE FORM OF BEING
IS DISTINGUISHED FROM THE OTHER. THE RECIPROCAL INSESSION OF THE THREE
FORMS 153 CHAPTER18. THE TEACHING ABOUT CONTAINER AND CONTENT, UNI-
VERSALLY SPEAKING 156 CHAPTER19. WHY THE TRINITY OF SUPREME FORMS DOES
NOT REMOVE THE UNITY OF BEING 160 CHAPTER20. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THIS
BOOK AND THOSE THAT FOLLOW: THE TRINITY IS THE BASIS AND MYSTERIOUS
FOUNDA- TION OF THEOSOPHY ARTICLE 1. CONNECTION WITH THE BOOKS THAT
FOLLOW 161 ARTICLE 2. THE THREE FORMS OF BEING ARE NOT THE DIVINE
TRINITY BUT SOMETHING WHICH IS ANALOGICALLY REFERRED TO IT 161 ARTICLE
3. THE TEACHING ABOUT THE DIVINE TRINITY CAN AND MUST BE ACCEPTED IN
PHILOSOPHY 163 ARTICLE 4. POSTULATES NECESSARY FOR THE PHILOSOPHICAL
INVESTIGA- TIONS OF THE BOOKS THAT FOLLOW 165 BOOKTWO BEING-AS-ONE
PREAMBLE SECTION ONE THE LANGUAGE OF ONTOLOGY 169 CHAPTER1. THE NEED TO
DISTINGUISH ACCURATELY THE MEANING OF SOME WORDS USED IN ONTOLOGY 173
CHAPTER2. THE DIALECTICAL CAUSES OF THE MULTIPLE MEANINGS OF 'BEING',
AND OF OTHER WORDS REFERRING TO BEING 175 CHAPTER3. THE MEANINGS OF
'BEING' AND OF OTHER WORDS USED IN ONTOLOGY ARTICLE 1. DEFINITIONS 179
ARTICLE 2. BEING OF INTUITION, VIRTUAL BEING, INITIAL, ABSTRACT AND
IDEAL BEING 179 ARTICLE 3. THE MEANINGS OF 'ENS' 182 ARTICLE 4. THE
MEANING OF 'ENTITY' AND 'THING' 185 ARTICLE 5. THE MEANING OF 'ESSENCE'
186 ARTICLE 6. THE MEANING OF 'SUBJECT' AND 'PREDICATE' 192 XV111
CONTENTS SECTION TWO THE SYSTEM OF DIALECTICAL UNITY CHAPTER 1. THE NEED
WHICH HUMAN INTELLIGENCE HAS TO REDUCE ALL THAT IS KNOWABLE TO ONE
PRINCIPLE, AND HOW THE FAIL- URE TO DEFINE SUFFICIENTLY THE MEANING OF
WORDS HAS RESULTED IN MANY ERRONEOUS SYSTEMS ARTICLE 1. THE ANTINOMY
BETWEEN THE UNITY AND PLURALITY OF BEING IS SOLVED ONLY BY A DIALECTICAL
DISTINCTION OF CONCEPTS 194 ARTICLE 2. THE ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS AND THE
PROBLEM OF THE UNITY AND PLURALITY OF BEING 195 ARTICLE 3. WHY FICHTE
WAS UNABLE TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF THE UNITY AND PLURALITY OF BEING 196
ARTICLE 4. SCHELLING'S TREATMENT OF THE PROBLEM OF THE UNITY AND
PLURALITY OF BEING § 1. SCHELLING POSITS THE PROBLEM INCORRECTLY 197 §2.
SCHELLING POSITS INCORRECTLY THE CONDITIONS FOR THE SOLU- TION OF THE
PROBLEM 201 §3. FICHTE'S AND SCHELLING'S SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM IS NOT
SATISFACTORY 208 ARTICLE 5. HOW TO SATISFY THE MIND'S NEED FOR UNITY 214
ARTICLE 6. EXPLANATION OF THE ERRORS OF SCHELLING AND HIS DIS- CIPLE,
HEGE! 218 CHAPTER 2. SYSTEM OF DIALECTICAL IDENTITY ARTICLE 1. BRIEF
EXPOSITION OF THE SYSTEM 223 ARTICLE 2. HOW BEING IS THE FIRST
DETERMINABLE, THE COMMON DETERMINANT AND THE ULTIMATE DETERMINATION OF
EVERY ENTITY 228 ARTICLE 3. INITIAL BEING IS THE PRINCIPLE OF WHAT IS
KNOWABLE, AND THE DIALECTICAL BEGINNING OF ALL THINGS 231 ARTICLE 4. THE
PART OF ENS WHICH CORRESPONDS WITH INITIAL BEING 236 §1. THE QUESTION IS
RESOLVED RELATIVE TO CONTINGENT ENS 237 §2. THE QUESTION IS RESOLVED
RELATIVE TO NECESSARY ENS 240 ARTICLE 5. IMPORTANT COROLLARIES. THREE
IMPORTANT COROLLARIES FROM WHAT HAS BEEN SAID §1. FIRST COROLLARY, THE
APRIORI DEMONSTRATION OF THE EXIST- ENCE OFGOD (NE, 3: 1456-1460;
SISTEMA, 178) 244 §2. SECOND COROLLARY: THE APRIORI DEMONSTRATION OF
CREATION 248 §3. THIRD COROLLARY: THE IMPERFECT GRASP OF THE CREATIVE
ACT ON THE OCCASION OF INTELLECTIVE PERCEPTION 253 ARTICLE 6. PLATO'S
DIALECTIC 256 CONTENTS SECTION THREE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
BEING-AS-ONE AND ITS TERMS IN GENERAL XIX CHAPTER 1. THE INVESTIGATION
TO BE CARRIED OUT IN THIS BOOK AND THE NEXT ABOUT THE MULTIPLICITY OF
BEING ARTICLE 1. DEFINITION OF BEING IN ITSELF AS OPPOSED TO DIALECTICAL
BEING 259 ARTICLE 2. THE PRINCIPLE OF THE THEORY OF BEING-AS-ONE 260
ARTICLE 3. THE PRINCIPLE OF THE THEORY OF TRINE BEING 261 ARTICLE 4.
WHAT REMAINS TO BE DONE TO COMPLETE THE INVESTIGA- TIONS CARRIED OUT IN
THIS BOOK 262 ARTICLE 5. A COMMENT ON ONTOLOGICAL METHOD 263 CHAPTER 2.
AN INVESTIGATION ABOUT THAT WHICH BEING CONFERS ON ITS TERMS FROM THE
POINT OF VIEW OF ABSOLUTE, INFINITE ENS 265 CHAPTER 3. THE INVESTIGATION
ABOUT THAT WHICH BEING CON- FERS ON ITS TERMS FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF
FINITE ENTIA. THE ANALYSIS OF THIS INVESTIGATION 270 CHAPTER 4. THAT
WHICH IN BEING IS INCOMMUNICABLE TO FINITE REAL THINGS ARTICLE 1. THE
ORIGIN OF THE INCOMMUNICABILITY OF CERTAIN PROPERTIES OF BEING TO FINITE
REAL THINGS 271 ARTICLE 2. SIX FIRST INCOMMUNICABLE PROPERTIES OF BEING
271 ARTICLE 6. SIX OTHER PROPERTIES OF BEING, INCOMMUNICABLE TO FINITE
REAL THINGS: 1. UNIVERSALITY; 2. NECESSITY; 3. IMMUTABILITY; 4.
ETERNITY; 5. ABSOLUTE SIMPLICITY; 6. ABSOLUTE PRIMALITY 274 ARTICLE 4.
THE TWOFOLD RELATIONSHIP OF BEING TO CONTINGENT THINGS: ONE RELATIONS
HIP ARISES FROM THE COMMUNICABLE PROPERTIES, THE OTHER FROM THE
INCOMMUNICABLE PROPERTIES OF BEING 277 ARTICLE 5. THE INCOMMUNICABLE AND
COMMUNICABLE PROPERTIES OF BEING RELATIVE TO THE ESSENCES OF FINITE
THINGS 277 CHAPTER 5. THE NATURE OF THE COMMUNICATION AND CONJUNC- TION
OF BEING WITH REAL THINGS ARTICLE 1. TRIPIE RELATIONSHIP OF BEING WITH
THE REAL 279 ARTICLE 2. THE RELATIONSHIP OF IDENTITY 279 ARTICLE 3. THE
DIRECT AND INDIRECT REIATIONSHIP OF ACT-CAUSE 281 ARTICLE 4. THE DIRECT
RELATIONSHIP OF ACT-CAUSE, OR ENTIFICATION 283 ARTICLE 5. THE ANTINOMIES
FOUND BY PLATO IN HIS MEDITATION ON ENTIFICATION. A CRITIQUE OF THEM 284
XX CONTENTS ARTICLE 6. THE INDIRECT RELATIONSHIP OF ACT-CAUSE OR ACTION
295 ARTICLE 7. THE RELATIONSHIP OF SUBJECT-CAUSE 297 CHAPTER 6. DOES
BEING RECEIVE NOTHING FROM ITS CONJUNCTION WITH FINITE REAL THINGS? 298
CHAPTER7. THE PROPERTIES OF BEING, COMMUNICABLE TO FINITE REAL THINGS,
AND PREDICABLE OF THEM 303 SECTION FOUR WHAT SUBJECTIVE BEING
COMMUNICATES TO FINITE REAL THINGS CHAPTER 1. THE FIRST PROPERTY
COMMUNICATED TO FINITE REAL THINGS BY INITIAL, ACTUATING BEING IS
EXISTENCE ARTICLE 1. EXISTENCE 312 ARTICLE 2. DURATION 313 CHAPTER 2.
THE SECOND PROPERTY: INITIAL, ACTUATING BEING COMMUNICATES TO FINITE
REAL THINGS THE ACT OF THEIR ACTS 314 ARTICLE 1. CONCEPT OF POTENCY AND
ACT 314 ARTICLE 2. CONCEPT OF VIRTUALITY 315 ARTICLE 3. CLASSIFICATION
OF POTENCIES POTENCIES IN THE PROPER SENSE OF THE WORD, AND IN THE
DIALECTICAL SENSE 343 ARTICLE 4. BEING CONSIDERED AS DIALECTICAL POTENCY
343 §1. !F AND HOW BEING, CONSIDERED AS THE FIRST DETERMINABLE, IS
DIALECTICAL POTENCY - TEACHING ABOUT THE POSSIBLE 344 §2. !F AND HOW
BEING, CONSIDERED AS DETERMINANT CAUSE, IS POTENCY 348 §3. WHETHER
BEING, CONSIDERED AS ULTIMATE DETERMINATION, ISPOTENCY - THE QUESTION
CONCLUDED 351 ARTICLE 5. IS THE VIRTUALITY OF INITIAL BEING A
LIMITATION? 353 CHAPTER3. CONTINUATION - TEACHING ABOUT POSSIBLE BEING
ARTICLE 1. THE STATE OF THE QUESTION: 'HOW CAN BEING, AS FIRST
DETERMINABLE, BE POTENCY?' 354 ARTICLE 2. GENERAL SOLUTION OF THE
QUESTION 354 ARTICLE 3. POSSIBILITY OF ENS - TEN GENERA OF POTENCIES 355
ARTICLE 4. THE POSSIBLE PREDICATE OF UNDETERMINED BEING RELA- TIVE TO
ITS PROPER AND IMPROPER TERMS 356 CONTENTS XXI ARTICLE 5. THE POSSIBLE,
PREDICATED OF THE TERMS OF BEING - ARE POSSIBLE FINITE THINGS SOMETHING
POSITIVE? LOGICAL POSSIBILITY AND METAPHYSICAL POSSIBILITY OF THESE
FINITE THINGS: THE TWO- FOLD NECESSITY OF ABSOLUTE BEING AND OF POSSIBLE
FINITE THINGS 359 CHAPTER 4. CONTINUATION. - ACT CONSIDERED IN UNDETER-
MINED BEING ARTICLE 1. A SUMMARY OF WHAT HAS BEEN SAID, AND ITS CONNEC-
TION WITH WHAT FOLLOWS 368 ARTICLE 2. HOW OPINIATIVE DIALECTICAL POTENCY
IS RECONCILED WITH THE ACTUALITY PROPER TO BEING 369 ARTICLE 3. HOW
IDEAL DIALECTICAL POTENCY IS RECONCILED WITH THE ACTUALITY OF BEING 372
ARTICLE 4. THE SENSE IN WHICH WE HAVE CALLED BEING 'UNIVERSAL MATTER',
THAT IS, 'THE FIRST DETERMINABLE' 380 CHAPTER5. IMPORTANT COROLLARIES
FROM THE PREVIOUS TEACHING 396 ARTICLE 1. FIRST COROLLARY: THE
ONTOLOGICAL REASON FOR THE PRIN- CIPLE: 'ONLY WHAT IS CONCEIVABLE CAN
EXIST' 396 ARTICLE 2. SECOND COROLLARY: ONLY THAT CAN REALLY EXIST WHICH
IS NOT ONLY CONCEIVABLE, BUT CONCEIVED BY SOME MIND 397 ARTICLE 3. THIRD
COROLLARY: CREATION CANNOT BE CARRIED OUT EXCEPT BY GOD 398 ARTICLE 4.
FOURTH COROLLARY: THE CONCEPT AND NECESSARY EXIST- ENCE OF DIVINE
FREEDOM 399 ARTICLE 5. FIFTH COROLLARY: EMANATISM IS AN ERRONEOUS SYSTEM
400 ARTICLE 6. SIXTH COROLLARY: PANTHEISM IS AN ERRONEOUS SYSTEM 400
ARTICLE 7. SEVENTH COROLLARY: DESCRIPTION OF CREATION 401 ARTICLE 8.
EIGHTH COROLLARY: THE EXEMPLAR OF THE WORLD IS NOT THE DIVINE WORD,
ALTHOUGH THE EXEMPLAR IS FOUND IN TWO MODES IN THE WORD: 1. EMINENTLY,
2. CONSEQUENTLY 412 ARTICLE 9. NINTH COROLLARY: THE CREATED REAL IS NOT
THE DIVINE REAL 426 ARTICLE 10. THE TENTH COROLLARY: THE REAL OF FINITE
ENTIA, AS PROPER TO THEM AND PERTAINING TO THEIR SUBJECTIVE (OR
EXTRASUBJECTIVE) EXISTENCE, IS OUTSIDE GOD; BUT IT EXISTS EMI- NENTLY IN
ABSOLUTE, OBJECTIVE BEING AS OBJECT OF THE CREATING, INTELLECTIVE ACT
427 ARTICLE 11. ELEVENTH COROLLARY: IDEAL BEING, THE LIGHT OF THE HUMAN
MIND, IS NOT THE DIVINE WORD, NOR THE DIVINE ESSENCE, BUT AN
APPURTENANCE OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE . 440 ARTICLE 12. TWELFTH COROLLARY -
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INITIAL BEING AND THE REAL, THE TWO ELEMENTS OF THE
WORLD 443 XXL1 CONTENTS CHAPTER 6. THE THIRD PROPERTY WHICH BEING
COMMUNICATES TO FINITE REAL THINGS: THE INTELLIGIBILITY OF AFFIRMATION
452 SECTION FIVE WHAT OBJECTIVE BEING COMMUNICATES TO FINITE REAL THINGS
CHAPTER1. THE FINITE FORM WHICH BEING COMMUNICATES TO THE REAL IN THE
MIND, BEFORE FINITE ENS CAN EXIST WITH AN EXISTENCE OF ITS OWN ARTICLE
1. THE FINITE REAL CANNOT RECEIVE EXISTENCE UNLESS IT IS FULLY
DETERMINED 456 ARTICLE 2. HOW IDEAL BEING CONTAINS THE PRINCIPLE OF
DETERMIN- ATION OF THE FINITE REAL 461 ARTICLE 3. IN THE UNIVERSE THERE
IS SOMETHING WHICH PERTAINS TO THE CREATOR'S CHOICE, AND SOMETHING WHICH
IS A NECESSARY CONSEQUENCE 471 ARTICLE 4. THE SUPREME GENERA OF MATTER,
THAT IS, OF REALITY, WHICH MAKE UP THE WORLD 471 ARTICLE 5. HOW THE
DIVINE MIND WAS ABLE TO FIND IN THE UNLIM- ITED REAL THE SUPREME GENERA
OF THE REALITIES WHICH MAKE UP THE WORLD 473 ARTICLE 6. THE NUMBER OF
ELEMENTS MAKING UP THE FORM OF THE FINITE REAL 474 ARTICLE 7.
DETERMINATIONS COMMON AND NOT COMMON TO EVERY FINITE ENS 476 CHAPTER 2.
CONTINUATION - THE FIRST ELEMENT OF THE FINITE FORM COMMON TO EVERY
FINITE ENS: SUPREME GENERIC QUALITY 478 CHAPTER3. CONTINUATION - THE
SECOND ELEMENT OF THE FINITE FORM COMMON TO EVERY FINITE ENS: OBJECTIVE
INTELLIGIBILITY 479 CHAPTER 4. CONTINUATION - THE THIRD ELEMENT OF THE
FINITE FORM COMMON TO EVERY FINITE ENS: DETERMINED QUANTITY ARTICLE 1.
ORIGIN OF THE INFINITY AND UNIVERSALITY OF IDEAS 482 ARTICLE 2.
DEFINITION OF QUANTITY 483 ARTICLE 3. ONTOLOGICAL QUANTITY 484 ARTICLE
4. ABSTRACT ONTOLOGICAL QUANTITY 487 CONTENTS XXLLL ARTICLE 5.
CONTINUATION - DISCRETE QUANTITY - ABSTRACT ONE IS ABSOLUTELY MEASURE;
IT IS NOT MEASURED; ALL OTHER MEASURES ARE MEASURABLE AND RECEIVE
BEING-MEASURES FROM ABSTRACT ONE 488 ARTICLE 6. COSMOLOGICAL QUANTITY
490 ARTICLE 7. CONTINUATION - THE CONCEPT OF 'QUALITY' 505 ARTICLE 8.
PHYSICAL QUANTITY, THAT IS, THE FINITE REAL IN ITSELF §1. QUANTITY OF
THE DETERMINED FINITE REAL, CONSIDERED IN THE FULL SPECIES 511 §2.
QUANTITY OF FINITE REAL CONSIDERED IN DIFFERENT FINITE REAL THINGS
COMPARED WITH EACH OTHER 515 CHAPTER 5. CONTINUATION - UNITY, THE FOURTH
ELEMENT OF THE FINITE FORM COMMON TO EVERY FINITE ENS 532 ARTICLE 1.
UNIVERSAL DEFINITION OF UNITY AND ONE 532 ARTICLE 2. VARIOUS MEANINGS OF
'ONE', ALL OF WHICH ADMIT OF THE ABOVE DEFINITION 532 ARTICLE 3. ARE ONE
AND ENS INTERCHANGEABLE? 534 ARTICLE 4. ORIGIN OF THE CONCEPT OF COMMON
ONE 534 ARTICLE 5. 'ONE' PREDICATED OF A SINGLE SUBJECT AND PREDICATED
AS COMMON TO MANY SUBJECTS - THE CONCEPT OF PLURALITY AND NUMBER 536
ARTICLE 6. IS IDEAL BEING ONE? 539 ARTICLE 7. THE CONCEPTS 'INDIVIDUAL'
AND 'COMMON' 541 CHAPTER 6. [THE CONCEPTS 'WH OIE', 'DIVISION' AND
'PARTS'] 545 ARTICLE 1. THE CONCEPT 'WHOIE' 545 ARTICLE 2. THE CONCEPTS
'DIVISION' AND 'PARTS' 547 CHAPTER 7. THE CONCEPT 'SIMPLE' ARTICLE 1.
THE ANTINOMY BETWEEN ENS-AS-ONE AND COMPOSITE ENS 550 ARTICLE 2. A
CERTAIN KIND OF SIMPLICITY IS ESSENTIAL TO EVERY ENS 550 ARTICLE 3. THE
CONCEPTS 'COMPOSITION' AND 'COMPOSITE' 551 ARTICLE 4. THE DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN OBJECTIVE COMPOSITES, DIALEC- TICAL COMPOSITES AND REAL
COMPOSITES 552 ARTICLE 5. TO KNOW WHETHER AN ENS IS SIMPLE OR COMPOSITE,
AND IN WHAT SENSE, WE NEED TO CONSIDER IF MANY ENTITIES COMPOSE THE
SUBJECT OF THE ENS, THAT IS, THE SUBJECTIVE ENS 554 ARTICLE 6.
SIMPLICITY AND MULTIPLICITY CONSIDERED IN OBJECTS AS OBJECTS, THAT IS,
IN IDEAS . 556 ARTICLE 7. SIMPLICITY AND DIALECTICAL COMPOSITION 566
ARTICLE 8. DIANOETICAL COMPOSITION 568 ARTICLE 9. SIMPLICITY AND
COMPOSITION IN REAL THINGS 570 XXIV CONTENTS ARTICLE 10. CONTINUATION:
THE TEACHING ABOUT THE BASE AND APPENDICES OF ENTIA 576 CHAPTER8. THEORY
OF IDENTITY ARTICLE 1. THE FORMATION OF THE CONCEPT OF IDENTITY.
IDENTITY AS THE OPPOSITE OF THE CONCEPT OF DIALECTICAL DIFFERENCE, AND
AS THE OPPOSITE OF THE CONCEPT OF OBJECTIVE DIFFERENCE 582 ARTICLE 2.
THE DIFFICULTY ENCOUNTERED IN JUDGMENTS ABOUT THE IDENTITY OF ENTIA; THE
SEAT OF IDENTITY; DOUBLE KIND OF THESE JUDGMENTS 584 ARTICLE 3. IDENTITY
RELATIVE TO EXTRINSIC VARIATION 586 ARTICLE 4. IDENTITY RELATIVE TO
INTRINSIC VARIATION 595 ARTICLE 5. THE CONCEPT 'BECOMING' 600 ARTICLE 6.
THE RICHNESS AND DIGNITY OF ENTIA 634 ARTICLE 7. THE SIMPLICITY OF
ABSOLUTE BEING AND OF UNDETER- MINED BEING. 635 ARTICLE 8. THE CONCEPT
'OTHER' 637 ARTICLE 9. RECAPITULATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF 'ONE' 639
CHAPTER9. THE DOCTRINE OF LIMITS ARTICLE 1. INTRODUCTION TO THE
DISCUSSION 641 ARTICLE 2. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 'LIMITED' AND
'UNLIMITED' IS A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ENTIA 641 ARTICLE 3. THE ONTOLOGICAL
ORIGIN OF LIMITATION 642 ARTICLE 4. INFINITE REALITY IS LIMITABLE ONLY
AS KNOWN; ITS IMITABILITY 644 ARTICLE 5. CONCEPTS SIMILAR TO THE CONCEPT
OF LIMITATION 645 ARTICLE 6. THE DEFINITION OF LIMITATION: ITS DOUBLE
MEANING EXPLAINED 646 ARTICLE 7. ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE LIMIT; THEIR
MEASUREMENT 647 ARTICLE 8. ANALYSIS OF THE DEFINITION OF LIMIT;
DEDUCTION OF THE DIFFERENT GENERA OF LIMITS 648 ARTICLE 9. THE FIRST
CLASS OF GENERA OF LIMITS, ARISING FROM THE DIVERSITY OF SUBJECTS OF THE
LIMITATIONS §1. THERE ARE SIX SUPREME GENERA OF THE FIRST DASS 649 §2.
THE LIMITATION OF BEING 649 §3. THE LIMITATION OF CATEGORICAL FORMS AND
OF MENTAL ENTI- TIES 650 §4. THE LIMITATION OF ENTIA 651 ARTICLE 10.
CONTINUATION: REAL FINITE ENTIA; ENTITATIVE LIMIT, TRAN- SCENDENT LIMIT
AND ESSENTIAL LIMIT 652 ARTICLE 11. CONTINUATION: SUBJECTIVE
TRANSCENDENT LIMIT AND OBJECTIVE TRANSCENDENT LIMIT; SECONDARY LIMITS
653 CONTENTS XXV ARTIDE 12. THE SECOND DASS OF GENERA OF LIMITS, ARISING
FROM THE DIFFERENT NATURE OF THE LIMITS THEMSELVES 655 ARTIDE 13. THE
THIRD DASS OF GENERA OF LIMITS HAVE THEIR FOUN- DATION IN THE DIFFERENT
CONJUNCTION BETWEEN THE LIMIT AND THE ENTITY WHICH IS THE SUBJECT OF THE
CONJUNCTION 656 §1. THE LIMITS WHOSE SUBJECT IS A PREVIOUSLY CONCEIVED,
REAL, INDIVIDUAL ENS 657 §2. CONTINUATION: THE SOURCE OF THE INDEFINITE,
AND WHY CERTAIN LIMITS CAN ALWAYS BE DIMINISHED WITHOUT BEING
ANNIHILATED 659 §3. CONTINUATION: THE INHERENCE OF SECONDARY LIMIT 665
§4. THE LIMITS PRIOR TO WHICH SOME ENTITIES, BUT NO REAL ENS, ARE
CONCEIVED 667 §5. LIMITS PRIOR TO WHICH NO ENS IS CONCEIVED NOR ANY
ENTITY WHICH CAN BE SUBJEET OF LIMITATION 673 §6. CONTINUATION: UNITY,
OR VAGUE ONE, ISPRESENT IN THE FIRST, UNDETERMINED FINITE REALITY IN THE
DIVINE MIND 683 §7. CONTINUATION: CISTHE NUMBER OF POSSIBLE FINITE ENTIA
FIN- ITE OR INFINITE?' 684 §8. CONTINUATION: THE COMPOSITE OF POSSIBLE
FINITE ENTIA IS AS SUCH ORDERED 686 ARTIDE 14. THE QUIDDITY OF FINITE
ENS IS CONSTITUTED BY ITS LIM- ITS, NOT BY WHAT IT HAS POSITIVELY 688
ARTIDE 15. DOES THE PRIMAL FINITE REALITY, BEFORE RECEIVING EXISTENCE IN
ITSELF, NEED TO BE DETERMINED BY A CONSTANT SERIES OF GENERIC AND
SPECIFIC DETERMINATIONS, OR CAN IT OBTAIN A FULL DETERMINATION WITH A
NUMBER (SOMETIMES GREATER, SOMETIMES SMALLER) OF SUCCESSIVE DIFFERENCES?
690 CHAPTER 10. RECAPITULATION AND CONCLUSION 692 APPENDIX 1. THE
NEOPLATONISTS' TEACHING ABOUT IMAGES 694 2. SUBSISTENT BEING IN ST.
THOMAS AND CAJETAN 695 3. ARISTOTLE'S DEFINITION OF POTENCY 697 4. IDEAS
AND REAL ENTIA IN ARISTOTLE AND PLATO 698 5. ARISTOTLE: THE MIND IS IN
SOME WAY ALL THINGS 699 6. ST. THOMAS ON IDEAS IN GOD 701 7. ST. THOMAS
ON GOD'S UNDERSTANDING IN CREATION 702 8. THE GENERATION OF THE DIVINE
WORD 704 9. ACT AND RELATIONSHIPS IN THE BLESSED TRINITY 706 10. ST.
THOMAS ON DIVISION AND UNITY 707 XXVI CONTENTS ORIGINAL LANGUAGE
REFERENCES INDEX OF PERSONS GENERAL INDEX 709 725 727 |
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| id | DE-604.BV023479183 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T21:37:17Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:19:42Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9781899093755 |
| language | English |
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| spelling | Rosmini, Antonio 1797-1855 Verfasser (DE-588)118602888 aut Teosofia Theosophy 1 The problem of ontology being-as-one Antonio Rosmini Durham Rosmini House 2007 XXVI, 752 S. 22 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier (DE-604)BV023479182 1 V:DE-604 application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016661371&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Rosmini, Antonio 1797-1855 Theosophy |
| title | Theosophy |
| title_alt | Teosofia |
| title_auth | Theosophy |
| title_exact_search | Theosophy |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Theosophy |
| title_full | Theosophy 1 The problem of ontology being-as-one Antonio Rosmini |
| title_fullStr | Theosophy 1 The problem of ontology being-as-one Antonio Rosmini |
| title_full_unstemmed | Theosophy 1 The problem of ontology being-as-one Antonio Rosmini |
| title_short | Theosophy |
| title_sort | theosophy the problem of ontology being as one |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016661371&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV023479182 |
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