Delegation in the regulatory state: independent regulatory agencies in Western Europe

Working from data of transnational depth and breadth, the author concludes that policy makers delegate in order to tighten the credibility of policy commitments and to tie the hands of future ministers who may have different preferences.

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser: Gilardi, Fabrizio (VerfasserIn)
Format: Buch
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Cheltenham Elgar 2008
Schlagworte:
Zusammenfassung:Working from data of transnational depth and breadth, the author concludes that policy makers delegate in order to tighten the credibility of policy commitments and to tie the hands of future ministers who may have different preferences.
Beschreibung:Includes bibliographical references (p. 155-180) and index
Introduction -- The institutional foundations of the regulatory state -- Delegation to independent regulatory agencies : credibility, political uncertainty, and veto players -- The formal independence of regulators : empirical analysis -- Interdependent delegation : the diffusion of independent regulatory agencies -- The diffusion of independent regulatory agencies : empirical analysis -- Conclusion -- Appendices
Beschreibung:XII, 186 S. Ill. 25 cm
ISBN:9781847204479
1847204473

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