Slom titove armije: jugoslavenska narodna armija i raspad Jugoslavije 1987. - 1992.
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | Croatian |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Zagreb
Golden Marketing [u.a.]
2008
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Abstract |
| Beschreibung: | Zsfassung in engl. Sprache |
| Beschreibung: | 518 S. graph. Darst., Kt. |
| ISBN: | 9789532123395 |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nam a2200000 c 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV023377907 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 20200129 | ||
| 007 | t | ||
| 008 | 080703s2008 bd|| |||| 00||| hrv d | ||
| 020 | |a 9789532123395 |9 978-953-212-339-5 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)310982705 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV023377907 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rakwb | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a hrv | |
| 049 | |a DE-12 |a DE-11 |a DE-Re13 | ||
| 050 | 0 | |a UA827 | |
| 084 | |a KV 5030 |0 (DE-625)86350: |2 rvk | ||
| 084 | |a NQ 8240 |0 (DE-625)128963: |2 rvk | ||
| 084 | |a 7,41 |2 ssgn | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Marijan, Davor |d 1966- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)1152099639 |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Slom titove armije |b jugoslavenska narodna armija i raspad Jugoslavije 1987. - 1992. |c Davor Marijan |
| 264 | 1 | |a Zagreb |b Golden Marketing [u.a.] |c 2008 | |
| 300 | |a 518 S. |b graph. Darst., Kt. | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 500 | |a Zsfassung in engl. Sprache | ||
| 610 | 2 | 4 | |a Yugoslavia. |b Jugoslovenska narodna armija |x History |
| 648 | 7 | |a Geschichte 1987-1992 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Geschichte | |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Jugoslawienkriege |0 (DE-588)4875209-5 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Staat |0 (DE-588)4056618-3 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Auflösung |0 (DE-588)4193468-4 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Militär |0 (DE-588)4039305-7 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 651 | 7 | |a Jugoslawien |0 (DE-588)4028966-7 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
| 689 | 0 | 0 | |a Jugoslawien |0 (DE-588)4028966-7 |D g |
| 689 | 0 | 1 | |a Militär |0 (DE-588)4039305-7 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 2 | |a Staat |0 (DE-588)4056618-3 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 3 | |a Auflösung |0 (DE-588)4193468-4 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 4 | |a Geschichte 1987-1992 |A z |
| 689 | 0 | |5 DE-604 | |
| 689 | 1 | 0 | |a Jugoslawien |0 (DE-588)4028966-7 |D g |
| 689 | 1 | |5 DE-604 | |
| 689 | 2 | 0 | |a Militär |0 (DE-588)4039305-7 |D s |
| 689 | 2 | 1 | |a Jugoslawienkriege |0 (DE-588)4875209-5 |D s |
| 689 | 2 | 2 | |a Geschichte 1987-1992 |A z |
| 689 | 2 | |5 DE-604 | |
| 856 | 4 | 2 | |m Digitalisierung BSBMuenchen |q application/pdf |u http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016561057&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |3 Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| 856 | 4 | 2 | |m Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen |q application/pdf |u http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016561057&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |3 Abstract |
| 940 | 1 | |n oe | |
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016561057 | ||
| 942 | 1 | 1 | |c 355.009 |e 22/bsb |f 09048 |g 496 |
| 942 | 1 | 1 | |c 355.009 |e 22/bsb |f 09049 |g 496 |
| 942 | 1 | 1 | |c 909 |e 22/bsb |f 09049 |g 496 |
| 942 | 1 | 1 | |c 909 |e 22/bsb |f 09048 |g 496 |
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804137748964048896 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | Sadržaj
Predgovor
................................................. 9
Uvod
..................................................... 11
1.
JUGOSLAVIJA I NJEZIN OBRAMBENI SUSTAV
............. 25
Obrambeni sustav
SFRJ
................................ 30
Rukovođenje i zapovijedanje Općenarodnom obranom i
oružanim snagama
.................................. 34
SKJ i JNA
............................................ 40
2.
ORGANIZACIJA I VAŽNIJE ZNAČAJKE JNA
................ 45
Organizacija JNA
...................................... 47
Brojno stanje, formacija, naoružanje i oprema
............... 53
Borbena spremnost i priprava
........................... 61
Nacionalna struktura starješinskoga kadra
................ 63
3.
JUGOSLAVENSKA KRIZA
................................ 69
Gospodarska kriza
..................................... 72
Kosovski problem i buđenje Srbije
....................... 73
Osporavanje revolucije i političkog sustava
................. 74
Borba za Titovu ostavštinu
.............................. 76
4.
JNA U KRIZI
............................................ 81
Osamostaljivanje JNA
.................................. 83
Posljedice gospodarske krize
............................. 87
JNA između specijalnog rata i unutarnjih neprijatelja
........ 89
Slovenski napad na obrambenu koncepciju i JNA
............ 96
Prijedlozi JNA za izlazak iz krize
......................... 102
Preustroj Jedinstvo: Odbrana Jugoslavije je nedjeljiva
...... 107
5.
JNA U PRVIM MJESECIMA VIŠESTRANAČJA
............... 125
Sa
14.
kongresa SKJ mora se izići programski i akciono ojačan
a ne oslabljen.
..................................... 127
Višestranački izbori
.................................... 133
SLOM TITOVE AEMIJE
Prijepor
о
Jugoslaviji
................................... 141
JNA i savezna tijela
.................................... 147
6.
UPREDVORJU RATA
.................................... 149
Razoružanje Teritorijalne obrane
......................... 151
Treća faza plana Jedinstvo
.............................. 156
JNA više neće tolerisati ovakve i druge slučajeve
........... 165
JNA i TO: Ne može biti jedna država, a
dve
vojske
.......... 171
Planovi uporabe
....................................... 178
7.
JUGOSLAVENSTVO NA KUŠNJI: SLOVENIJA
............... 185
Novačko
pitanje
....................................... 188
Sukob oko mjerodavnosti nad TO-om Slovenije
.............. 192
Carinski rat
......................................... 195
Posljedice sukoba
...................................... 208
Kako je moguće da JNA napušta deo teritorije
SFRJ
........ 212
8.
ZAPLET: JNA I HRVATSKA
............................... 219
Srpska pobuna u Hrvatskoj
.............................. 225
Film koji je zapalio Jugoslaviju
......................... 231
Na pragu izvanrednog stanja
............................ 241
Vojska neće nikoga napadati, ali će braniti i sebe i srpski
narod u Krajini
.................................... 247
Položaj JNA u Hrvatskoj za vrijeme sukoba u Sloveniji
....... 262
JNA će razmjestiti snage na svim područjima gde žive Srbi
.. 268
Odmah prekinite lakrdiju i uključite vodu i struju
.......... 278
Naoružavanje i stvaranje vojske pobunjenih Srba u Hrvatskoj
. 283
Napadna operacija
..................................... 289
Centralno vojište
...................................... 291
Sjeverozapadno vojište
................................. 300
Jadranskopomorsko vojište
.............................. 306
Pregovori i povlačenje JNA iz neokupiranog dijela Hrvatske
... 314
JNA u posljednjim mjesecima
1991........................ 322
Posljednji ustroj JNA
................................... 324
Internacionalizacija krize i dolazak mirovnih snaga
Ujedinjenih naroda
.................................. 327
Pripreme JNA za povlačenje iz Hrvatske
................... 336
9.
NJEMAČKA HOĆE NA DVA MORA, NA SEVERNO I NA
JADRANSKO MORE
.................................. 339
10.
JNA I SRBIJA: JER, KADA JE VOJNIK JNA U HRVATSKOJ
NE MOŽE SE REĆI DAJE TO SRBIJA
................... 347
Sadržaj
11.
IZ MAKEDONIJE BEZ ISPALJENOG METKA
.............. 359
12.
KRAJ: JNA I BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA
.................... 365
JNA u
ВІН
do kraja
1991................................ 370
Odraz rata u Hrvatskoj na Bosnu i Hercegovinu
............. 371
Pripreme JNA za rat u Bosni i Hercegovini
................. 375
Posljednji ratni dani
................................... 380
13.
JEDNA JNA ZA TRI VOJSKE
............................. 391
Kraj JNA
............................................ 399
14.
JNAURATU
........................................... 401
Strategija djelovanja i planovi uporabe
.................... 403
Slom ratnog umijeća
................................... 407
Novačenje, mobilizacija i popuna
......................... 417
Zapovijedanje i zapovjednici
............................. 426
Netko od njih će u kriznim stanjima odstupiti od stavova i
opredelenja najvišeg državnog i vojnog rukovodstva
...... 434
Kad vodim politiku, mene može i da zanima i da ne zanima
šta drugi rade, ali kad dajem glavu, hoću da znam zašto je
dajem
............................................ 446
Informiranje
.......................................... 451
Kršenje zakona i običaja ratovanja
........................ 456
Financijski položaj JNA
................................. 463
Zaključak
................................................. 467
Summary
................................................. 475
Kratice
................................................... 483
Tumač znakova
............................................ 487
Izvori i literatura
.......................................... 491
Popis karata
.............................................. 513
Kazalo osobnih imena
....................................... 515
Summary
Yugoslav People s Army
(JNA)
was a military force of the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(SFRJ)
and the most important part of
its defence mechanism by
1968.
Since
1968,
Yugoslavia s military forc¬
es have consisted of two components
-
JNA
and the Territorial Defence.
Their duty was to defend the country and its constitutional arrangement.
After the war, the army was Yugoslavia s most important security foun¬
dation and the only common Yugoslav institution in the
1980s,
or this is
how it presented itself and how it was perceived by the population which
considered itself to be Yugoslav. During the crisis years
(1948, 1956,
1967, 1968, 1971, 1980, 1981),
the army affirmed itself as the most effi¬
cient security lever and the answer to foreign pressures, but also as the
means of intimidating those of different political beliefs in the country.
Its members were chose according to moral and political criteria, which
meant that what had been required was loyalty to the League of Commu¬
nists of Yugoslavia (SKJ), while expert qualifications had been neglected.
The majority of the army experts (officers and junior officers) were mem¬
bers of SKJ, which was a prerequisite for having a career.
JNA
was an unusual military organization. It was modelled according
to the Soviet ideological role model and, during the first years after the
war, it adopted the Soviet system of organization. This meant its organi¬
zation was in accordance with the organization of the Red Army and its
doctrine. After
1948,
the Soviet influence became marginal, although it
never completely disappeared. Break-up with the Soviet Union brought,
at the beginning of the
1950s,
a strong influence from the West, particu¬
larly the U.S. understanding of fighting a war and of a military organi¬
zation.
JNA
sought later its own personal development and was open to
organizational and structural influences from both world blocks.
Influence from both of the blocks is also visible in the
JNA
armament
politics.
JNA
ranked third or fourth among Europe s communist armies
according to the number of arms. Yugoslavia s political path, strong sup-
475
SLOM TITOVE AEMIJE
port of Stalin at the beginning and then strong opposition to him, get¬
ting closer to the West and then again to the East, were all reasons why
JNA,
for European standards and excluding Albania, was a rare mixture
of arms and equipment. Logistically, this was probably the most demand¬
ing military organization in Europe.
JNA
consisted of three branches: Land Army, War Navy and Aviation,
and Antiaircraft Defence. Land Army was intended to implement the ar¬
my s main goals: fight against the enemy s main forces and ensure mobi¬
lization and development of armed forces and other society s defence forc¬
es. War Aviation and Antiaircraft Defence went through several radical
changes with the main aim to gain supremacy in air space, to reconnoi¬
tre and provide the Land Army and War Navy with quality support. They
developed in order to become individually stronger than the aviation of
the strongest neighbouring countries, which could have been achieved
to a certain degree by the end of
1960s.
As an armed forces branch and
a strategic-operative group, War Navy carried this name between
1945
and
1962.
With organizational changes in the
1960s,
Wary Navy spread
militarily and territorially to the hinterland, so its land characteristic
was emphasized for some time, as well as its land name accordingly. It
was renamed into Military-Naval Region in
1968,
when the naval char¬
acteristic again prevailed over the land one.
Since mid-1945 until the end of
1968,
Land Army changed its organi¬
zation several times. At the end of
1968,
armies were formed instead of
military regions, so that two new armies were formed next to the four
existing ones, the overall number amounting to six
(1st, 2nd, 3rd,
5th,
7th, and 9th). The independent military territory of
Titograd,
later the
Titograd
army corps, was at the level of armies. Since then, the Army
had the structure and territorial organization for exactly
20
years, which,
however, did change, but it still kept the structure usually referred to as
the republican structure of the army. The territories of socialist repub¬
lics of Slovenia and Macedonia are the closest to this classification
-
the
territory under jurisdiction of one army; Bosnia and Herzegovina and
Serbia were under the jurisdiction of two armies, Montenegro was in
an independent army corps and part of the Military-Naval Region, and
Croatia was under the jurisdiction of two armies and of the Military-Na¬
val Region.
Until
1980
and the death of
Josip Broz
Tito, the army was exclusively
his field, in which other party members did not get involved. Such a cor¬
relation suited Tito as well as the army leadership. Tito enjoyed absolute
obedience and had the highest rank in the country, and the generals had
their own field of action into which there was no outside involvement.
After Tito s death, the chief commander was the collective Presidency of
SFRJ,
which consisted of one member from each of the republics and au¬
tonomous provinces and, by the end of
1988,
of the president of SKJ.
476
Summary
Tito s death opened the path to Army s independence and to its conver¬
sion into a factor of politics, for which there were plenty ambitions among
the top army leaders. With its
1974
Constitution, Yugoslavia entered the
phase of the biggest decentralization up to that moment, in which some
parts (republics and provinces) gained supremacy over the unity (fed¬
eral state). Through the SKJ organization in
JNA,
the army was a fac¬
tor equal to other organizations of republics and provinces. After Tito s
death, SKJ began its transformation into an association of organizations,
from which
JNA
benefited as well. Preoccupation of republics and prov¬
inces with their own interests enabled
JNA
to become, quickly and pain¬
lessly, an independent factor.
Not later than mid-1983,
JNA
delegations started visiting the par¬
ty and state leadership, warning them about the crisis and suggesting
changes. Before they asked for the return of a strong leader, they had
asked for a change in the defence system. A part of the proposals was
adopted and the other part was not. Proposals in the field of defence were
mainly adopted in the old party way, far from the public eye and not in
accordance with the Constitution and the law. Although it ignored the
Constitution, the army was not satisfied. This is why lobbying for con¬
stitutional changes in order to strengthen functions of the federal state
became its main priority in the
1980s.
The army asked for a definition of
the federal state in order for
JNA,
as a federal army, to fulfil its obliga¬
tions in a legal way: to defend the integrity and constitutional order of the
country . In this way, it found itself on the same side with Serbia, which
struggled with including autonomous provinces into the republic. Its ex¬
pert group started dividing, due to political views of the army leadership,
which was identical to the one of Serbia s political leadership.
After it started changing the defence system, the army tried the same
with the organization of the federation. Its efforts were directed at ar¬
ranging the system at its own will, i.e. it asked for the state which it, al¬
legedly, lost in
1974.
The armies delegation proposed twice to the
SFRJ
Presidency in
1988
to change its constitutional position and to increase
its powers. The state leadership did not adopt the proposal.
The army did not receive the news of its unsuccessful unready. After
years-long work, it switched, on the last day of
1988,
to the new organi¬
zation of the defence forces under the name Unity
(Jedinstvo).
The name
was synonymous for everything the army wished to accomplish: unity of
the whole territory of Yugoslavia as one battlefield, unity of armed forc¬
es in the battlefield, unity of armed conflicts and unity of command over
the armed forces. The change was introduced under the assumption of
outside threats to Yugoslavia, which in times of switching to the new or¬
ganization of
JNA
were the lowest ever. The main point of JNA s attack
on the defence system was the Territorial Defence.
477
SLOM TITOVE ARMIJE
The army worked out a thesis that the Supreme Command of
SFRJ
armed forces would not be able to coordinate military actions in case of
an aggression, because strategic level of warfare would be lost in numer¬
ous operations performed by operation groups. For that reason, the army
proposed, in
1985,
that three battlefields be introduced instead of six ar¬
mies of the land army and that republic and provincial headquarters of
the Territorial Defence be subject to them. Years-long efforts of the mili¬
tary leadership were crowned successful in
1986.
With Slovenia object¬
ing,
SFRJ
Presidency adopted an unconstitutional decision according to
which command and groups of Territorial Defence, during the war, were
subject to the
JNA
commands. Although this was a solution for the case
of war, it functioned to a very high degree in peace times as well, which
became evident during the outcome of the Yugoslav crisis.
With its Unity plan,
JNA
achieved unity of the whole territory of Yu¬
goslavia as a battlefield, unity of armed forces at the battlefield, unity of
armed conflicts, and unity of leadership and command. Strategic com¬
mand was divided into two levels: supreme command of the armed forces
and command of the battlefields. New organization was explained with
decentralization, which evidently should have been an argument against
the army critics who saw in it, with good reason, a representative of cen¬
tralization. Supreme command of the
SFRJ
armed forces was the highest
command level and consisted of
SFRJ
Presidency and newly established
headquarters of the supreme command. Supreme command transferred
arrangement and leadership of strategic operations in the battlefields on¬
to battlefield commands, as well as the command over all forces of
JNA
and Territorial Defence in the battlefields. Supreme command should
have become a warfare body which runs the entire war in all its dimen¬
sions . This point of view had only one huge flaw: it was unconstitutional.
The most intriguing part of the supreme command was the headquarters
of the supreme command, an institution reorganized by admiral Mam-
ula. Regarding the contempt he showed for the constitutional supreme
commander
-
SFRJ
Presidency
-
it could be logically concluded that the
purpose of the headquarters of the supreme command was to redirect the
supreme command from the
SFRJ
President to federal secretariat, in ac¬
cordance with the principle saying that in case federal secretariat is ab¬
sent or prevented, head of the headquarters performs the duty of the com¬
mander. At times when the headquarters was established,
SFRJ
Presi¬
dency had already showed a number of weaknesses in its functioning, so
it could have been supposed that in case of war the situation would have
been even worse. Reorganized headquarters of the supreme command
was the biggest individual proof of JNA s political independence.
Characteristics of the new
JNA
organization were corps and brigades,
as opposed to the previous organization which included squadrons and
regiments. Despite the better-sounding names in the organizational hi-
478
Summary
erarchy, comparison of squadrons and land army corps, which replaced
them, leads us to conclude that real changes in the Army were of cos¬
metic nature only. Instead of three corpses, one operational group and
19
squadrons,
JNA
was divided into
16
corpses and six squadrons, which
meant that the number of higher joint commands (squadrons) and new op¬
erational commands (corpses) remained similar. During the later phases
of the Unity plan, this was somewhat reduced by further abolishing the
commands, but general characteristics remained similar. Corps was on¬
ly slightly stronger than squadron, gaming strength with the partisans
echelon of
JNA
and envisaged to be made stronger during the times of
war by means of the mobile part of Territorial Defence. The
Knin
corps,
for example, actually remained a squadron even after the reorganization.
The Zagreb corps also remained just a stronger squadron.
JNA
transferred to the military system during the last days of De¬
cember
1988,
when newly-established commands of military regions took
over the command of
JNA
formations from up-to-then army commands
and from the
Titograd
corps of the land army. It held in its hands all
more important segments of the defence system, except for the recruit¬
ment jobs, which republics and autonomous provinces took over on Jan.
1,1988.
The largest part of
JNA
-
land army
-
was, according to the Uni¬
ty plan, organized into three military districts. The
1st
military district
with command in Belgrade was formed by joining the
1st
and the 7th ar¬
my, and its authority spread over Bosnia and Herzegovina (excluding the
wider
Bihać
area),
Vojvodina, Slavonija
and Serbia, excluding its south¬
east part. The areas of the
2nd
and
3rd
army and the
Titograd
corps
joined into the
3rd
military district with command in Skopje. The areas
of the 5th and 9th army joined into the 5th military district with com¬
mand in Zagreb. At a lower level, the land army consisted of
16
corpses,
the city of Belgrade defence command, five squadrons of the land army,
river war-time flotilla, and formations directly subject to commands of
military districts.
War Aviation and Antiaircraft Defence switched to the new organiza¬
tion in
1986,
when three corpses were formed, intended to provide help
to battlefields. Their ordinal numbers were in accordance with ordinal
numbers of battlefields to which they were supposed to provide air sup¬
port and defence. The 1st corps was designated for the support to the 1st
military district, the 3rd corps to the 3rd military district, and the 5th corps
to the area of the 5th military district. The naval district kept its existing
organization, the headquarters remained in Split, and it spread territo¬
rially to
Istria
at the expense of the 5th military district. It consisted of:
headquarters formations, the fleet, the 9th
Knin
corps, and three naval
sectors with headquarters in
Pula
(the 5th),
Šibenik
(the 8th), and Kum-
bor (the 9th). School centres, motorized guard brigades, three liaison regi¬
ments, one engineering regiment, light missile artillery regiment of the
479
SLOM TITOVE ARMIJE
Antiaircraft Defence, part of the logistics formations, one teaching centre
and several independent battalions (divisions) remained under the direct
command of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence (SSNO).
Implementation of the Unity plan s first phase ended with the afore¬
mentioned changes. The second phase
—
reduction of man-power, tech¬
nical modernization, a more efficient command, more rational dealings,
and greater overall fight readiness
-
was planned to be implemented
in the first half of
1990s.
Reduction of man-power was intended to be
done by grouping formations into
A-classification
and R-classification,
and very rarely into B-classification. The highest number of changes was
planned to be implemented as early as
1990.
But plans are just plans and
they were subject to changes. Due to the defeat of communists at elec¬
tions in Slovenia and Croatia in
1990,
the army partially changed its
plans. The biggest changes were made at the territory of the 5th military
district, primarily in eliminations.
JNA
entered the new organization with a new military strategy and
with emphasis on peaceful and internal tasks. Up to then, the main ar¬
my task was to oppose an armed aggression as an external threat. The
new strategy, next to the old one, brought certain tasks of society self-
protection in peace times and extraordinary circumstances, which un¬
derstood the use in internal conflicts. Extraordinary circumstances were
new in SFRJ s defence dictionary, which, up to then, recognized only the
terms special war and armed aggression . The extraordinary circum¬
stances stood for an armed or other activity which directly endangered
the country s independence, its sovereignty and territorial cohesion, and
the structure of the society set in the
SFRJ
Constitution. The term ex¬
traordinary circumstances was actually a euphemism for a more specif¬
ic, but temporally inappropriate counter-revolution.
Yugoslavia was an unsuccessful experiment, which, however, had a
few good sides (primarily the social politics), but generally this was a
country which was formed during wars with the support of the neigh¬
bouring international actors, and held together with the help of internal
force. In
1980s,
the communist project of Yugoslavia was brought to an
end. At the turn of
1980s
into
1990s,
a relation of forces for the change
of Yugoslavia organized by
1974
Constitution was formed. By the end of
1989,
the country s constitutional make-up was disputed three times.
JNA
disputed it the first, then Serbia, and, in the end, Slovenia. The
process finished by the end of
1990
with elections in which communists
were defeated in all republics except for Serbia and Montenegro. This
made the need for a new arrangement even more real. Serbia, Montene¬
gro, and
JNA
asked for a Yugoslavia in which others recognized solutions
before the constitutional changes of the
1970s,
and the remaining sides,
namely Croatia and Slovenia, offered a confederation, i.e. a community
of sovereign states or a break-up according to the existing borders of re-
480
Summary
publics. An agreement was not reached, a war and collapse of Yugosla¬
via followed. The army did not start the war, but it did make it possible
by taking sides with Serbia. As long as Slobodan Milosevic threatened
with a war, this was more or less seriously considered in the neighbour¬
ing republics. The threat became serious when
JNA
accepted his vision
of Yugoslavia. Since then, Milosevic has not been just one of the rabble-
rousers to whom winds of democracy opened space for attempting to form
a country at the expense of others. For this reason, opinions that
JNA
is the main culprit for the start of the war are not that far from truth.
Questions which ask for answers on the reasons for JNA s moral down¬
fall are superfluous. This is the sphere of pure ethics and ethics is some¬
thing that
JNA
taught in schools but did not practice.
Translation by:
Tamara
Banjeglav
481
|
| adam_txt |
Sadržaj
Predgovor
. 9
Uvod
. 11
1.
JUGOSLAVIJA I NJEZIN OBRAMBENI SUSTAV
. 25
Obrambeni sustav
SFRJ
. 30
Rukovođenje i zapovijedanje Općenarodnom obranom i
oružanim snagama
. 34
SKJ i JNA
. 40
2.
ORGANIZACIJA I VAŽNIJE ZNAČAJKE JNA
. 45
Organizacija JNA
. 47
Brojno stanje, formacija, naoružanje i oprema
. 53
Borbena spremnost i priprava
. 61
Nacionalna struktura starješinskoga kadra
. 63
3.
JUGOSLAVENSKA KRIZA
. 69
Gospodarska kriza
. 72
Kosovski problem i "buđenje" Srbije
. 73
Osporavanje revolucije i političkog sustava
. 74
Borba za Titovu ostavštinu
. 76
4.
JNA U KRIZI
. 81
Osamostaljivanje JNA
. 83
Posljedice gospodarske krize
. 87
JNA između specijalnog rata i unutarnjih neprijatelja
. 89
Slovenski napad na obrambenu koncepciju i JNA
. 96
Prijedlozi JNA za izlazak iz krize
. 102
Preustroj Jedinstvo: "Odbrana Jugoslavije je nedjeljiva"
. 107
5.
JNA U PRVIM MJESECIMA VIŠESTRANAČJA
. 125
"Sa
14.
kongresa SKJ mora se izići programski i akciono ojačan
a ne oslabljen."
. 127
Višestranački izbori
. 133
SLOM TITOVE AEMIJE
Prijepor
о
Jugoslaviji
. 141
JNA i savezna tijela
. 147
6.
UPREDVORJU RATA
. 149
Razoružanje Teritorijalne obrane
. 151
Treća faza plana Jedinstvo
. 156
JNA više neće "tolerisati ovakve i druge slučajeve"
. 165
JNA i TO: Ne može 'biti jedna država, a
dve
vojske"
. 171
Planovi uporabe
. 178
7.
JUGOSLAVENSTVO NA KUŠNJI: SLOVENIJA
. 185
Novačko
pitanje
. 188
Sukob oko mjerodavnosti nad TO-om Slovenije
. 192
"Carinski rat"
. 195
Posljedice sukoba
. 208
Kako je "moguće da JNA napušta deo teritorije
SFRJ"
. 212
8.
ZAPLET: JNA I HRVATSKA
. 219
Srpska pobuna u Hrvatskoj
. 225
"Film koji je zapalio Jugoslaviju"
. 231
Na pragu izvanrednog stanja
. 241
"Vojska neće nikoga napadati, ali će braniti i sebe i srpski
narod u Krajini"
. 247
Položaj JNA u Hrvatskoj za vrijeme sukoba u Sloveniji
. 262
JNA će razmjestiti snage na svim područjima "gde žive Srbi"
. 268
"Odmah prekinite lakrdiju i uključite vodu i struju"
. 278
Naoružavanje i stvaranje vojske pobunjenih Srba u Hrvatskoj
. 283
Napadna operacija
. 289
Centralno vojište
. 291
Sjeverozapadno vojište
. 300
Jadranskopomorsko vojište
. 306
Pregovori i povlačenje JNA iz neokupiranog dijela Hrvatske
. 314
JNA u posljednjim mjesecima
1991. 322
Posljednji ustroj JNA
. 324
Internacionalizacija krize i dolazak mirovnih snaga
Ujedinjenih naroda
. 327
Pripreme JNA za povlačenje iz Hrvatske
. 336
9.
NJEMAČKA "HOĆE NA DVA MORA, NA SEVERNO I NA
JADRANSKO MORE"
. 339
10.
JNA I SRBIJA: "JER, KADA JE VOJNIK JNA U HRVATSKOJ
NE MOŽE SE REĆI DAJE TO SRBIJA"
. 347
Sadržaj
11.
IZ MAKEDONIJE "BEZ ISPALJENOG METKA"
. 359
12.
KRAJ: JNA I BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA
. 365
JNA u
ВІН
do kraja
1991. 370
Odraz rata u Hrvatskoj na Bosnu i Hercegovinu
. 371
Pripreme JNA za rat u Bosni i Hercegovini
. 375
Posljednji ratni dani
. 380
13.
JEDNA JNA ZA TRI VOJSKE
. 391
Kraj JNA
. 399
14.
JNAURATU
. 401
Strategija djelovanja i planovi uporabe
. 403
Slom ratnog umijeća
. 407
Novačenje, mobilizacija i popuna
. 417
Zapovijedanje i zapovjednici
. 426
Netko od njih će u kriznim stanjima odstupiti od "stavova i
opredelenja najvišeg državnog i vojnog rukovodstva"
. 434
"Kad vodim politiku, mene može i da zanima i da ne zanima
šta drugi rade, ali kad dajem glavu, hoću da znam zašto je
dajem"
. 446
Informiranje
. 451
Kršenje zakona i običaja ratovanja
. 456
Financijski položaj JNA
. 463
Zaključak
. 467
Summary
. 475
Kratice
. 483
Tumač znakova
. 487
Izvori i literatura
. 491
Popis karata
. 513
Kazalo osobnih imena
. 515
Summary
Yugoslav People's Army
(JNA)
was a military force of the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(SFRJ)
and the most important part of
its defence mechanism by
1968.
Since
1968,
Yugoslavia's military forc¬
es have consisted of two components
-
JNA
and the Territorial Defence.
Their duty was to defend the country and its constitutional arrangement.
After the war, the army was Yugoslavia's most important security foun¬
dation and the only common Yugoslav institution in the
1980s,
or this is
how it presented itself and how it was perceived by the population which
considered itself to be Yugoslav. During the crisis years
(1948, 1956,
1967, 1968, 1971, 1980, 1981),
the army affirmed itself as the most effi¬
cient security lever and the answer to foreign pressures, but also as the
means of intimidating those of different political beliefs in the country.
Its members were chose according to moral and political criteria, which
meant that what had been required was loyalty to the League of Commu¬
nists of Yugoslavia (SKJ), while expert qualifications had been neglected.
The majority of the army experts (officers and junior officers) were mem¬
bers of SKJ, which was a prerequisite for having a career.
JNA
was an unusual military organization. It was modelled according
to the Soviet ideological role model and, during the first years after the
war, it adopted the Soviet system of organization. This meant its organi¬
zation was in accordance with the organization of the Red Army and its
doctrine. After
1948,
the Soviet influence became marginal, although it
never completely disappeared. Break-up with the Soviet Union brought,
at the beginning of the
1950s,
a strong influence from the West, particu¬
larly the U.S. understanding of fighting a war and of a military organi¬
zation.
JNA
sought later its own personal development and was open to
organizational and structural influences from both world blocks.
Influence from both of the blocks is also visible in the
JNA
armament
politics.
JNA
ranked third or fourth among Europe's communist armies
according to the number of arms. Yugoslavia's political path, strong sup-
475
SLOM TITOVE AEMIJE
port of Stalin at the beginning and then strong opposition to him, get¬
ting closer to the West and then again to the East, were all reasons why
JNA,
for European standards and excluding Albania, was a rare mixture
of arms and equipment. Logistically, this was probably the most demand¬
ing military organization in Europe.
JNA
consisted of three branches: Land Army, War Navy and Aviation,
and Antiaircraft Defence. Land Army was intended to implement the ar¬
my's main goals: fight against the enemy's main forces and ensure mobi¬
lization and development of armed forces and other society's defence forc¬
es. War Aviation and Antiaircraft Defence went through several radical
changes with the main aim to gain supremacy in air space, to reconnoi¬
tre and provide the Land Army and War Navy with quality support. They
developed in order to become individually stronger than the aviation of
the strongest neighbouring countries, which could have been achieved
to a certain degree by the end of
1960s.
As an armed forces branch and
a strategic-operative group, War Navy carried this name between
1945
and
1962.
With organizational changes in the
1960s,
Wary Navy spread
militarily and territorially to the hinterland, so its land characteristic
was emphasized for some time, as well as its "land" name accordingly. It
was renamed into Military-Naval Region in
1968,
when the naval char¬
acteristic again prevailed over the land one.
Since mid-1945 until the end of
1968,
Land Army changed its organi¬
zation several times. At the end of
1968,
armies were formed instead of
military regions, so that two new armies were formed next to the four
existing ones, the overall number amounting to six
(1st, 2nd, 3rd,
5th,
7th, and 9th). The independent military territory of
Titograd,
later the
Titograd
army corps, was at the level of armies. Since then, the Army
had the structure and territorial organization for exactly
20
years, which,
however, did change, but it still kept the structure usually referred to as
the republican structure of the army. The territories of socialist repub¬
lics of Slovenia and Macedonia are the closest to this classification
-
the
territory under jurisdiction of one army; Bosnia and Herzegovina and
Serbia were under the jurisdiction of two armies, Montenegro was in
an independent army corps and part of the Military-Naval Region, and
Croatia was under the jurisdiction of two armies and of the Military-Na¬
val Region.
Until
1980
and the death of
Josip Broz
Tito, the army was exclusively
his field, in which other party members did not get involved. Such a cor¬
relation suited Tito as well as the army leadership. Tito enjoyed absolute
obedience and had the highest rank in the country, and the generals had
their own field of action into which there was no outside involvement.
After Tito's death, the chief commander was the collective Presidency of
SFRJ,
which consisted of one member from each of the republics and au¬
tonomous provinces and, by the end of
1988,
of the president of SKJ.
476
Summary
Tito's death opened the path to Army's independence and to its conver¬
sion into a factor of politics, for which there were plenty ambitions among
the top army leaders. With its
1974
Constitution, Yugoslavia entered the
phase of the biggest decentralization up to that moment, in which some
parts (republics and provinces) gained supremacy over the unity (fed¬
eral state). Through the SKJ organization in
JNA,
the army was a fac¬
tor equal to other organizations of republics and provinces. After Tito's
death, SKJ began its transformation into an association of organizations,
from which
JNA
benefited as well. Preoccupation of republics and prov¬
inces with their own interests enabled
JNA
to become, quickly and pain¬
lessly, an independent factor.
Not later than mid-1983,
JNA
delegations started visiting the par¬
ty and state leadership, warning them about the crisis and suggesting
changes. Before they asked for the return of a strong leader, they had
asked for a change in the defence system. A part of the proposals was
adopted and the other part was not. Proposals in the field of defence were
mainly adopted in the old party way, far from the public eye and not in
accordance with the Constitution and the law. Although it ignored the
Constitution, the army was not satisfied. This is why lobbying for con¬
stitutional changes in order to strengthen functions of the federal state
became its main priority in the
1980s.
The army asked for a definition of
the federal state in order for
JNA,
as a federal army, to "fulfil its obliga¬
tions in a legal way: to defend the integrity and constitutional order of the
country". In this way, it found itself on the same side with Serbia, which
struggled with including autonomous provinces into the republic. Its ex¬
pert group started dividing, due to political views of the army leadership,
which was identical to the one of Serbia's political leadership.
After it started changing the defence system, the army tried the same
with the organization of the federation. Its efforts were directed at ar¬
ranging the system at its own will, i.e. it asked for the state which it, al¬
legedly, lost in
1974.
The armies' delegation proposed twice to the
SFRJ
Presidency in
1988
to change its constitutional position and to increase
its powers. The state leadership did not adopt the proposal.
The army did not receive the news of its unsuccessful unready. After
years-long work, it switched, on the last day of
1988,
to the new organi¬
zation of the defence forces under the name Unity
(Jedinstvo).
The name
was synonymous for everything the army wished to accomplish: unity of
the whole territory of Yugoslavia as one battlefield, unity of armed forc¬
es in the battlefield, unity of armed conflicts and unity of command over
the armed forces. The change was introduced under the assumption of
outside threats to Yugoslavia, which in times of switching to the new or¬
ganization of
JNA
were the lowest ever. The main point of JNA's attack
on the defence system was the Territorial Defence.
477
SLOM TITOVE ARMIJE
The army worked out a thesis that the Supreme Command of
SFRJ
armed forces would not be able to coordinate military actions in case of
an aggression, because strategic level of warfare would be lost in numer¬
ous operations performed by operation groups. For that reason, the army
proposed, in
1985,
that three battlefields be introduced instead of six ar¬
mies of the land army and that republic and provincial headquarters of
the Territorial Defence be subject to them. Years-long efforts of the mili¬
tary leadership were crowned successful in
1986.
With Slovenia object¬
ing,
SFRJ
Presidency adopted an unconstitutional decision according to
which command and groups of Territorial Defence, during the war, were
subject to the
JNA
commands. Although this was a solution for the case
of war, it functioned to a very high degree in peace times as well, which
became evident during the outcome of the Yugoslav crisis.
With its Unity plan,
JNA
achieved unity of the whole territory of Yu¬
goslavia as a battlefield, unity of armed forces at the battlefield, unity of
armed conflicts, and unity of leadership and command. Strategic com¬
mand was divided into two levels: supreme command of the armed forces
and command of the battlefields. New organization was explained with
decentralization, which evidently should have been an argument against
the army critics who saw in it, with good reason, a representative of cen¬
tralization. Supreme command of the
SFRJ
armed forces was the highest
command level and consisted of
SFRJ
Presidency and newly established
headquarters of the supreme command. Supreme command transferred
arrangement and leadership of strategic operations in the battlefields on¬
to battlefield commands, as well as the command over all forces of
JNA
and Territorial Defence in the battlefields. Supreme command should
have become a warfare body which "runs the entire war in all its dimen¬
sions". This point of view had only one huge flaw: it was unconstitutional.
The most intriguing part of the supreme command was the headquarters
of the supreme command, an institution reorganized by admiral Mam-
ula. Regarding the contempt he showed for the constitutional supreme
commander
-
SFRJ
Presidency
-
it could be logically concluded that the
purpose of the headquarters of the supreme command was to redirect the
supreme command from the
SFRJ
President to federal secretariat, in ac¬
cordance with the principle saying that in case federal secretariat is ab¬
sent or prevented, head of the headquarters performs the duty of the com¬
mander. At times when the headquarters was established,
SFRJ
Presi¬
dency had already showed a number of weaknesses in its functioning, so
it could have been supposed that in case of war the situation would have
been even worse. Reorganized headquarters of the supreme command
was the biggest individual proof of JNA's political independence.
Characteristics of the new
JNA
organization were corps and brigades,
as opposed to the previous organization which included squadrons and
regiments. Despite the better-sounding names in the organizational hi-
478
Summary
erarchy, comparison of squadrons and land army corps, which replaced
them, leads us to conclude that real changes in the Army were of cos¬
metic nature only. Instead of three corpses, one operational group and
19
squadrons,
JNA
was divided into
16
corpses and six squadrons, which
meant that the number of higher joint commands (squadrons) and new op¬
erational commands (corpses) remained similar. During the later phases
of the Unity plan, this was somewhat reduced by further abolishing the
commands, but general characteristics remained similar. Corps was on¬
ly slightly stronger than squadron, gaming strength with the partisans'
echelon of
JNA
and envisaged to be made stronger during the times of
war by means of the mobile part of Territorial Defence. The
Knin
corps,
for example, actually remained a squadron even after the reorganization.
The Zagreb corps also remained just a stronger squadron.
JNA
transferred to the military system during the last days of De¬
cember
1988,
when newly-established commands of military regions took
over the command of
JNA
formations from up-to-then army commands
and from the
Titograd
corps of the land army. It held in its hands all
more important segments of the defence system, except for the recruit¬
ment jobs, which republics and autonomous provinces took over on Jan.
1,1988.
The largest part of
JNA
-
land army
-
was, according to the Uni¬
ty plan, organized into three military districts. The
1st
military district
with command in Belgrade was formed by joining the
1st
and the 7th ar¬
my, and its authority spread over Bosnia and Herzegovina (excluding the
wider
Bihać
area),
Vojvodina, Slavonija
and Serbia, excluding its south¬
east part. The areas of the
2nd
and
3rd
army and the
Titograd
corps
joined into the
3rd
military district with command in Skopje. The areas
of the 5th and 9th army joined into the 5th military district with com¬
mand in Zagreb. At a lower level, the land army consisted of
16
corpses,
the city of Belgrade defence command, five squadrons of the land army,
river war-time flotilla, and formations directly subject to commands of
military districts.
War Aviation and Antiaircraft Defence switched to the new organiza¬
tion in
1986,
when three corpses were formed, intended to provide help
to battlefields. Their ordinal numbers were in accordance with ordinal
numbers of battlefields to which they were supposed to provide air sup¬
port and defence. The 1st corps was designated for the support to the 1st
military district, the 3rd corps to the 3rd military district, and the 5th corps
to the area of the 5th military district. The naval district kept its existing
organization, the headquarters remained in Split, and it spread territo¬
rially to
Istria
at the expense of the 5th military district. It consisted of:
headquarters formations, the fleet, the 9th
Knin
corps, and three naval
sectors with headquarters in
Pula
(the 5th),
Šibenik
(the 8th), and Kum-
bor (the 9th). School centres, motorized guard brigades, three liaison regi¬
ments, one engineering regiment, light missile artillery regiment of the
479
SLOM TITOVE ARMIJE
Antiaircraft Defence, part of the logistics formations, one teaching centre
and several independent battalions (divisions) remained under the direct
command of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence (SSNO).
Implementation of the Unity plan's first phase ended with the afore¬
mentioned changes. The second phase
—
reduction of man-power, tech¬
nical modernization, a more efficient command, more rational dealings,
and greater overall fight readiness
-
was planned to be implemented
in the first half of
1990s.
Reduction of man-power was intended to be
done by grouping formations into
A-classification
and R-classification,
and very rarely into B-classification. The highest number of changes was
planned to be implemented as early as
1990.
But plans are just plans and
they were subject to changes. Due to the defeat of communists at elec¬
tions in Slovenia and Croatia in
1990,
the army partially changed its
plans. The biggest changes were made at the territory of the 5th military
district, primarily in eliminations.
JNA
entered the new organization with a new military strategy and
with emphasis on peaceful and internal tasks. Up to then, the main ar¬
my task was to oppose an armed aggression as an external threat. The
new strategy, next to the old one, brought "certain tasks of society self-
protection in peace times" and extraordinary circumstances, which un¬
derstood the use in internal conflicts. Extraordinary circumstances were
new in SFRJ's defence dictionary, which, up to then, recognized only the
terms "special war" and "armed aggression". The extraordinary circum¬
stances stood for an armed or other activity which directly endangered
the country's independence, its sovereignty and territorial cohesion, and
the structure of the society set in the
SFRJ
Constitution. The term "ex¬
traordinary circumstances" was actually a euphemism for a more specif¬
ic, but temporally inappropriate counter-revolution.
Yugoslavia was an unsuccessful experiment, which, however, had a
few good sides (primarily the social politics), but generally this was a
country which was formed during wars with the support of the neigh¬
bouring international actors, and held together with the help of internal
force. In
1980s,
the communist project of Yugoslavia was brought to an
end. At the turn of
1980s
into
1990s,
a relation of forces for the change
of Yugoslavia organized by
1974
Constitution was formed. By the end of
1989,
the country's constitutional make-up was disputed three times.
JNA
disputed it the first, then Serbia, and, in the end, Slovenia. The
process finished by the end of
1990
with elections in which communists
were defeated in all republics except for Serbia and Montenegro. This
made the need for a new arrangement even more real. Serbia, Montene¬
gro, and
JNA
asked for a Yugoslavia in which others recognized solutions
before the constitutional changes of the
1970s,
and the remaining sides,
namely Croatia and Slovenia, offered a confederation, i.e. a community
of sovereign states or a break-up according to the existing borders of re-
480
Summary
publics. An agreement was not reached, a war and collapse of Yugosla¬
via followed. The army did not start the war, but it did make it possible
by taking sides with Serbia. As long as Slobodan Milosevic threatened
with a war, this was more or less seriously considered in the neighbour¬
ing republics. The threat became serious when
JNA
accepted his vision
of Yugoslavia. Since then, Milosevic has not been just one of the rabble-
rousers to whom winds of democracy opened space for attempting to form
a country at the expense of others. For this reason, opinions that
JNA
is the main culprit for the start of the war are not that far from truth.
Questions which ask for answers on the reasons for JNA's moral down¬
fall are superfluous. This is the sphere of pure ethics and ethics is some¬
thing that
JNA
taught in schools but did not practice.
Translation by:
Tamara
Banjeglav
481 |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| any_adam_object_boolean | 1 |
| author | Marijan, Davor 1966- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)1152099639 |
| author_facet | Marijan, Davor 1966- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Marijan, Davor 1966- |
| author_variant | d m dm |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV023377907 |
| callnumber-first | U - Military Science |
| callnumber-label | UA827 |
| callnumber-raw | UA827 |
| callnumber-search | UA827 |
| callnumber-sort | UA 3827 |
| callnumber-subject | UA - Armies |
| classification_rvk | KV 5030 NQ 8240 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)310982705 (DE-599)BVBBV023377907 |
| discipline | Geschichte Slavistik |
| discipline_str_mv | Geschichte Slavistik |
| era | Geschichte 1987-1992 gnd |
| era_facet | Geschichte 1987-1992 |
| format | Book |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>02622nam a2200637 c 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV023377907</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20200129 </controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">080703s2008 bd|| |||| 00||| hrv d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9789532123395</subfield><subfield code="9">978-953-212-339-5</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)310982705</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV023377907</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">hrv</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-11</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-Re13</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="050" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">UA827</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">KV 5030</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)86350:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">NQ 8240</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)128963:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">7,41</subfield><subfield code="2">ssgn</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Marijan, Davor</subfield><subfield code="d">1966-</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)1152099639</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Slom titove armije</subfield><subfield code="b">jugoslavenska narodna armija i raspad Jugoslavije 1987. - 1992.</subfield><subfield code="c">Davor Marijan</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Zagreb</subfield><subfield code="b">Golden Marketing [u.a.]</subfield><subfield code="c">2008</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">518 S.</subfield><subfield code="b">graph. Darst., Kt.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Zsfassung in engl. Sprache</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="610" ind1="2" ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Yugoslavia.</subfield><subfield code="b">Jugoslovenska narodna armija</subfield><subfield code="x">History</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="648" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Geschichte 1987-1992</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Geschichte</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Jugoslawienkriege</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4875209-5</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Staat</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4056618-3</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Auflösung</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4193468-4</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Militär</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4039305-7</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Jugoslawien</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4028966-7</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Jugoslawien</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4028966-7</subfield><subfield code="D">g</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Militär</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4039305-7</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="2"><subfield code="a">Staat</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4056618-3</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="3"><subfield code="a">Auflösung</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4193468-4</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Geschichte 1987-1992</subfield><subfield code="A">z</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Jugoslawien</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4028966-7</subfield><subfield code="D">g</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="2" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Militär</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4039305-7</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="2" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Jugoslawienkriege</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4875209-5</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="2" ind2="2"><subfield code="a">Geschichte 1987-1992</subfield><subfield code="A">z</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="2" ind2=" "><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="m">Digitalisierung BSBMuenchen</subfield><subfield code="q">application/pdf</subfield><subfield code="u">http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016561057&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA</subfield><subfield code="3">Inhaltsverzeichnis</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="m">Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen</subfield><subfield code="q">application/pdf</subfield><subfield code="u">http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016561057&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA</subfield><subfield code="3">Abstract</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="940" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="n">oe</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016561057</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="942" ind1="1" ind2="1"><subfield code="c">355.009</subfield><subfield code="e">22/bsb</subfield><subfield code="f">09048</subfield><subfield code="g">496</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="942" ind1="1" ind2="1"><subfield code="c">355.009</subfield><subfield code="e">22/bsb</subfield><subfield code="f">09049</subfield><subfield code="g">496</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="942" ind1="1" ind2="1"><subfield code="c">909</subfield><subfield code="e">22/bsb</subfield><subfield code="f">09049</subfield><subfield code="g">496</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="942" ind1="1" ind2="1"><subfield code="c">909</subfield><subfield code="e">22/bsb</subfield><subfield code="f">09048</subfield><subfield code="g">496</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| geographic | Jugoslawien (DE-588)4028966-7 gnd |
| geographic_facet | Jugoslawien |
| id | DE-604.BV023377907 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T21:15:15Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:17:14Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9789532123395 |
| language | Croatian |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016561057 |
| oclc_num | 310982705 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 DE-11 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR |
| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-11 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR |
| physical | 518 S. graph. Darst., Kt. |
| publishDate | 2008 |
| publishDateSearch | 2008 |
| publishDateSort | 2008 |
| publisher | Golden Marketing [u.a.] |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Marijan, Davor 1966- Verfasser (DE-588)1152099639 aut Slom titove armije jugoslavenska narodna armija i raspad Jugoslavije 1987. - 1992. Davor Marijan Zagreb Golden Marketing [u.a.] 2008 518 S. graph. Darst., Kt. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Zsfassung in engl. Sprache Yugoslavia. Jugoslovenska narodna armija History Geschichte 1987-1992 gnd rswk-swf Geschichte Jugoslawienkriege (DE-588)4875209-5 gnd rswk-swf Staat (DE-588)4056618-3 gnd rswk-swf Auflösung (DE-588)4193468-4 gnd rswk-swf Militär (DE-588)4039305-7 gnd rswk-swf Jugoslawien (DE-588)4028966-7 gnd rswk-swf Jugoslawien (DE-588)4028966-7 g Militär (DE-588)4039305-7 s Staat (DE-588)4056618-3 s Auflösung (DE-588)4193468-4 s Geschichte 1987-1992 z DE-604 Jugoslawienkriege (DE-588)4875209-5 s Digitalisierung BSBMuenchen application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016561057&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016561057&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Abstract |
| spellingShingle | Marijan, Davor 1966- Slom titove armije jugoslavenska narodna armija i raspad Jugoslavije 1987. - 1992. Yugoslavia. Jugoslovenska narodna armija History Geschichte Jugoslawienkriege (DE-588)4875209-5 gnd Staat (DE-588)4056618-3 gnd Auflösung (DE-588)4193468-4 gnd Militär (DE-588)4039305-7 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4875209-5 (DE-588)4056618-3 (DE-588)4193468-4 (DE-588)4039305-7 (DE-588)4028966-7 |
| title | Slom titove armije jugoslavenska narodna armija i raspad Jugoslavije 1987. - 1992. |
| title_auth | Slom titove armije jugoslavenska narodna armija i raspad Jugoslavije 1987. - 1992. |
| title_exact_search | Slom titove armije jugoslavenska narodna armija i raspad Jugoslavije 1987. - 1992. |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Slom titove armije jugoslavenska narodna armija i raspad Jugoslavije 1987. - 1992. |
| title_full | Slom titove armije jugoslavenska narodna armija i raspad Jugoslavije 1987. - 1992. Davor Marijan |
| title_fullStr | Slom titove armije jugoslavenska narodna armija i raspad Jugoslavije 1987. - 1992. Davor Marijan |
| title_full_unstemmed | Slom titove armije jugoslavenska narodna armija i raspad Jugoslavije 1987. - 1992. Davor Marijan |
| title_short | Slom titove armije |
| title_sort | slom titove armije jugoslavenska narodna armija i raspad jugoslavije 1987 1992 |
| title_sub | jugoslavenska narodna armija i raspad Jugoslavije 1987. - 1992. |
| topic | Yugoslavia. Jugoslovenska narodna armija History Geschichte Jugoslawienkriege (DE-588)4875209-5 gnd Staat (DE-588)4056618-3 gnd Auflösung (DE-588)4193468-4 gnd Militär (DE-588)4039305-7 gnd |
| topic_facet | Yugoslavia. Jugoslovenska narodna armija History Geschichte Jugoslawienkriege Staat Auflösung Militär Jugoslawien |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016561057&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016561057&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT marijandavor slomtitovearmijejugoslavenskanarodnaarmijairaspadjugoslavije19871992 |