The economics of imperfect labor markets:
Gespeichert in:
Hauptverfasser: | , |
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Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Princeton, NJ [u.a.]
Princeton Univ. Press
2008
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Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
Beschreibung: | Literaturverz. S. [291] - 311 ; Index |
Beschreibung: | XX, 319 S. graph. Darst. |
ISBN: | 9780691124490 9780691137353 |
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245 | 1 | 0 | |a The economics of imperfect labor markets |c Tito Boeri and Jan van Ours |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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adam_text | CONTENTS PREFACE XI SYMBOLS AND ACRONYMS XVII 1 OVERVIEW 1 1.1 A FEW KEY
DEFINITIONS 2 1.2 A COMPETITIVE LABOR MARKET 4 1.2.1 LABOR SUPPLY AND
THE RESERVATION WAGE WITHOUT HOURS RESTRICTIONS 4 1.2.2 AGGREGATE LABOR
SUPPLY 7 1.2.3 LABOR DEMAND AND WAGE DETERMINATION 9 1.2.4 EQUILIBRIUM
11 1.3 LABOR MARKET INSTITUTIONS 14 1.3.1 ACTING ON PRICES 14 1.3.2
ACTING ON QUANTITIES 15 1.3.3 INSTITUTIONAL INTERACTIONS 17 1.3.4 WHY DO
LABOR MARKET INSTITUTIONS EXIST? 18 1.3.5 PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION AND
INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS 21 1.4 TECHNICAL ANNEX: A SIMPLE STATIC FRAMEWORK
24 1.4.1 A COMPETITIVE LABOR MARKET 24 1.4.2 LABOR MARKET INSTITUTIONS
25 1.4.3 THE WEDGE 26 1.4.4 PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION AND THE
EMPLOYMENT BIAS OF INSTITUTIONS 27 2 MINIMUM WAGES 29 2.1 CROSS-COUNTRY
COMPARISONS 30 2.2 THEORY 33 2.2.1 A COMPETITIVE LABOR MARKET 33 2.2.2 A
NONCOMPEDTIVE LABOR MARKET 34 2.3 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 38 2.3.1 STUDIES
BASED ON FIRM-LEVEL DATA 38 2.3.2 STUDIES BASED ON NATURAL EXPERIMENTS
39 2.3.3 STUDIES BASED ON WORKERS HISTORIES 43 2.4 POLICY ISSUES 44
2.4.1 SHOULD THE MINIMUM WAGE BE REDUCED OR INCREASED? 44 2.4.2 IS THE
MINIMUM WAGE EFFECTIVE IN REDUCING EARNINGS INEQUALITY AND POVERTY? 45
2.5 WHY DOES A MINIMUM WAGE EXIST? 46 VI CONTENTS 2.6 SUGGESTIONS FOR
FURTHER READING 47 2.7 REVIEW QUESTIONS 47 2.8 TECHNICAL ANNEX:
FINE-TUNING OF THE MINIMUM WAGE 48 3 UNIONS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 51
3.1 MEASURES AND CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISONS 52 3.1.1 UNION DENSITY 52
3.1.2 COVERAGE AND EXCESS COVERAGE 54 3.1.3 COORDINATION 56 3.2 THEORY
56 3.2.1 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 57 3.2.2 ENDOGENOUS MEMBERSHIP 61 3.3
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 66 3.3.1 EFFECTS OF UNIONS ON WAGES 67 3.3.2
BARGAINING COORDINATION, UNION DENSITY, AND UNEMPLOYMENT 71 3.4 POLICY
ISSUES 72 3.4.1 DO UNIONS INCREASE EFFICIENCY? 72 3.4.2 SHOULD
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING BE DECENTRALIZED? 74 3.5 WHY DO UNIONS EXIST? 75
3.6 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING 76 3.7 REVIEW QUESTIONS 76 3.8
TECHNICAL ANNEX: HOW STRONG SHOULD UNIONS BE IN ORDER TO BE EFFICIENT?
77 4 PAYROLL TAXES 81 4.1 MEASURES AND CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISONS 82 4.2
THEORY 86 4.3 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 90 4.4 POLICY ISSUES 92 4.4.1 NEGATIVE
INCOME TAXES OR IN-WORK BENEFITS? 92 4.4.2 TAX CREDITS OR WAGE
SUBSIDIES? 96 4.5 WHY DO PAYROLL TAXES EXIST? 97 4.6 SUGGESTIONS FOR
FURTHER READING 98 4.7 REVIEW QUESTIONS 98 4.8 TECHNICAL ANNEX: TAXES
AND BENEFITS IN A COMPETITIVE LABOR MARKET 98 5 REGULATION OF WORKING
HOURS 101 5.1 MEASURES AND CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISONS 101 5.2 THEORY 102
5.2.1 REGULATING WEEKLY WORKING HOURS 104 5.2.2 PART-TIME WORK 107 5.3
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 109 5.3.1 WORKING HOURS 109 5.3.2 PART-TIME WORK 113
5.4 POLICY ISSUES 116 5.4.1 SHOULD GOVERNMENTS REGULATE WORKING HOURS?
116 5.4.2 SHOULD GOVERNMENTS STIMULATE PART-TIME LABOR? 117 5.5 WHY DOES
REGULATION OF WORKING HOURS EXIST? 117 5.6 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER
READING 118 5.7 REVIEW QUESTIONS 118 5.8 TECHNICAL ANNEX: REDUCTION OF
STANDARD WORKING HOURS 119 CONTENTS VN 6 RETIREMENT PROGRAMS 121 6.1
MEASURES AND CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISONS 122 6.2 THEORY 124 6.3 EMPIRICAL
EVIDENCE 125 6.3.1 AGE AND EMPLOYMENT 125 6.3.2 AGE AND PRODUCTIVITY 132
6.4 POLICY ISSUES . 134 6.4.1 SHOULD THE MANDATORY RETIREMENT AGE BE
INCREASED? 134 6.4.2 SHOULD EARLY RETIREMENT PROGRAMS BE PHASED OUT? 135
6.5 WHY DO EARLY RETIREMENT PROGRAMS EXIST? 136 6.6 SUGGESTIONS FOR
FURTHER READING 136 6.7 REVIEW QUESTIONS 136 6.8 TECHNICAL ANNEX:
OPTIMAL RETIREMENT AGE 137 7 FAMILY POLICIES 139 7.1 MEASURES AND
CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISONS 140 7.2 THEORY 142 7.2.1 CHILD CARE FACILITIES
142 7.2.2 PARENTAL LEAVE 142 7.3 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 144 7.4 POLICY
ISSUES 150 7.4.1 CAN WORK AND FAMILY LIFE BE BALANCED? 150 7.4.2 IS
THERE A TRADE-OFF BETWEEN FERTILITY AND EMPLOYMENT? 151 7.5 WHY DO
FAMILY POLICIES EXIST? 153. 7.6 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING 153 7.7
REVIEW QUESTIONS 154 7.8 TECHNICAL ANNEX: CHILD CARE FACILITIES AND
HOURS OF WORK 1 54 8 EDUCATION AND TRAINING 157 8.1 MEASURES AND
CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISONS 158 8.2 THEORY 160 8.2.1 SCHOOLING 160 8.2.2
TRAINING 163 8.3 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 165 8.3.1 RETURNS TO SCHOOLING 165
8.3.2 ON-THE-JOB TRAINING 169 8.4 POLICY ISSUES 170 8.4.1 SHOULD
GOVERNMENTS SUBSIDIZE IN-COMPANY TRAINING? 170 8.4.2 SHOULD THERE BE A
COMPULSORY SCHOOLING AGE? 171 8.5 WHY DO GOVERNMENTS PROVIDE EDUCATION
AND TRAINING? 171 8.6 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING 1.72 8.7 REVIEW
QUESTIONS 172 8.8 TECHNICAL ANNEX: SCHOOLING AND TRAINING 172 8.8.1
OPTIMAL YEARS OF SCHOOLING 172 8.8.2 WHO PAYS FOR GENERAL TRAINING? 174
9 MIGRATION POLICIES 175 9.1 MEASURES AND CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISONS 176
9.2 THEORY 178 VIII CONTENTS 9.2.1 A COMPETITIVE LABOR MARKET 179 9.2.2
AN ECONOMY WITH WAGE RIGIDITIES 180 9.2.3 WAGE RIGIDITIES AND
UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS 181 9.2.4 WHAT DRIVES MIGRATION DECISIONS? 182
9.2.5 EFFECTS ON INCOME DISTRIBUTION OF SKILL-BIASED MIGRATION 183 9.3
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 184 9.3.1 THE LABOR MARKET PERFORMANCE OF MIGRANTS
189 9.3.2 FISCAL EFFECTS 190 9.4 POLICY ISSUES 191 9.4.1 CLOSING THE
WELFARE DOOR? 192 9.4.2 ADOPTING A POINTS SYSTEM? 193 9.5 WHY DO
MIGRATION POLICIES EXIST? 194 9.6 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING 195
9.7 REVIEW QUESTIONS 195 9.8 TECHNICAL ANNEX: NET GAINS FROM MIGRATION
AND THE OPTION VALUE OF WAITING 195 10 EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION LEGISLATION
199 10.1 MEASURES AND CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISONS 200 10.2 THEORY 204
10.2.1 A NEUTRALITY RESULT 204 10.2.2 REMOVING RISK NEUTRALITY 206
10.2.3 EPL WITH RIGID WAGES 206 10.2.4 EPL AS A TAX 209 10.2.5 TWO-TIER
REGIMES 210 10.3 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 211 ] 0,3.1 CROSS-COUNTRY ANALYSES
211 10.3.2 WITHIN-COUNTRY STUDIES 213 10.3.3 ENDOGENEITY OF EPL 214 10.4
POLICY ISSUES 215 10.4.1 HOW MUCH PROTECTION SHOULD EPL PROVIDE? 215
10.4.2 WHOM SHOULD EPL BE PROTECTING? 218 10.5 WHY DOES EMPLOYMENT
PROTECTION LEGISLATION EXIST? 220 10.6 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING
220 10.7 REVIEW QUESTIONS 221 10.8 TECHNICAL ANNEX: EPL IN A
SEARCH-MATCHING MODEL 221 10.8.1 A SIMPLE DYNAMIC FRAMEWORK 221 10.8.2
PRESENT DISCOUNTED AND FLOW VALUES 221 10.8.3 BEHAVIOR OF WORKERS 222
10.8.4 MATCHING 222 10.8.5 FIRMS 223 10.8.6 WAGE BARGAINING 223 10.8.7
INTRODUCING EPL 223 10.8.8 BASELINE PARAMETERS 224 11 UNEMPLOYMENT
BENEFITS 225 11.1 MEASURES AND CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISONS 226 11.2 THEORY
230 11.2.1 A COMPETITIVE LABOR MARKET 230 11.2.2 AN IMPERFECT LABOR
MARKET 234 CONTENTS IX 11.3 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 238 11.3.1 EFFECTS ON
RESERVATION WAGE 238 11.3.2 EFFECTS ON UNEMPLOYMENT DURATION: AGGREGATE
DATA 239 11.3.3 EFFECTS ON UNEMPLOYMENT DURATION: MICROECONOMIC DATA 240
11.3.4 EFFECTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT ON THE GENEROSITY OF UBS 243 11.4 POLICY
ISSUES 244 11.4.1 WHY AND WHEN SHOULD UBS BE PUBLICLY PROVIDED? 244
11.4.2 WHAT IS THE OPTIMAL STRUCTURE OF UBS? 246 11.5 WHY DO
UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS EXIST? 247 11.6 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING
248 11.7 REVIEW QUESTIONS 248 11.8 TECHNICAL ANNEX: UBS IN A
SEARCH-MATCHING MODEL 249 11.8.1 EFFECTS OF UBS IN A TWO-SIDED JOB
SEARCH MODEL 249 11.8.2 OPTIMAL JOB SEARCH INTENSITY 249 11.8.3
VACANCIES AND THE MATCHING FUNCTION 250 11.8.4 WAGE B ARGAINING 251
11.8.5 LABOR MARKET PARTICIPATION 251 11.8.6 BALANCED BUDGET 253 11.8.7
NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS 253 12 ACTIVE LABOR MARKET POLICIES 255 12.1
MEASURES AND CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISONS 256 12.2 THEORY 258 12.3
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 263 12.3.1 EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES 264 12.3.2
NONEXPERIMENTAL STUDIES 268 12.4 POLICY ISSUES 270 12.4.1 DO WE NEED
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT SERVICES? 271 12.4.2 DO WE NEED ACTIVATION POLICIES?
271 12.5 WHY DO ACTIVE LABOR MARKET POLICIES EXIST? 272 12.6 SUGGESTIONS
FOR FURTHER READING 272 12.7 REVIEW QUESTIONS 273 12.8 TECHNICAL ANNEX:
ACTIVATING UNEMPLOYED WORKERS 273 13 INSTITUTIONAL INTERACTIONS 277 13.1
TAXES AND UNIONS 278 13.2 EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION AND UNEMPLOYMENT
BENEFITS 280 13.3 UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS AND ACTIVE LABOR MARKET POLICIES
282 13.4 EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION AND UNIONS 284 13.5 TAXES AND
UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS 285 13.6 EDUCATION AND RETIREMENT PROGRAMS 287
13.7 WHAT FUTURE FOR THESE INSTITUTIONS? 288 REFERENCES 291 INDEX 313
|
adam_txt |
CONTENTS PREFACE XI SYMBOLS AND ACRONYMS XVII 1 OVERVIEW 1 1.1 A FEW KEY
DEFINITIONS 2 1.2 A COMPETITIVE LABOR MARKET 4 1.2.1 LABOR SUPPLY AND
THE RESERVATION WAGE WITHOUT HOURS RESTRICTIONS 4 1.2.2 AGGREGATE LABOR
SUPPLY 7 1.2.3 LABOR DEMAND AND WAGE DETERMINATION 9 1.2.4 EQUILIBRIUM
11 1.3 LABOR MARKET INSTITUTIONS 14 1.3.1 ACTING ON PRICES 14 1.3.2
ACTING ON QUANTITIES 15 1.3.3 INSTITUTIONAL INTERACTIONS 17 1.3.4 WHY DO
LABOR MARKET INSTITUTIONS EXIST? 18 1.3.5 PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION AND
INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS 21 1.4 TECHNICAL ANNEX: A SIMPLE STATIC FRAMEWORK
24 1.4.1 A COMPETITIVE LABOR MARKET 24 1.4.2 LABOR MARKET INSTITUTIONS
25 1.4.3 THE WEDGE 26 1.4.4 PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION AND THE
EMPLOYMENT BIAS OF INSTITUTIONS 27 2 MINIMUM WAGES 29 2.1 CROSS-COUNTRY
COMPARISONS 30 2.2 THEORY 33 2.2.1 A COMPETITIVE LABOR MARKET 33 2.2.2 A
NONCOMPEDTIVE LABOR MARKET 34 2.3 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 38 2.3.1 STUDIES
BASED ON FIRM-LEVEL DATA 38 2.3.2 STUDIES BASED ON NATURAL EXPERIMENTS
39 2.3.3 STUDIES BASED ON WORKERS' HISTORIES 43 2.4 POLICY ISSUES 44
2.4.1 SHOULD THE MINIMUM WAGE BE REDUCED OR INCREASED? 44 2.4.2 IS THE
MINIMUM WAGE EFFECTIVE IN REDUCING EARNINGS INEQUALITY AND POVERTY? 45
2.5 WHY DOES A MINIMUM WAGE EXIST? 46 VI CONTENTS 2.6 SUGGESTIONS FOR
FURTHER READING 47 2.7 REVIEW QUESTIONS 47 2.8 TECHNICAL ANNEX:
FINE-TUNING OF THE MINIMUM WAGE 48 3 UNIONS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 51
3.1 MEASURES AND CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISONS 52 3.1.1 UNION DENSITY 52
3.1.2 COVERAGE AND EXCESS COVERAGE 54 3.1.3 COORDINATION 56 3.2 THEORY
56 3.2.1 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 57 3.2.2 ENDOGENOUS MEMBERSHIP 61 3.3
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 66 3.3.1 EFFECTS OF UNIONS ON WAGES 67 3.3.2
BARGAINING COORDINATION, UNION DENSITY, AND UNEMPLOYMENT 71 3.4 POLICY
ISSUES 72 3.4.1 DO UNIONS INCREASE EFFICIENCY? 72 3.4.2 SHOULD
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING BE DECENTRALIZED? 74 3.5 WHY DO UNIONS EXIST? 75
3.6 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING 76 3.7 REVIEW QUESTIONS 76 3.8
TECHNICAL ANNEX: HOW STRONG SHOULD UNIONS BE IN ORDER TO BE EFFICIENT?
77 4 PAYROLL TAXES 81 4.1 MEASURES AND CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISONS 82 4.2
THEORY 86 4.3 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 90 4.4 POLICY ISSUES 92 4.4.1 NEGATIVE
INCOME TAXES OR IN-WORK BENEFITS? 92 4.4.2 TAX CREDITS OR WAGE
SUBSIDIES? 96 4.5 WHY DO PAYROLL TAXES EXIST? 97 4.6 SUGGESTIONS FOR
FURTHER READING 98 4.7 REVIEW QUESTIONS 98 4.8 TECHNICAL ANNEX: TAXES
AND BENEFITS IN A COMPETITIVE LABOR MARKET 98 5 REGULATION OF WORKING
HOURS 101 5.1 MEASURES AND CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISONS 101 5.2 THEORY 102
5.2.1 REGULATING WEEKLY WORKING HOURS 104 5.2.2 PART-TIME WORK 107 5.3
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 109 5.3.1 WORKING HOURS 109 5.3.2 PART-TIME WORK 113
5.4 POLICY ISSUES 116 5.4.1 SHOULD GOVERNMENTS REGULATE WORKING HOURS?
116 5.4.2 SHOULD GOVERNMENTS STIMULATE PART-TIME LABOR? 117 5.5 WHY DOES
REGULATION OF WORKING HOURS EXIST? 117 5.6 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER
READING 118 5.7 REVIEW QUESTIONS 118 5.8 TECHNICAL ANNEX: REDUCTION OF
STANDARD WORKING HOURS 119 CONTENTS VN 6 RETIREMENT PROGRAMS 121 6.1
MEASURES AND CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISONS 122 6.2 THEORY 124 6.3 EMPIRICAL
EVIDENCE 125 6.3.1 AGE AND EMPLOYMENT 125 6.3.2 AGE AND PRODUCTIVITY 132
6.4 POLICY ISSUES . 134 6.4.1 SHOULD THE MANDATORY RETIREMENT AGE BE
INCREASED? 134 6.4.2 SHOULD EARLY RETIREMENT PROGRAMS BE PHASED OUT? 135
6.5 WHY DO EARLY RETIREMENT PROGRAMS EXIST? 136 6.6 SUGGESTIONS FOR
FURTHER READING 136 6.7 REVIEW QUESTIONS 136 6.8 TECHNICAL ANNEX:
OPTIMAL RETIREMENT AGE 137 7 FAMILY POLICIES 139 " 7.1 MEASURES AND
CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISONS 140 7.2 THEORY 142 7.2.1 CHILD CARE FACILITIES
142 7.2.2 PARENTAL LEAVE 142 7.3 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 144 7.4 POLICY
ISSUES 150 7.4.1 CAN WORK AND FAMILY LIFE BE BALANCED? 150 7.4.2 IS
THERE A TRADE-OFF BETWEEN FERTILITY AND EMPLOYMENT? 151 7.5 WHY DO
FAMILY POLICIES EXIST? 153. 7.6 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING 153 7.7
REVIEW QUESTIONS 154 7.8 TECHNICAL ANNEX: CHILD CARE FACILITIES AND
HOURS OF WORK 1 54 8 EDUCATION AND TRAINING 157 8.1 MEASURES AND
CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISONS 158 8.2 THEORY 160 8.2.1 SCHOOLING 160 8.2.2
TRAINING 163 8.3 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 165 8.3.1 RETURNS TO SCHOOLING 165
8.3.2 ON-THE-JOB TRAINING 169 8.4 POLICY ISSUES 170 8.4.1 SHOULD
GOVERNMENTS SUBSIDIZE IN-COMPANY TRAINING? 170 8.4.2 SHOULD THERE BE A
COMPULSORY SCHOOLING AGE? 171 8.5 WHY DO GOVERNMENTS PROVIDE EDUCATION
AND TRAINING? 171 8.6 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING 1.72 8.7 REVIEW
QUESTIONS 172 8.8 TECHNICAL ANNEX: SCHOOLING AND TRAINING 172 8.8.1
OPTIMAL YEARS OF SCHOOLING 172 8.8.2 WHO PAYS FOR GENERAL TRAINING? 174
9 MIGRATION POLICIES 175 9.1 MEASURES AND CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISONS 176
9.2 THEORY 178 VIII CONTENTS 9.2.1 A COMPETITIVE LABOR MARKET 179 9.2.2
AN ECONOMY WITH WAGE RIGIDITIES 180 9.2.3 WAGE RIGIDITIES AND
UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS 181 9.2.4 WHAT DRIVES MIGRATION DECISIONS? 182
9.2.5 EFFECTS ON INCOME DISTRIBUTION OF SKILL-BIASED MIGRATION 183 9.3
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 184 9.3.1 THE LABOR MARKET PERFORMANCE OF MIGRANTS
189 9.3.2 FISCAL EFFECTS 190 9.4 POLICY ISSUES 191 9.4.1 CLOSING THE
WELFARE DOOR? 192 9.4.2 ADOPTING A POINTS SYSTEM? 193 9.5 WHY DO
MIGRATION POLICIES EXIST? 194 9.6 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING 195
9.7 REVIEW QUESTIONS 195 9.8 TECHNICAL ANNEX: NET GAINS FROM MIGRATION
AND THE OPTION VALUE OF WAITING 195 10 EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION LEGISLATION
199 10.1 MEASURES AND CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISONS 200 10.2 THEORY 204
10.2.1 A NEUTRALITY RESULT 204 10.2.2 REMOVING RISK NEUTRALITY 206
10.2.3 EPL WITH RIGID WAGES 206 10.2.4 EPL AS A TAX 209 10.2.5 TWO-TIER
REGIMES 210 10.3 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 211 ] 0,3.1 CROSS-COUNTRY ANALYSES
211 10.3.2 WITHIN-COUNTRY STUDIES 213 10.3.3 ENDOGENEITY OF EPL 214 10.4
POLICY ISSUES 215 10.4.1 HOW MUCH PROTECTION SHOULD EPL PROVIDE? 215
10.4.2 WHOM SHOULD EPL BE PROTECTING? 218 10.5 WHY DOES EMPLOYMENT
PROTECTION LEGISLATION EXIST? 220 10.6 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING
220 10.7 REVIEW QUESTIONS 221 10.8 TECHNICAL ANNEX: EPL IN A
SEARCH-MATCHING MODEL 221 10.8.1 A SIMPLE DYNAMIC FRAMEWORK 221 10.8.2
PRESENT DISCOUNTED AND FLOW VALUES 221 10.8.3 BEHAVIOR OF WORKERS 222
10.8.4 MATCHING 222 10.8.5 FIRMS 223 10.8.6 WAGE BARGAINING 223 10.8.7
INTRODUCING EPL 223 10.8.8 BASELINE PARAMETERS 224 11 UNEMPLOYMENT
BENEFITS 225 11.1 MEASURES AND CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISONS 226 11.2 THEORY
230 11.2.1 A COMPETITIVE LABOR MARKET 230 11.2.2 AN IMPERFECT LABOR
MARKET 234 CONTENTS IX 11.3 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 238 11.3.1 EFFECTS ON
RESERVATION WAGE 238 11.3.2 EFFECTS ON UNEMPLOYMENT DURATION: AGGREGATE
DATA 239 11.3.3 EFFECTS ON UNEMPLOYMENT DURATION: MICROECONOMIC DATA 240
11.3.4 EFFECTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT ON THE GENEROSITY OF UBS 243 11.4 POLICY
ISSUES 244 11.4.1 WHY AND WHEN SHOULD UBS BE PUBLICLY PROVIDED? 244
11.4.2 WHAT IS THE OPTIMAL STRUCTURE OF UBS? 246 11.5 WHY DO
UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS EXIST? 247 11.6 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING
248 11.7 REVIEW QUESTIONS 248 11.8 TECHNICAL ANNEX: UBS IN A
SEARCH-MATCHING MODEL 249 11.8.1 EFFECTS OF UBS IN A TWO-SIDED JOB
SEARCH MODEL 249 11.8.2 OPTIMAL JOB SEARCH INTENSITY 249 11.8.3
VACANCIES AND THE MATCHING FUNCTION 250 11.8.4 WAGE B ARGAINING 251
11.8.5 LABOR MARKET PARTICIPATION 251 11.8.6 BALANCED BUDGET 253 11.8.7
NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS 253 12 ACTIVE LABOR MARKET POLICIES 255 12.1
MEASURES AND CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISONS 256 12.2 THEORY 258 12.3
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 263 12.3.1 EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES 264 12.3.2
NONEXPERIMENTAL STUDIES 268 12.4 POLICY ISSUES 270 12.4.1 DO WE NEED
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT SERVICES? 271 12.4.2 DO WE NEED ACTIVATION POLICIES?
271 12.5 WHY DO ACTIVE LABOR MARKET POLICIES EXIST? 272 12.6 SUGGESTIONS
FOR FURTHER READING 272 12.7 REVIEW QUESTIONS 273 12.8 TECHNICAL ANNEX:
ACTIVATING UNEMPLOYED WORKERS 273 13 INSTITUTIONAL INTERACTIONS 277 13.1
TAXES AND UNIONS 278 13.2 EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION AND UNEMPLOYMENT
BENEFITS 280 13.3 UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS AND ACTIVE LABOR MARKET POLICIES
282 13.4 EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION AND UNIONS 284 13.5 TAXES AND
UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS 285 13.6 EDUCATION AND RETIREMENT PROGRAMS 287
13.7 WHAT FUTURE FOR THESE INSTITUTIONS? 288 REFERENCES 291 INDEX 313 |
any_adam_object | 1 |
any_adam_object_boolean | 1 |
author | Boeri, Tito 1958- Ours, Jan C. van 1954- |
author_GND | (DE-588)124802133 (DE-588)121874095 |
author_facet | Boeri, Tito 1958- Ours, Jan C. van 1954- |
author_role | aut aut |
author_sort | Boeri, Tito 1958- |
author_variant | t b tb j c v o jcv jcvo |
building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | BV023420813 |
callnumber-first | H - Social Science |
callnumber-label | HD5706 |
callnumber-raw | HD5706 |
callnumber-search | HD5706 |
callnumber-sort | HD 45706 |
callnumber-subject | HD - Industries, Land Use, Labor |
classification_rvk | QV 200 |
ctrlnum | (OCoLC)213358276 (DE-599)BVBBV023420813 |
dewey-full | 331.12 |
dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
dewey-ones | 331 - Labor economics |
dewey-raw | 331.12 |
dewey-search | 331.12 |
dewey-sort | 3331.12 |
dewey-tens | 330 - Economics |
discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
discipline_str_mv | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
format | Book |
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id | DE-604.BV023420813 |
illustrated | Illustrated |
index_date | 2024-07-02T21:31:01Z |
indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:18:15Z |
institution | BVB |
isbn | 9780691124490 9780691137353 |
language | English |
lccn | 2008062104 |
oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016603256 |
oclc_num | 213358276 |
open_access_boolean | |
owner | DE-20 DE-N2 DE-703 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-739 DE-521 DE-384 DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-M382 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-11 DE-2070s DE-188 DE-29 DE-1047 |
owner_facet | DE-20 DE-N2 DE-703 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-739 DE-521 DE-384 DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-M382 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-11 DE-2070s DE-188 DE-29 DE-1047 |
physical | XX, 319 S. graph. Darst. |
publishDate | 2008 |
publishDateSearch | 2008 |
publishDateSort | 2008 |
publisher | Princeton Univ. Press |
record_format | marc |
spelling | Boeri, Tito 1958- Verfasser (DE-588)124802133 aut The economics of imperfect labor markets Tito Boeri and Jan van Ours Princeton, NJ [u.a.] Princeton Univ. Press 2008 XX, 319 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Literaturverz. S. [291] - 311 ; Index Labor market Arbeitsmarkttheorie (DE-588)4122827-3 gnd rswk-swf Arbeitsmarktpolitik (DE-588)4002737-5 gnd rswk-swf Arbeitsökonomie (DE-588)4322126-9 gnd rswk-swf Arbeitsmarkt (DE-588)4002733-8 gnd rswk-swf Unvollkommener Markt (DE-588)4062060-8 gnd rswk-swf Arbeitsmarkttheorie (DE-588)4122827-3 s Unvollkommener Markt (DE-588)4062060-8 s Arbeitsmarktpolitik (DE-588)4002737-5 s DE-604 Arbeitsmarkt (DE-588)4002733-8 s Arbeitsökonomie (DE-588)4322126-9 s 1\p DE-604 Ours, Jan C. van 1954- Verfasser (DE-588)121874095 aut SWB Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016603256&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
spellingShingle | Boeri, Tito 1958- Ours, Jan C. van 1954- The economics of imperfect labor markets Labor market Arbeitsmarkttheorie (DE-588)4122827-3 gnd Arbeitsmarktpolitik (DE-588)4002737-5 gnd Arbeitsökonomie (DE-588)4322126-9 gnd Arbeitsmarkt (DE-588)4002733-8 gnd Unvollkommener Markt (DE-588)4062060-8 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4122827-3 (DE-588)4002737-5 (DE-588)4322126-9 (DE-588)4002733-8 (DE-588)4062060-8 |
title | The economics of imperfect labor markets |
title_auth | The economics of imperfect labor markets |
title_exact_search | The economics of imperfect labor markets |
title_exact_search_txtP | The economics of imperfect labor markets |
title_full | The economics of imperfect labor markets Tito Boeri and Jan van Ours |
title_fullStr | The economics of imperfect labor markets Tito Boeri and Jan van Ours |
title_full_unstemmed | The economics of imperfect labor markets Tito Boeri and Jan van Ours |
title_short | The economics of imperfect labor markets |
title_sort | the economics of imperfect labor markets |
topic | Labor market Arbeitsmarkttheorie (DE-588)4122827-3 gnd Arbeitsmarktpolitik (DE-588)4002737-5 gnd Arbeitsökonomie (DE-588)4322126-9 gnd Arbeitsmarkt (DE-588)4002733-8 gnd Unvollkommener Markt (DE-588)4062060-8 gnd |
topic_facet | Labor market Arbeitsmarkttheorie Arbeitsmarktpolitik Arbeitsökonomie Arbeitsmarkt Unvollkommener Markt |
url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016603256&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
work_keys_str_mv | AT boeritito theeconomicsofimperfectlabormarkets AT oursjancvan theeconomicsofimperfectlabormarkets |