A stakeholder rationale for risk management: implications for corporate finance decisions
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Format: | Abschlussarbeit Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Wiesbaden
Gabler
2008
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Ausgabe: | 1. ed. |
Schriftenreihe: | Gabler Edition Wissenschaft
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Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
Beschreibung: | XVIII, 210 S. 21 cm |
ISBN: | 9783834909855 |
Internformat
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100 | 1 | |a Gossy, Gregor |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
245 | 1 | 0 | |a A stakeholder rationale for risk management |b implications for corporate finance decisions |c Gregor Gossy. With a foreword by Paul Wentges |
250 | |a 1. ed. | ||
264 | 1 | |a Wiesbaden |b Gabler |c 2008 | |
300 | |a XVIII, 210 S. |c 21 cm | ||
336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
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338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
490 | 0 | |a Gabler Edition Wissenschaft | |
502 | |a Zugl.: Wien, Wirtschaftsuniv., Diss., 2007 | ||
650 | 4 | |a Corporations |x Finance | |
650 | 4 | |a Risk management | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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adam_text | Table of Contents
1 Introduction...........................................................................................................1
1.1 Relevance of the topic......................................................................................1
1.2 Objectives of the dissertation and research questions......................................2
1.3 Structure...........................................................................................................3
2 Stakeholder Theory...............................................................................................5
2.1 Historical roots of stakeholder theory..............................................................5
2.2 Stakeholder definitions....................................................................................6
2.3 Classifications of stakeholder theory...............................................................7
2.3.1 The classification by Donaldson and Preston (1995)...............................7
2.3.2 The classification by Roberts and Mahoney (2004).................................9
2.3.3 Concluding remarks................................................................................10
3 The Theory of the Firm.......................................................................................13
3.1 The firm in neoclassical economic theory.....................................................13
3.2 The firm within the framework of new institutional economic theory..........14
3.2.1 Positive agency theory............................................................................14
3.2.2 Transaction cost theory...........................................................................16
3.2.2.1 Characteristics of transactions.........................................................17
3.2.2.2 Holdup and moral hazard................................................................19
3.2.2.3 The firm as a governance mechanism.............................................19
3.2.3 Property rights theory.............................................................................20
3.2.3.1 Traditional property rights theory...................................................20
3.2.3.2 Property rights theory of Grossmann, Hart and Moore...................22
3.2.4 The modern firm as a nexus of specific investments.............................24
3.3 The resource-based view of the firm..............................................................25
3.3.1 General....................................................................................................25
3.3.2 Comparing the resource-based view to alternative theories of the firm. 27
3.4 A stakeholder-centered concept of the modern firm......................................29
3.4.1 Value creation in the modern firm..........................................................29
3.4.2 Conceptualizing firm value through Net Organizational Capital...........30
4 The Theory of Corporate Risk Management....................................................33
4.1 The foundations of modern finance...............................................................33
4.1.1 The Modigliani Miller-framework in the context of corporate
risk management.....................................................................................33
4.1.2 Capital market theory in the context of corporate risk management......34
4.1.2.1 A critical appraisal of the Capital Asset Pricing Model..................38
4.1.2.1.1 Challenges from a financial economics perspective...................38
4.1.2.1.2 Challenges from a strategic management s perspective...............39
4.2 The financial theory of corporate risk management......................................41
4.2.1 The managerial utility maximization hypothesis of corporate
risk management.....................................................................................43
XI
4.2.2 The shareholder value maximization hypothesis of corporate
risk management.....................................................................................44
4.2.2.1 Large undiversified shareholders....................................................44
4.2.2.2 Taxes...............................................................................................44
4.2.2.3 Underinvestment and asset substitution problems..........................45
4.2.2.4 Investment policy and capital market imperfections......................47
4.2.2.5 Direct costs of bankruptcy and financial distress............................48
4.3 A stakeholder rationale for risk management................................................49
4.3.1 Non-financial stakeholders as risk bearers.............................................49
4.3.1.1 Contractual incompleteness and opportunistic firm behavior.........49
4.3.1.2 Costs of financial distress and the firm s financial standing...........51
4.3.1.2.1 Sources of indirect costs of financial distress..............................51
4.3.1.2.2 Probability of default...................................................................53
4.3.2 Implications of a stakeholder reasoning for risk management...............53
4.3.2.1 Widening the scope of corporate risk management........................53
4.3.2.2 The role of corporate financial policy.............................................55
4.3.2.2.1 Signaling through financial policy...............................................55
4.3.2.2.2 Increasing management s flexibility............................................56
4.3.2.3 The performance effect...................................................................58
4.3.3 Empirical evidence.................................................................................60
4.3.3.1 Evidence from financial economics literature.................................61
4.3.3.1.1 Evidence on capital structure choice............................................61
4.3.3.1.2 Evidence on dividend policy........................................................63
4.3.3.1.3 Evidence on cash holdings...........................................................63
4.3.3.1.4 Evidence on corporate hedging....................................................64
4.3.3.2 Evidence from strategic management literature..............................64
4.3.3.3 Evidence from accounting literature...............................................65
4.3.4 Concluding remarks................................................................................66
Theories of Corporate Finance Decisions.........................................................69
5.1 Capital structure.............................................................................................69
5.1.1 Theoretical evidence...............................................................................69
5.1.1.1 Neoclassical theories of capital structure........................................69
5.1.1.2 Neo-institutional theories of capital structure.................................71
5.1.1.2.1 Agency cost models of capital structure......................................72
5.1.1.2.2 Asymmetric information models of capital structure..................74
5.1.1.2.3 Capital structure models based on product/input
market interactions.......................................................................76
5.1.1.2.4 Transaction cost arguments for capital structure.........................80
5.1.1.3 Stakeholder theory of capital structure...........................................81
5.1.1.4 Capital structure and corporate strategy..........................................81
5.1.2 Empirical evidence.................................................................................83
5.1.2.1 General............................................................................................83
5.1.2.2 Studies considering strategic aspects of the capital structure
choice...............................................................................................85
5.1.2.2.1 Barton and Gordon (1988)...........................................................85
5.1.2.2.2 Barton et al. (1989)......................................................................85
XII
5.1.2.2.3 Lowe et al. (1994) and Jordan et al. (1998).................................87
5.1.2.2.4 Balakrishnan and Fox (1993).......................................................87
5.1.2.2.5 Vicente-Lorente(2001)................................................................89
5.1.2.2.6 O Brien (2003).............................................................................90
5.1.2.3 Studies considering product/input market interactions...................91
5.1.2.3.1 Sarig(1998)..................................................................................92
5.1.2.3.2 Banerjee et al. (2004)...................................................................92
5.1.2.3.3 Franck and Huyghebaert (2006)..................................................94
5.1.2.3.4 Kale and Shahrur (2007)..............................................................95
5.2 Dividend policy..............................................................................................96
5.2.1 Theoretical evidence...............................................................................96
5.2.1.1 Asymmetric information - signaling models of dividend policy.... 97
5.2.1.2 Agency models of dividend policy..................................................98
5.2.1.3 A stakeholder-based argument on dividend policy.........................98
5.2.2 Empirical evidence.................................................................................99
5.2.2.1 Holder etal. (1998).......................................................................100
5.2.2.2 Brav et al. (2004)...........................................................................102
5.3 Corporate cash holdings...............................................................................103
5.3.1 Theoretical evidence.............................................................................103
5.3.1.1 Static trade-off theory....................................................................104
5.3.1.2 Financing hierarchy theory............................................................107
5.3.1.3 A corporate hedging based argument on cash holdings................108
5.3.1.4 A stakeholder-based argument on cash holdings..........................110
5.3.2 Empirical evidence...............................................................................110
5.3.2.1 Kim et al. (1998)...........................................................................110
5.3.2.2 Opleretal. (1999).........................................................................Ill
5.3.2.3 Dittmar et al. (2003)......................................................................Ill
5.3.2.4 Mikkelson and Partch (2003)........................................................112
5.3.2.5 Schwetzler and Reimund (2004)...................................................113
5.3.2.6 Ozkan and Ozkan (2004)...............................................................114
5.3.2.7 Bates et al. (2006)..........................................................................114
5.4 Conservatism in finance and accounting.....................................................115
5.5 Concluding remarks.....................................................................................116
6 Statistical methodology.....................................................................................119
6.1 Multiple linear regression............................................................................119
6.2 Panel data.....................................................................................................122
6.2.1 General..................................................................................................122
6.2.2 The omitted variables problem.............................................................123
6.2.3 The basic linear unobserved effects panel data model.........................123
6.2.4 Methods of estimation..........................................................................124
6.2.4.1 Pooled OLS estimation..................................................................124
6.2.4.2 First differencing estimation.........................................................125
6.2.4.3 Fixed effects estimation................................................................126
6.2.4.3.1 Estimation with cross-section fixed effects...............................126
6.2.4.3.2 Estimation with time fixed effects.............................................128
6.2.4.3.3 Estimation with both cross-section and time fixed effects........128
XIII
6.2.4.4 Random effects estimation............................................................129
6.2.5 Comparison of estimation methods......................................................130
6.2.5.1 Fixed effects or first differencing..................................................130
6.2.5.2 Fixed effects or random effects.....................................................130
7 Empirical study..................................................................................................133
7.1 Research gap................................................................................................133
7.2 Hypotheses...................................................................................................133
7.3 Data..............................................................................................................134
7.3.1 Data collection......................................................................................134
7.3.2 Sample deletion process.......................................................................135
7.3.3 Subsamples based on reported accounting standards...........................136
7.4 Variables......................................................................................................138
7.4.1 Capital structure variables....................................................................138
7.4.1.1 Dependent variable........................................................................138
7.4.1.2 Independent financial control variables........................................140
7.4.2 Cash holdings variables........................................................................143
7.4.2.1 Dependent variable........................................................................143
7.4.2.2 Independent financial control variables........................................143
7.4.3 Stakeholder variables............................................................................146
7.4.3.1 An accounting-based approach of measuring implicit
stakeholder claims.........................................................................146
7.4.3.1.1 Bowen et al. (1995)....................................................................146
7.4.3.1.2 Matsumoto (2002)......................................................................150
7.4.3.2 Independent stakeholder variables employed in this study...........150
7.5 FD and FE model specifications..................................................................153
7.5.1 Capital structure models.......................................................................154
7.5.2 Cash holdings models...........................................................................155
7.6 Results and discussion.................................................................................155
7.6.1 Univariate descriptive results...............................................................155
7.6.1.1 Univariate descriptive results of corporate capital structure.........155
7.6.1.2 Univariate descriptive results of corporate cash holdings.............157
7.6.2 Multivariate results...............................................................................158
7.6.2.1 Multivariate analysis of corporate capital structure......................159
7.6.2.2 Multivariate analysis of corporate cash holdings..........................163
8 Conclusions and suggestions for future research...........................................167
Appendix A (Industry classification of all samples for the 1998-2004 period).........171
Appendix B (Descriptive statistics of all samples for the 2002-2004 period)............175
Appendix C (Correlation matrices of all samples for the 2002-2004 period)............179
Appendix D (FD capital structure model results of Local Standards/IFRS firms) .... 180
Appendix E (FD cash holdings model results of US GAAP/Overall sample firms).. 181
References..................................................................................................................183
XIV
List of Tables
Table 1: Sample deletion process...............................................................................136
Table 2: Observations by accounting standard for the sample period 1998-2004.....137
Table 3: Missing values by accounting standard for the sample period 1998-2004 ..138
Table 4: Industry dummy variable..............................................................................153
Table 5: Leverage ratios in percent across all subsamples.........................................156
Table 6: Cash ratios in percent across all subsamples................................................157
Table 7: Fixed effects estimation of the capital structure model................................159
Table 8: Fixed effects estimation of the cash holdings model....................................163
XV
|
adam_txt |
Table of Contents
1 Introduction.1
1.1 Relevance of the topic.1
1.2 Objectives of the dissertation and research questions.2
1.3 Structure.3
2 Stakeholder Theory.5
2.1 Historical roots of stakeholder theory.5
2.2 Stakeholder definitions.6
2.3 Classifications of stakeholder theory.7
2.3.1 The classification by Donaldson and Preston (1995).7
2.3.2 The classification by Roberts and Mahoney (2004).9
2.3.3 Concluding remarks.10
3 The Theory of the Firm.13
3.1 The firm in neoclassical economic theory.13
3.2 The firm within the framework of new institutional economic theory.14
3.2.1 Positive agency theory.14
3.2.2 Transaction cost theory.16
3.2.2.1 Characteristics of transactions.17
3.2.2.2 Holdup and moral hazard.19
3.2.2.3 The firm as a governance mechanism.19
3.2.3 Property rights theory.20
3.2.3.1 Traditional property rights theory.20
3.2.3.2 Property rights theory of Grossmann, Hart and Moore.22
3.2.4 The modern firm as a nexus of specific investments.24
3.3 The resource-based view of the firm.25
3.3.1 General.25
3.3.2 Comparing the resource-based view to alternative theories of the firm. 27
3.4 A stakeholder-centered concept of the modern firm.29
3.4.1 Value creation in the modern firm.29
3.4.2 Conceptualizing firm value through Net Organizational Capital.30
4 The Theory of Corporate Risk Management.33
4.1 The foundations of modern finance.33
4.1.1 The Modigliani Miller-framework in the context of corporate
risk management.33
4.1.2 Capital market theory in the context of corporate risk management.34
4.1.2.1 A critical appraisal of the Capital Asset Pricing Model.38
4.1.2.1.1 Challenges from a financial economics' perspective.38
4.1.2.1.2 Challenges from a strategic management's perspective.39
4.2 The financial theory of corporate risk management.41
4.2.1 The managerial utility maximization hypothesis of corporate
risk management.43
XI
4.2.2 The shareholder value maximization hypothesis of corporate
risk management.44
4.2.2.1 Large undiversified shareholders.44
4.2.2.2 Taxes.44
4.2.2.3 Underinvestment and asset substitution problems.45
4.2.2.4 Investment policy and capital market imperfections.47
4.2.2.5 Direct costs of bankruptcy and financial distress.48
4.3 A stakeholder rationale for risk management.49
4.3.1 Non-financial stakeholders as risk bearers.49
4.3.1.1 Contractual incompleteness and opportunistic firm behavior.49
4.3.1.2 Costs of financial distress and the firm's financial standing.51
4.3.1.2.1 Sources of indirect costs of financial distress.51
4.3.1.2.2 Probability of default.53
4.3.2 Implications of a stakeholder reasoning for risk management.53
4.3.2.1 Widening the scope of corporate risk management.53
4.3.2.2 The role of corporate financial policy.55
4.3.2.2.1 Signaling through financial policy.55
4.3.2.2.2 Increasing management's flexibility.56
4.3.2.3 The performance effect.58
4.3.3 Empirical evidence.60
4.3.3.1 Evidence from financial economics literature.61
4.3.3.1.1 Evidence on capital structure choice.61
4.3.3.1.2 Evidence on dividend policy.63
4.3.3.1.3 Evidence on cash holdings.63
4.3.3.1.4 Evidence on corporate hedging.64
4.3.3.2 Evidence from strategic management literature.64
4.3.3.3 Evidence from accounting literature.65
4.3.4 Concluding remarks.66
Theories of Corporate Finance Decisions.69
5.1 Capital structure.69
5.1.1 Theoretical evidence.69
5.1.1.1 Neoclassical theories of capital structure.69
5.1.1.2 Neo-institutional theories of capital structure.71
5.1.1.2.1 Agency cost models of capital structure.72
5.1.1.2.2 Asymmetric information models of capital structure.74
5.1.1.2.3 Capital structure models based on product/input
market interactions.76
5.1.1.2.4 Transaction cost arguments for capital structure.80
5.1.1.3 Stakeholder theory of capital structure.81
5.1.1.4 Capital structure and corporate strategy.81
5.1.2 Empirical evidence.83
5.1.2.1 General.83
5.1.2.2 Studies considering strategic aspects of the capital structure
choice.85
5.1.2.2.1 Barton and Gordon (1988).85
5.1.2.2.2 Barton et al. (1989).85
XII
5.1.2.2.3 Lowe et al. (1994) and Jordan et al. (1998).87
5.1.2.2.4 Balakrishnan and Fox (1993).87
5.1.2.2.5 Vicente-Lorente(2001).89
5.1.2.2.6 O'Brien (2003).90
5.1.2.3 Studies considering product/input market interactions.91
5.1.2.3.1 Sarig(1998).92
5.1.2.3.2 Banerjee et al. (2004).92
5.1.2.3.3 Franck and Huyghebaert (2006).94
5.1.2.3.4 Kale and Shahrur (2007).95
5.2 Dividend policy.96
5.2.1 Theoretical evidence.96
5.2.1.1 Asymmetric information - signaling models of dividend policy. 97
5.2.1.2 Agency models of dividend policy.98
5.2.1.3 A stakeholder-based argument on dividend policy.98
5.2.2 Empirical evidence.99
5.2.2.1 Holder etal. (1998).100
5.2.2.2 Brav et al. (2004).102
5.3 Corporate cash holdings.103
5.3.1 Theoretical evidence.103
5.3.1.1 Static trade-off theory.104
5.3.1.2 Financing hierarchy theory.107
5.3.1.3 A corporate hedging based argument on cash holdings.108
5.3.1.4 A stakeholder-based argument on cash holdings.110
5.3.2 Empirical evidence.110
5.3.2.1 Kim et al. (1998).110
5.3.2.2 Opleretal. (1999).Ill
5.3.2.3 Dittmar et al. (2003).Ill
5.3.2.4 Mikkelson and Partch (2003).112
5.3.2.5 Schwetzler and Reimund (2004).113
5.3.2.6 Ozkan and Ozkan (2004).114
5.3.2.7 Bates et al. (2006).114
5.4 Conservatism in finance and accounting.115
5.5 Concluding remarks.116
6 Statistical methodology.119
6.1 Multiple linear regression.119
6.2 Panel data.122
6.2.1 General.122
6.2.2 The omitted variables problem.123
6.2.3 The basic linear unobserved effects panel data model.123
6.2.4 Methods of estimation.124
6.2.4.1 Pooled OLS estimation.124
6.2.4.2 First differencing estimation.125
6.2.4.3 Fixed effects estimation.126
6.2.4.3.1 Estimation with cross-section fixed effects.126
6.2.4.3.2 Estimation with time fixed effects.128
6.2.4.3.3 Estimation with both cross-section and time fixed effects.128
XIII
6.2.4.4 Random effects estimation.129
6.2.5 Comparison of estimation methods.130
6.2.5.1 Fixed effects or first differencing.130
6.2.5.2 Fixed effects or random effects.130
7 Empirical study.133
7.1 Research gap.133
7.2 Hypotheses.133
7.3 Data.134
7.3.1 Data collection.134
7.3.2 Sample deletion process.135
7.3.3 Subsamples based on reported accounting standards.136
7.4 Variables.138
7.4.1 Capital structure variables.138
7.4.1.1 Dependent variable.138
7.4.1.2 Independent financial control variables.140
7.4.2 Cash holdings variables.143
7.4.2.1 Dependent variable.143
7.4.2.2 Independent financial control variables.143
7.4.3 Stakeholder variables.146
7.4.3.1 An accounting-based approach of measuring implicit
stakeholder claims.146
7.4.3.1.1 Bowen et al. (1995).146
7.4.3.1.2 Matsumoto (2002).150
7.4.3.2 Independent stakeholder variables employed in this study.150
7.5 FD and FE model specifications.153
7.5.1 Capital structure models.154
7.5.2 Cash holdings models.155
7.6 Results and discussion.155
7.6.1 Univariate descriptive results.155
7.6.1.1 Univariate descriptive results of corporate capital structure.155
7.6.1.2 Univariate descriptive results of corporate cash holdings.157
7.6.2 Multivariate results.158
7.6.2.1 Multivariate analysis of corporate capital structure.159
7.6.2.2 Multivariate analysis of corporate cash holdings.163
8 Conclusions and suggestions for future research.167
Appendix A (Industry classification of all samples for the 1998-2004 period).171
Appendix B (Descriptive statistics of all samples for the 2002-2004 period).175
Appendix C (Correlation matrices of all samples for the 2002-2004 period).179
Appendix D (FD capital structure model results of Local Standards/IFRS firms) . 180
Appendix E (FD cash holdings model results of US GAAP/Overall sample firms). 181
References.183
XIV
List of Tables
Table 1: Sample deletion process.136
Table 2: Observations by accounting standard for the sample period 1998-2004.137
Table 3: Missing values by accounting standard for the sample period 1998-2004 .138
Table 4: Industry dummy variable.153
Table 5: Leverage ratios in percent across all subsamples.156
Table 6: Cash ratios in percent across all subsamples.157
Table 7: Fixed effects estimation of the capital structure model.159
Table 8: Fixed effects estimation of the cash holdings model.163
XV |
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edition | 1. ed. |
format | Thesis Book |
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genre | (DE-588)4113937-9 Hochschulschrift gnd-content |
genre_facet | Hochschulschrift |
id | DE-604.BV023411644 |
illustrated | Not Illustrated |
index_date | 2024-07-02T21:27:48Z |
indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:18:02Z |
institution | BVB |
isbn | 9783834909855 |
language | English |
oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016594247 |
oclc_num | 603543015 |
open_access_boolean | |
owner | DE-12 |
owner_facet | DE-12 |
physical | XVIII, 210 S. 21 cm |
publishDate | 2008 |
publishDateSearch | 2008 |
publishDateSort | 2008 |
publisher | Gabler |
record_format | marc |
series2 | Gabler Edition Wissenschaft |
spelling | Gossy, Gregor Verfasser aut A stakeholder rationale for risk management implications for corporate finance decisions Gregor Gossy. With a foreword by Paul Wentges 1. ed. Wiesbaden Gabler 2008 XVIII, 210 S. 21 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Gabler Edition Wissenschaft Zugl.: Wien, Wirtschaftsuniv., Diss., 2007 Corporations Finance Risk management Risikomanagement (DE-588)4121590-4 gnd rswk-swf Unternehmen (DE-588)4061963-1 gnd rswk-swf Stakeholder (DE-588)4300861-6 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4113937-9 Hochschulschrift gnd-content Unternehmen (DE-588)4061963-1 s Stakeholder (DE-588)4300861-6 s Risikomanagement (DE-588)4121590-4 s DE-604 HBZ Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016594247&sequence=000004&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
spellingShingle | Gossy, Gregor A stakeholder rationale for risk management implications for corporate finance decisions Corporations Finance Risk management Risikomanagement (DE-588)4121590-4 gnd Unternehmen (DE-588)4061963-1 gnd Stakeholder (DE-588)4300861-6 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4121590-4 (DE-588)4061963-1 (DE-588)4300861-6 (DE-588)4113937-9 |
title | A stakeholder rationale for risk management implications for corporate finance decisions |
title_auth | A stakeholder rationale for risk management implications for corporate finance decisions |
title_exact_search | A stakeholder rationale for risk management implications for corporate finance decisions |
title_exact_search_txtP | A stakeholder rationale for risk management implications for corporate finance decisions |
title_full | A stakeholder rationale for risk management implications for corporate finance decisions Gregor Gossy. With a foreword by Paul Wentges |
title_fullStr | A stakeholder rationale for risk management implications for corporate finance decisions Gregor Gossy. With a foreword by Paul Wentges |
title_full_unstemmed | A stakeholder rationale for risk management implications for corporate finance decisions Gregor Gossy. With a foreword by Paul Wentges |
title_short | A stakeholder rationale for risk management |
title_sort | a stakeholder rationale for risk management implications for corporate finance decisions |
title_sub | implications for corporate finance decisions |
topic | Corporations Finance Risk management Risikomanagement (DE-588)4121590-4 gnd Unternehmen (DE-588)4061963-1 gnd Stakeholder (DE-588)4300861-6 gnd |
topic_facet | Corporations Finance Risk management Risikomanagement Unternehmen Stakeholder Hochschulschrift |
url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016594247&sequence=000004&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
work_keys_str_mv | AT gossygregor astakeholderrationaleforriskmanagementimplicationsforcorporatefinancedecisions |