Superstar CEOS:
"Compensation, status, and press coverage of managers in the U.S. follow a highly skewed distribution: a small number of 'superstars' enjoy the bulk of the rewards. We evaluate the impact of CEOs achieving superstar status on the performance of their firms, using prestigious business...
Gespeichert in:
Hauptverfasser: | , |
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Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2008
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Schriftenreihe: | NBER working paper
14140 |
Online-Zugang: | kostenfrei |
Zusammenfassung: | "Compensation, status, and press coverage of managers in the U.S. follow a highly skewed distribution: a small number of 'superstars' enjoy the bulk of the rewards. We evaluate the impact of CEOs achieving superstar status on the performance of their firms, using prestigious business awards to measure shocks to CEO status. We find that award-winning CEOs subsequently underperform, both relative to their prior performance and relative to a matched sample of non-winning CEOs. At the same time, they extract more compensation following the award, both in absolute amounts and relative to other top executives in their firms. They also spend more time on public and private activities outside their companies, such as assuming board seats or writing books. The incidence of earnings management increases after winning awards. The effects are strongest in firms with weak governance, even though the frequency of obtaining superstar status is independent of corporate governance. Our results suggest that the ex-post consequences of media-induced superstar status for shareholders are negative"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site |
Beschreibung: | 31 S. graph. Darst. |
Internformat
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520 | 8 | |a "Compensation, status, and press coverage of managers in the U.S. follow a highly skewed distribution: a small number of 'superstars' enjoy the bulk of the rewards. We evaluate the impact of CEOs achieving superstar status on the performance of their firms, using prestigious business awards to measure shocks to CEO status. We find that award-winning CEOs subsequently underperform, both relative to their prior performance and relative to a matched sample of non-winning CEOs. At the same time, they extract more compensation following the award, both in absolute amounts and relative to other top executives in their firms. They also spend more time on public and private activities outside their companies, such as assuming board seats or writing books. The incidence of earnings management increases after winning awards. The effects are strongest in firms with weak governance, even though the frequency of obtaining superstar status is independent of corporate governance. Our results suggest that the ex-post consequences of media-induced superstar status for shareholders are negative"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site | |
700 | 1 | |a Tate, Geoffrey |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)129717770 |4 aut | |
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830 | 0 | |a NBER working paper |v 14140 |w (DE-604)BV002801238 |9 14140 | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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format | Book |
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id | DE-604.BV023411750 |
illustrated | Illustrated |
index_date | 2024-07-02T21:27:51Z |
indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:18:03Z |
institution | BVB |
language | English |
oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016594353 |
oclc_num | 233266334 |
open_access_boolean | 1 |
owner | DE-M382 DE-521 |
owner_facet | DE-M382 DE-521 |
physical | 31 S. graph. Darst. |
publishDate | 2008 |
publishDateSearch | 2008 |
publishDateSort | 2008 |
publisher | National Bureau of Economic Research |
record_format | marc |
series | NBER working paper |
series2 | NBER working paper |
spelling | Malmendier, Ulrike 1973- Verfasser (DE-588)123423619 aut Superstar CEOS Ulrike Malmendier ; Geoffrey Tate Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2008 31 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier NBER working paper 14140 "Compensation, status, and press coverage of managers in the U.S. follow a highly skewed distribution: a small number of 'superstars' enjoy the bulk of the rewards. We evaluate the impact of CEOs achieving superstar status on the performance of their firms, using prestigious business awards to measure shocks to CEO status. We find that award-winning CEOs subsequently underperform, both relative to their prior performance and relative to a matched sample of non-winning CEOs. At the same time, they extract more compensation following the award, both in absolute amounts and relative to other top executives in their firms. They also spend more time on public and private activities outside their companies, such as assuming board seats or writing books. The incidence of earnings management increases after winning awards. The effects are strongest in firms with weak governance, even though the frequency of obtaining superstar status is independent of corporate governance. Our results suggest that the ex-post consequences of media-induced superstar status for shareholders are negative"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site Tate, Geoffrey Verfasser (DE-588)129717770 aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe NBER working paper 14140 (DE-604)BV002801238 14140 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w14140.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
spellingShingle | Malmendier, Ulrike 1973- Tate, Geoffrey Superstar CEOS NBER working paper |
title | Superstar CEOS |
title_auth | Superstar CEOS |
title_exact_search | Superstar CEOS |
title_exact_search_txtP | Superstar CEOS |
title_full | Superstar CEOS Ulrike Malmendier ; Geoffrey Tate |
title_fullStr | Superstar CEOS Ulrike Malmendier ; Geoffrey Tate |
title_full_unstemmed | Superstar CEOS Ulrike Malmendier ; Geoffrey Tate |
title_short | Superstar CEOS |
title_sort | superstar ceos |
url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w14140.pdf |
volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT malmendierulrike superstarceos AT tategeoffrey superstarceos |