The subject's point of view:
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford [u.a.]
Oxford Univ. Press
2008
|
| Ausgabe: | 1. publ. |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Beschreibung: | XXVII, 197 S. |
| ISBN: | 9780199230327 |
Internformat
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| 100 | 1 | |a Farkas, Katalin |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a The subject's point of view |c Katalin Farkas |
| 250 | |a 1. publ. | ||
| 264 | 1 | |a Oxford [u.a.] |b Oxford Univ. Press |c 2008 | |
| 300 | |a XXVII, 197 S. | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 500 | |a Includes bibliographical references and index | ||
| 600 | 1 | 4 | |a Descartes, René |d 1596-1650 |
| 650 | 4 | |a Philosophy of mind | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Externalism (Philosophy of mind) | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Internalism (Theory of knowledge) | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Knowledge, Theory of | |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Philosophy of Mind |0 (DE-588)4248301-3 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Internalismus |0 (DE-588)7500662-5 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
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| 689 | 0 | 1 | |a Internalismus |0 (DE-588)7500662-5 |D s |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804137740185370624 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | CONTENTS ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS PART ONE. OUR CARTESIAN MIND I.
PRIVILEGED ACCESS AND THE MARK OF THE MENTAL 2. UNCONSCIOUS, CONSCIOUS,
BODILY 3. PERSONS AND MINDS PART TWO. INTERNALISM AND EXTERNALISM 4. THE
INTERNAL AND THE EXTERNAL 5. INDISCRIMINABILITY 6. EXTERNALISM AND
PRIVILEGED SELF-KNOWLEDGE 7. REFERENCE AND SENSE RIFERENCES INDEX XL11 I
3 33 51 7 1 100 127 157 185 195 ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS PART ONE.
OUR CARTESIAN MIND I PRIVILEGED ACCESS AND THE MARK OF THE MENTAL 1.1
THE LIST RICHARD RORTY CLAIMED THAT MANY OF OUR INTUITIONS ABOUT THE
MIND SIMPLY RESULT FROM OUR UNCRITICAL RELIANCE ON THE MODEM
PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITION ORIGINATING FROM DESCARTES, BUT HAVE NO FURTHER
SIGNIFICANCE. RORTY IS RIGHT THAT OUR CONCEPTION OF THE MIND IS
ESSENTIALLY SHAPED BY THE CARTESIAN THEORY, BUT THIS BOOK, UNLIKE RORTY,
SUGGESTS EMBRACING, RATHER THAN OVERTHROWING, THIS TRADITION. 1.2 THE
PROJECT OF THE SECOND MEDITATION DESCARTES S SECOND MEDITATION BEARS THE
TIDE THE NATURE OF THE HUMAN MIND, AND HOW IT IS BETTER KNOWN THAN THE
BODY . DESCARTES HERE CONSIDERS THE ARISTOTELIAN LIST OF PSYCHO- LOGICAL
FACULTIES: NUTRITIVE, LOCOMOTIVE, SENSORY, AND THINKING CAPACITIES, AND
CLAIMS THAT OO1Y THE LAST IS ESSENTIAL TO HIM. 1.3 VARIETIES OF THOUGHT
AFTER HE HAS ESTABLISHED THAT HE IS A THINKING THING, DESCARTES TURNS TO
THE QUESTION OF WHAT A THINKING THING ISO HIS NEW UNDERSTANDING OF
SENSORY PERCEPTIONS MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO INCLUDE THEM AS A FORM OF
THOUGHT ; APPLYING DESCARTES S METHOD, SENSATIONS, AND EMOTIONS ALSO
TURN OUT TO BE VARIETIES OF THOUGHT-THAT IS, VARIETIES OF MENTAL
PHENOMENA. 1.4 INCORPOREAL MINDS AND CERTAINTY HOW DO WE DECIDE WHETHER
WE REGARD A FEATURE AS BELONGING TO THE MIND? TWO SUGGESTIONS ARE
CONSIDERED AND REJECTED: THAT XLV ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS MENTAL
FEATURES ARE THOSE THAT CAN BE EXEMPLIFIED IN AN IMMA- TERIAL SUBSTANCE;
AND THAT MENTAL FEATURES ARE THOSE WE CANNOT DOUBT WE POSSESS. 1.5
SPECIAL ACCESS DIFFERENT COGNITIVE FACULTIES ARE DISTINGUISHED. ONLY ONE
OF THEM HAS THE FOLLOWING FEATURE: IT ENABLES THE SUBJECT TO KNOW ITS
SUBJECT MATTER IN A WAY THAT NO ONE ELSE WHO IS ENDOWED WITH THE SAME
COGNITIVE FACULTY CAN. EVERYTHING THAT IS KNOWN THROUGH THE USE OF THIS
FACULTY BELONGS TO THE MIND. PRIVILEGED ACCESSIBILITY IS THE MARK OF THE
MENTAL. 1.6 COGNITIVE FACULTIES THE COGNITIVE FACULTY THAT PROVIDES
SPECIAL ACCESS TO ITS SUBJECT MATTER IS INTROSPECTION. INTROSPECTION IS
DISTINGUISHED FROM APRIORI KNOWLEDGE-THE KIND OF KNOWLEDGE WE HAVE, FOR
EXAMPLE, OF LOGIC AND MATHEMATICS. INTROSPECTIVE JUSTIFICATION IS ALSO
DISTINGUISHED FROM JUSTIFICATION THAT IS BASED ON THE CONTEXTUA11Y
SELF-VERIFYING NATURE OF CERTAIN THOUGHTS. 1.7 THE SUBJECT S POINT OF
VIEW AN EXPLANATION OF WHY A PORTION OF REALITY SHOULD BE KNOWN TO ONE
PERSON IN A SPECIAL WAY IS ADVANCED. MENTAL FACTS ARE PERSPECTIVAL
FACTS; MENTAL FACTS ARE CHARACTERIZED BY HOW THINGS ARE FOT THE SUBJECT.
TO BE A SUBJECT IS TO POSSESS A POINT OF VIEW. THIS ENDOWS THE SUBJECT
WITH A PRIMA FACIE AUTHORITY, BUT DOES NOT PROVIDE HER WITH
INFALLIBILITY IN THIS AREA. 2 UNCONSCIOUS, CONSCIOUS, BODILY 2.1 ACCESS
TO THE BODY ONE OBJECTION TO THE THESIS THAT MY MIND IS PRECISELY WHAT
IS KNOWN TO ME IN A WAY THAT IS KNOWN TO NO ONE ELSE IS THAT THE SAME IS
TRUE OF CERTAIN STATES OF MY BODY. HUT THIS IS CONTINGENT: ANALYTICAL
TABLE OF CONTENTS XV SOMEONE ELSE COULD BE APPROPRIATELY WIRED TO MY
BODY AND LEAM ABOUT ITS STATES, BUT SHE WOULD NOT THEREBY LEAM ABOUT MY
FEELINGS CONCEMING THESE STATES. 2.2 STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND
STANDING STATES WE DISTINGUISH BETWEEN TWO TYPES OF MENTAL PHENOMENA:
OCCURRENT EVENTS, WHICH ARE CONSCIOUS AND HAVE A PHENOMENAL CHARACTER;
AND STANDING STATES, WHICH ARE EITHER NOT ALWAYS CON- SCIOUS, OR,
ACCORDING TO SOME, NEVER CONSCIOUS. THIS LATTER POS- ITION IS ALSO
COMPATIBLE WITH THE MAIN THESIS OF THE BOOK: WHEN I KNOW THAT, FOR
EXAMPLE, I HAVE A CERTAIN BELIEF, I AM CONSCIOUS OF HAVING THE BELIEF,
EVEN IF THE BELIEF ITSELF IS NOT CONSCIOUS. 2.3 THE MIND AS AN IDEAL
SOME CLEAR COUNTER-EXAMPLES TO THE THESIS THAT THE MIND IS KNOWN TO THE
SUBJECT IN A PRIVILEGED WAY ARE CASES OF REPRESSED UNCONSCIOUS DESIRES,
OR CASES OF SELF-DECEPTION. AN ARGUMENT GIVEN BY FREUD FOR THE EXISTENCE
OF THE UNCONSCIOUS CAN BE USED TO DEFEND THE CARTESIAN CONCEPTION: OUR
UNDERSTANDING OF THE UNCONSCIOUS IS PARASITIC ON OUR UNDERSTANDING OF
MENTAL STATES THAT ARE AVAILABLE TO CONSCIOUS REFLECTION. 3 PERSONS AND
MINDS 3. I THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CARTESIAN LIST OUR LIST OF WHAT BELONGS
TO THE MIND IS THE SAME AS THE CARTESIAN LIST OF MENTAL FEATURES, AND
RATHER DIFFERENT FROM, SAY, THE ARISTOTELIAN LIST OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
POWERS. DISCARDING THE CARTESIAN CONCEPTION MAY, THEREFORE, BE MORE
DIFFICULT THAN SOME CRITICS SUGGEST, BECAUSE IT WOULD REQUIRE A
FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN OUR CONCEPTION OF THE MENTAL. 3.2 CITIZEN OFTWO
WORLDS THE PRESENT PROPOSAL IS NOT COMMITTED TO DUALISM ABOUT MIND AND
BODY, BUT IT DOES IMPLY A CERTAIN DUALITY ABOUT OUR XVI ANALYTICAL TABLE
OF CONTENTS NATURE: HUMAN BEINGS ARE CITIZENS OF TWO WORLDS . THERE IS
SOMETHING IN OUR NATURE THAT WE SHARE WITH THE REST OF THE CREATED
WORLD, AND THERE IS SOMETHING THAT IS DISTINCTIVE OF OUR MODE OF
EXISTENCE. THE LATTER ASPECT IS DESCRIBED HERE BY SAYING THAT WE ARE
PERSONS. 3.3 QUESTIONS ABOUT PERSONS FOUR QUESTIONS ABOUT PERSONS ARE
DISTINGUISHED. FIRST, DO PER- SONS DESERVE A SPECIAL TREATMENT BY OTHER
PERSONS, AND, IF THEY DO, WHAT SHOULD THIS TREATMENT BE? SECOND, WHAT
SORT OF CHARACTERISTICS QUALIFY A CREATURE TO BE REGARDED AS A PER- SON?
THIRD, WHAT IS THE ONTOLOGICAL CATEGORY TO WHICH PERSONS BELONG? FOURTH,
WHAT ARE THE CONDITIONS FOR SOMEONE TO REMAIN THE SAME PERSON THROUGH
TIME? OUR INTEREST HERE IS IN THE SECOND QUESTION. 3.4 CRITERIA OF
PERSONHOOD THE SUGGESTION IS THAT A PERSON IS A CREATURE WHO HAS THE
KIND OF RNIND WE HAVE. HERE LIES THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CARTESIAN
CONCEPTION OF THE RNIND: IT OFTERSUS A LIST OF MENTAL PHENOMENA THAT IS
PUT TOGETHER ON A PRINCIPLED BASIS; AND IT IS THE POSSESSION OF MORE OR
LESS THIS LIST OF MENTAL ATTRIBUTES THAT PROVIDES THE CRITERIA FOR
SOMEONE TO BE REGARDED AS A PERSON. 3.5 THE PERSON AND THE HUMAN ANIMA!
IT IS EXPLAINED WHY THE SUGGESTION OF THE PREVIOUS SECTION IS COMPATIBLE
WITH VARIOUS THEORIES OF PERSONHOOD AND PERSONAL IDENTITY; FOR EXAMPLE,
WITH A LOCKEAN THEORY OR WITH AN ANIMALIST THEORY. 3.6 CONCLUSION OFPART
ONE DESCARTES S THEORY OF THE MIND HAS RECEIVED SEVERE CRITICISM IN THE
TWENTIETH AND TWENTY-FIRST CENTURIES. THIS FIRST PART OF THIS BOOK HAS
ATTEMPTED TO RESTORE SOMEWHAT THE REPUTATION OF THE ANALYTICAL TABLE OF
CONTENTS XVLL CARTESIAN CONCEPTION, EVEN THOUGH THE CONCEPTION DEFENDED
HERE DEPARTS FROM DESCARTES IN A NUMBER OF WAYS. THE PLAN FOR PART TWO
IS TO ARGUE THAT THE CHARACTERISTIC FEATURE OF THIS CONCEPTION IS THAT
IT IS INTERNALIST: IT IS COMMITTED TO THE CLAIM THAT A SUBJECT S MENTAL
FEATURES ARE ENTIRELY DETERMINED BY HER INTERNAL PROPERTIES. PART TWO.
INTEMALISM AND EXTEMALISM 4 THE INTERNAL AND THE EXTERNAL 4. I THE
BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE INTERNAL AND THE EXTERNAL THE TWIN EARTH ARGUMENT
IS BRIEFLY INTRODUCED. THE CONCLU- SION OF THIS ARGUMENT IS SUPPOSED TO
BE THAT THE CONTE NT OF OUR MENTAL STATES IS DETERMINED BY FACTS
EXTERNAL TO USO THE DEFINITION IS INCOMPLETE UNLESS WE SPECIFY WHAT
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL MEAN. 4.2 IDENTITY IN PHYSICAL MAKE-UP THE
USUAL SET-UP OF THE TWIN EARTH THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS RELATE THE TWINS BY
INTERNAL PHYSICAL SAMENESS. THIS IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO RON A GENERAL
EXTERNALIST ARGUMENT, FOR IT FAILS TO ADDRESS DUALIST THEORIES. IT IS
NOT NECESSARY FOR THE EXTERNALIST ARGUMENT EITHER, FOR EXTERNALISM CAN
ARISE WITH RESPECT TO FACTS INSIDE THE BODY. 4.3 EXTERNAL/INTERNAL
DEFINED WE ATTEMPT TO DEFINE THE EXTERNAL/INTERNAL RELATION BY FOCUS-
ING ON THE RELATION BETWEEN THE TWINS IN THE TWIN EARTH SCENARIO:
WHATEVER IS SHARED BY THE TWINS IS INTERNAL, AND WHAT IS DIFFERENT IS
EXTERNAL. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THE RELATION BETWEEN THE TWINS IS THE
SUBJECTIVE INDISTINGUISHABILITY OF THEIR SITUATION-EVERYTHING SEEMS THE
SAME TO THEM. XV11L ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS 4.4 TWIN SITUATIONS A
MORE PRECISE UNDERSTANCLING OF SUBJECTIVE INCLISTINGUISH- ABILITY IS
SOUGHT BY LISTING SITUATIONS THAT STAND IN THIS RELATION: A SUBJECT
ACTUALLY TASTING WATER AND COUNTERFACTUALLY TASTING A SUPERFICIALLY
SIMILAR LIQUID; AN EMBOCLIED SUBJECT AND HER BRAIN-IN-A-VAT COUNTERPART.
4.5 PHYSICAL OR FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENCE THE RELATION BETWEEN THE TWINS
CANNOT BE DEFINED AS PHYS- ICAL, FUNCTIONAL, OR MERELY BEHAVIOURAL
EQUIVALENCE. INSTEAD, IT SHOULD BE DEFINED IN TERMS OF SAMENESS OF SOME
MENTAL FEATURES (CALLED HERE THE METAPHYSICAL ACCOUNT ) OR IN
EPISTERNIC TERMS. 4.6 PHENOMENAL PROPERTIES INTRODUCED A SENSORY
EXPERIENCE IS AN EVENT OF ITS APPEARING TO A SUBJECT THAT THINGS ARE IN
A CERTAIN WAY. IN SO FAR AS TWO EXPERIENCES INVOLVE THINGS APPEARING IN
THE SAME WAY, THEY SHARE A PHE- NOMENAL PROPERTY. PHENOMENAL PROPERTIES
DETERRNINE WHAT IT IS LIKE TO HAVE AN EXPERIENCE. THIS NOTION OF
PHENOMENAL PROP- ERTIES CAN BE EXTENDED TO ALL CONSCIOUS MENTAL STATES,
INCLUCLING COGNITIVE STATES. THE RELATION BETWEEN THE TWINS IS SAMENESS
OF PHENOMENAL PROPERTIES OF ALL THEIR CONSCIOUS MENTALLIFE. 4.7 NARROW
CONTENT IT MAY BE SUGGESTED THAT THE RELATION BETWEEN THE TWINS IS
SAMENESS OF NARROW CONTENT OF THEIR MENTAL STATES. THIS IS ACCOMMODATED
BY THE PREVIOUS PROPOSAL IN SO FAR AS THE PHE- NOMENALLY CONSTITUTED
INTENTIONAL FEATURES ARE SHARED BETWEEN THE TWINS. 4.8 POSSIBLE
OBJECTIONS TO PHENOMENAL PROPERTIES THE SUGGESTION THAT THE RELATION
CONSTITUTIVE OFTWIN SITUATIONS IS SAMENESS OF PHENOMENAL PROPERTIES
FACES SOME OBJECTIONS: THAT SAMENESS OF PHENOMENAL PROPERTIES IS BASED
ON THE SAME APPEARANCE RELATION , WHICH IS NOT TRANSITIVE; AND THAT, IN
ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS XIX EXTERNALIST REPRESENTATIONALIST AND
DISJUNCTIVIST VIEWS, SOME TWIN EXPERIENCES DO NOT SHARE ALL PHENOMENAL
PROPERTIES. 4.9 EXTERNALISM ABOUT THE PHENOMENAL THOSE WHO OBJECT TO THE
ACCOUNT OF THE TWIN SITUATIONS IN TERMS OF SHARED PHENOMENAL PROPERTIES
NEED TO ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: IF NOT PHYSICAL, FUNCTIONAL, OR
BEHAVIOURAL SAMENESS,IF NOT SHARED NARROW CONTENT, AND IF NOT EVEN
SHARED PHENOMENAL CHARACTER, THEN WHAT MAKES TWO SITUATIONS COUNT AS
SUBJECTIVELY INDISTINGUISHABLE? THE MOST PLAUSIBLE ANSWER IS SOME
EPISTEMIC RELATION. 5 INDISCRIMINABILITY 5. I THE FITTING RELATION SOME
TERRNINOLOGY: INDISCRIMINABILITY IS A POSSIBLY NON- TRANSITIVE
EPISTEMIE RELATION; SAMENESS OF APPEARANCE IS THE TRANSITIVE RELATION
OF IDENTITY OF PHENOMENAL PROPERTIES. THE FITTING RELATION IS THE
RELATION CONSTITUTIVE OFTWIN SITUATIONS. THE CHAPTER DEALS WITH VARIOUS
UNDERSTANDINGS OF INDISCRIM- INABILITY, AND ATTEMPTS TO SHOW THAT NONE
OF THEM EAN BE USED TO DEFINE THE FITTING RELATION. 5.2 ACTIVE
DISCRIMINABILITY A AND BARE AETIVELY DISERIMINABLE IF A SUBJEET CANNOT
AETIVATE KNOWLEDGE THAT A AND BARE DISTINCT. ACTIVE INDISCRIMINAB- ILITY
IS PRESENTATION SENSITIVE. ONEE PRESENTATIONS ARE FTXED, ACTIVE
INDISCRIMINABILITY IS REFLEXIVE, SYMMETRICAL, AND NON- TRANSITIVE. THIS
IS ILLUSTRATED, FOR EXAMPLE, BY THE CASE OF THE PHENOMENAL SORITES
SERIES. 5.3 REFLECTIVE KNOWLEDGE IF AETIVE INDISCRIMINABILITY IS TO BE
USED TO DEFINE THE FIT- TING RELATION, THE RELEVANT KNOWLEDGE MUST BE
LIMITED TO XX ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS KNOWLEDGE FROM INTROSPECTION.
ONE REASON WHY ACTIVE INDIS- CRIMINABILITY IS NOT SUITABLE FOR DEFINING
THE FITTING RELATION IS THAT THE INABILITY TO DISCRIMINATE TWO
EXPERIENCES MAY BE A RESULT OF SOME DEFICIENCY IN A SUBJECT S COGNITIVE
ABILITIES, EVEN IF THE EXPERIENCES ARE SUBJECTIVELY QUITE DIFFERENT. 5.4
THE IMPORTANCE OFPRESENTATIONS TWIN EXPERIENCES CANNOT BE COMPARED
DIRECTLY, THAT IS, BY HAVING BOTH OF THEM AT THE SAME TIME. IF THE
SUBJECT IS HAVING ONE OF THE TWIN EXPERIENCES, WE HAVE TO FIND AN
ADEQUATE WAY OF PRESENTING THE OTHER EXPERIENCE, SO THAT THE OTHER
EXPERIENCE FITS THE SUBJECT S PRESENT EXPERIENCE JUST IN CASE THE
EXPERIENCES ARE INDISCRIMINABLE. VARIOUS CANDIDATES ARE CONSIDERED AND
REJECTED. 5.5 SUCCESSIVE PRESENTATIONS A NEW SUGGESTION IS THAT, IF TWO
EXPERIENCES CANNOT BE DISCRIMINATED IN ANY SEQUENCES WHEN THEY ARE
EXPERIENCED IN IMMEDIATE SUCCESSION, THEY FIT. BUT, AGAIN, THIS COULD BE
A RESULT OF SOME COGNITIVE DEFICIENCY THAT MAKES SUBJECTIVELY QUITE
DIFFERENT EXPERIENCES INDISCRIMINABLE. 5.6 PHENOMENAL SIMILARITY AND
PHENOMENAL SAMENESS IT MAY BE SUGGESTED THAT, IN ANY CASE, ADJACENT
MEMBERS OF THE PHENOMENAL SORITES SERIES OFFER A CLEAR EXAMPLE OF
EXPERIENCES THAT ARE INDISCRIMINABLE, BUT PHENOMENALLY DIFFERENT. BUT
THOSE WHO WOULD WANT TO DEFINE THE FITTING RELATION IN EPI- STEMIC TERMS
BECAUSE THEY ARE EXTEMALIST ABOUT PHENOMENAL PROPERTIES CANNOT MAKE USE
OF THIS ANALOGY. ACTIVE INDISCRIM- INABILITY IS NOT SUITABLE FOR
DEFINING THE FITTING RELATION. 5.7 ACCESS INDISCRIMINABILITY TAKE ALL
THE PROPOSITIONS THE SUBJECT KNOWS IN A CERTAIN SITUATION A. IF ALL
THESE PROPOSITIONS ARE TRUE IN A SITU- ATION B, THEN B IS ACCESS
INDISCRIMINABLE FROM HER PRESENT SITUATION A. ACCESS INDISCRIMINABILITY
IS DIFFERENT FROM ACTIVE ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS XXL
INDISCRIMINABILITY IN THAT IT IS NOT SENSITIVE TO PRESENTATIONS; IT IS
REFLEXIVE, NON-SYMMETRICAL, AND NON-TRANSITIVE. 5.8 ACCESS
INDISCRIRNINABILITY AND TWIN SITUATIONS IF EXTERNALISM ABOUT CONTENT IS
ACCEPTED, THEN THE TWIN SITUATIONS ARE NOT ACCESS INDISCRIMINABLE.
THEREFORE ACCESS INDISCRIMINABILITY CANNOT BE USED TO DEFINE THE FITTING
RELATION IF ONE IS AN EXTERNALIST. 5.9 RESPONSE DISCRIRNINATION THE
THIRD NOTION OF DISCRIMINATION: TWO OBJECTS ARE RESPONSE INDISCRIMINABLE
IF AND ONLY IF THEY GENERATE THE SAME COGNITIVE RESPONSE. RESPONSE
INDISCRIMINABILITY IS REFLEXIVE, SYMMET- RICAL, AND TRANSITIVE. IT
CANNOT BE USED TO DEFINE THE FITTING RELATION EITHER, BECAUSE, IF
CONTENT EXTERNALISM IS TRUE, THEN TWIN SITUATIONS TURN OUT TO BE
RESPONSE DISCRIMINABLE. THIS CONCLUDES THE ARGUMENT THAT THE RELATION
BETWEEN THE TWINS CANNOT BE DEFINED IN EPISTEMIC TERMS. 5.10
CONCLUSIONS, INTEMALISM STATED WE RETURN TO THE EARLIER SUGGESTION THAT
THE FITTING RELATION SHOULD BE DEFMED IN TERMS OF SAMENESS OF PHENOMENAL
PROP- ERTIES. THE PREVIOUS OBJECTIONS TO PHENOMENAL PROPERTIES ARE
ANSWERED. INTERNALISM ABOUT A MENTAL FEATURE IS THE VIEW THAT THE
PHENOMENAL PROPERTIES OF CONSCIOUS THOUGHTS AND EXPERI- ENCES, WHICH ARE
SHARED BETWEEN SUBJECTS IN TWIN SITUATIONS, DETERMINE THE MENTAL FEATURE
IN QUESTION. HERE INTERNALISM IS DEFENDED WITH RESPECT TO ALL FEATURES
OF CONSCIOUS MENTAL STATES. 6 EXTEMALISM AND PRIVILEGED SELF-KNOWLEDGE
6. I INCOMPATIBILITY AND THE USUAL UNDERSTANDING THIS CHAPTER AIMS TO
SHOW THAT EXTERNALISM IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE CLAIM THAT ALL MENTAL
FEATURES ARE ACCESSIBLE IN A XXLL ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS
PRIVILEGED WAY. THIS IS SOMEWHAT OBSCURED BY THE USUAL UNDERSTANDING OF
EXTERNALISM, WHICH DRAWS THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE INTERNAL AND THE
EXTERNAL AROUND THE BRAIN OR THE BODY. 6.2 INTEMALISM AND PRIVILEGED
ACCESS ALL AND ONLY PHENOMENAL PROPERTIES OF CONSCIOUS EVENTS GIVE RISE
TO PERSPECTIVAL FACTS, WHICH ARE PRECISELY THE FACTS THAT ARE OPEN TO
PRIVILEGED ACCESS. PHENOMENAL PROPERTIES ARE SHARED BY SUBJECTS IN TWIN
SITUATIONS. ACCORDING TO EXTERNALISTS, MENTAL FEATURES ARE DETERMINED BY
FACTORS THAT GO BEYOND PHENOMENAL PROPERTIES, AND HENCE THEY DO NOT
REGISTER WITHIN THE SUBJECT S POINT OF VIEW. COMPARED TO INTERNALISM,
EXTERNALISM LIMITS PRIVILEGED ACCESSIBILITY. 6.3 CONTEXTUALLY
SELF-VERIFYING THOUGHTS SOME EXTERNALISTS SUGGESTED AN ACCOUNT OF
PRIVILEGED SELF- KNOWLEDGE THAT IS PERFECTLY COMPATIBLE WITH
EXTERNALISM: THAT SOME REFLECTIVE THOUGHTS ARE JUSTIFIED BECAUSE OF
THEIR CONTEXT- UALLY SELF-VERIF)RING NATURE, AND THE CONSEQUENT
IMPOSSIBILITY OF THEIR BEING FALSE. THIS IS NOT AN ADEQUATE ACCOUNT OF
SELF-KNOWLEDGE, BECAUSE GUARANTEED CORRECTNESS IS COMPATIBLE WITH
IGNORANCE, AND BECAUSE THE ACCOUNT APPLIES ONLY TO A SMALL PART OF OUR
CONSCIOUS MENTALLIFE. 6.4 EXTEMALISM ABOUT VARIOUS MENTAL FEATURES
EXTERNALISM ABOUT CONTENT IS THE MOST FREQUENTLY DISCUSSED FORM OF
EXTERNALISM, BUT IT IS POSSIBLE TO BE EXTERNALIST ABOUT ATTITUDES, OR
PHENOMENAL CHARACTER, OR SENSORY FEATURES AS WEN. 6.5 FAILURE
OFPRIVILEGED ACCESS SELF-ATTRIBUTIONS OF MENTAL FEATURES OTHER THAN
CONTENT ARE NOT CONTEXTUALLY SELF-VERIF)RING, AND, IF EXTERNALISM ABOUT
THESE FEATURES IS ACCEPTED, THESE STATEMENTS CAN EASILY BE FALSE. HERE
THE LIMITATION THAT EXTERNALISM POSES ON PRIVILEGED SELF-KNOWLEDGE IS
OBVIOUS. IN THE CASES OF ATTRIBUTIONS OF ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS
XX111 CONTENT, THE LIMITATION IS OBSCURED BY THE CONTEXTUALLY SELF-
VERIFYING NATURE OF THE ATTRIBUTION. 6.6 TRAVELLING CASES MY ARGUMENT
MAY RESEMBLE THE STRUCTURE OF A POPULAR ARGUMENT FOR THE INCOMPATIBILITY
OF EXTERNALISM AND SELF- KNOWLEDGE: ACCORDING TO THIS ARGUMENT, SOME
FORM OF DISCRIMINABILITY IS A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR KNOWLEDGE, BUT
SUBJECTS CANNOT DISCRIMINATE THEIR EXTERNALLY INDIVIDUATED THOUGHTS. THE
DEBATES SURROUNDING THIS ISSUE ARE PARTLY DUE TO THE LACK OF CLARITY
ABOUT WHICH SENSE OF DISCRIMINABILITY IS IN PLAY IN THE ARGUMENT. 6.7
DISCRIMINATION AND INTROSPECTIVE KNOWLEDGE WHEN THE CLAIM THAT
DISCRIMINATION IS NECESSARY FOR KNOW- LEDGE IS USED IN AN ARGUMENT, THE
REFERENCE IS OFTEN TO THE WORK OF ALVIN GOLDMAN, WHO DEFENDS THE VIEW
THAT DISCRIMINATION IS NECESSARY FOR PERCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE. THE NOTION
GOLDMAN USES IS RESPONSE DISCRIMINATION; BUT, AS WAS SHOWN EARLIER, IF
CONTENT EXTERNALISM IS TRUE, THEN TWIN THOUGHTS ARE RESPONSE
DISCRIMINABLE. HENCE THIS ARGUMENT FOR INCOMPATIBILITY DOES NOT WORK.
6.8 ACCESS DISCRIMINABILITY AND INTROSPECTIVE KNOWLEDGE IF THE GENERAL
NECESSARY CONDITION FOR KNOWLEDGE IS FORMULATED IN TERMS OF ACCESS,
RATHER THAN RESPONSE DISCRIMINABILITY, THE RESULT IS STILL THE SAME: IF
EXTERNALISM IS TRUE, TWIN SITUATIONS ARE ACCESS DISCRIMINABLE. HENCE THE
ARGUMENTS FOR INCOMPATIBILITY THAT TRY TO SHOW A DEFICIENCY IN THE
EXTERNALIST S SELF-KNOWLEDGE BECAUSE OF THE FAILURE OF SOME GENERAL
NECESSARY DISCRIMINATION CONDITION DO NOT WORK. MY ARGUMENT DOES NOT
HAVE THIS STRUCTURE. 6.9 DISCRIMINATION THROUGH EXTEMALLY INDIVIDUATED
CONTENTS IF DISCRIMINABILITY-IN BOTH THE RESPONSE AND THE ACCESS
SENSE-IS DUE MERELY TO EXTERNALLY INDIVIDUATED COGNITIVE XXIV ANALYTICAL
TABLE OF CONTENTS RESPONSES, IT CEASES TO BE A USEFUL REQUIREMENT FOR
KNOW- LEDGE. HENCE THE DEBATE ABOUT THE TRAVELLING CASES HAS BEEN SO FAR
INCONCLUSIVE: IT DOES NOT SHOW THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF EXTEMALISM AND
PRIVILEGED SELF-KNOWLEDGE, BUT DOES NOT VINDICATE ANY COGNITIVE
ACHIEVEMENT FOR EXTERNALIST VIEWS EITHER. 6.10 THE TRANSPARENCY OF
CONTENT THE CLAIM THAT A SUBJECT SHOULD ALWAYS KNOW, BY REFLECTION,
WHETHER TWO OF HER CONCEPTS OR THOUGHT CONTENTS ARE THE SAME, IS
DEFENDED. SUBJECTS ARE NOT INFALLIBLE ABOUT THESE MAUERS, BUT, IF THEY
MAKE AMISTAKE, THEY SHOULD BE ABLE TO RECOVER THROUGH REFLECTION, AND,
IF THEY DO NOT, THEY BREACH A NORM OF RATIONALITY. 6. I I EXTERNAL
FEATURE OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF PRIVILEGED ACCESS IF EXTEMALISM IS TRUE,
THEN THERE ARE MENTAL FEATURES THAT ARE NOT ACCESSIBLE IN A PRIVILEGED
WAY: IN SOME SPECIFIC SITUATIONS, A SUBJECT MAY ENTERTAIN TWO CONCEPTS,
AND BE UNABLE TO DECIDE BY REFLECTION THAT THE TWO ARE DIFFERENT. IT IS
A MENTAL FACT THAT THESE CONCEPTS ARE DIFFERENT, YET THIS LIES OUTSIDE
THE REALM OF PRIVILEGED ACCESS. HOWEVER, THIS RESULT GOES AGAINST THE
CONCEPTION OF MIND DEFENDED IN PART ONE. 7 REFERENCE AND SENSE 7. I
PHENOMENAL AND EXTERNALISTIC INTENTIONALITY EVEN WHEN ARGUMENTS ABOUT
PRIVILEGED SELF-KNOWLEDGE, OR RATIONALITY, OR AGENCY ARE PRESENTED IN
DEFENCE OF INTERNALISM, IT IS ORTEN CLAIMED THAT INTEMALISM FACES A
DECISIVE OBJEC- TION: IT CANNOT ACCOUNT FOR INTENTIONALITY, OR
REPRESENTATION. THEREFORE MANY ACCEPT THAT WE NEED TWO KINDS OF
INTENTION- ALITY: PHENOMENAL AND EXTERNALISTIC; OR TWO KINDS OF CONTENT:
NARROW AND BROAD. ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS XXV 7.2 THE
INEXPRESSIBILITY OFNARROW CONTENT CONTENTS ARE OBJECTS OF MENTAL
ATTITUDES. DEFENDERS OF DUAL- CONTENT-OR DUAL-INTENTIONALITY-THEORIES
OCCASIONALLY CLAIM THAT NARROW CONTENTS ARE NOT EXPRESSIBLE BY USING OUR
LAN- GUAGE. THIS, IF NOT FATAL, IS, IN ANY CASE, AN UNCOMFORTABLE
CONSEQUENCE FOR AN INTEMALIST THEORY, AND SHOULD BE AVOIDED, IF
POSSIBLE. 7.3 FREGE ON SENSE AND REFERENCE THE DOCTRINE THAT SENSE
DETERMINES REFERENCE IS AN EXPRESSION OF THE IDEA THAT SENSE IS
RESPONSIBLE FOR SEMANTIC PROPERTIES (TRUTH AND REFERENCE). FREGE HELD
THE DOCTRINE BOTH FOR NAMES AND FOR SENTENCES; IN THE LATTER CASE, HE
HELD THAT THE SENSE OF A SENTENCE, A THOUGHT, DETERMINES A UNIQUE TRUTH
VALUE. IT SEEMS THAT FREGE ACTUALLY BELIEVED THAT SENSE ALONE DETERMINES
REFERENCE. 7.4- ARISTOTLE ON BELIEFS AND TRUTH VALUES IF A THOUGHT
DETERMINES A TRUTH VALUE, THEN SENTENCES WITH DIFFERENT TRUTH VALUES
EXPRESS DIFFERENT THOUGHTS. MANY PEOPLE SEEM TO ACCEPT THIS. BUT, FOR
EXAMPLE, ARISTODE, IN THE CAT- EGORIES, PUTS FORWARD A DIFFERENT VIEW:
HE THINKS THE TRUTH VALUE OF A BELIEF AND STATEMENT CAN CHANGE, NOT
BECAUSE THE BELIEF IS CHANGING, BUT BECAUSE OF A CHANGE IN THE WORLD. IN
THAT CASE, DIFFERENCE IN TRUTH VALUE DOES NOT IMPLY DIFFERENCE IN
CONTENT. 7.5 SAME CONTENT-DIFFERENT TRUTH VALUE THE CLAIM THAT SENSE
ALONE DETERMINES REFERENCE (THOUGHT/ CONTENT ALONE DETERMINES A TRUTH
VALUE) MAY BE PLAUSIBLE IN THE CASE OF MATHEMATICS AND LOGIC. BUT AN
ORDINARY CONTINGENT DESCRIPTIVE SENTENCE LIKE THE INVENTOR OFBIFOCALS
WAS A MAN CAN BE TRUE IN ONE WORLD AND FALSE IN ANOTHER, WHILE HAVING
THE SAME CONTENT. THIS MEANS THAT SENSE ALONE DOES NOT DETERMINE
REFERENCE; THAT DIFFERENCE IN TRUTH VALUE DOES NOT, IN ITSELF, IMPLY
DIFFERENCE IN CONTENT. XXVI ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS 7.6 CROSS- W
ORLD AND WITHIN-A- W ORLD COMPARISON MANY WOULD PERHAPS ACCEPT THAT
SENSE ALONE DOES NOT DETER- MINE REFERENCE WHEN WE COMPARE DIFFERENT
POSSIBLE WORLDS; BUT THEY MAY SAY THAT, WITHIN A WORLD, DIFFERENCE IN
TRUTH VALUE OR REFERENCE IMPLIES DIFFERENCE IN SENSE. BUT THIS IS MERELY
A PREJUDICE. IF WE HAVE INDEPENDENT REASONS TO SUPPORT THIS MOVE, WE CAN
TREAT THE WITHIN-THE-WORLD CASE ANALOGOUSIY TO THE CROSS-WORLD CASE. 7.7
NON-INDEXICAL CONTEXTUALISM CONTENTS NEED NOT BE CONCEIVED AS
PROPOSITIONS WHOSE TRUTH VALUE IS FIXED WITHIN A WORLD. THE PRESENT
SUGGESTION IS SIMI- IAR TO THE VIEW THAT JOHN MACFARLANE CALLS
NON-INDEXICAL CONTEXTUALISM , WHICH TREATS CONTEXT-SENSITIVE
EXPRESSIONS AS EXPRESSING THE SAME CONTENTS IN DIFFERENT CONTEXTS, BUT
RECEIV- ING DIFFERENT REFERENCES OR TRUTH VALUES, BECAUSE SOME CHANGE IN
A FEATURE OF THE CONTEXT IS TREATED AS A CHANGE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF
EVALUATION. 7.8 DOUBLE INDEXING DIFFERENT FEATURES OF A CONTEXT MAY HAVE
DIFFERENT IOGICAL OR SEMANTIC ROLES WHEN DETERMINING SEMANTIC VALUES;
THIS IS ALLOWED BY THE PRESENT PROPOSAL. THE IMPORTANT POINT IS THAT
THEIR METAPHYSICAL STATUS IS THE SAME: THEY ARE ALL EXTEMAL TO THE
CONTENT. DISTINGUISHING THEIR SEMANTIC ROLES ANSWERS A CERTAIN OBJECTION
BY KAPLAN. 7.9 RELATIVIZED PROPOSITIONS AN OBJECTION BY JOHN PERRY TO A
VIEW SIMILAR TO THE PRESENT PROPOSAL IS CONSIDERED AND ANSWERED. 7.10
THE INCONCLUSIVENESS OF THE TWIN EARTH ARGUMENT THE CLASSIC TWIN EARTH
ARGUMENT IN PUTNAM S FORMULATION STATES THAT INTEMALISM IS INCOMPATIBLE
WITH THE DOCTRINE THAT ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS XXVII SENSE
DETERMINES REFERENCE. THE FOREGOING SHOWS THAT THIS IS NOT CORRECT.
SINCE NO ONE WOULD WANT TO CLAIM THAT SENSE ALONE DETERMINES REFERENCE,
IF SENSE PLUS SOMETHING ELSE DETERMINES REFERENCE, THE DOCTRINE IS STILL
UPHELD. AND THIS IS PRECISELY THE IDEA BEHIND MY INTERNALIST THEORY.
7.II INTEMALISM WITH TRUTH CONDITIONALITY THIS CONCLUDES THE PROJECT OF
THIS BOOK. THE MIND IS ESSENTIALLY REVEALED FROM THE SUBJECT S POINT OF
VIEW. THIS CONCEPTION LIES AT THE HEART OF CONTEMPORARY INTERNALIST
THEORIES. MOREOVER, INTEMALISM CAN ACCOUNT FOR TRUTH CONDI- TIONALITY;
HENCE, OVERALL, IT IS TO BE PREFERRED TO EXTERNALISM.
|
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CONTENTS ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS PART ONE. OUR CARTESIAN MIND I.
PRIVILEGED ACCESS AND THE MARK OF THE MENTAL 2. UNCONSCIOUS, CONSCIOUS,
BODILY 3. PERSONS AND MINDS PART TWO. INTERNALISM AND EXTERNALISM 4. THE
INTERNAL AND THE EXTERNAL 5. INDISCRIMINABILITY 6. EXTERNALISM AND
PRIVILEGED SELF-KNOWLEDGE 7. REFERENCE AND SENSE RIFERENCES INDEX XL11 I
3 33 51 7 1 100 127 157 185 195 ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS PART ONE.
OUR CARTESIAN MIND I PRIVILEGED ACCESS AND THE MARK OF THE MENTAL 1.1
THE LIST RICHARD RORTY CLAIMED THAT MANY OF OUR INTUITIONS ABOUT THE
MIND SIMPLY RESULT FROM OUR UNCRITICAL RELIANCE ON THE MODEM
PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITION ORIGINATING FROM DESCARTES, BUT HAVE NO FURTHER
SIGNIFICANCE. RORTY IS RIGHT THAT OUR CONCEPTION OF THE MIND IS
ESSENTIALLY SHAPED BY THE CARTESIAN THEORY, BUT THIS BOOK, UNLIKE RORTY,
SUGGESTS EMBRACING, RATHER THAN OVERTHROWING, THIS TRADITION. 1.2 THE
PROJECT OF THE SECOND MEDITATION DESCARTES'S SECOND MEDITATION BEARS THE
TIDE 'THE NATURE OF THE HUMAN MIND, AND HOW IT IS BETTER KNOWN THAN THE
BODY'. DESCARTES HERE CONSIDERS THE ARISTOTELIAN LIST OF PSYCHO- LOGICAL
FACULTIES: NUTRITIVE, LOCOMOTIVE, SENSORY, AND THINKING CAPACITIES, AND
CLAIMS THAT OO1Y THE LAST IS ESSENTIAL TO HIM. 1.3 VARIETIES OF THOUGHT
AFTER HE HAS ESTABLISHED THAT HE IS A THINKING THING, DESCARTES TURNS TO
THE QUESTION OF WHAT A THINKING THING ISO HIS NEW UNDERSTANDING OF
'SENSORY PERCEPTIONS' MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO INCLUDE THEM AS A FORM OF
'THOUGHT'; APPLYING DESCARTES'S METHOD, SENSATIONS, AND EMOTIONS ALSO
TURN OUT TO BE VARIETIES OF THOUGHT-THAT IS, VARIETIES OF MENTAL
PHENOMENA. 1.4 INCORPOREAL MINDS AND CERTAINTY HOW DO WE DECIDE WHETHER
WE REGARD A FEATURE AS BELONGING TO THE MIND? TWO SUGGESTIONS ARE
CONSIDERED AND REJECTED: THAT XLV ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS MENTAL
FEATURES ARE THOSE THAT CAN BE EXEMPLIFIED IN AN IMMA- TERIAL SUBSTANCE;
AND THAT MENTAL FEATURES ARE THOSE WE CANNOT DOUBT WE POSSESS. 1.5
SPECIAL ACCESS DIFFERENT COGNITIVE FACULTIES ARE DISTINGUISHED. ONLY ONE
OF THEM HAS THE FOLLOWING FEATURE: IT ENABLES THE SUBJECT TO KNOW ITS
SUBJECT MATTER IN A WAY THAT NO ONE ELSE WHO IS ENDOWED WITH THE SAME
COGNITIVE FACULTY CAN. EVERYTHING THAT IS KNOWN THROUGH THE USE OF THIS
FACULTY BELONGS TO THE MIND. PRIVILEGED ACCESSIBILITY IS THE MARK OF THE
MENTAL. 1.6 COGNITIVE FACULTIES THE COGNITIVE FACULTY THAT PROVIDES
SPECIAL ACCESS TO ITS SUBJECT MATTER IS INTROSPECTION. INTROSPECTION IS
DISTINGUISHED FROM APRIORI KNOWLEDGE-THE KIND OF KNOWLEDGE WE HAVE, FOR
EXAMPLE, OF LOGIC AND MATHEMATICS. INTROSPECTIVE JUSTIFICATION IS ALSO
DISTINGUISHED FROM JUSTIFICATION THAT IS BASED ON THE CONTEXTUA11Y
SELF-VERIFYING NATURE OF CERTAIN THOUGHTS. 1.7 THE SUBJECT' S POINT OF
VIEW AN EXPLANATION OF WHY A PORTION OF REALITY SHOULD BE KNOWN TO ONE
PERSON IN A SPECIAL WAY IS ADVANCED. MENTAL FACTS ARE PERSPECTIVAL
FACTS; MENTAL FACTS ARE CHARACTERIZED BY HOW THINGS ARE FOT THE SUBJECT.
TO BE A SUBJECT IS TO POSSESS A POINT OF VIEW. THIS ENDOWS THE SUBJECT
WITH A PRIMA FACIE AUTHORITY, BUT DOES NOT PROVIDE HER WITH
INFALLIBILITY IN THIS AREA. 2 UNCONSCIOUS, CONSCIOUS, BODILY 2.1 ACCESS
TO THE BODY ONE OBJECTION TO THE THESIS THAT MY MIND IS PRECISELY WHAT
IS KNOWN TO ME IN A WAY THAT IS KNOWN TO NO ONE ELSE IS THAT THE SAME IS
TRUE OF CERTAIN STATES OF MY BODY. HUT THIS IS CONTINGENT: ANALYTICAL
TABLE OF CONTENTS XV SOMEONE ELSE COULD BE APPROPRIATELY 'WIRED' TO MY
BODY AND LEAM ABOUT ITS STATES, BUT SHE WOULD NOT THEREBY LEAM ABOUT MY
FEELINGS CONCEMING THESE STATES. 2.2 STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND
STANDING STATES WE DISTINGUISH BETWEEN TWO TYPES OF MENTAL PHENOMENA:
OCCURRENT EVENTS, WHICH ARE CONSCIOUS AND HAVE A PHENOMENAL CHARACTER;
AND STANDING STATES, WHICH ARE EITHER NOT ALWAYS CON- SCIOUS, OR,
ACCORDING TO SOME, NEVER CONSCIOUS. THIS LATTER POS- ITION IS ALSO
COMPATIBLE WITH THE MAIN THESIS OF THE BOOK: WHEN I KNOW THAT, FOR
EXAMPLE, I HAVE A CERTAIN BELIEF, I AM CONSCIOUS OF HAVING THE BELIEF,
EVEN IF THE BELIEF ITSELF IS NOT CONSCIOUS. 2.3 THE MIND AS AN IDEAL
SOME CLEAR COUNTER-EXAMPLES TO THE THESIS THAT THE MIND IS KNOWN TO THE
SUBJECT IN A PRIVILEGED WAY ARE CASES OF REPRESSED UNCONSCIOUS DESIRES,
OR CASES OF SELF-DECEPTION. AN ARGUMENT GIVEN BY FREUD FOR THE EXISTENCE
OF THE UNCONSCIOUS CAN BE USED TO DEFEND THE CARTESIAN CONCEPTION: OUR
UNDERSTANDING OF THE UNCONSCIOUS IS PARASITIC ON OUR UNDERSTANDING OF
MENTAL STATES THAT ARE AVAILABLE TO CONSCIOUS REFLECTION. 3 PERSONS AND
MINDS 3. I THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CARTESIAN LIST OUR LIST OF WHAT BELONGS
TO THE MIND IS THE SAME AS THE CARTESIAN LIST OF MENTAL FEATURES, AND
RATHER DIFFERENT FROM, SAY, THE ARISTOTELIAN LIST OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
POWERS. DISCARDING THE CARTESIAN CONCEPTION MAY, THEREFORE, BE MORE
DIFFICULT THAN SOME CRITICS SUGGEST, BECAUSE IT WOULD REQUIRE A
FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN OUR CONCEPTION OF THE MENTAL. 3.2 CITIZEN OFTWO
WORLDS THE PRESENT PROPOSAL IS NOT COMMITTED TO DUALISM ABOUT MIND AND
BODY, BUT IT DOES IMPLY A CERTAIN DUALITY ABOUT OUR XVI ANALYTICAL TABLE
OF CONTENTS NATURE: HUMAN BEINGS ARE 'CITIZENS OF TWO WORLDS'. THERE IS
SOMETHING IN OUR NATURE THAT WE SHARE WITH THE REST OF THE CREATED
WORLD, AND THERE IS SOMETHING THAT IS DISTINCTIVE OF OUR MODE OF
EXISTENCE. THE LATTER ASPECT IS DESCRIBED HERE BY SAYING THAT WE ARE
PERSONS. 3.3 QUESTIONS ABOUT PERSONS FOUR QUESTIONS ABOUT PERSONS ARE
DISTINGUISHED. FIRST, DO PER- SONS DESERVE A SPECIAL TREATMENT BY OTHER
PERSONS, AND, IF THEY DO, WHAT SHOULD THIS TREATMENT BE? SECOND, WHAT
SORT OF CHARACTERISTICS QUALIFY A CREATURE TO BE REGARDED AS A PER- SON?
THIRD, WHAT IS THE ONTOLOGICAL CATEGORY TO WHICH PERSONS BELONG? FOURTH,
WHAT ARE THE CONDITIONS FOR SOMEONE TO REMAIN THE SAME PERSON THROUGH
TIME? OUR INTEREST HERE IS IN THE SECOND QUESTION. 3.4 CRITERIA OF
PERSONHOOD THE SUGGESTION IS THAT A PERSON IS A CREATURE WHO HAS THE
KIND OF RNIND WE HAVE. HERE LIES THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CARTESIAN
CONCEPTION OF THE RNIND: IT OFTERSUS A LIST OF MENTAL PHENOMENA THAT IS
PUT TOGETHER ON A PRINCIPLED BASIS; AND IT IS THE POSSESSION OF MORE OR
LESS THIS LIST OF MENTAL ATTRIBUTES THAT PROVIDES THE CRITERIA FOR
SOMEONE TO BE REGARDED AS A PERSON. 3.5 THE PERSON AND THE HUMAN ANIMA!
IT IS EXPLAINED WHY THE SUGGESTION OF THE PREVIOUS SECTION IS COMPATIBLE
WITH VARIOUS THEORIES OF PERSONHOOD AND PERSONAL IDENTITY; FOR EXAMPLE,
WITH A LOCKEAN THEORY OR WITH AN ANIMALIST THEORY. 3.6 CONCLUSION OFPART
ONE DESCARTES'S THEORY OF THE MIND HAS RECEIVED SEVERE CRITICISM IN THE
TWENTIETH AND TWENTY-FIRST CENTURIES. THIS FIRST PART OF THIS BOOK HAS
ATTEMPTED TO RESTORE SOMEWHAT THE REPUTATION OF THE ANALYTICAL TABLE OF
CONTENTS XVLL CARTESIAN CONCEPTION, EVEN THOUGH THE CONCEPTION DEFENDED
HERE DEPARTS FROM DESCARTES IN A NUMBER OF WAYS. THE PLAN FOR PART TWO
IS TO ARGUE THAT THE CHARACTERISTIC FEATURE OF THIS CONCEPTION IS THAT
IT IS INTERNALIST: IT IS COMMITTED TO THE CLAIM THAT A SUBJECT'S MENTAL
FEATURES ARE ENTIRELY DETERMINED BY HER INTERNAL PROPERTIES. PART TWO.
INTEMALISM AND EXTEMALISM 4 THE INTERNAL AND THE EXTERNAL 4. I THE
BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE INTERNAL AND THE EXTERNAL THE TWIN EARTH ARGUMENT
IS BRIEFLY INTRODUCED. THE CONCLU- SION OF THIS ARGUMENT IS SUPPOSED TO
BE THAT THE CONTE NT OF OUR MENTAL STATES IS DETERMINED BY FACTS
EXTERNAL TO USO THE DEFINITION IS INCOMPLETE UNLESS WE SPECIFY WHAT
'INTERNAL' AND 'EXTERNAL' MEAN. 4.2 IDENTITY IN PHYSICAL MAKE-UP THE
USUAL SET-UP OF THE TWIN EARTH THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS RELATE THE TWINS BY
INTERNAL PHYSICAL SAMENESS. THIS IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO RON A GENERAL
EXTERNALIST ARGUMENT, FOR IT FAILS TO ADDRESS DUALIST THEORIES. IT IS
NOT NECESSARY FOR THE EXTERNALIST ARGUMENT EITHER, FOR EXTERNALISM CAN
ARISE WITH RESPECT TO FACTS INSIDE THE BODY. 4.3 EXTERNAL/INTERNAL
DEFINED WE ATTEMPT TO DEFINE THE EXTERNAL/INTERNAL RELATION BY FOCUS-
ING ON THE RELATION BETWEEN THE TWINS IN THE TWIN EARTH SCENARIO:
WHATEVER IS SHARED BY THE TWINS IS INTERNAL, AND WHAT IS DIFFERENT IS
EXTERNAL. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THE RELATION BETWEEN THE TWINS IS THE
SUBJECTIVE INDISTINGUISHABILITY OF THEIR SITUATION-EVERYTHING SEEMS THE
SAME TO THEM. XV11L ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS 4.4 TWIN SITUATIONS A
MORE PRECISE UNDERSTANCLING OF 'SUBJECTIVE INCLISTINGUISH- ABILITY' IS
SOUGHT BY LISTING SITUATIONS THAT STAND IN THIS RELATION: A SUBJECT
ACTUALLY TASTING WATER AND COUNTERFACTUALLY TASTING A SUPERFICIALLY
SIMILAR LIQUID; AN EMBOCLIED SUBJECT AND HER BRAIN-IN-A-VAT COUNTERPART.
4.5 PHYSICAL OR FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENCE THE RELATION BETWEEN THE TWINS
CANNOT BE DEFINED AS PHYS- ICAL, FUNCTIONAL, OR MERELY BEHAVIOURAL
EQUIVALENCE. INSTEAD, IT SHOULD BE DEFINED IN TERMS OF SAMENESS OF SOME
MENTAL FEATURES (CALLED HERE THE 'METAPHYSICAL ACCOUNT') OR IN
EPISTERNIC TERMS. 4.6 PHENOMENAL PROPERTIES INTRODUCED A SENSORY
EXPERIENCE IS AN EVENT OF ITS APPEARING TO A SUBJECT THAT THINGS ARE IN
A CERTAIN WAY. IN SO FAR AS TWO EXPERIENCES INVOLVE THINGS APPEARING IN
THE SAME WAY, THEY SHARE A PHE- NOMENAL PROPERTY. PHENOMENAL PROPERTIES
DETERRNINE WHAT IT IS LIKE TO HAVE AN EXPERIENCE. THIS NOTION OF
PHENOMENAL PROP- ERTIES CAN BE EXTENDED TO ALL CONSCIOUS MENTAL STATES,
INCLUCLING COGNITIVE STATES. THE RELATION BETWEEN THE TWINS IS SAMENESS
OF PHENOMENAL PROPERTIES OF ALL THEIR CONSCIOUS MENTALLIFE. 4.7 NARROW
CONTENT IT MAY BE SUGGESTED THAT THE RELATION BETWEEN THE TWINS IS
SAMENESS OF NARROW CONTENT OF THEIR MENTAL STATES. THIS IS ACCOMMODATED
BY THE PREVIOUS PROPOSAL IN SO FAR AS THE PHE- NOMENALLY CONSTITUTED
INTENTIONAL FEATURES ARE SHARED BETWEEN THE TWINS. 4.8 POSSIBLE
OBJECTIONS TO PHENOMENAL PROPERTIES THE SUGGESTION THAT THE RELATION
CONSTITUTIVE OFTWIN SITUATIONS IS SAMENESS OF PHENOMENAL PROPERTIES
FACES SOME OBJECTIONS: THAT SAMENESS OF PHENOMENAL PROPERTIES IS BASED
ON THE 'SAME APPEARANCE RELATION', WHICH IS NOT TRANSITIVE; AND THAT, IN
ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS XIX EXTERNALIST REPRESENTATIONALIST AND
DISJUNCTIVIST VIEWS, SOME TWIN EXPERIENCES DO NOT SHARE ALL PHENOMENAL
PROPERTIES. 4.9 EXTERNALISM ABOUT THE PHENOMENAL THOSE WHO OBJECT TO THE
ACCOUNT OF THE TWIN SITUATIONS IN TERMS OF SHARED PHENOMENAL PROPERTIES
NEED TO ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: IF NOT PHYSICAL, FUNCTIONAL, OR
BEHAVIOURAL SAMENESS,IF NOT SHARED NARROW CONTENT, AND IF NOT EVEN
SHARED PHENOMENAL CHARACTER, THEN WHAT MAKES TWO SITUATIONS COUNT AS
SUBJECTIVELY INDISTINGUISHABLE? THE MOST PLAUSIBLE ANSWER IS SOME
EPISTEMIC RELATION. 5 INDISCRIMINABILITY 5. I THE FITTING RELATION SOME
TERRNINOLOGY: 'INDISCRIMINABILITY' IS A POSSIBLY NON- TRANSITIVE
EPISTEMIE RELATION; 'SAMENESS OF APPEARANCE' IS THE TRANSITIVE RELATION
OF IDENTITY OF PHENOMENAL PROPERTIES. THE 'FITTING RELATION' IS THE
RELATION CONSTITUTIVE OFTWIN SITUATIONS. THE CHAPTER DEALS WITH VARIOUS
UNDERSTANDINGS OF INDISCRIM- INABILITY, AND ATTEMPTS TO SHOW THAT NONE
OF THEM EAN BE USED TO DEFINE THE FITTING RELATION. 5.2 ACTIVE
DISCRIMINABILITY A AND BARE AETIVELY DISERIMINABLE IF A SUBJEET CANNOT
AETIVATE KNOWLEDGE THAT A AND BARE DISTINCT. ACTIVE INDISCRIMINAB- ILITY
IS PRESENTATION SENSITIVE. ONEE PRESENTATIONS ARE FTXED, ACTIVE
INDISCRIMINABILITY IS REFLEXIVE, SYMMETRICAL, AND NON- TRANSITIVE. THIS
IS ILLUSTRATED, FOR EXAMPLE, BY THE CASE OF THE PHENOMENAL SORITES
SERIES. 5.3 REFLECTIVE KNOWLEDGE IF AETIVE INDISCRIMINABILITY IS TO BE
USED TO DEFINE THE FIT- TING RELATION, THE RELEVANT KNOWLEDGE MUST BE
LIMITED TO XX ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS KNOWLEDGE FROM INTROSPECTION.
ONE REASON WHY ACTIVE INDIS- CRIMINABILITY IS NOT SUITABLE FOR DEFINING
THE FITTING RELATION IS THAT THE INABILITY TO DISCRIMINATE TWO
EXPERIENCES MAY BE A RESULT OF SOME DEFICIENCY IN A SUBJECT'S COGNITIVE
ABILITIES, EVEN IF THE EXPERIENCES ARE SUBJECTIVELY QUITE DIFFERENT. 5.4
THE IMPORTANCE OFPRESENTATIONS TWIN EXPERIENCES CANNOT BE COMPARED
DIRECTLY, THAT IS, BY HAVING BOTH OF THEM AT THE SAME TIME. IF THE
SUBJECT IS HAVING ONE OF THE TWIN EXPERIENCES, WE HAVE TO FIND AN
ADEQUATE WAY OF PRESENTING THE OTHER EXPERIENCE, SO THAT THE OTHER
EXPERIENCE FITS THE SUBJECT'S PRESENT EXPERIENCE JUST IN CASE THE
EXPERIENCES ARE INDISCRIMINABLE. VARIOUS CANDIDATES ARE CONSIDERED AND
REJECTED. 5.5 SUCCESSIVE PRESENTATIONS A NEW SUGGESTION IS THAT, IF TWO
EXPERIENCES CANNOT BE DISCRIMINATED IN ANY SEQUENCES WHEN THEY ARE
EXPERIENCED IN IMMEDIATE SUCCESSION, THEY FIT. BUT, AGAIN, THIS COULD BE
A RESULT OF SOME COGNITIVE DEFICIENCY THAT MAKES SUBJECTIVELY QUITE
DIFFERENT EXPERIENCES INDISCRIMINABLE. 5.6 PHENOMENAL SIMILARITY AND
PHENOMENAL SAMENESS IT MAY BE SUGGESTED THAT, IN ANY CASE, ADJACENT
MEMBERS OF THE PHENOMENAL SORITES SERIES OFFER A CLEAR EXAMPLE OF
EXPERIENCES THAT ARE INDISCRIMINABLE, BUT PHENOMENALLY DIFFERENT. BUT
THOSE WHO WOULD WANT TO DEFINE THE FITTING RELATION IN EPI- STEMIC TERMS
BECAUSE THEY ARE EXTEMALIST ABOUT PHENOMENAL PROPERTIES CANNOT MAKE USE
OF THIS ANALOGY. ACTIVE INDISCRIM- INABILITY IS NOT SUITABLE FOR
DEFINING THE FITTING RELATION. 5.7 ACCESS INDISCRIMINABILITY TAKE ALL
THE PROPOSITIONS THE SUBJECT KNOWS IN A CERTAIN SITUATION A. IF ALL
THESE PROPOSITIONS ARE TRUE IN A SITU- ATION B, THEN B IS ACCESS
INDISCRIMINABLE FROM HER PRESENT SITUATION A. ACCESS INDISCRIMINABILITY
IS DIFFERENT FROM ACTIVE ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS XXL
INDISCRIMINABILITY IN THAT IT IS NOT SENSITIVE TO PRESENTATIONS; IT IS
REFLEXIVE, NON-SYMMETRICAL, AND NON-TRANSITIVE. 5.8 ACCESS
INDISCRIRNINABILITY AND TWIN SITUATIONS IF EXTERNALISM ABOUT CONTENT IS
ACCEPTED, THEN THE TWIN SITUATIONS ARE NOT ACCESS INDISCRIMINABLE.
THEREFORE ACCESS INDISCRIMINABILITY CANNOT BE USED TO DEFINE THE FITTING
RELATION IF ONE IS AN EXTERNALIST. 5.9 RESPONSE DISCRIRNINATION THE
THIRD NOTION OF DISCRIMINATION: TWO OBJECTS ARE RESPONSE INDISCRIMINABLE
IF AND ONLY IF THEY GENERATE THE SAME COGNITIVE RESPONSE. RESPONSE
INDISCRIMINABILITY IS REFLEXIVE, SYMMET- RICAL, AND TRANSITIVE. IT
CANNOT BE USED TO DEFINE THE FITTING RELATION EITHER, BECAUSE, IF
CONTENT EXTERNALISM IS TRUE, THEN TWIN SITUATIONS TURN OUT TO BE
RESPONSE DISCRIMINABLE. THIS CONCLUDES THE ARGUMENT THAT THE RELATION
BETWEEN THE TWINS CANNOT BE DEFINED IN EPISTEMIC TERMS. 5.10
CONCLUSIONS, INTEMALISM STATED WE RETURN TO THE EARLIER SUGGESTION THAT
THE FITTING RELATION SHOULD BE DEFMED IN TERMS OF SAMENESS OF PHENOMENAL
PROP- ERTIES. THE PREVIOUS OBJECTIONS TO PHENOMENAL PROPERTIES ARE
ANSWERED. INTERNALISM ABOUT A MENTAL FEATURE IS THE VIEW THAT THE
PHENOMENAL PROPERTIES OF CONSCIOUS THOUGHTS AND EXPERI- ENCES, WHICH ARE
SHARED BETWEEN SUBJECTS IN TWIN SITUATIONS, DETERMINE THE MENTAL FEATURE
IN QUESTION. HERE INTERNALISM IS DEFENDED WITH RESPECT TO ALL FEATURES
OF CONSCIOUS MENTAL STATES. 6 EXTEMALISM AND PRIVILEGED SELF-KNOWLEDGE
6. I INCOMPATIBILITY AND THE USUAL UNDERSTANDING THIS CHAPTER AIMS TO
SHOW THAT EXTERNALISM IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE CLAIM THAT ALL MENTAL
FEATURES ARE ACCESSIBLE IN A XXLL ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS
PRIVILEGED WAY. THIS IS SOMEWHAT OBSCURED BY THE USUAL UNDERSTANDING OF
EXTERNALISM, WHICH DRAWS THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE INTERNAL AND THE
EXTERNAL AROUND THE BRAIN OR THE BODY. 6.2 INTEMALISM AND PRIVILEGED
ACCESS ALL AND ONLY PHENOMENAL PROPERTIES OF CONSCIOUS EVENTS GIVE RISE
TO PERSPECTIVAL FACTS, WHICH ARE PRECISELY THE FACTS THAT ARE OPEN TO
PRIVILEGED ACCESS. PHENOMENAL PROPERTIES ARE SHARED BY SUBJECTS IN TWIN
SITUATIONS. ACCORDING TO EXTERNALISTS, MENTAL FEATURES ARE DETERMINED BY
FACTORS THAT GO BEYOND PHENOMENAL PROPERTIES, AND HENCE THEY DO NOT
REGISTER WITHIN THE SUBJECT'S POINT OF VIEW. COMPARED TO INTERNALISM,
EXTERNALISM LIMITS PRIVILEGED ACCESSIBILITY. 6.3 CONTEXTUALLY
SELF-VERIFYING THOUGHTS SOME EXTERNALISTS SUGGESTED AN ACCOUNT OF
PRIVILEGED SELF- KNOWLEDGE THAT IS PERFECTLY COMPATIBLE WITH
EXTERNALISM: THAT SOME REFLECTIVE THOUGHTS ARE JUSTIFIED BECAUSE OF
THEIR CONTEXT- UALLY SELF-VERIF)RING NATURE, AND THE CONSEQUENT
IMPOSSIBILITY OF THEIR BEING FALSE. THIS IS NOT AN ADEQUATE ACCOUNT OF
SELF-KNOWLEDGE, BECAUSE GUARANTEED CORRECTNESS IS COMPATIBLE WITH
IGNORANCE, AND BECAUSE THE ACCOUNT APPLIES ONLY TO A SMALL PART OF OUR
CONSCIOUS MENTALLIFE. 6.4 EXTEMALISM ABOUT VARIOUS MENTAL FEATURES
EXTERNALISM ABOUT CONTENT IS THE MOST FREQUENTLY DISCUSSED FORM OF
EXTERNALISM, BUT IT IS POSSIBLE TO BE EXTERNALIST ABOUT ATTITUDES, OR
PHENOMENAL CHARACTER, OR SENSORY FEATURES AS WEN. 6.5 FAILURE
OFPRIVILEGED ACCESS SELF-ATTRIBUTIONS OF MENTAL FEATURES OTHER THAN
CONTENT ARE NOT CONTEXTUALLY SELF-VERIF)RING, AND, IF EXTERNALISM ABOUT
THESE FEATURES IS ACCEPTED, THESE STATEMENTS CAN EASILY BE FALSE. HERE
THE LIMITATION THAT EXTERNALISM POSES ON PRIVILEGED SELF-KNOWLEDGE IS
OBVIOUS. IN THE CASES OF ATTRIBUTIONS OF ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS
XX111 CONTENT, THE LIMITATION IS OBSCURED BY THE CONTEXTUALLY SELF-
VERIFYING NATURE OF THE ATTRIBUTION. 6.6 TRAVELLING CASES MY ARGUMENT
MAY RESEMBLE THE STRUCTURE OF A POPULAR ARGUMENT FOR THE INCOMPATIBILITY
OF EXTERNALISM AND SELF- KNOWLEDGE: ACCORDING TO THIS ARGUMENT, SOME
FORM OF DISCRIMINABILITY IS A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR KNOWLEDGE, BUT
SUBJECTS CANNOT DISCRIMINATE THEIR EXTERNALLY INDIVIDUATED THOUGHTS. THE
DEBATES SURROUNDING THIS ISSUE ARE PARTLY DUE TO THE LACK OF CLARITY
ABOUT WHICH SENSE OF' DISCRIMINABILITY' IS IN PLAY IN THE ARGUMENT. 6.7
DISCRIMINATION AND INTROSPECTIVE KNOWLEDGE WHEN THE CLAIM THAT
DISCRIMINATION IS NECESSARY FOR KNOW- LEDGE IS USED IN AN ARGUMENT, THE
REFERENCE IS OFTEN TO THE WORK OF ALVIN GOLDMAN, WHO DEFENDS THE VIEW
THAT DISCRIMINATION IS NECESSARY FOR PERCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE. THE NOTION
GOLDMAN USES IS RESPONSE DISCRIMINATION; BUT, AS WAS SHOWN EARLIER, IF
CONTENT EXTERNALISM IS TRUE, THEN TWIN THOUGHTS ARE RESPONSE
DISCRIMINABLE. HENCE THIS ARGUMENT FOR INCOMPATIBILITY DOES NOT WORK.
6.8 ACCESS DISCRIMINABILITY AND INTROSPECTIVE KNOWLEDGE IF THE GENERAL
NECESSARY CONDITION FOR KNOWLEDGE IS FORMULATED IN TERMS OF ACCESS,
RATHER THAN RESPONSE DISCRIMINABILITY, THE RESULT IS STILL THE SAME: IF
EXTERNALISM IS TRUE, TWIN SITUATIONS ARE ACCESS DISCRIMINABLE. HENCE THE
ARGUMENTS FOR INCOMPATIBILITY THAT TRY TO SHOW A DEFICIENCY IN THE
EXTERNALIST'S SELF-KNOWLEDGE BECAUSE OF THE FAILURE OF SOME GENERAL
NECESSARY DISCRIMINATION CONDITION DO NOT WORK. MY ARGUMENT DOES NOT
HAVE THIS STRUCTURE. 6.9 DISCRIMINATION THROUGH EXTEMALLY INDIVIDUATED
CONTENTS IF DISCRIMINABILITY-IN BOTH THE RESPONSE AND THE ACCESS
SENSE-IS DUE MERELY TO EXTERNALLY INDIVIDUATED COGNITIVE XXIV ANALYTICAL
TABLE OF CONTENTS RESPONSES, IT CEASES TO BE A USEFUL REQUIREMENT FOR
KNOW- LEDGE. HENCE THE DEBATE ABOUT THE TRAVELLING CASES HAS BEEN SO FAR
INCONCLUSIVE: IT DOES NOT SHOW THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF EXTEMALISM AND
PRIVILEGED SELF-KNOWLEDGE, BUT DOES NOT VINDICATE ANY COGNITIVE
ACHIEVEMENT FOR EXTERNALIST VIEWS EITHER. 6.10 THE 'TRANSPARENCY' OF
CONTENT THE CLAIM THAT A SUBJECT SHOULD ALWAYS KNOW, BY REFLECTION,
WHETHER TWO OF HER CONCEPTS OR THOUGHT CONTENTS ARE THE SAME, IS
DEFENDED. SUBJECTS ARE NOT INFALLIBLE ABOUT THESE MAUERS, BUT, IF THEY
MAKE AMISTAKE, THEY SHOULD BE ABLE TO RECOVER THROUGH REFLECTION, AND,
IF THEY DO NOT, THEY BREACH A NORM OF RATIONALITY. 6. I I EXTERNAL
FEATURE OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF PRIVILEGED ACCESS IF EXTEMALISM IS TRUE,
THEN THERE ARE MENTAL FEATURES THAT ARE NOT ACCESSIBLE IN A PRIVILEGED
WAY: IN SOME SPECIFIC SITUATIONS, A SUBJECT MAY ENTERTAIN TWO CONCEPTS,
AND BE UNABLE TO DECIDE BY REFLECTION THAT THE TWO ARE DIFFERENT. IT IS
A MENTAL FACT THAT THESE CONCEPTS ARE DIFFERENT, YET THIS LIES OUTSIDE
THE REALM OF PRIVILEGED ACCESS. HOWEVER, THIS RESULT GOES AGAINST THE
CONCEPTION OF MIND DEFENDED IN PART ONE. 7 REFERENCE AND SENSE 7. I
PHENOMENAL AND EXTERNALISTIC INTENTIONALITY EVEN WHEN ARGUMENTS ABOUT
PRIVILEGED SELF-KNOWLEDGE, OR RATIONALITY, OR AGENCY ARE PRESENTED IN
DEFENCE OF INTERNALISM, IT IS ORTEN CLAIMED THAT INTEMALISM FACES A
DECISIVE OBJEC- TION: IT CANNOT ACCOUNT FOR INTENTIONALITY, OR
REPRESENTATION. THEREFORE MANY ACCEPT THAT WE NEED TWO KINDS OF
INTENTION- ALITY: PHENOMENAL AND EXTERNALISTIC; OR TWO KINDS OF CONTENT:
NARROW AND BROAD. ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS XXV 7.2 THE
'INEXPRESSIBILITY OFNARROW CONTENT' CONTENTS ARE OBJECTS OF MENTAL
ATTITUDES. DEFENDERS OF DUAL- CONTENT-OR DUAL-INTENTIONALITY-THEORIES
OCCASIONALLY CLAIM THAT NARROW CONTENTS ARE NOT EXPRESSIBLE BY USING OUR
LAN- GUAGE. THIS, IF NOT FATAL, IS, IN ANY CASE, AN UNCOMFORTABLE
CONSEQUENCE FOR AN INTEMALIST THEORY, AND SHOULD BE AVOIDED, IF
POSSIBLE. 7.3 FREGE ON SENSE AND REFERENCE THE DOCTRINE THAT SENSE
DETERMINES REFERENCE IS AN EXPRESSION OF THE IDEA THAT SENSE IS
RESPONSIBLE FOR SEMANTIC PROPERTIES (TRUTH AND REFERENCE). FREGE HELD
THE DOCTRINE BOTH FOR NAMES AND FOR SENTENCES; IN THE LATTER CASE, HE
HELD THAT THE SENSE OF A SENTENCE, A THOUGHT, DETERMINES A UNIQUE TRUTH
VALUE. IT SEEMS THAT FREGE ACTUALLY BELIEVED THAT SENSE ALONE DETERMINES
REFERENCE. 7.4- ARISTOTLE ON BELIEFS AND TRUTH VALUES IF A THOUGHT
DETERMINES A TRUTH VALUE, THEN SENTENCES WITH DIFFERENT TRUTH VALUES
EXPRESS DIFFERENT THOUGHTS. MANY PEOPLE SEEM TO ACCEPT THIS. BUT, FOR
EXAMPLE, ARISTODE, IN THE CAT- EGORIES, PUTS FORWARD A DIFFERENT VIEW:
HE THINKS THE TRUTH VALUE OF A BELIEF AND STATEMENT CAN CHANGE, NOT
BECAUSE THE BELIEF IS CHANGING, BUT BECAUSE OF A CHANGE IN THE WORLD. IN
THAT CASE, DIFFERENCE IN TRUTH VALUE DOES NOT IMPLY DIFFERENCE IN
CONTENT. 7.5 SAME CONTENT-DIFFERENT TRUTH VALUE THE CLAIM THAT SENSE
ALONE DETERMINES REFERENCE (THOUGHT/ CONTENT ALONE DETERMINES A TRUTH
VALUE) MAY BE PLAUSIBLE IN THE CASE OF MATHEMATICS AND LOGIC. BUT AN
ORDINARY CONTINGENT DESCRIPTIVE SENTENCE LIKE 'THE INVENTOR OFBIFOCALS
WAS A MAN' CAN BE TRUE IN ONE WORLD AND FALSE IN ANOTHER, WHILE HAVING
THE SAME CONTENT. THIS MEANS THAT SENSE ALONE DOES NOT DETERMINE
REFERENCE; THAT DIFFERENCE IN TRUTH VALUE DOES NOT, IN ITSELF, IMPLY
DIFFERENCE IN CONTENT. XXVI ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS 7.6 CROSS- W
ORLD AND WITHIN-A- W ORLD COMPARISON MANY WOULD PERHAPS ACCEPT THAT
SENSE ALONE DOES NOT DETER- MINE REFERENCE WHEN WE COMPARE DIFFERENT
POSSIBLE WORLDS; BUT THEY MAY SAY THAT, WITHIN A WORLD, DIFFERENCE IN
TRUTH VALUE OR REFERENCE IMPLIES DIFFERENCE IN SENSE. BUT THIS IS MERELY
A PREJUDICE. IF WE HAVE INDEPENDENT REASONS TO SUPPORT THIS MOVE, WE CAN
TREAT THE WITHIN-THE-WORLD CASE ANALOGOUSIY TO THE CROSS-WORLD CASE. 7.7
NON-INDEXICAL CONTEXTUALISM CONTENTS NEED NOT BE CONCEIVED AS
PROPOSITIONS WHOSE TRUTH VALUE IS FIXED WITHIN A WORLD. THE PRESENT
SUGGESTION IS SIMI- IAR TO THE VIEW THAT JOHN MACFARLANE CALLS
'NON-INDEXICAL CONTEXTUALISM', WHICH TREATS CONTEXT-SENSITIVE
EXPRESSIONS AS EXPRESSING THE SAME CONTENTS IN DIFFERENT CONTEXTS, BUT
RECEIV- ING DIFFERENT REFERENCES OR TRUTH VALUES, BECAUSE SOME CHANGE IN
A FEATURE OF THE CONTEXT IS TREATED AS A CHANGE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF
EVALUATION. 7.8 DOUBLE INDEXING DIFFERENT FEATURES OF A CONTEXT MAY HAVE
DIFFERENT IOGICAL OR SEMANTIC ROLES WHEN DETERMINING SEMANTIC VALUES;
THIS IS ALLOWED BY THE PRESENT PROPOSAL. THE IMPORTANT POINT IS THAT
THEIR METAPHYSICAL STATUS IS THE SAME: THEY ARE ALL EXTEMAL TO THE
CONTENT. DISTINGUISHING THEIR SEMANTIC ROLES ANSWERS A CERTAIN OBJECTION
BY KAPLAN. 7.9 RELATIVIZED PROPOSITIONS AN OBJECTION BY JOHN PERRY TO A
VIEW SIMILAR TO THE PRESENT PROPOSAL IS CONSIDERED AND ANSWERED. 7.10
THE INCONCLUSIVENESS OF THE TWIN EARTH ARGUMENT THE CLASSIC TWIN EARTH
ARGUMENT IN PUTNAM'S FORMULATION STATES THAT INTEMALISM IS INCOMPATIBLE
WITH THE DOCTRINE THAT ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS XXVII SENSE
DETERMINES REFERENCE. THE FOREGOING SHOWS THAT THIS IS NOT CORRECT.
SINCE NO ONE WOULD WANT TO CLAIM THAT SENSE ALONE DETERMINES REFERENCE,
IF SENSE PLUS SOMETHING ELSE DETERMINES REFERENCE, THE DOCTRINE IS STILL
UPHELD. AND THIS IS PRECISELY THE IDEA BEHIND MY INTERNALIST THEORY.
7.II INTEMALISM WITH TRUTH CONDITIONALITY THIS CONCLUDES THE PROJECT OF
THIS BOOK. THE MIND IS ESSENTIALLY REVEALED FROM THE SUBJECT'S POINT OF
VIEW. THIS CONCEPTION LIES AT THE HEART OF CONTEMPORARY INTERNALIST
THEORIES. MOREOVER, INTEMALISM CAN ACCOUNT FOR TRUTH CONDI- TIONALITY;
HENCE, OVERALL, IT IS TO BE PREFERRED TO EXTERNALISM. |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
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| id | DE-604.BV023372076 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T21:12:58Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:17:06Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780199230327 |
| language | English |
| lccn | 2008011954 |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016555325 |
| oclc_num | 214282451 |
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| owner | DE-29 DE-12 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-188 |
| owner_facet | DE-29 DE-12 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-188 |
| physical | XXVII, 197 S. |
| publishDate | 2008 |
| publishDateSearch | 2008 |
| publishDateSort | 2008 |
| publisher | Oxford Univ. Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Farkas, Katalin Verfasser aut The subject's point of view Katalin Farkas 1. publ. Oxford [u.a.] Oxford Univ. Press 2008 XXVII, 197 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Includes bibliographical references and index Descartes, René 1596-1650 Philosophy of mind Externalism (Philosophy of mind) Internalism (Theory of knowledge) Knowledge, Theory of Philosophy of Mind (DE-588)4248301-3 gnd rswk-swf Internalismus (DE-588)7500662-5 gnd rswk-swf Philosophy of Mind (DE-588)4248301-3 s Internalismus (DE-588)7500662-5 s DE-604 V:DE-604 application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016555325&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Farkas, Katalin The subject's point of view Descartes, René 1596-1650 Philosophy of mind Externalism (Philosophy of mind) Internalism (Theory of knowledge) Knowledge, Theory of Philosophy of Mind (DE-588)4248301-3 gnd Internalismus (DE-588)7500662-5 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4248301-3 (DE-588)7500662-5 |
| title | The subject's point of view |
| title_auth | The subject's point of view |
| title_exact_search | The subject's point of view |
| title_exact_search_txtP | The subject's point of view |
| title_full | The subject's point of view Katalin Farkas |
| title_fullStr | The subject's point of view Katalin Farkas |
| title_full_unstemmed | The subject's point of view Katalin Farkas |
| title_short | The subject's point of view |
| title_sort | the subject s point of view |
| topic | Descartes, René 1596-1650 Philosophy of mind Externalism (Philosophy of mind) Internalism (Theory of knowledge) Knowledge, Theory of Philosophy of Mind (DE-588)4248301-3 gnd Internalismus (DE-588)7500662-5 gnd |
| topic_facet | Descartes, René 1596-1650 Philosophy of mind Externalism (Philosophy of mind) Internalism (Theory of knowledge) Knowledge, Theory of Philosophy of Mind Internalismus |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016555325&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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