Reformatorstvo bez reformi: političeskata ikonomija na bălgarskija komunizăm ; 1963 - 1989
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | Bulgarian |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Sofija
Inst. za Izučavane na Blizkoto Minalo [u.a.]
2008
|
| Ausgabe: | 1. izd. |
| Schriftenreihe: | Poredica Minalo nesvăršeno
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Abstract |
| Beschreibung: | In kyrill. Schr., bulg. - Zsfassung in engl. Sprache |
| Beschreibung: | 315 S. Ill., graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 9789542801986 |
Internformat
MARC
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Reformatorstvo bez reformi |b političeskata ikonomija na bălgarskija komunizăm ; 1963 - 1989 |c Martin Ivanov |
| 250 | |a 1. izd. | ||
| 264 | 1 | |a Sofija |b Inst. za Izučavane na Blizkoto Minalo [u.a.] |c 2008 | |
| 300 | |a 315 S. |b Ill., graph. Darst. | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 0 | |a Poredica Minalo nesvăršeno | |
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| 648 | 7 | |a Geschichte 1963-1989 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
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| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Planwirtschaft |0 (DE-588)4046242-0 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Wirtschaftsreform |0 (DE-588)4066512-4 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 651 | 7 | |a Bulgarien |0 (DE-588)4008866-2 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
| 655 | 7 | |0 (DE-588)4113937-9 |a Hochschulschrift |2 gnd-content | |
| 689 | 0 | 0 | |a Bulgarien |0 (DE-588)4008866-2 |D g |
| 689 | 0 | 1 | |a Planwirtschaft |0 (DE-588)4046242-0 |D s |
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| 689 | 1 | 2 | |a Politische Ökonomie |0 (DE-588)4115586-5 |D s |
| 689 | 1 | 3 | |a Geschichte 1963-1989 |A z |
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| 689 | 2 | 3 | |a Geschichte 1963-1989 |A z |
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| 856 | 4 | 2 | |m Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen |q application/pdf |u http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016507667&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |3 Abstract |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1816873418698522624 |
|---|---|
| adam_text |
СЪДЪРЖАНИЕ
СъдърЖание на английски език
.
.8
Списък на таблиците и диаграмите
.
Благодарности
.
Използвани съкращения
.
Увод
.".
.41
Глава
I
Хронология на реформите
.
Надолу към бездната. Дефицити на класическия ^
сталински модел
.".'. ¿2
„ДВе напред, една назад"
.
нпітіо
ПърВата Вълна.
Нова
система за планиране и ръкоВодстВо на народни ^
стопанство
(1963-1968
г.). Рсформсн
„минимум"
.
Отстъпление от реформите. „Заместители" ^
на промяната
(19684975 г.)
.·*.
"V,"
.
Втората Вълна. НоВият икономически механизъм и „отпускането ^
от началото на 80-те години
(1976-1983
z.)
.
Третата Вълна. Преустройстбото като бторо до
преработено
издание на НИМ.
Юлска концепция
( 1984-1989
г)
.
.
\П
Глава
îl
Анатомия на промените
. [23
Планиране
.
до
Догоборна система
.
до
Стопанска сметка, печалба
.'
\$
Заетост и заплащане на труда
.
К$
Самоуправление, „лична" собетбеност
.
Ценообразуване, Валутни коефициенти,
174
конвертируемост на лева
.""
ш
финансов и банкоВ контрол
.$5
Инвестиционна политика
.
пава
III
В страната на социалистическото
205
благоденствие
.
Глава
IV,
РеволЬция на пролетариата и
228
ре&олЪция на технокрацията
.
Глава
V.
Шестнайсета република. Стопанското сътрудничество
272
със СССР като реформен сурогат
.
292
ЗаклЬчение
.
Литература
.
РезЬме на английски език
. .
CONTENTS
Ust
of Tables and Figures
.7
Acknowledgements
.11
List of Frequently Used Abbreviations
. 13
introduction
. 15
Parti. Chronology ofChanges
.41
Down the Abyss: Deficits of the Classical Stalinist Economy
.41
'Two steps ahead, one back'
.52
The First Wave: The New System of Management,
1961-1968.55
Reforms in Retreat: The Substitutes to the change,
1968-1975 .78
The Second Wave: The New Economic Mechanism and the 'Relaxation'
of Early
1980s, 1976-1983.92
The Third Wave:
Perestroika
as a Second and Improved Edition of
NEM
and 'The July Concept',
1984-1989.104
Partii Anatomy
of Changes
. 123
Planning
.123
Contract System
.142
Self-Supporting Account and Profits
.145
Employment and Wages
.156
Self-governance and 'Personal' Property
.162
Price-Formation, Currency Coefficients and Convertibility of the Lev
.174
Financial and Bank Control
.184
Investment Policy
.195
Partili.
The Country of the 'Socialist Prosperity'
.205
Part IV. Revolution of the Proletariat vs. Revolution of the Technocracy
.228
Part V. Sixteen Republic; Co-operation with the USSR
as a Substitute to (he Reforms
.272
Conclusion
.292
Bibliography
.303
Executive summery
.313
СПИСЪК НА ТАБЛИЦИТЕ И ДИАГРАМИТЕ
Глаба
I.
Хронология на реформите
Диаграма
1.1.
Дефицити и стопански реформи
.42
Таблица
1.1.
НеизползВано работно бреме,
1973-1988
г
.44
Диаграма
1.2,
Естествен прираст на населението, на
1000
души,
1939-1980 3.
60
Таблица
1.2,
Дълбочина на реформите от 60-те години
.76
Таблица
1.3.
Сравнение на реформените програми от края
на 60-те години
6
Източна Ебропа
."
Таблица
1.4.
Индустриални и аграрни отраслови министерства
и/или комитети,
1966-1976
г
.
°у
Таблица
1.5.
Незавършено строителство
.
y¿-
Глава
II.
Анатомия на промените
Таблица
2.1.
Задължителни планови показатели, нормативи и лимити
.130-132
Диаграми
2.1
до
2.8.
Технология на планирането,
1966-1989
г.
Диаграма
2.1. 1966
г.,
Основни положения на Новата система за планиране и
ръководство на народното стопанство
.·."
Диаграма
2.2. 1968
г.,
Наредба за планирането
.
^
Диаграма
2.3. 1970
г.,
Наредба за планирането
.*■
Диаграма
2.4. 1975
г.,
Правилник за планирането
.
^'
Диаграма
2.5. 1982
г.,
Правилник за икономическия механизъм
.
™
Диазрама
2.6. 1987
г.,
Правилник за стопанската дейност
.
13У
Диаграма
2.7. 1987
г.,
Изменение на Правилника за стопанската дейност
(декември)
.
т
Диаграма
2.S.
1989
г., Указ
за стопанска дейност
.
Таблица
2.2.
Неустойки при виновно неизпълнение
на договорните задълЖения
.
Т;
Таблица
2.3.
Балансова печалба на
100
л(Ј.
производствени фондове, лв
.
^о
Таблица
2.4.
Предоставяни дотации и
біодасетни
субсидии
.
1
Диаграми
2.9.
до
2.14.
Схема за разпределение на печалбата,
1966-1989
г.
Диаграма
2.9.
Наредба за образуване и разпределение на печалбата,
1968
г
.
Ј52
Диазрама
2.10.
Наредба за образуване и разпределение на печалбата,
1970
г
.152
Диаграма
2.11.
Изменение на Наредба за образуване и разпределение
на печалбата,
1971
г
.
^
Диаграма
2.12.
Изменение Наредба за образуване и разпределение
на печалбата,
1973
г
.;.
153
Диаграма
2.13.
Правилник за стопанската дейност,
1987
г
.
¡^
Диаграма
2.14.
Указ
№ 56
за стопанската дейност,
1989
г
. ■
Таблица
2.5.
Квалификационни степени
по Единната квалификационна скала,
1988-1989
г
.
159
Таблица
2.6.
Централно определяни цени на отделни стоки и услуги
или групи от тях, брой
. 1'°
Таблица
2.7.
Валутни курсове и коефициенти,
1985-1988- .
181
г.
ГлаВа
III.
В страната
іш
социалистическото благоденствие
Таблица
3,1.
Посетили България чуЖденци и пътували зад граница българи,
1960-1988 2.212
Таблица
3.2.
Разпределение на националния доход,
1952-1988
г
.216
Таблица
3.3.
Изпълнение на Декемврийската програма
.219
Таблица
3.4.
Внос на автомобили,
1956-1988
z
.222
Глава
IV.
Революция на пролетариата и
реВоліоция на
технокрацията
Таблица
4.1.
Износ на организационна и изчислителна техника,
1980-1989
г., млн. л6.,
%.246
Глава
V.
Шестнайсета република* Стопанското еьтрудничеетбо
със СССР като реформен сурогат
Диаграма
5.1.
Диференциал меЖду събетските и световните цени
на петрола,
8
конбертируеми рубли,
1970-1983
г
.275
Таблица
5.1.
Темп на нарастване вноса на основни суровини от СССР
по петилетки,
% . 276
Таблица
5.2.
Внос на суров петрол
от НРБ по
дърЖави,
хил.
m,
1974-1990
г.
. 276
Таблица
5.3.
Български капиталовложения за изграЖдането на „Ямбург"
и „Кривой
рог",
мли.
преВ. рубли
.280
Таблица
5.4.
Класация на дърЖабите от СИВ според размера на съветската
помощ
.285
Таблица
5.5,
Годишни косвени птьргобски субсидии от СССР на глава от
населението, В
1980
щ.
g
.289
Заключение
Диаграма
6.1.
Темп на растеЖ на българския
ВВП на глава от
населението,
1951-1989
z
.297
Таблица
6.1.
Оценки за размера на брутния
външен публичен дълг на България,
1979-1989
г., млн. щ.
g.
298
EXECUTIVE
SUMMERY
The ever-greater tensions at macro level together with the slowing rate of
economic growth were among the chief factors motivating the attempt in the
1960s
to radically revise the communist model of development. For the party leadership it
was becoming obvious that the classical command economy was drawing near the
limits of its potential. In the years between
1963
and
1966
the Politburo experimented
with a strategy, which was designed to ensure the switch from extensive to intensive
growth. It was not long, however, before the Bulgarian Communist Party's (BCP)
enthusiasm for reforms melted away. By the end of the
1960s
the first Bulgarian
economic reform has been "supplemented" by a substitutes that seemed far more
acceptable from an ideological point of view. The "unique cooperation" with the
Soviet Union, the creation of giant economic units and the technological innovation
Were soon inserted into the reform blueprint. All the three policies were commonly
employed in East Europe as a surrogate for reforms. As far as the interrelations with
the USSR and the "scientific-technological revolution" were concerned, however,
Bulgaria did its best to "out do" all the other communist states.
There would be strong reasons to expect that, having put immense part of its
energy into nourishing a cordial relationship withMoscow and into the accomplishment
of technological modernization, the BCP would manifest diminishing enthusiasm
for reforms. Nevertheless, if we can trust the authoritative Western assessments, the
Bulgarian blueprint was more liberal than the changes foreseen by other COMECON
countries. In fact both in the
1960s
and in the
1980s
the Bulgarian reform package
ranked immediately after Hungarian and Czech new economic mechanism.
Even though more liberal the reform package was far from what the economy
actually needed to overcome the in-built deficits of the system. Due to its heavy
ideological impediments Bulgarian communist leadership was not prepared to put
in question the foundations of the Stalinist economy. Accumulated macro economic
tensions were deciphered by Politburo as reparable defects, which could be "corrected"
by perfecting the economic engine. At no instant were the reforms considered by the
BCP elite as an alternative to the orthodox communist matrix. The aim was not to
dismantle but to optimise the classical system,
For obvious reasons the Politburo did not, and could not, have the insight that
the old model was irreparable. With the problem zones thus conceived (as temporary,
reparable defects) the strategy chosen by BCP seemed to be reasonable and promising.
The programme envisaged reparation of the rustiest economic mechanisms and the
duplication of these corrections with several substitutes: the cooperation with the
USSR, "scientific and technological revolution" and economic concentration. There
was a real danger that those secondary lines of development might turn into leading
ones. Nevertheless BCP managed to keep the engine of reforms going, even though at
slow speed. The combination chosen by the regime was not just a promise. For some
time in the
1960s,
early
1970s
and in the beginning of the
1980s
it successfully got
over the immediate problems (the debt crisis, the petrol shock) avoiding the switch to
negative or even to zero growth.
A historical appreciation of the reform agenda requires that they be assessed
against the authentic aims of the regime. Communist leadership considered economic
313
changes
solely in view of preserving its position of power. This, however, trapped
the Politburo into an unenviable position: to reconcile two tasks incompatible by
nature. The dilemma of reforms was how to decentralize economic processes without
decentralizing Party's control over them. Or, as the long-lived Bulgarian communist
leader Todor Zhivkov frankly acknowledged: "We are trying to do so, as to preserve
some of the power for us too and not to find ourselves out of the game."
All the time the Party leadership felt as if it was carrying out a controlled
experiment, in which its principle task was to keep its eye on what was happening in
the test-tube. Given this aim, the preservation of political stability had to remain the
primary task while the "perfection of economic mechanisms" was pursued, as far it
was not contradicting the leadership's effort to keep power. That is why the Politburo
was inclined to choose the "remedies" from the traditional communist medicine-
chest. This, indeed, meant that BCP was addressing the external symptoms and not
the intrinsic causes of the economic deficits.
However rational within its fictitious world, the BCP's strategy proved
incapable or reviving the rusty economic system. Although more liberal then some
other reorganization programmes of the COMECOM countries, Bulgarian reform did
not dispose of the necessary instruments to diminish the macro economic tensions
and to alleviate the inborn defects of the system.
Figure
1.
Per Capita Rate of GNP Growth,
1951-1989
10
Source: Maddison Historical Statistics.
The figure underlines the narrow temporal horizon that the applied economic
strategy had. Since
1975
the rate of growth fell markedly (the black line on the
diagram, showing the 5-years moving averages). In addition the economy became
mired in external debt. During six (more then half of the period) of the years between
1977
and
1989
Bulgaria experienced a negative or zero growth. Moreover, as the time
314
passed the crisis aggravated. From
3.6
per cent for the sixth five-year-period
( 1970—
1975)
in the next three five year periods it
fel]
to
0.7, 0,58
and
-0.86%
respectively.
What was BCP's reaction to the deteriorating results of its anti-crisis strategy?
Since the
mid-1970s
the Politburo speeded up the technological modernization,
undertook even closer rapprochement with the Soviet Union and only as last resort
initiated a moderate reform programme. Neither the integration with Moscow nor
the "scientific and technological revolution" was able to make amends Tor the lack of
radical reform in the economy. The three decades of inconsistent economic experiments
proved how unsusceptible to corrections the classical system was. The few pro-market
implants have soon been rejected by the unreformed economic organism.
As the crisis deepened and the social and economic mechanisms were ever
more visibly corroded, reforms became inevitable. Since the
mid-1980s
the BCP was
already aware that, in order to keep the power, it had to undertake a more radical
transformation of economy. This brought the third wave of reform to life. Despite
of this sudden selfish interest of the communist elite in the accomplishment of the
transition, ideological impediments remained. Even in those last years of the regime
the armoured ideological strait jacket quieted any attempt for a more profound
change. As a result even the most radical reforms were like a palliative diet rather
then a surgery to cut out the economic tumours. Even with its most liberal reforms
(the creation of joint-stock companies) the Party kept striving to correct and perfect
the old classical model, and certainly not to dismantle it.
Even in its most radical edition (Edict No.
56)
the Bulgarian reform programme
was not able to throw off the burden of ideology. Changes, although extremely
limited, have been treated as a temporary retreat. Hope lived on that the situation
was, perhaps, going to "turn the other way round" and then, as in the years of the
Soviet
NEP,
the gains of the "profiteers" would be confiscated by the state. However,
the state had to preserve its control on the economy. Only the responsibility for
overcoming economic deficiencies and the supply of commodities for the deficit
market was to be decentralized.
Practiced for nearly three decades cosmetic optimisation proved to have no
future. This demonstrates the ultimate insusceptibility to reforms of the communist
economic system. Sooner or later, all changes run against the limits of admissibility
imposed by the Marxist-Leninist matrix. This was the place, at the border between
the market and the plan where the reform enthusiasm of "enlightened" party elites
faded away.
315 |
| adam_txt |
СЪДЪРЖАНИЕ
СъдърЖание на английски език
.
.8
Списък на таблиците и диаграмите
.
Благодарности
.
Използвани съкращения
.
Увод
.".
.41
Глава
I
Хронология на реформите
.
Надолу към бездната. Дефицити на класическия ^
сталински модел
.".'. ¿2
„ДВе напред, една назад"
.
нпітіо
ПърВата Вълна.
Нова
система за планиране и ръкоВодстВо на народни ^
стопанство
(1963-1968
г.). Рсформсн
„минимум"
.
Отстъпление от реформите. „Заместители" ^
на промяната
(19684975 г.)
.·*.
"V,"
.
Втората Вълна. НоВият икономически механизъм и „отпускането ^
от началото на 80-те години
(1976-1983
z.)
.
Третата Вълна. Преустройстбото като бторо до
преработено
издание на НИМ.
Юлска концепция
( 1984-1989
г)
.
.
\П
Глава
îl
Анатомия на промените
. [23
Планиране
.
до
Догоборна система
.
до
Стопанска сметка, печалба
.'
\$
Заетост и заплащане на труда
.
К$
Самоуправление, „лична" собетбеност
.
Ценообразуване, Валутни коефициенти,
174
конвертируемост на лева
.""
ш
финансов и банкоВ контрол
.$5
Инвестиционна политика
.
пава
III
В страната на социалистическото
205
благоденствие
.
Глава
IV,
РеволЬция на пролетариата и
228
ре&олЪция на технокрацията
.
Глава
V.
Шестнайсета република. Стопанското сътрудничество
272
със СССР като реформен сурогат
.
292
ЗаклЬчение
.
Литература
.
РезЬме на английски език
. .
CONTENTS
Ust
of Tables and Figures
.7
Acknowledgements
.11
List of Frequently Used Abbreviations
. 13
introduction
. 15
Parti. Chronology ofChanges
.41
Down the Abyss: Deficits of the Classical Stalinist Economy
.41
'Two steps ahead, one back'
.52
The First Wave: The New System of Management,
1961-1968.55
Reforms in Retreat: The Substitutes to the change,
1968-1975 .78
The Second Wave: The New Economic Mechanism and the 'Relaxation'
of Early
1980s, 1976-1983.92
The Third Wave:
Perestroika
as a Second and Improved Edition of
NEM
and 'The July Concept',
1984-1989.104
Partii Anatomy
of Changes
. 123
Planning
.123
Contract System
.142
Self-Supporting Account and Profits
.145
Employment and Wages
.156
Self-governance and 'Personal' Property
.162
Price-Formation, Currency Coefficients and Convertibility of the Lev
.174
Financial and Bank Control
.184
Investment Policy
.195
Partili.
The Country of the 'Socialist Prosperity'
.205
Part IV. Revolution of the Proletariat vs. Revolution of the Technocracy
.228
Part V. Sixteen Republic; Co-operation with the USSR
as a Substitute to (he Reforms
.272
Conclusion
.292
Bibliography
.303
Executive summery
.313
СПИСЪК НА ТАБЛИЦИТЕ И ДИАГРАМИТЕ
Глаба
I.
Хронология на реформите
Диаграма
1.1.
Дефицити и стопански реформи
.42
Таблица
1.1.
НеизползВано работно бреме,
1973-1988
г
.44
Диаграма
1.2,
Естествен прираст на населението, на
1000
души,
1939-1980 3.
60
Таблица
1.2,
Дълбочина на реформите от 60-те години
.76
Таблица
1.3.
Сравнение на реформените програми от края
на 60-те години
6
Източна Ебропа
."
Таблица
1.4.
Индустриални и аграрни отраслови министерства
и/или комитети,
1966-1976
г
.
°у
Таблица
1.5.
Незавършено строителство
.
y¿-
Глава
II.
Анатомия на промените
Таблица
2.1.
Задължителни планови показатели, нормативи и лимити
.130-132
Диаграми
2.1
до
2.8.
Технология на планирането,
1966-1989
г.
Диаграма
2.1. 1966
г.,
Основни положения на Новата система за планиране и
ръководство на народното стопанство
.·."
Диаграма
2.2. 1968
г.,
Наредба за планирането
.
^
Диаграма
2.3. 1970
г.,
Наредба за планирането
.*■
Диаграма
2.4. 1975
г.,
Правилник за планирането
.
^'
Диаграма
2.5. 1982
г.,
Правилник за икономическия механизъм
.
™
Диазрама
2.6. 1987
г.,
Правилник за стопанската дейност
.
13У
Диаграма
2.7. 1987
г.,
Изменение на Правилника за стопанската дейност
(декември)
.
т
Диаграма
2.S.
1989
г., Указ
за стопанска дейност
.
Таблица
2.2.
Неустойки при виновно неизпълнение
на договорните задълЖения
.
Т;
Таблица
2.3.
Балансова печалба на
100
л(Ј.
производствени фондове, лв
.
^о
Таблица
2.4.
Предоставяни дотации и
біодасетни
субсидии
.
1
Диаграми
2.9.
до
2.14.
Схема за разпределение на печалбата,
1966-1989
г.
Диаграма
2.9.
Наредба за образуване и разпределение на печалбата,
1968
г
.
Ј52
Диазрама
2.10.
Наредба за образуване и разпределение на печалбата,
1970
г
.152
Диаграма
2.11.
Изменение на Наредба за образуване и разпределение
на печалбата,
1971
г
.
^
Диаграма
2.12.
Изменение Наредба за образуване и разпределение
на печалбата,
1973
г
.;.
153
Диаграма
2.13.
Правилник за стопанската дейност,
1987
г
.
¡^
Диаграма
2.14.
Указ
№ 56
за стопанската дейност,
1989
г
. ■
Таблица
2.5.
Квалификационни степени
по Единната квалификационна скала,
1988-1989
г
.
159
Таблица
2.6.
Централно определяни цени на отделни стоки и услуги
или групи от тях, брой
. 1'°
Таблица
2.7.
Валутни курсове и коефициенти,
1985-1988- .
181
г.
ГлаВа
III.
В страната
іш
социалистическото благоденствие
Таблица
3,1.
Посетили България чуЖденци и пътували зад граница българи,
1960-1988 2.212
Таблица
3.2.
Разпределение на националния доход,
1952-1988
г
.216
Таблица
3.3.
Изпълнение на Декемврийската програма
.219
Таблица
3.4.
Внос на автомобили,
1956-1988
z
.222
Глава
IV.
Революция на пролетариата и
реВоліоция на
технокрацията
Таблица
4.1.
Износ на организационна и изчислителна техника,
1980-1989
г., млн. л6.,
%.246
Глава
V.
Шестнайсета република* Стопанското еьтрудничеетбо
със СССР като реформен сурогат
Диаграма
5.1.
Диференциал меЖду събетските и световните цени
на петрола,
8
конбертируеми рубли,
1970-1983
г
.275
Таблица
5.1.
Темп на нарастване вноса на основни суровини от СССР
по петилетки,
% . 276
Таблица
5.2.
Внос на суров петрол
от НРБ по
дърЖави,
хил.
m,
1974-1990
г.
. 276
Таблица
5.3.
Български капиталовложения за изграЖдането на „Ямбург"
и „Кривой
рог",
мли.
преВ. рубли
.280
Таблица
5.4.
Класация на дърЖабите от СИВ според размера на съветската
помощ
.285
Таблица
5.5,
Годишни косвени птьргобски субсидии от СССР на глава от
населението, В
1980
щ.
g
.289
Заключение
Диаграма
6.1.
Темп на растеЖ на българския
ВВП на глава от
населението,
1951-1989
z
.297
Таблица
6.1.
Оценки за размера на брутния
външен публичен дълг на България,
1979-1989
г., млн. щ.
g.
298
EXECUTIVE
SUMMERY
The ever-greater tensions at macro level together with the slowing rate of
economic growth were among the chief factors motivating the attempt in the
1960s
to radically revise the communist model of development. For the party leadership it
was becoming obvious that the classical command economy was drawing near the
limits of its potential. In the years between
1963
and
1966
the Politburo experimented
with a strategy, which was designed to ensure the switch from extensive to intensive
growth. It was not long, however, before the Bulgarian Communist Party's (BCP)
enthusiasm for reforms melted away. By the end of the
1960s
the first Bulgarian
economic reform has been "supplemented" by a substitutes that seemed far more
acceptable from an ideological point of view. The "unique cooperation" with the
Soviet Union, the creation of giant economic units and the technological innovation
Were soon inserted into the reform blueprint. All the three policies were commonly
employed in East Europe as a surrogate for reforms. As far as the interrelations with
the USSR and the "scientific-technological revolution" were concerned, however,
Bulgaria did its best to "out do" all the other communist states.
There would be strong reasons to expect that, having put immense part of its
energy into nourishing a cordial relationship withMoscow and into the accomplishment
of technological modernization, the BCP would manifest diminishing enthusiasm
for reforms. Nevertheless, if we can trust the authoritative Western assessments, the
Bulgarian blueprint was more liberal than the changes foreseen by other COMECON
countries. In fact both in the
1960s
and in the
1980s
the Bulgarian reform package
ranked immediately after Hungarian and Czech new economic mechanism.
Even though more liberal the reform package was far from what the economy
actually needed to overcome the in-built deficits of the system. Due to its heavy
ideological impediments Bulgarian communist leadership was not prepared to put
in question the foundations of the Stalinist economy. Accumulated macro economic
tensions were deciphered by Politburo as reparable defects, which could be "corrected"
by perfecting the economic engine. At no instant were the reforms considered by the
BCP elite as an alternative to the orthodox communist matrix. The aim was not to
dismantle but to optimise the classical system,
For obvious reasons the Politburo did not, and could not, have the insight that
the old model was irreparable. With the problem zones thus conceived (as temporary,
reparable defects) the strategy chosen by BCP seemed to be reasonable and promising.
The programme envisaged reparation of the rustiest economic mechanisms and the
duplication of these corrections with several substitutes: the cooperation with the
USSR, "scientific and technological revolution" and economic concentration. There
was a real danger that those secondary lines of development might turn into leading
ones. Nevertheless BCP managed to keep the engine of reforms going, even though at
slow speed. The combination chosen by the regime was not just a promise. For some
time in the
1960s,
early
1970s
and in the beginning of the
1980s
it successfully got
over the immediate problems (the debt crisis, the petrol shock) avoiding the switch to
negative or even to zero growth.
A historical appreciation of the reform agenda requires that they be assessed
against the authentic aims of the regime. Communist leadership considered economic
313
changes
solely in view of preserving its position of power. This, however, trapped
the Politburo into an unenviable position: to reconcile two tasks incompatible by
nature. The dilemma of reforms was how to decentralize economic processes without
decentralizing Party's control over them. Or, as the long-lived Bulgarian communist
leader Todor Zhivkov frankly acknowledged: "We are trying to do so, as to preserve
some of the power for us too and not to find ourselves out of the game."
All the time the Party leadership felt as if it was carrying out a controlled
experiment, in which its principle task was to keep its eye on what was happening in
the test-tube. Given this aim, the preservation of political stability had to remain the
primary task while the "perfection of economic mechanisms" was pursued, as far it
was not contradicting the leadership's effort to keep power. That is why the Politburo
was inclined to choose the "remedies" from the traditional communist medicine-
chest. This, indeed, meant that BCP was addressing the external symptoms and not
the intrinsic causes of the economic deficits.
However rational within its fictitious world, the BCP's strategy proved
incapable or reviving the rusty economic system. Although more liberal then some
other reorganization programmes of the COMECOM countries, Bulgarian reform did
not dispose of the necessary instruments to diminish the macro economic tensions
and to alleviate the inborn defects of the system.
Figure
1.
Per Capita Rate of GNP Growth,
1951-1989
10
Source: Maddison Historical Statistics.
The figure underlines the narrow temporal horizon that the applied economic
strategy had. Since
1975
the rate of growth fell markedly (the black line on the
diagram, showing the 5-years moving averages). In addition the economy became
mired in external debt. During six (more then half of the period) of the years between
1977
and
1989
Bulgaria experienced a negative or zero growth. Moreover, as the time
314
passed the crisis aggravated. From
3.6
per cent for the sixth five-year-period
( 1970—
1975)
in the next three five year periods it
fel]
to
0.7, 0,58
and
-0.86%
respectively.
What was BCP's reaction to the deteriorating results of its anti-crisis strategy?
Since the
mid-1970s
the Politburo speeded up the technological modernization,
undertook even closer rapprochement with the Soviet Union and only as last resort
initiated a moderate reform programme. Neither the integration with Moscow nor
the "scientific and technological revolution" was able to make amends Tor the lack of
radical reform in the economy. The three decades of inconsistent economic experiments
proved how unsusceptible to corrections the classical system was. The few pro-market
implants have soon been rejected by the unreformed economic organism.
As the crisis deepened and the social and economic mechanisms were ever
more visibly corroded, reforms became inevitable. Since the
mid-1980s
the BCP was
already aware that, in order to keep the power, it had to undertake a more radical
transformation of economy. This brought the third wave of reform to life. Despite
of this sudden selfish interest of the communist elite in the accomplishment of the
transition, ideological impediments remained. Even in those last years of the regime
the armoured ideological strait jacket quieted any attempt for a more profound
change. As a result even the most radical reforms were like a palliative diet rather
then a surgery to cut out the economic tumours. Even with its most liberal reforms
(the creation of joint-stock companies) the Party kept striving to correct and perfect
the old classical model, and certainly not to dismantle it.
Even in its most radical edition (Edict No.
56)
the Bulgarian reform programme
was not able to throw off the burden of ideology. Changes, although extremely
limited, have been treated as a temporary retreat. Hope lived on that the situation
was, perhaps, going to "turn the other way round" and then, as in the years of the
Soviet
NEP,
the gains of the "profiteers" would be confiscated by the state. However,
the state had to preserve its control on the economy. Only the responsibility for
overcoming economic deficiencies and the supply of commodities for the deficit
market was to be decentralized.
Practiced for nearly three decades cosmetic optimisation proved to have no
future. This demonstrates the ultimate insusceptibility to reforms of the communist
economic system. Sooner or later, all changes run against the limits of admissibility
imposed by the Marxist-Leninist matrix. This was the place, at the border between
the market and the plan where the reform enthusiasm of "enlightened" party elites
faded away.
315 |
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| author | Ivanov, Martin Ivanov 1970- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)135635586 |
| author_facet | Ivanov, Martin Ivanov 1970- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Ivanov, Martin Ivanov 1970- |
| author_variant | m i i mi mii |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV023323616 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)239367926 (DE-599)BVBBV023323616 |
| edition | 1. izd. |
| era | Geschichte 1963-1989 gnd |
| era_facet | Geschichte 1963-1989 |
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| id | DE-604.BV023323616 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T20:54:38Z |
| indexdate | 2024-11-27T11:05:13Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9789542801986 |
| language | Bulgarian |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016507667 |
| oclc_num | 239367926 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR |
| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR |
| physical | 315 S. Ill., graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 2008 |
| publishDateSearch | 2008 |
| publishDateSort | 2008 |
| publisher | Inst. za Izučavane na Blizkoto Minalo [u.a.] |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Poredica Minalo nesvăršeno |
| spelling | Ivanov, Martin Ivanov 1970- Verfasser (DE-588)135635586 aut Reformatorstvo bez reformi političeskata ikonomija na bălgarskija komunizăm ; 1963 - 1989 Martin Ivanov 1. izd. Sofija Inst. za Izučavane na Blizkoto Minalo [u.a.] 2008 315 S. Ill., graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Poredica Minalo nesvăršeno In kyrill. Schr., bulg. - Zsfassung in engl. Sprache Geschichte 1963-1989 gnd rswk-swf Wirtschaftssystem (DE-588)4117663-7 gnd rswk-swf Politische Ökonomie (DE-588)4115586-5 gnd rswk-swf Planwirtschaft (DE-588)4046242-0 gnd rswk-swf Wirtschaftsreform (DE-588)4066512-4 gnd rswk-swf Bulgarien (DE-588)4008866-2 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4113937-9 Hochschulschrift gnd-content Bulgarien (DE-588)4008866-2 g Planwirtschaft (DE-588)4046242-0 s Geschichte 1963-1989 z DE-604 Wirtschaftsreform (DE-588)4066512-4 s Politische Ökonomie (DE-588)4115586-5 s Wirtschaftssystem (DE-588)4117663-7 s Digitalisierung BSBMuenchen application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016507667&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016507667&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Abstract |
| spellingShingle | Ivanov, Martin Ivanov 1970- Reformatorstvo bez reformi političeskata ikonomija na bălgarskija komunizăm ; 1963 - 1989 Wirtschaftssystem (DE-588)4117663-7 gnd Politische Ökonomie (DE-588)4115586-5 gnd Planwirtschaft (DE-588)4046242-0 gnd Wirtschaftsreform (DE-588)4066512-4 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4117663-7 (DE-588)4115586-5 (DE-588)4046242-0 (DE-588)4066512-4 (DE-588)4008866-2 (DE-588)4113937-9 |
| title | Reformatorstvo bez reformi političeskata ikonomija na bălgarskija komunizăm ; 1963 - 1989 |
| title_auth | Reformatorstvo bez reformi političeskata ikonomija na bălgarskija komunizăm ; 1963 - 1989 |
| title_exact_search | Reformatorstvo bez reformi političeskata ikonomija na bălgarskija komunizăm ; 1963 - 1989 |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Reformatorstvo bez reformi političeskata ikonomija na bălgarskija komunizăm ; 1963 - 1989 |
| title_full | Reformatorstvo bez reformi političeskata ikonomija na bălgarskija komunizăm ; 1963 - 1989 Martin Ivanov |
| title_fullStr | Reformatorstvo bez reformi političeskata ikonomija na bălgarskija komunizăm ; 1963 - 1989 Martin Ivanov |
| title_full_unstemmed | Reformatorstvo bez reformi političeskata ikonomija na bălgarskija komunizăm ; 1963 - 1989 Martin Ivanov |
| title_short | Reformatorstvo bez reformi |
| title_sort | reformatorstvo bez reformi politiceskata ikonomija na balgarskija komunizam 1963 1989 |
| title_sub | političeskata ikonomija na bălgarskija komunizăm ; 1963 - 1989 |
| topic | Wirtschaftssystem (DE-588)4117663-7 gnd Politische Ökonomie (DE-588)4115586-5 gnd Planwirtschaft (DE-588)4046242-0 gnd Wirtschaftsreform (DE-588)4066512-4 gnd |
| topic_facet | Wirtschaftssystem Politische Ökonomie Planwirtschaft Wirtschaftsreform Bulgarien Hochschulschrift |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016507667&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016507667&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT ivanovmartinivanov reformatorstvobezreformipoliticeskataikonomijanabalgarskijakomunizam19631989 |