Politika Moskvy v respublikach Baltii v poslevoennye gody (1944 - 1956): issledovanija i dokumenty
Политика Москвы в республиках Балтии в послевоенные годы (1944 - 1956) исследования и документы
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | Russian |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Tartu
Tartu Univ. Press
2008
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Abstract Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | Zsfassung in engl. Sprache u.d.T.: Moscow's policy in the union republics of the Baltic during the post-war years (1944 - 1956) |
| Beschreibung: | 374 S. |
| ISBN: | 9789949118281 |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nam a2200000 c 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV023362663 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 20121023 | ||
| 007 | t | ||
| 008 | 080625s2008 |||| 00||| rus d | ||
| 020 | |a 9789949118281 |9 978-9949-11-828-1 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)605480108 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV023362663 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rakwb | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a rus | |
| 049 | |a DE-12 |a DE-521 |a DE-Re13 | ||
| 084 | |a ML 7250 |0 (DE-625)123210: |2 rvk | ||
| 084 | |a ML 7303 |0 (DE-625)123217: |2 rvk | ||
| 084 | |a 7,41 |2 ssgn | ||
| 100 | 1 | |6 880-01 |a Tannberg, Tõnu |d 1961- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)135758866 |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |6 880-02 |a Politika Moskvy v respublikach Baltii v poslevoennye gody (1944 - 1956) |b issledovanija i dokumenty |c Tynu Tannberg. [Red. Tatʹjana Šor] |
| 264 | 1 | |a Tartu |b Tartu Univ. Press |c 2008 | |
| 300 | |a 374 S. | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 500 | |a Zsfassung in engl. Sprache u.d.T.: Moscow's policy in the union republics of the Baltic during the post-war years (1944 - 1956) | ||
| 546 | |a In kyrill. Schr., russ. | ||
| 648 | 7 | |a Geschichte 1944-1956 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
| 651 | 7 | |a Baltikum |0 (DE-588)4004379-4 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
| 651 | 7 | |a Estland |0 (DE-588)4015587-0 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
| 651 | 7 | |a Sowjetunion |0 (DE-588)4077548-3 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
| 655 | 7 | |0 (DE-588)4135952-5 |a Quelle |2 gnd-content | |
| 689 | 0 | 0 | |a Sowjetunion |0 (DE-588)4077548-3 |D g |
| 689 | 0 | 1 | |a Estland |0 (DE-588)4015587-0 |D g |
| 689 | 0 | 2 | |a Baltikum |0 (DE-588)4004379-4 |D g |
| 689 | 0 | 3 | |a Geschichte 1944-1956 |A z |
| 689 | 0 | |5 DE-604 | |
| 856 | 4 | 2 | |m Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen |q application/pdf |u http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016546080&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |3 Abstract |
| 856 | 4 | 2 | |m HEBIS Datenaustausch |q application/pdf |u http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016546080&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |3 Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| 880 | 1 | |6 100-01/(N |a Таннберг, Тыну |a ut | |
| 880 | 1 | 0 | |6 245-02/(N |a Политика Москвы в республиках Балтии в послевоенные годы (1944 - 1956) |b исследования и документы |c Тыну Таннберг. [Ред. Татьяна Шор] |
| 940 | 1 | |f sla | |
| 940 | 1 | |n oe | |
| 942 | 1 | 1 | |c 900 |e 22/bsb |f 09044 |g 479 |
| 942 | 1 | 1 | |c 909 |e 22/bsb |f 09045 |g 947.08 |
| 942 | 1 | 1 | |c 909 |e 22/bsb |f 09044 |g 947.08 |
| 942 | 1 | 1 | |c 900 |e 22/bsb |f 09045 |g 479 |
| 943 | 1 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016546080 | |
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1814344167479836672 |
|---|---|
| adam_text |
5.
MOSCOW'S POLICY IN THE UNION REPUBLICS
OF THE BALTIC DURING THE POST-WAR YEARS
(1944-1956)
Articles and documents
Summary
The first Soviet year and the time period between autumn
1944
and
1956
constitutes the significant epoch in Estonian history, which is characterized
by dismantling of the independence-period statehood and construction of
the Soviet power structure, completion of the new cadres, suppression of
the armed resistance, realization of the large-scale repressions, introduction
of the Soviet economical system, sovietization of the society's spiritual life
and development and instalment of Moscow's control mechanisms over the
union republic. In other words, it was the period when the new regime was
finally instituted in Estonia, and the foundation for the Estonian
SSR
was
created.
Although it is an important period in the history of Estonia as well as in
the history of other Baltic countries, there has not been an extensive re¬
search carried out about it. Indeed, the existent historiography lists thor¬
ough treatments of single topics (mass repressions, armed resistance,
censorship etc.), but they rather focus too much on Estonia and neglect the
wider perspective. Association of the developments in Estonia at that time
with the events in the Soviet Union, in Eastern Europe and on international
level have remained in the background. Yet, recognition of this wider per¬
spective is
cruciai
in order to understand the processes that happened then
in Estonia, The unexploited archival sources in the archives of Estonia,
Russia and other countries would offer this approach a good opportunity,
as do also the recently published researches and document publications in
Russia and elsewhere in the world.
The primary goal of the current collection is to at least partially fill those
gaps listed above and to contribute considerably to the research and inter¬
pretation of the period under the discussion
- 1940-1956.
The majority of
the researches in the book have been completed within the Estonian Science
Foundation grant no.
5715.
Five topic-related articles by the author are published in the first part of
the book.
364
Summary
Moscow's institutional and nomenclature-related control
mechanisms in the Estonian
SSR
during the post-war
years
After the re-occupation of the Baltic republics in
1944,
the Kremlin was
faced with the agenda how to exercise control over these regions. Already in
late October
1944
and early November same year, the so-called Baltic ques¬
tion was discussed in the Organizational Bureau of the Union-wide Central
Committee of the Communist (Bolshevik) Party where decisions were taken
with regard to "mistakes and deficiencies" in the work of the union repub¬
lics' party organizations. The fight against the "bourgeois nationalism" was
the most principal task which was brought up. These decisions became the
direct guidelines for the leaders of the union republics and, from the
broader perspective, the foundational documents for the sovietization of
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Apart from adopting the mentioned deci¬
sions, the plan of extensive measures was settled in order to successfully
launch the sovietization process.
Simultaneously with the aforesaid decisions, the complex system of
control mechanisms was initiated where initially the most important roles
according to the decision of the Political Bureau of the Union-wide Central
Committee of the Communist (Bolshevik) Party were ascribed to the bu¬
reaus of the union republics. The bureaus of the union republics were liable
to report to Moscow. Their directives and orders had to be carried out by
the local authority. Nikolai Shatalin
-
an important figure in the Kremlin
power corridors
-
was appointed to lead the Estonian Bureau the Union-
wide Central Committee of the Communist (Bolshevik) Party. In
1946
he
was succeeded by
Georgi Perov.
The bureau consisted besides the people
appointed from Moscow also by the union republic's representatives of the
Communist party and the executive power: the first secretary of the Esto¬
nian Communist (Bolshevik) Party Nikolai Karotamm and the head of the
government Arnold Veimer. Representatives of the security institutions
(NKVD/KGB) constituted also the eminent part of the bureau. In Estonia,
the latter position was at first run by Nikolia Sazykin
(1944-1945)
and later
by Nikolai Gorlinski
(1945-1947).
Representatives of the security institu¬
tions were in charge of the coordination of suppressing the resistance
movement and purging the society of "hostile elements".
The tasks of the aforesaid bureaus were to direct the implementation of
the sovietization process and to exercise control over the leaderships of the
union republics. The bureaus of the union republics' were thus the ex¬
traordinary and temporary institutions of control and support. Such bu¬
reaus existed till spring
1947,
when Moscow came to the decision that local
leaderships are competent enough in building up the "new system". The
Summary
365
liquidation of the union republics' bureaus was partly connected with the
election of the Supreme Soviets, which was seen in Moscow as the important
milestone in the legitimization of the Soviet authority in the Baltic coun¬
tries.
In keeping check on the union republic's leadership and exercising the
control, a significant role was played by the institution of the 2nd Secretary,
which was established already in late
1944.
As a general rule, Moscow held
to the principle that the party leader of the union republic would be the
representative of the local nationality. Nevertheless, Moscow did not display
full trust regarding the local party leaders, as a result of which the "not
local" 2nd Secretary was appointed to keep watch. The leadership of the
union republic had no say in the appointment matters; one just had to get
adjusted to this emissary from Moscow. Thus, the 2nd Secretary became
"Moscow's eye" on the spot. The Secretary sent from the centre to the un¬
ion republic had to be, on the one hand, the closest aid
-
a sort of "advi¬
sor"
-
to the union republic's party leader, but, on the other hand, also the
checker of his activities and the mediator and interpreter of Moscow's
guidelines. During the post-war period
-
until the death of Stalin in
1953 -
the 2nd Secretary was undoubtedly one of the key figures in carrying out the
sovietization in all three Baltic union republics. In the Estonian
SSR
it was
Sergei Sazanov
(1944-1948),
Georgi
Kedrov
(1948-1949)
and Vassili
Kossov
(1950-1953).
After Stalin's death and the ensuing period of the
"new national policy" conducted by L. Beria, Moscow gave up the principle
to unilaterally appoint the 2"d Secretary. This was the signal of the weaken¬
ing control of the centre over the union republics.
During the post-war years, the nomenclature, too, exercised the vital
role in the power relations between the centre and the union republic as it
constituted the list of the most important positions for the political author¬
ity. While the system of nomenclature in the Soviet Union was established
already during the middle of the
1920s,
then in the Estonian
SSR
and other
Baltic union republics it only happened during the post-war years. The
nomenclature in the Soviet society had many different levels. The Union-
wide or the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Un¬
ion's nomenclature consisted also of the union republics' leaders. The sec¬
ond level comprised of the local level
-
the nomenclature of oblasts, krais
and union republics
-
where one, in turn, could distinguish further lower
levels.
The functioning of the principle of the nomenclature in society meant
that even the least important appointment to the position in various power
structures demanded compulsory approval from the party organizations.
Such coordination depended on the importance of the position and its
location in the power structure. Each party institution
-
from the Political
366
Summary
Bureau of the Union-wide Central Committee of the Communist (Bolshe¬
vik) Party and the Secretariat to the municipal and district committees
-
had the list of the planned positions. Fulfilling of these positions could only
take place in concordance with the party institution. Consequently, the
nomenclature for the political authority was a multilayered device for exer¬
cising the direct control.
In the beginning of
1946
there were
1842
positions in the Estonian
SSR's nomenclature, of which
272
people belonged to the Union-wide
nomenclature
-
to the list of the Union-wide
Centrai
Committee of the
Communist (Bolshevik) Party. There were
2149
positions in the nomencla¬
ture established in the Estonian
SSR
for the year
1947. 288
of them be¬
longed to the Union-wide nomenclature. In
1953,
the respective indicators
were
2252
and
116.
Therefore, until
1953
the positions belonging to the
Union-wide nomenclature within the nomenclature of the Estonian
SSR
had significantly decreased, thus demonstrating the fact that after Stalin's
death the nomenclature-related control over the union republic was less¬
ened. In the Soviet Union as a whole, major cuts in the nomenclature took
place in
1953:
while by the end of Stalin's rule there were around
45 000
positions in the Union-wide nomenclature, then the new list approved in
July
1953
consisted of only
25 000
positions. Regarding Estonia, it is impor¬
tant to keep in mind that the increase of the nomenclature in the union
republic was conditioned by the sovietization of the administrative division
(especially due to the creation of the districts
-
raions
-
in
1950)
when the
number of administrative units grew considerably.
The years
1944-1953
for the Estonian
SSR
and other Baltic union re¬
publics were a period when the centre finally developed its control mecha¬
nisms over the union republics. The system of control mechanisms
implemented at that time helped undeniably the sovietization of the Baltic
countries alongside with the sorting out of the loyal cadres for the new
positions of authority in the Soviet power structures. Although during the
time following the death of Stalin, the power relations between the centre
and the union republics were modified and the control over the periphery
loosened, the established control mechanisms during the post-war period
remained in effect and functioned without major changes till the second
half of the
1980s.
Summary
367
Security organs suppressing resistance movement
in Estonia in early
1953
On
30
December
1952,
the Cenu-al Committee of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union passed a resolution that obliged the authorities of the
Ukrainian, Belarusian and Baltic Soviet republics to deal a final blow to
armed resistance and nationalist organizations. To carry out that resolution,
the Security Ministry of the USSR issued its order No.
0062
On measures to
liquidate the nationalist underground and its armed groupings in the western regions
of the Ukrainian and Belarusian
SSR,
Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian
SSR,
In
early February, Security Ministry of the Estonian
SSR,
in its turn, drew up
its Plan of measures to liquidate the nationalist underground and its groupings in the
Estonian
SSR.
The plan envisaged the liquidation of
15
groups and
91
solitary armed
fighters ("bandits" in the official jargon, popularly known as "forest broth¬
ers") registered in the "database" of the security organs. This marked the
beginning of one of the last major actions against armed resistance in the
post-war Estonian
SSR,
which culminated in February and March
1953.
This is graphically shown by the data of security organs.
In January
1953,
one bandit was killed in the Estonian
SSR
and eight
were arrested. Two illegal persons were detained. The results for February
were much more impressive. During that month, the security organs liqui¬
dated
2
groups of forest brothers,
2
group leaders and
7
members and
15
solitary bandits. Four nationalist organizations or groups with
31
members
were discovered. Thirteen forest brothers were killed. Twenty helpers of
forest brothers and
20
people who were called "other anti-Soviet elements"
were arrested;
27
illegal persons were prosecuted and
12
persons were
legalized. During the suppression of the resistance movement,
1
security
officer was killed;
3
soldiers and
1
member of the destroyer battalion were
wounded.
In March, the security organs were even more active: in that month
4
groups of forest brothers were destroyed completely and
2
partly;
7
group
leaders,
34
group members and
16
solitary bandits were caught. Thirty
forest brothers were killed. In addition,
20
helpers of forest brothers,
15
illegal persons,
3
members of nationalist groups,
9
solitary nationalists and
7
"other anti-Soviet elements" were arrested; two forest brothers gave them¬
selves up to the authorities. During the operations conducted in March one
soldier of the interior forces was killed and one was wounded.
In three months, the security organs confiscated from forest brothers
and nationalists
3
machine guns,
18
automatic rifles,
28
rifles,
73
pistols,
19
grenades,
4
shotguns,
1
pair of binoculars and almost
4000
cartridges.
By the beginning of April, the security organs of the Estonian
SSR
had
368
Summary
obtained information on
12
armed groups and
32
members of these,
73
solitary bandits and
241
illegal persons.
The early months of
1953
were most tragic for forest brothers
-
at least
44
of them were killed by the security organs. This is comparable only to
the period of
1945-1946.
The security organs' attack in early
1953
did not
bring along complete destruction of the resistance movement but dealt it a
severe blow. After j. Stalin's death in March
1953,
the resistance movement
subsided relatively quickly; a reason for this was L. Beria's new ethnic policy
in the Baltic and changes in the general political situation.
L. Beria's "new course" in suppressing
the resistance movement in spring
1953
After the death of Stalin, L. Beria, who had become the Minister of the
Interior in
1953,
began to implement a "new course" as regards the periph¬
ery of the empire, which also consisted of changing the methods and tactics
of the anti-resistance struggle, with the aim of finally "pacifying" these
areas.
The pointlessness of the previous anti-resistance struggle was also to be
proved by the statistics on repressions as compiled on Beria's orders. Based
on the data compiled by the security organs, a total of
270 000
persons
underwent repressions in the Lithuanian
SSR
in
1944-1952,
of whom
63
011 persons were arrested as members of the "anti-soviet nationalist under¬
ground",
67 326
persons were arrested by the militia and prosecutor offices,
126 037
persons were deported,
20 005
forest brothers were killed, as were
12 910
party and soviet activists. Therefore, almost
10%
of the Lithuanian
population fell victim to repression. In western Ukraine, however, almost
500 000
persons fell victim to repression, of whom
134 467
persons were
arrested, charged with belonging to the "nationalistic underground", or
participating in diversionary activities or in some other "anti-soviet" activity.
In Latvia,
119 000
persons fell victim to repression, of whom
43 702
were
deported,
26 617
were arrested by the security organs,
46 358
were ar¬
rested by the militia or the prosecutor's office, and
2321
were killed as
"bandits". In Estonia, in the period
1944-1953,
a total of
662
"gangs" and
336
national organisations were disbanded. During the same years, a total
of over
67 000
persons were arrested or deported, including
18 772
ar¬
rested by the security organs,
26 284
by the prosecutor's office and militia,
20919
were exiled, and
1425
"bandits" were killed.
In the wider context, Beria's "new course" was to assist the local cadre to
power, and in doing so, to also increase the decision-making of the union
republics themselves
-
thereby completing the sovietisation of their regions.
_
Summary
_369
One of the primary goals of realising this "program" was also the suppres¬
sion of armed resistance, the calming of the periphery of the empire, ceas¬
ing to carry out the mass repressions and the "military-Chekist operations",
since these had not had the desired results despite the time that had passed.
Total mass terror was replaced by selected repressions. Thereby, the re¬
pressive organs were also to become more acceptable to the population.
This meant the promotion of the local cadre to leading positions, and in the
longer perspective, the estonianisation, Iatvianisation, etc, of the security
organs.
One possibility that Bern saw for suppression of the resistance was co¬
operation with persons who had participated in the resistance movement
and independence-era politicians who had been repressed. His aim in co-
opting these people was, on the one hand, to increase the support base of
the regime, to provide it with a greater legitimacy in the eyes of the people.
On the other hand, however, such an approach was to eventually neutralise
any real resistance to the regime, both nationally and internationally.
It was important for the Kremlin that this should be done under the
control of the authorities. But this in turn would require an institution that
would be acceptable to the population, that the people would start to trust.
Thus, Beria suggested a plan to create an underground organisation that
would operate under the control of the authorities, where persons publicly
known and respected in western Ukraine and Lithuania would be brought
to the fore. The plans for such a pseudo-organisation were developed the
furthest in western Ukraine. This approach also did not exclude the promo¬
tion of "prominent nationalists" to the leadership of a union republic, which
was probably being planned for the Estonian
SSR.
The "new course" was undoubtedly also meant to achieve control over
the exile groups. These plans are also reminiscent of the pseudo-organi¬
sation "Trust" which successfully operated in the
1920s,
and which helped
Moscow to control, to a substantial degree, the Russian emigrant circles.
In conclusion, the goal of Beria was to completely unite the western
areas of the Soviet Union, and it seems that such a milder, and a so-called
local sovietisation would actually have accelerated adaptation to, and recon¬
ciliation with, the regime.
370
Summary
Designs of the Kremlin on Estonia in the Summer
1953
Joseph Stalin's death in March
1953
laid the basis of a new internal-political
situation in the Soviet Union. Formally, after Stalin, a collective leadership
came to power (G. Malenkov, L. Beria,
N.
Khrushstshev) with an under¬
standing that changes in the administration of the empire and in communi¬
cation with the rest of the world were indispensable.
Internal-politically, L. Beria became particularly active, starting to carry
out "a new national policy" in the peripheral areas of the Soviet Union (first
of
ali, in
the territories that were annexed in
1939-1940)
and that a few
months later were subjected to separate resolutions on the highest level of
power
-
in the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU. After
passing the resolutions they were immediately carried out in the union
republics.
L. Beria took a new course of action as regards the most problematic
union republics among the peripheral ones
-
West Ukraine and Lithuania
-
where the resistance to the Soviet regime was the most widespread in the
post-war years. On
26
May
1953
the Presidium of the Central Committee of
the CPSU adopted resolutions that signified a new Kremlin approach to the
peripheral areas of the empire. On June
12 1953,
analogous decisions were
made about the western obksts of
Belo-Russia
and the Latvian
SSR.
Based on the resolutions of the Central Committee of the CPSU as of
May-June
1953,
the named union republics were to:
•
End the current groundless and mass policy of violence and rigid ad¬
ministration in government offices;
•
Carry out a thorough exchange of staff on all levels of party and Soviet
organs and promote local figures to managerial staff;
•
Introduce the local languages into official managerial practice of the
union republics,
et
the same time considering the interests of minor eth¬
nic groups (e.g. Polish in Lithuania);
•
Work out concrete measures to consolidate the system of collective
farms.
The decisions made by the Central Committee of the CPSU were immedi¬
ately put into practice. In June
1953,
communist party plenary sessions of
the named union republics took place and approved of the tables from
Moscow and thereafter the new course was taken. It first brought about a
rather widespread exchange of personnel, transmission to local languages
in the management of public business and the mitigation of counterattacks
against resistance movement.
An analogous decision was started to prepare about the Estonian
SSR.
First, a thorough exchange of personnel, and structural reorganisation in
the ESSR Ministry of Internal Affairs were carried out. Security officials of
Summary
371
local descent were promoted to leading posts, the Estonian Mihhail Krass-
man was appointed a new minister. In June the second secretary of the
Central Committee of the ECP Vassili Kossov who had been sent here from
Moscow was called back from Estonia.
Simultaneously, the Central Committee of the CPSU worked out direc¬
tive materials concerning the Estonian
SSR:
a memorandum characterising
the situation in the union republic and the draft decision of the Presidium
of the Centra] Committee of the CPSU, dated as of
20
June
1953.
The
named documents declared the activity of the authorities of the Estonian
SSR
in the management of the union republic clearly unsatisfactory and
designated more essential guidelines for improving the situation.
In accordance with the draft decision of the Central Committee of the
CPSU both the Central Committee of the ESSR and the ESSR Council of
Ministers were to:
•
Liquidate resistance movement;
•
End violations of Soviet legislation and start finally carrying out a "cor¬
rect" national policy;
•
Carry out the promotion of the "Estonian personnel" to leading posts,
regarding it of the utmost importance;
•
End the current practice in according to which the second secretaries of
the party organisations were Russians;
•
Enhance ideological work among intellectuals, boldly promote out¬
standing intellectuals to leading posts;
•
End unfounded suspicions against the people who lived in Estonia dur¬
ing the German occupation;
•
Establish Estonian-language management of public affairs on all levels of
the administration of the union republic;
•
Liquidate drawbacks in building up collective farming.
The draft project for Estonia remained on the paper, though, and it was
not carried out since L, Beria fell victim to the Kremlin struggle for power
and was arrested on
26
June
1953.
One of the main accusations against
L. Beria was his erroneous national policy in the western areas of the em¬
pire. The Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU as of
2
July
1953
annulled the earlier decisions made on national policy. Beria's activity
in the field of national policy was considered as erroneous also in union
republics.
: The aim of L. Beria's "new national policy" was to perfect the effective
regime and make it more efficient, he had hoped to attain it by reducing
the number and influence of party bureaucracy in society. In the frames of
the "new national policy" he had never intended to give the Baltic countries
the status of the Eastern-European states. His purpose was rather to inte¬
grate these areas in the framework of a new Baltic special order, never give
372
Summary
them up. L. Beria regarded the former national policy of the central ad¬
ministration of the Russian Empire in the peripheral areas as more flexible,
effective, and what is important in the given context
-
worthy as an exam¬
ple
-
than the policy pursued by the Soviets. Thus, in sum, had L. Beria
maintained his power, it could indeed have led to the establishment of a
new Baltic special order in the Baltic.
The unknown amnesty of
1953:
L. Beria's
rehabilitation plans on the basis of Estonian
SSR
On March
27, 1953,
the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium adopted a
decision whereby an extensive amnesty was declared, on the initiative of
Minister for Interior L. Beria. On the basis of the
1953
amnesty, a total of
1
201 738
prisoners or nearly
54%
of all prisoners
-
most of whom had been
convicted of criminal activity
-
were released from the Gulag camps and
colonies in the Soviet Union. The amnesty also shortened the terms of
many prisoners, and numerous criminal procedures were dropped.
The March amnesty actually affected, to a greater or lesser degree, a
total of
2 695 400
people. L. Beria also planned to carry out, by the end of
1953,
the release of political prisoners. These plans, however, were not
realized, since as a result of a Kremlin power struggle, L. Beria was arrested
and the release of political prisoners was suspended, the issue not being
raised again until
1954.
As of September
10, 1953,
the Estonian
SSR
militia
had registered
9260
amnesty subjects, of whom
7449 (80.4%)
had found
employment. Non-employed dependents made up
1095 (11.8%)
of those
amnestied (incl.
58
students). Therefore, at that time,
716 (7.7%)
of those
amnestied were dependents. One-fifth of all those registered by the militia
was comprised of people registered as living in Tallinn
(1907
amnestied).
Of these,
1480 (77.6%)
had found work, and
257 (13.5%)
were dependents,
with
170
people unemployed
(8.9%).
Tartu had
732
amnestied people and
Pärnu
had
449,
of whom
608 (83.1%)
and
295 (65.7%),
respectively, were
employed, and
107 (14.6%)
and
69 (15.4%)
were dependents.
The
1953
amnesty, which was undoubtedly an important setback for the
Stalinist terror machine, made public the issue of abiding by "socialist
legality". Thus the foundation was laid for the liberalization of legislation in
the
mid-1950s,
and the rehabilitation process was initiated which in
previous historical sources has unfortunately been erroneously associated
only with the name of
N.
Khruschev.
Summary
373
1956
and Problems of the Baltics in Kremlin
The
artide
provides, on the background of the Soviet Union's internal and
external revolutionary events in
1956
(CPSU 20th Congress, events in
Poland and Hungary), an overview of the more important developments
that took place in the Baltic soviet republics during that year, thereby kee¬
ping in mind the questions: how were the Baltic issues reflected in the
corridors of power during that year?
The analysis is based primarily on archival materials that have not been
used up to now (from the Russian Recent History State Archives and the
Estonian National Archives), on recent source publications and studies. The
more important conclusions are:
1.
As regards the CPSU 20th Congress and
N.
Khrushchev's speech
denouncing the personalitycult, it should not be forgotten that this was not
a calculated plan to provide a true assessment of the Stalin era regime. For
Khrushchev this was also a
means to ensure his position of power and to remove the "old guard" from
power.
2.
The fact that the speech exposing the personality cult resulted in such
extensive reaction both in the USSR itself and on the international arena,
was unexpected by the top leadership in the Kremlin. This had not been
taken into account, and subsequently the lost positions started to be
retaken, step by step
-
by muzzling society. Internally this resulted in a
situation where by the end of the year, the implementation of limited
repressions was sanctioned by the party, and in foreign policy, things went
even further
-
at the start of November
1956
Soviet tanks suffocated the
freedom aspirations of the Hungarians.
3.
For the Baltic soviet republics one of the central issues in
1956
was still
the issue of the local language and local officials. It is surprising that the
Kremlin had not by this time thrown aside the "new nationalities" principles
that started to be implemented in
1953,
led by L. Beria, towards the
frontier republics of the empire. Moscow still supported attention being
paid to the local languages and the promotion of national officials to high
positions. Such an approach survived in the Kremlin until
1959,
when the
purgin of the leadership of the Latvian
SSR
was undertaken after it was
accused of nationalism.
4.
The
1956
events in Poland and Hungary were received with extensive
interest in the three Baltic Soviet Republics, especially in Lithuania and
Estonia. The activity in the Baltics was seen in the Kremlin as quite a serious
danger, and at the end of November, the CPSU Central Committee bureau
prepared a memorandum titled "Nationalistic and anti-Soviet manifesta¬
tions in the Baltic Soviet Republics." The events in the Baltics were one of
374
SUMMARY
the impulses tor the application
oť
repressive measures. The repression of
the Hungarian uprising was a clear sign to the Estonians, Latvian and
I-itíumtiiíins
that the »Soviet regime was not going to collapse.
Φ
*
Numerous documents, which more or less relate to the topics discussed, are
published in the second part of' the book. These documents mainly derive
from the archives in Estonia
und
Russia.
Тартуский университет
Кафедра истории Эстонии
Тыну Таннберг
ПОЛИТИКА МОСКВЫ
В РЕСПУБЛИКАХ БАЛТИИ
В ПОСЛЕВОЕННЫЕ ГОДЫ
(1944-1956)
Исследования и документы
ТАКШ 11МУЕК5ПТ
Р К Е 5 8
ОГЛАВЛЕНИЕ
1 Предисловие 7
2 Исследования 13
2 1 Институциональные и номенклатурные механизмы
контроля Москвы в Эстонской ССР в послевоенные годы 13
2 2 Деятельность органов госбезопасности по подавлению
лесного братства в Эстонии в начале 1953 года 62
2 3 Новый курс Л Берии по подавлению движения сопротив
ления в Балтии и в Западной Украине весной 1953 года 78
2 4 Планы Москвы в отношении Эстонии летом 1953 года 106
2 5 Неизвестная амнистия Бериевские планы реабилитации
1953 года на примере Эстонской ССР 121
2 6 1956 год и проблемы Балтии в Кремле 143
3 Документы 177
1 Письмо секретаря ЦК КПЭ Н Каротамма И Сталину,
2 Секретная справка наркома безопасности Эстонской ССР
Б Кумма о «засоренности» школ и средних специальных
учебных заведений Эстонской ССР «антисоветскими
элементами», 3 01 1950 197
3 Справки сектора партийного учета кадров ЦК КПЭ
о национальном составе руководящего аппарата по
состоянию на май и июнь 1953 года 233
4 Секретная справка Отдела 2-Н Министерства внутренних
дел Эстонской ССР о работе органов безопасности по
подавлению движения сопротивления за период 1952—
1953 гг по состоянию на 29 05 1953 г 241
5 Секретное постановление Бюро ЦК КПЭ о недостатках
в трудоустройстве освобожденных по амнистии граждан,
6 Справка министра внутренних дел Эстонской ССР
М Крассмана о ходе амнистии, 3 06 1953 285
7 Справка министра внутренних дел Эстонской ССР М
Крассмана о национальных кадрах и о результатах борьбы
с движением сопротивления в 1944-1953 гг , 4 06 1953 286
8 Секретная справка 4-го отдела Министерства внутренних
дел Эстонской ССР о действиях органов безопасности
по подавлению движения сопротивления в 1944-1945 гг ,
ПРЕДИСЛОВИЕ
Секретные предложения органов контрольной инспекции
СССР по улучшению работы Министерства внутренних дел
Эстонской ССР, 10 06 1953
Приказ министра внутренних дел Эстонской ССР
М Крассмана о ликвидации вооруженного сопротивления,
Информация секретаря ЦК КПЭ Л Аенцмана о трудо
устройстве амнистированных граждан, 19 06 1953
Докладная записка заведующего отделом партийных,
профсоюзных и комсомольских органов ЦК КПСС Е
Громова Н Хрущову, 20 06 1953
Проект постановления ЦК КПСС о недостатках в работе
руководства Эстонской ССР, 20 06 1953
Секретное письмо секретаря ЦК КПЭ И Кэбина в ЦК
КПСС по поводу якобы имевшего место увольнения русских
на предприятиях Таллинна 29 08 1953
Отчет председателя Совета Министров Эстонской ССР А
Мююрисепа о ходе трудоустройства амнистированных
граждан, 12 09 1953
Секретное письмо секретаря ЦК КПЭ И Кэбина в ЦК
КПСС в связи с жалобами на массовые увольнения русских
в Таллинне, 28 09 1953
Информация секретаря ЦК КПЭ И Кэбина в ЦК КПСС
о результатах в области идеологической работы,
заслушанных на III пленуме ЦК КПЭ, 28 09 1953
Секретное донесение секретаря ЦК КПЭ И Кэбина в ЦК
КПСС об общественном настроении в Эстонской ССР
в связи с событиями в Венгрии, 3 11 1956
Справка председателя КГБ Эстонской ССР И Карпова
о явившихся с повинной и легализованных гражданах в
1954-1956 гг , 10 12 1956
Справка председателя КГБ Эстонской ССР И Карпова
о числе лиц, ранее судимых за контрреволюционные
преступления и их трудоустройстве, 19 12 1956
Справка представителей прокуратуры Эстонской ССР, КГБ
ЭССР, Министерства внутренних дел, ЦК КПЭ и Совета
Министров ЭССР „О состоянии работы среди лиц ранее
судимых за контрреволюционные и другие преступления,
Источники и использованная литература
8иттагу |
| adam_txt |
5.
MOSCOW'S POLICY IN THE UNION REPUBLICS
OF THE BALTIC DURING THE POST-WAR YEARS
(1944-1956)
Articles and documents
Summary
The first Soviet year and the time period between autumn
1944
and
1956
constitutes the significant epoch in Estonian history, which is characterized
by dismantling of the independence-period statehood and construction of
the Soviet power structure, completion of the new cadres, suppression of
the armed resistance, realization of the large-scale repressions, introduction
of the Soviet economical system, sovietization of the society's spiritual life
and development and instalment of Moscow's control mechanisms over the
union republic. In other words, it was the period when the new regime was
finally instituted in Estonia, and the foundation for the Estonian
SSR
was
created.
Although it is an important period in the history of Estonia as well as in
the history of other Baltic countries, there has not been an extensive re¬
search carried out about it. Indeed, the existent historiography lists thor¬
ough treatments of single topics (mass repressions, armed resistance,
censorship etc.), but they rather focus too much on Estonia and neglect the
wider perspective. Association of the developments in Estonia at that time
with the events in the Soviet Union, in Eastern Europe and on international
level have remained in the background. Yet, recognition of this wider per¬
spective is
cruciai
in order to understand the processes that happened then
in Estonia, The unexploited archival sources in the archives of Estonia,
Russia and other countries would offer this approach a good opportunity,
as do also the recently published researches and document publications in
Russia and elsewhere in the world.
The primary goal of the current collection is to at least partially fill those
gaps listed above and to contribute considerably to the research and inter¬
pretation of the period under the discussion
- 1940-1956.
The majority of
the researches in the book have been completed within the Estonian Science
Foundation grant no.
5715.
Five topic-related articles by the author are published in the first part of
the book.
364
Summary
Moscow's institutional and nomenclature-related control
mechanisms in the Estonian
SSR
during the post-war
years
After the re-occupation of the Baltic republics in
1944,
the Kremlin was
faced with the agenda how to exercise control over these regions. Already in
late October
1944
and early November same year, the so-called Baltic ques¬
tion was discussed in the Organizational Bureau of the Union-wide Central
Committee of the Communist (Bolshevik) Party where decisions were taken
with regard to "mistakes and deficiencies" in the work of the union repub¬
lics' party organizations. The fight against the "bourgeois nationalism" was
the most principal task which was brought up. These decisions became the
direct guidelines for the leaders of the union republics and, from the
broader perspective, the foundational documents for the sovietization of
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Apart from adopting the mentioned deci¬
sions, the plan of extensive measures was settled in order to successfully
launch the sovietization process.
Simultaneously with the aforesaid decisions, the complex system of
control mechanisms was initiated where initially the most important roles
according to the decision of the Political Bureau of the Union-wide Central
Committee of the Communist (Bolshevik) Party were ascribed to the bu¬
reaus of the union republics. The bureaus of the union republics were liable
to report to Moscow. Their directives and orders had to be carried out by
the local authority. Nikolai Shatalin
-
an important figure in the Kremlin
power corridors
-
was appointed to lead the Estonian Bureau the Union-
wide Central Committee of the Communist (Bolshevik) Party. In
1946
he
was succeeded by
Georgi Perov.
The bureau consisted besides the people
appointed from Moscow also by the union republic's representatives of the
Communist party and the executive power: the first secretary of the Esto¬
nian Communist (Bolshevik) Party Nikolai Karotamm and the head of the
government Arnold Veimer. Representatives of the security institutions
(NKVD/KGB) constituted also the eminent part of the bureau. In Estonia,
the latter position was at first run by Nikolia Sazykin
(1944-1945)
and later
by Nikolai Gorlinski
(1945-1947).
Representatives of the security institu¬
tions were in charge of the coordination of suppressing the resistance
movement and purging the society of "hostile elements".
The tasks of the aforesaid bureaus were to direct the implementation of
the sovietization process and to exercise control over the leaderships of the
union republics. The bureaus of the union republics' were thus the ex¬
traordinary and temporary institutions of control and support. Such bu¬
reaus existed till spring
1947,
when Moscow came to the decision that local
leaderships are competent enough in building up the "new system". The
Summary
365
liquidation of the union republics' bureaus was partly connected with the
election of the Supreme Soviets, which was seen in Moscow as the important
milestone in the legitimization of the Soviet authority in the Baltic coun¬
tries.
In keeping check on the union republic's leadership and exercising the
control, a significant role was played by the institution of the 2nd Secretary,
which was established already in late
1944.
As a general rule, Moscow held
to the principle that the party leader of the union republic would be the
representative of the local nationality. Nevertheless, Moscow did not display
full trust regarding the local party leaders, as a result of which the "not
local" 2nd Secretary was appointed to keep watch. The leadership of the
union republic had no say in the appointment matters; one just had to get
adjusted to this emissary from Moscow. Thus, the 2nd Secretary became
"Moscow's eye" on the spot. The Secretary sent from the centre to the un¬
ion republic had to be, on the one hand, the closest aid
-
a sort of "advi¬
sor"
-
to the union republic's party leader, but, on the other hand, also the
checker of his activities and the mediator and interpreter of Moscow's
guidelines. During the post-war period
-
until the death of Stalin in
1953 -
the 2nd Secretary was undoubtedly one of the key figures in carrying out the
sovietization in all three Baltic union republics. In the Estonian
SSR
it was
Sergei Sazanov
(1944-1948),
Georgi
Kedrov
(1948-1949)
and Vassili
Kossov
(1950-1953).
After Stalin's death and the ensuing period of the
"new national policy" conducted by L. Beria, Moscow gave up the principle
to unilaterally appoint the 2"d Secretary. This was the signal of the weaken¬
ing control of the centre over the union republics.
During the post-war years, the nomenclature, too, exercised the vital
role in the power relations between the centre and the union republic as it
constituted the list of the most important positions for the political author¬
ity. While the system of nomenclature in the Soviet Union was established
already during the middle of the
1920s,
then in the Estonian
SSR
and other
Baltic union republics it only happened during the post-war years. The
nomenclature in the Soviet society had many different levels. The Union-
wide or the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Un¬
ion's nomenclature consisted also of the union republics' leaders. The sec¬
ond level comprised of the local level
-
the nomenclature of oblasts, krais
and union republics
-
where one, in turn, could distinguish further lower
levels.
The functioning of the principle of the nomenclature in society meant
that even the least important appointment to the position in various power
structures demanded compulsory approval from the party organizations.
Such coordination depended on the importance of the position and its
location in the power structure. Each party institution
-
from the Political
366
Summary
Bureau of the Union-wide Central Committee of the Communist (Bolshe¬
vik) Party and the Secretariat to the municipal and district committees
-
had the list of the planned positions. Fulfilling of these positions could only
take place in concordance with the party institution. Consequently, the
nomenclature for the political authority was a multilayered device for exer¬
cising the direct control.
In the beginning of
1946
there were
1842
positions in the Estonian
SSR's nomenclature, of which
272
people belonged to the Union-wide
nomenclature
-
to the list of the Union-wide
Centrai
Committee of the
Communist (Bolshevik) Party. There were
2149
positions in the nomencla¬
ture established in the Estonian
SSR
for the year
1947. 288
of them be¬
longed to the Union-wide nomenclature. In
1953,
the respective indicators
were
2252
and
116.
Therefore, until
1953
the positions belonging to the
Union-wide nomenclature within the nomenclature of the Estonian
SSR
had significantly decreased, thus demonstrating the fact that after Stalin's
death the nomenclature-related control over the union republic was less¬
ened. In the Soviet Union as a whole, major cuts in the nomenclature took
place in
1953:
while by the end of Stalin's rule there were around
45 000
positions in the Union-wide nomenclature, then the new list approved in
July
1953
consisted of only
25 000
positions. Regarding Estonia, it is impor¬
tant to keep in mind that the increase of the nomenclature in the union
republic was conditioned by the sovietization of the administrative division
(especially due to the creation of the districts
-
raions
-
in
1950)
when the
number of administrative units grew considerably.
The years
1944-1953
for the Estonian
SSR
and other Baltic union re¬
publics were a period when the centre finally developed its control mecha¬
nisms over the union republics. The system of control mechanisms
implemented at that time helped undeniably the sovietization of the Baltic
countries alongside with the sorting out of the loyal cadres for the new
positions of authority in the Soviet power structures. Although during the
time following the death of Stalin, the power relations between the centre
and the union republics were modified and the control over the periphery
loosened, the established control mechanisms during the post-war period
remained in effect and functioned without major changes till the second
half of the
1980s.
Summary
367
Security organs suppressing resistance movement
in Estonia in early
1953
On
30
December
1952,
the Cenu-al Committee of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union passed a resolution that obliged the authorities of the
Ukrainian, Belarusian and Baltic Soviet republics to deal a final blow to
armed resistance and nationalist organizations. To carry out that resolution,
the Security Ministry of the USSR issued its order No.
0062
On measures to
liquidate the nationalist underground and its armed groupings in the western regions
of the Ukrainian and Belarusian
SSR,
Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian
SSR,
In
early February, Security Ministry of the Estonian
SSR,
in its turn, drew up
its Plan of measures to liquidate the nationalist underground and its groupings in the
Estonian
SSR.
The plan envisaged the liquidation of
15
groups and
91
solitary armed
fighters ("bandits" in the official jargon, popularly known as "forest broth¬
ers") registered in the "database" of the security organs. This marked the
beginning of one of the last major actions against armed resistance in the
post-war Estonian
SSR,
which culminated in February and March
1953.
This is graphically shown by the data of security organs.
In January
1953,
one bandit was killed in the Estonian
SSR
and eight
were arrested. Two illegal persons were detained. The results for February
were much more impressive. During that month, the security organs liqui¬
dated
2
groups of forest brothers,
2
group leaders and
7
members and
15
solitary bandits. Four nationalist organizations or groups with
31
members
were discovered. Thirteen forest brothers were killed. Twenty helpers of
forest brothers and
20
people who were called "other anti-Soviet elements"
were arrested;
27
illegal persons were prosecuted and
12
persons were
legalized. During the suppression of the resistance movement,
1
security
officer was killed;
3
soldiers and
1
member of the destroyer battalion were
wounded.
In March, the security organs were even more active: in that month
4
groups of forest brothers were destroyed completely and
2
partly;
7
group
leaders,
34
group members and
16
solitary bandits were caught. Thirty
forest brothers were killed. In addition,
20
helpers of forest brothers,
15
illegal persons,
3
members of nationalist groups,
9
solitary nationalists and
7
"other anti-Soviet elements" were arrested; two forest brothers gave them¬
selves up to the authorities. During the operations conducted in March one
soldier of the interior forces was killed and one was wounded.
In three months, the security organs confiscated from forest brothers
and nationalists
3
machine guns,
18
automatic rifles,
28
rifles,
73
pistols,
19
grenades,
4
shotguns,
1
pair of binoculars and almost
4000
cartridges.
By the beginning of April, the security organs of the Estonian
SSR
had
368
Summary
obtained information on
12
armed groups and
32
members of these,
73
solitary bandits and
241
illegal persons.
The early months of
1953
were most tragic for forest brothers
-
at least
44
of them were killed by the security organs. This is comparable only to
the period of
1945-1946.
The security organs' attack in early
1953
did not
bring along complete destruction of the resistance movement but dealt it a
severe blow. After j. Stalin's death in March
1953,
the resistance movement
subsided relatively quickly; a reason for this was L. Beria's new ethnic policy
in the Baltic and changes in the general political situation.
L. Beria's "new course" in suppressing
the resistance movement in spring
1953
After the death of Stalin, L. Beria, who had become the Minister of the
Interior in
1953,
began to implement a "new course" as regards the periph¬
ery of the empire, which also consisted of changing the methods and tactics
of the anti-resistance struggle, with the aim of finally "pacifying" these
areas.
The pointlessness of the previous anti-resistance struggle was also to be
proved by the statistics on repressions as compiled on Beria's orders. Based
on the data compiled by the security organs, a total of
270 000
persons
underwent repressions in the Lithuanian
SSR
in
1944-1952,
of whom
63
011 persons were arrested as members of the "anti-soviet nationalist under¬
ground",
67 326
persons were arrested by the militia and prosecutor offices,
126 037
persons were deported,
20 005
forest brothers were killed, as were
12 910
party and soviet activists. Therefore, almost
10%
of the Lithuanian
population fell victim to repression. In western Ukraine, however, almost
500 000
persons fell victim to repression, of whom
134 467
persons were
arrested, charged with belonging to the "nationalistic underground", or
participating in diversionary activities or in some other "anti-soviet" activity.
In Latvia,
119 000
persons fell victim to repression, of whom
43 702
were
deported,
26 617
were arrested by the security organs,
46 358
were ar¬
rested by the militia or the prosecutor's office, and
2321
were killed as
"bandits". In Estonia, in the period
1944-1953,
a total of
662
"gangs" and
336
national organisations were disbanded. During the same years, a total
of over
67 000
persons were arrested or deported, including
18 772
ar¬
rested by the security organs,
26 284
by the prosecutor's office and militia,
20919
were exiled, and
1425
"bandits" were killed.
In the wider context, Beria's "new course" was to assist the local cadre to
power, and in doing so, to also increase the decision-making of the union
republics themselves
-
thereby completing the sovietisation of their regions.
_
Summary
_369
One of the primary goals of realising this "program" was also the suppres¬
sion of armed resistance, the calming of the periphery of the empire, ceas¬
ing to carry out the mass repressions and the "military-Chekist operations",
since these had not had the desired results despite the time that had passed.
Total mass terror was replaced by selected repressions. Thereby, the re¬
pressive organs were also to become more acceptable to the population.
This meant the promotion of the local cadre to leading positions, and in the
longer perspective, the estonianisation, Iatvianisation, etc, of the security
organs.
One possibility that Bern saw for suppression of the resistance was co¬
operation with persons who had participated in the resistance movement
and independence-era politicians who had been repressed. His aim in co-
opting these people was, on the one hand, to increase the support base of
the regime, to provide it with a greater legitimacy in the eyes of the people.
On the other hand, however, such an approach was to eventually neutralise
any real resistance to the regime, both nationally and internationally.
It was important for the Kremlin that this should be done under the
control of the authorities. But this in turn would require an institution that
would be acceptable to the population, that the people would start to trust.
Thus, Beria suggested a plan to create an underground organisation that
would operate under the control of the authorities, where persons publicly
known and respected in western Ukraine and Lithuania would be brought
to the fore. The plans for such a pseudo-organisation were developed the
furthest in western Ukraine. This approach also did not exclude the promo¬
tion of "prominent nationalists" to the leadership of a union republic, which
was probably being planned for the Estonian
SSR.
The "new course" was undoubtedly also meant to achieve control over
the exile groups. These plans are also reminiscent of the pseudo-organi¬
sation "Trust" which successfully operated in the
1920s,
and which helped
Moscow to control, to a substantial degree, the Russian emigrant circles.
In conclusion, the goal of Beria was to completely unite the western
areas of the Soviet Union, and it seems that such a milder, and a so-called
local sovietisation would actually have accelerated adaptation to, and recon¬
ciliation with, the regime.
370
Summary
Designs of the Kremlin on Estonia in the Summer
1953
Joseph Stalin's death in March
1953
laid the basis of a new internal-political
situation in the Soviet Union. Formally, after Stalin, a collective leadership
came to power (G. Malenkov, L. Beria,
N.
Khrushstshev) with an under¬
standing that changes in the administration of the empire and in communi¬
cation with the rest of the world were indispensable.
Internal-politically, L. Beria became particularly active, starting to carry
out "a new national policy" in the peripheral areas of the Soviet Union (first
of
ali, in
the territories that were annexed in
1939-1940)
and that a few
months later were subjected to separate resolutions on the highest level of
power
-
in the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU. After
passing the resolutions they were immediately carried out in the union
republics.
L. Beria took a new course of action as regards the most problematic
union republics among the peripheral ones
-
West Ukraine and Lithuania
-
where the resistance to the Soviet regime was the most widespread in the
post-war years. On
26
May
1953
the Presidium of the Central Committee of
the CPSU adopted resolutions that signified a new Kremlin approach to the
peripheral areas of the empire. On June
12 1953,
analogous decisions were
made about the western obksts of
Belo-Russia
and the Latvian
SSR.
Based on the resolutions of the Central Committee of the CPSU as of
May-June
1953,
the named union republics were to:
•
End the current groundless and mass policy of violence and rigid ad¬
ministration in government offices;
•
Carry out a thorough exchange of staff on all levels of party and Soviet
organs and promote local figures to managerial staff;
•
Introduce the local languages into official managerial practice of the
union republics,
et
the same time considering the interests of minor eth¬
nic groups (e.g. Polish in Lithuania);
•
Work out concrete measures to consolidate the system of collective
farms.
The decisions made by the Central Committee of the CPSU were immedi¬
ately put into practice. In June
1953,
communist party plenary sessions of
the named union republics took place and approved of the tables from
Moscow and thereafter the new course was taken. It first brought about a
rather widespread exchange of personnel, transmission to local languages
in the management of public business and the mitigation of counterattacks
against resistance movement.
An analogous decision was started to prepare about the Estonian
SSR.
First, a thorough exchange of personnel, and structural reorganisation in
the ESSR Ministry of Internal Affairs were carried out. Security officials of
Summary
371
local descent were promoted to leading posts, the Estonian Mihhail Krass-
man was appointed a new minister. In June the second secretary of the
Central Committee of the ECP Vassili Kossov who had been sent here from
Moscow was called back from Estonia.
Simultaneously, the Central Committee of the CPSU worked out direc¬
tive materials concerning the Estonian
SSR:
a memorandum characterising
the situation in the union republic and the draft decision of the Presidium
of the Centra] Committee of the CPSU, dated as of
20
June
1953.
The
named documents declared the activity of the authorities of the Estonian
SSR
in the management of the union republic clearly unsatisfactory and
designated more essential guidelines for improving the situation.
In accordance with the draft decision of the Central Committee of the
CPSU both the Central Committee of the ESSR and the ESSR Council of
Ministers were to:
•
Liquidate resistance movement;
•
End violations of Soviet legislation and start finally carrying out a "cor¬
rect" national policy;
•
Carry out the promotion of the "Estonian personnel" to leading posts,
regarding it of the utmost importance;
•
End the current practice in according to which the second secretaries of
the party organisations were Russians;
•
Enhance ideological work among intellectuals, boldly promote out¬
standing intellectuals to leading posts;
•
End unfounded suspicions against the people who lived in Estonia dur¬
ing the German occupation;
•
Establish Estonian-language management of public affairs on all levels of
the administration of the union republic;
•
Liquidate drawbacks in building up collective farming.
The draft project for Estonia remained on the paper, though, and it was
not carried out since L, Beria fell victim to the Kremlin struggle for power
and was arrested on
26
June
1953.
One of the main accusations against
L. Beria was his erroneous national policy in the western areas of the em¬
pire. The Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU as of
2
July
1953
annulled the earlier decisions made on national policy. Beria's activity
in the field of national policy was considered as erroneous also in union
republics.
: The aim of L. Beria's "new national policy" was to perfect the effective
regime and make it more efficient, he had hoped to attain it by reducing
the number and influence of party bureaucracy in society. In the frames of
the "new national policy" he had never intended to give the Baltic countries
the status of the Eastern-European states. His purpose was rather to inte¬
grate these areas in the framework of a new Baltic special order, never give
372
Summary
them up. L. Beria regarded the former national policy of the central ad¬
ministration of the Russian Empire in the peripheral areas as more flexible,
effective, and what is important in the given context
-
worthy as an exam¬
ple
-
than the policy pursued by the Soviets. Thus, in sum, had L. Beria
maintained his power, it could indeed have led to the establishment of a
new Baltic special order in the Baltic.
The unknown amnesty of
1953:
L. Beria's
rehabilitation plans on the basis of Estonian
SSR
On March
27, 1953,
the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium adopted a
decision whereby an extensive amnesty was declared, on the initiative of
Minister for Interior L. Beria. On the basis of the
1953
amnesty, a total of
1
201 738
prisoners or nearly
54%
of all prisoners
-
most of whom had been
convicted of criminal activity
-
were released from the Gulag camps and
colonies in the Soviet Union. The amnesty also shortened the terms of
many prisoners, and numerous criminal procedures were dropped.
The March amnesty actually affected, to a greater or lesser degree, a
total of
2 695 400
people. L. Beria also planned to carry out, by the end of
1953,
the release of political prisoners. These plans, however, were not
realized, since as a result of a Kremlin power struggle, L. Beria was arrested
and the release of political prisoners was suspended, the issue not being
raised again until
1954.
As of September
10, 1953,
the Estonian
SSR
militia
had registered
9260
amnesty subjects, of whom
7449 (80.4%)
had found
employment. Non-employed dependents made up
1095 (11.8%)
of those
amnestied (incl.
58
students). Therefore, at that time,
716 (7.7%)
of those
amnestied were dependents. One-fifth of all those registered by the militia
was comprised of people registered as living in Tallinn
(1907
amnestied).
Of these,
1480 (77.6%)
had found work, and
257 (13.5%)
were dependents,
with
170
people unemployed
(8.9%).
Tartu had
732
amnestied people and
Pärnu
had
449,
of whom
608 (83.1%)
and
295 (65.7%),
respectively, were
employed, and
107 (14.6%)
and
69 (15.4%)
were dependents.
The
1953
amnesty, which was undoubtedly an important setback for the
Stalinist terror machine, made public the issue of abiding by "socialist
legality". Thus the foundation was laid for the liberalization of legislation in
the
mid-1950s,
and the rehabilitation process was initiated which in
previous historical sources has unfortunately been erroneously associated
only with the name of
N.
Khruschev.
Summary
373
1956
and Problems of the Baltics in Kremlin
The
artide
provides, on the background of the Soviet Union's internal and
external revolutionary events in
1956
(CPSU 20th Congress, events in
Poland and Hungary), an overview of the more important developments
that took place in the Baltic soviet republics during that year, thereby kee¬
ping in mind the questions: how were the Baltic issues reflected in the
corridors of power during that year?
The analysis is based primarily on archival materials that have not been
used up to now (from the Russian Recent History State Archives and the
Estonian National Archives), on recent source publications and studies. The
more important conclusions are:
1.
As regards the CPSU 20th Congress and
N.
Khrushchev's speech
denouncing the personalitycult, it should not be forgotten that this was not
a calculated plan to provide a true assessment of the Stalin era regime. For
Khrushchev this was also a
means to ensure his position of power and to remove the "old guard" from
power.
2.
The fact that the speech exposing the personality cult resulted in such
extensive reaction both in the USSR itself and on the international arena,
was unexpected by the top leadership in the Kremlin. This had not been
taken into account, and subsequently the lost positions started to be
retaken, step by step
-
by muzzling society. Internally this resulted in a
situation where by the end of the year, the implementation of limited
repressions was sanctioned by the party, and in foreign policy, things went
even further
-
at the start of November
1956
Soviet tanks suffocated the
freedom aspirations of the Hungarians.
3.
For the Baltic soviet republics one of the central issues in
1956
was still
the issue of the local language and local officials. It is surprising that the
Kremlin had not by this time thrown aside the "new nationalities" principles
that started to be implemented in
1953,
led by L. Beria, towards the
frontier republics of the empire. Moscow still supported attention being
paid to the local languages and the promotion of national officials to high
positions. Such an approach survived in the Kremlin until
1959,
when the
purgin of the leadership of the Latvian
SSR
was undertaken after it was
accused of nationalism.
4.
The
1956
events in Poland and Hungary were received with extensive
interest in the three Baltic Soviet Republics, especially in Lithuania and
Estonia. The activity in the Baltics was seen in the Kremlin as quite a serious
danger, and at the end of November, the CPSU Central Committee bureau
prepared a memorandum titled "Nationalistic and anti-Soviet manifesta¬
tions in the Baltic Soviet Republics." The events in the Baltics were one of
374
SUMMARY
the impulses tor the application
oť
repressive measures. The repression of
the Hungarian uprising was a clear sign to the Estonians, Latvian and
I-itíumtiiíins
that the »Soviet regime was not going to collapse.
Φ
*
Numerous documents, which more or less relate to the topics discussed, are
published in the second part of' the book. These documents mainly derive
from the archives in Estonia
und
Russia.
Тартуский университет
Кафедра истории Эстонии
Тыну Таннберг
ПОЛИТИКА МОСКВЫ
В РЕСПУБЛИКАХ БАЛТИИ
В ПОСЛЕВОЕННЫЕ ГОДЫ
(1944-1956)
Исследования и документы
ТАКШ 11МУЕК5ПТ
Р К Е 5 8
ОГЛАВЛЕНИЕ
1 Предисловие 7
2 Исследования 13
2 1 Институциональные и номенклатурные механизмы
контроля Москвы в Эстонской ССР в послевоенные годы 13
2 2 Деятельность органов госбезопасности по подавлению
лесного братства в Эстонии в начале 1953 года 62
2 3 Новый курс Л Берии по подавлению движения сопротив
ления в Балтии и в Западной Украине весной 1953 года 78
2 4 Планы Москвы в отношении Эстонии летом 1953 года 106
2 5 Неизвестная амнистия Бериевские планы реабилитации
1953 года на примере Эстонской ССР 121
2 6 1956 год и проблемы Балтии в Кремле 143
3 Документы 177
1 Письмо секретаря ЦК КПЭ Н Каротамма И Сталину,
2 Секретная справка наркома безопасности Эстонской ССР
Б Кумма о «засоренности» школ и средних специальных
учебных заведений Эстонской ССР «антисоветскими
элементами», 3 01 1950 197
3 Справки сектора партийного учета кадров ЦК КПЭ
о национальном составе руководящего аппарата по
состоянию на май и июнь 1953 года 233
4 Секретная справка Отдела 2-Н Министерства внутренних
дел Эстонской ССР о работе органов безопасности по
подавлению движения сопротивления за период 1952—
1953 гг по состоянию на 29 05 1953 г 241
5 Секретное постановление Бюро ЦК КПЭ о недостатках
в трудоустройстве освобожденных по амнистии граждан,
6 Справка министра внутренних дел Эстонской ССР
М Крассмана о ходе амнистии, 3 06 1953 285
7 Справка министра внутренних дел Эстонской ССР М
Крассмана о национальных кадрах и о результатах борьбы
с движением сопротивления в 1944-1953 гг , 4 06 1953 286
8 Секретная справка 4-го отдела Министерства внутренних
дел Эстонской ССР о действиях органов безопасности
по подавлению движения сопротивления в 1944-1945 гг ,
ПРЕДИСЛОВИЕ
Секретные предложения органов контрольной инспекции
СССР по улучшению работы Министерства внутренних дел
Эстонской ССР, 10 06 1953
Приказ министра внутренних дел Эстонской ССР
М Крассмана о ликвидации вооруженного сопротивления,
Информация секретаря ЦК КПЭ Л Аенцмана о трудо
устройстве амнистированных граждан, 19 06 1953
Докладная записка заведующего отделом партийных,
профсоюзных и комсомольских органов ЦК КПСС Е
Громова Н Хрущову, 20 06 1953
Проект постановления ЦК КПСС о недостатках в работе
руководства Эстонской ССР, 20 06 1953
Секретное письмо секретаря ЦК КПЭ И Кэбина в ЦК
КПСС по поводу якобы имевшего место увольнения русских
на предприятиях Таллинна 29 08 1953
Отчет председателя Совета Министров Эстонской ССР А
Мююрисепа о ходе трудоустройства амнистированных
граждан, 12 09 1953
Секретное письмо секретаря ЦК КПЭ И Кэбина в ЦК
КПСС в связи с жалобами на массовые увольнения русских
в Таллинне, 28 09 1953
Информация секретаря ЦК КПЭ И Кэбина в ЦК КПСС
о результатах в области идеологической работы,
заслушанных на III пленуме ЦК КПЭ, 28 09 1953
Секретное донесение секретаря ЦК КПЭ И Кэбина в ЦК
КПСС об общественном настроении в Эстонской ССР
в связи с событиями в Венгрии, 3 11 1956
Справка председателя КГБ Эстонской ССР И Карпова
о явившихся с повинной и легализованных гражданах в
1954-1956 гг , 10 12 1956
Справка председателя КГБ Эстонской ССР И Карпова
о числе лиц, ранее судимых за контрреволюционные
преступления и их трудоустройстве, 19 12 1956
Справка представителей прокуратуры Эстонской ССР, КГБ
ЭССР, Министерства внутренних дел, ЦК КПЭ и Совета
Министров ЭССР „О состоянии работы среди лиц ранее
судимых за контрреволюционные и другие преступления,
Источники и использованная литература
8иттагу |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| any_adam_object_boolean | 1 |
| author | Tannberg, Tõnu 1961- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)135758866 |
| author_facet | Tannberg, Tõnu 1961- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Tannberg, Tõnu 1961- |
| author_variant | t t tt |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV023362663 |
| classification_rvk | ML 7250 ML 7303 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)605480108 (DE-599)BVBBV023362663 |
| discipline | Politologie |
| discipline_str_mv | Politologie |
| era | Geschichte 1944-1956 gnd |
| era_facet | Geschichte 1944-1956 |
| format | Book |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>00000nam a2200000 c 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV023362663</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20121023</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">080625s2008 |||| 00||| rus d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9789949118281</subfield><subfield code="9">978-9949-11-828-1</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)605480108</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV023362663</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">rus</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-521</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-Re13</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ML 7250</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)123210:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ML 7303</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)123217:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">7,41</subfield><subfield code="2">ssgn</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="6">880-01</subfield><subfield code="a">Tannberg, Tõnu</subfield><subfield code="d">1961-</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)135758866</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="6">880-02</subfield><subfield code="a">Politika Moskvy v respublikach Baltii v poslevoennye gody (1944 - 1956)</subfield><subfield code="b">issledovanija i dokumenty</subfield><subfield code="c">Tynu Tannberg. [Red. Tatʹjana Šor]</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Tartu</subfield><subfield code="b">Tartu Univ. Press</subfield><subfield code="c">2008</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">374 S.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Zsfassung in engl. Sprache u.d.T.: Moscow's policy in the union republics of the Baltic during the post-war years (1944 - 1956)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="546" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">In kyrill. Schr., russ.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="648" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Geschichte 1944-1956</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Baltikum</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4004379-4</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Estland</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4015587-0</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Sowjetunion</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4077548-3</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="655" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4135952-5</subfield><subfield code="a">Quelle</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd-content</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Sowjetunion</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4077548-3</subfield><subfield code="D">g</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Estland</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4015587-0</subfield><subfield code="D">g</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="2"><subfield code="a">Baltikum</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4004379-4</subfield><subfield code="D">g</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="3"><subfield code="a">Geschichte 1944-1956</subfield><subfield code="A">z</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="m">Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen</subfield><subfield code="q">application/pdf</subfield><subfield code="u">http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016546080&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA</subfield><subfield code="3">Abstract</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="m">HEBIS Datenaustausch</subfield><subfield code="q">application/pdf</subfield><subfield code="u">http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016546080&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA</subfield><subfield code="3">Inhaltsverzeichnis</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="880" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="6">100-01/(N</subfield><subfield code="a">Таннберг, Тыну</subfield><subfield code="a">ut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="880" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="6">245-02/(N</subfield><subfield code="a">Политика Москвы в республиках Балтии в послевоенные годы (1944 - 1956)</subfield><subfield code="b">исследования и документы</subfield><subfield code="c">Тыну Таннберг. [Ред. Татьяна Шор]</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="940" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="f">sla</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="940" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="n">oe</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="942" ind1="1" ind2="1"><subfield code="c">900</subfield><subfield code="e">22/bsb</subfield><subfield code="f">09044</subfield><subfield code="g">479</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="942" ind1="1" ind2="1"><subfield code="c">909</subfield><subfield code="e">22/bsb</subfield><subfield code="f">09045</subfield><subfield code="g">947.08</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="942" ind1="1" ind2="1"><subfield code="c">909</subfield><subfield code="e">22/bsb</subfield><subfield code="f">09044</subfield><subfield code="g">947.08</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="942" ind1="1" ind2="1"><subfield code="c">900</subfield><subfield code="e">22/bsb</subfield><subfield code="f">09045</subfield><subfield code="g">479</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="943" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016546080</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| genre | (DE-588)4135952-5 Quelle gnd-content |
| genre_facet | Quelle |
| geographic | Baltikum (DE-588)4004379-4 gnd Estland (DE-588)4015587-0 gnd Sowjetunion (DE-588)4077548-3 gnd |
| geographic_facet | Baltikum Estland Sowjetunion |
| id | DE-604.BV023362663 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T21:09:39Z |
| indexdate | 2024-10-30T13:03:53Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9789949118281 |
| language | Russian |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016546080 |
| oclc_num | 605480108 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 DE-521 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR |
| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-521 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR |
| physical | 374 S. |
| publishDate | 2008 |
| publishDateSearch | 2008 |
| publishDateSort | 2008 |
| publisher | Tartu Univ. Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | 880-01 Tannberg, Tõnu 1961- Verfasser (DE-588)135758866 aut 880-02 Politika Moskvy v respublikach Baltii v poslevoennye gody (1944 - 1956) issledovanija i dokumenty Tynu Tannberg. [Red. Tatʹjana Šor] Tartu Tartu Univ. Press 2008 374 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Zsfassung in engl. Sprache u.d.T.: Moscow's policy in the union republics of the Baltic during the post-war years (1944 - 1956) In kyrill. Schr., russ. Geschichte 1944-1956 gnd rswk-swf Baltikum (DE-588)4004379-4 gnd rswk-swf Estland (DE-588)4015587-0 gnd rswk-swf Sowjetunion (DE-588)4077548-3 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4135952-5 Quelle gnd-content Sowjetunion (DE-588)4077548-3 g Estland (DE-588)4015587-0 g Baltikum (DE-588)4004379-4 g Geschichte 1944-1956 z DE-604 Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016546080&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Abstract HEBIS Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016546080&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis 100-01/(N Таннберг, Тыну ut 245-02/(N Политика Москвы в республиках Балтии в послевоенные годы (1944 - 1956) исследования и документы Тыну Таннберг. [Ред. Татьяна Шор] |
| spellingShingle | Tannberg, Tõnu 1961- Politika Moskvy v respublikach Baltii v poslevoennye gody (1944 - 1956) issledovanija i dokumenty |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4004379-4 (DE-588)4015587-0 (DE-588)4077548-3 (DE-588)4135952-5 |
| title | Politika Moskvy v respublikach Baltii v poslevoennye gody (1944 - 1956) issledovanija i dokumenty |
| title_auth | Politika Moskvy v respublikach Baltii v poslevoennye gody (1944 - 1956) issledovanija i dokumenty |
| title_exact_search | Politika Moskvy v respublikach Baltii v poslevoennye gody (1944 - 1956) issledovanija i dokumenty |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Politika Moskvy v respublikach Baltii v poslevoennye gody (1944 - 1956) issledovanija i dokumenty |
| title_full | Politika Moskvy v respublikach Baltii v poslevoennye gody (1944 - 1956) issledovanija i dokumenty Tynu Tannberg. [Red. Tatʹjana Šor] |
| title_fullStr | Politika Moskvy v respublikach Baltii v poslevoennye gody (1944 - 1956) issledovanija i dokumenty Tynu Tannberg. [Red. Tatʹjana Šor] |
| title_full_unstemmed | Politika Moskvy v respublikach Baltii v poslevoennye gody (1944 - 1956) issledovanija i dokumenty Tynu Tannberg. [Red. Tatʹjana Šor] |
| title_short | Politika Moskvy v respublikach Baltii v poslevoennye gody (1944 - 1956) |
| title_sort | politika moskvy v respublikach baltii v poslevoennye gody 1944 1956 issledovanija i dokumenty |
| title_sub | issledovanija i dokumenty |
| topic_facet | Baltikum Estland Sowjetunion Quelle |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016546080&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016546080&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT tannbergtonu politikamoskvyvrespublikachbaltiivposlevoennyegody19441956issledovanijaidokumenty |