Naked exclusion: an experimental study of contracts with externalities
"This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to assess the ability of an incumbent seller to profitably foreclose a market with exclusive contracts. We use the strategic environment described by Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and Wiley (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000) where entry is unpro...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2008
|
| Schriftenreihe: | NBER working paper series
14115 |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | "This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to assess the ability of an incumbent seller to profitably foreclose a market with exclusive contracts. We use the strategic environment described by Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and Wiley (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000) where entry is unprofitable when sufficiently many downstream buyers sign exclusive contracts with the incumbent. When discrimination is impossible, the game resembles a stag-hunt (coordination) game in which the buyers' payoffs are endogenously chosen by the incumbent seller. Exclusion occurs when the buyers fail to coordinate on their preferred equilibrium. Two-way non-binding pre-play communication among the buyers lowers the power of exclusive contracts and induces more generous contract terms from the seller. When discrimination and communication are possible, the exclusion rate rises. Divide-and-conquer strategies are observed more frequently when buyers can communicate with each other. Exclusion rates are significantly higher when the buyers' payoffs are endogenously chosen rather than exogenously given. Finally, secret offers are shown to decrease the incumbent's power to profitably exclude"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site |
| Beschreibung: | 38, 5 S. graph. Darst. |
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| 520 | 8 | |a "This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to assess the ability of an incumbent seller to profitably foreclose a market with exclusive contracts. We use the strategic environment described by Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and Wiley (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000) where entry is unprofitable when sufficiently many downstream buyers sign exclusive contracts with the incumbent. When discrimination is impossible, the game resembles a stag-hunt (coordination) game in which the buyers' payoffs are endogenously chosen by the incumbent seller. Exclusion occurs when the buyers fail to coordinate on their preferred equilibrium. Two-way non-binding pre-play communication among the buyers lowers the power of exclusive contracts and induces more generous contract terms from the seller. When discrimination and communication are possible, the exclusion rate rises. Divide-and-conquer strategies are observed more frequently when buyers can communicate with each other. Exclusion rates are significantly higher when the buyers' payoffs are endogenously chosen rather than exogenously given. Finally, secret offers are shown to decrease the incumbent's power to profitably exclude"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site | |
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| id | DE-604.BV023394147 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T21:21:13Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:17:37Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016577039 |
| oclc_num | 255014763 |
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| physical | 38, 5 S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 2008 |
| publishDateSearch | 2008 |
| publishDateSort | 2008 |
| publisher | National Bureau of Economic Research |
| record_format | marc |
| series | NBER working paper series |
| series2 | NBER working paper series |
| spelling | Landeo, Claudia M. Verfasser aut Naked exclusion an experimental study of contracts with externalities Claudia M. Landeo ; Kathryn E. Spier Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2008 38, 5 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier NBER working paper series 14115 "This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to assess the ability of an incumbent seller to profitably foreclose a market with exclusive contracts. We use the strategic environment described by Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and Wiley (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000) where entry is unprofitable when sufficiently many downstream buyers sign exclusive contracts with the incumbent. When discrimination is impossible, the game resembles a stag-hunt (coordination) game in which the buyers' payoffs are endogenously chosen by the incumbent seller. Exclusion occurs when the buyers fail to coordinate on their preferred equilibrium. Two-way non-binding pre-play communication among the buyers lowers the power of exclusive contracts and induces more generous contract terms from the seller. When discrimination and communication are possible, the exclusion rate rises. Divide-and-conquer strategies are observed more frequently when buyers can communicate with each other. Exclusion rates are significantly higher when the buyers' payoffs are endogenously chosen rather than exogenously given. Finally, secret offers are shown to decrease the incumbent's power to profitably exclude"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site Spier, Kathryn E. Verfasser aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe NBER working paper series 14115 (DE-604)BV002801238 14115 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w14115.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Landeo, Claudia M. Spier, Kathryn E. Naked exclusion an experimental study of contracts with externalities NBER working paper series |
| title | Naked exclusion an experimental study of contracts with externalities |
| title_auth | Naked exclusion an experimental study of contracts with externalities |
| title_exact_search | Naked exclusion an experimental study of contracts with externalities |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Naked exclusion an experimental study of contracts with externalities |
| title_full | Naked exclusion an experimental study of contracts with externalities Claudia M. Landeo ; Kathryn E. Spier |
| title_fullStr | Naked exclusion an experimental study of contracts with externalities Claudia M. Landeo ; Kathryn E. Spier |
| title_full_unstemmed | Naked exclusion an experimental study of contracts with externalities Claudia M. Landeo ; Kathryn E. Spier |
| title_short | Naked exclusion |
| title_sort | naked exclusion an experimental study of contracts with externalities |
| title_sub | an experimental study of contracts with externalities |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w14115.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT landeoclaudiam nakedexclusionanexperimentalstudyofcontractswithexternalities AT spierkathryne nakedexclusionanexperimentalstudyofcontractswithexternalities |