Making the law explicit: the normativity of legal argumentation
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English German |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford [u.a.]
Hart
2008
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| Schriftenreihe: | European Academy of Legal Theory monograph series
7 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | XVI, 303 S. |
| ISBN: | 9781841134918 1841134910 |
Internformat
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| 240 | 1 | 0 | |a Theorie der Wortlautgrenze |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Making the law explicit |b the normativity of legal argumentation |c Matthias Klatt |
| 264 | 1 | |a Oxford [u.a.] |b Hart |c 2008 | |
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| 490 | 1 | |a European Academy of Legal Theory monograph series |v 7 | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Law / Methodology | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Philosophie | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Recht | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Sprache | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Language and languages |x Philosophy | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Law |x Language | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Law |x Methodology | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Semantics (Law) | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Semantics (Philosophy) | |
| 830 | 0 | |a European Academy of Legal Theory monograph series |v 7 |w (DE-604)BV039536633 |9 7 | |
| 856 | 4 | 2 | |m Digitalisierung UB Bayreuth - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment |q application/pdf |u http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016494005&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |3 Inhaltsverzeichnis |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804137642829283328 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | Table
of Contents
Preface
vii
Introduction
1
I. The Doctrine of the Limits of the Wording
4
A. Interpretation as a Legal Method
4
B. Judicial Development of the Law
5
С
Why the Differentiation Matters
6
II. Interpretation and Invention in English Legal Reasoning
7
A. Statutory Interpretation and Democracy
7
(i) The Purposive Versus the Literal Approach
7
(ii) Law-Applying Versus Law-Making
9
(iii)
The Missing Method: Judicial Development of the Law
12
B. Human Rights Act: What Is Possible?
13
C. Result
14
III. Towards a Common European Approach
15
IV. The Possibility of the Rule of Law Defended
18
V. The Sceptical Challenge: Indeterminacy and Vagueness
19
A. The Concept of Indeterminacy
20
B. Vagueness as Boundarylessness
20
(i) Higher-order Vagueness
21
(ii) The Significance of Interpretation in the Law
22
C. Scepticism in Law
22
VI. The Rationality and Objectivity of Legal Reasoning
23
A. Justification, Rationality and Legitimacy
24
B. The Dworkin-Fish Controversy
25
C. B Semantics versus
KP
Semantics
26
D. The Objectivity of Law Defended
27
VII.
At a Glance
27
A. General Approach
27
B. Chapter
1 28
C. Chapter
2 29
D. Chapter
3 31
x
Table of Contents
Chapter
1:
The Doctrine of the Limits of the Wording
33
I. The Limits of the Wording in Hermeneutic Legal Theory
33
A. The Reception of Ontological Hermeneutics in Legal Theory
33
(i) The Limits of the Wording and Pre-Judgements
35
(a) Ontological Prerequisites for the Understanding of
Normative Texts
35
(b) Significance for the Application of Law in General
36
(c) Significance for the Limits of the Wording
37
(ii) Limits of the Wording and Typology
40
(iii)
The Limits of the Wording and the
Analogicity
of
Language
42
B. Hermeneutics and Legal Interpretation
43
II. The Limits of the Wording in Analytic Legal Theory
44
A. The Clarification of the Limits of the Wording by Koch,
Rüßmann,
and
Herberger
44
(і)
Establishing and Assigning Meaning
45
(ii) Classification of Unclear Usage Rules
46
(a) Ambiguity
47
(b) Inconsistency
47
(c) Vagueness
48
(iii)
The Limits of the Wording According to Koch,
Rüßmann,
and
Herberger
48
B.
The Role of the Limits of the Wording in Alexy s Theory
of Legal Argumentation
50
(Ї)
The Discursive Character of Interpretation
50
(ii) Main Features of the Theory of Legal Argumentation
51
(a) Internal Justification and the Word Usage Rule
51
(b) External Justification and Semantic Arguments
52
III. The Deconstructivistic Challenge of the Structuring Legal Theory
54
A. Basic Premises of Structuring Legal Theory
54
B. Criticism of New Hermeneutics
56
C. Criticism of the Theory of Legal Reasoning According to
Koch and
Rüßmann 56
Ό.
Criticism of Alexy s Theory of Legal Argumentation
58
E. Structuring Legal Theory and the Limits of the Wording
59
(i) The Limits of the Wording as a Result of the
Concrétisation
of Rules
59
(ii) Binding Effects of Legal Culture
60
(iii)
The Limits of the Wording as the Limits of the
Normative Program
62
(iv)
The Role of the Limits of the Normative Program
63
Table
of Contents
xi
F.
Structuring Legal Theory
—
Summary
63
TV. The Results of the First Chapter
64
A. State of Research
64
(i) The Hermeneutic Position
65
(a) Pre-Judgements and Typology
65
(b) Arguments in Support of the Hermeneutic Position
65
(1)
Argument of
О
ntological Hermeneutics
65
(2)
Argument of
Analogicity
66
(3)
Argument of Procedural Correctness
66
(4)
Argument of Normative Necessity
66
(ii) The Analytic Position
66
(a) Establishing and Assigning Meaning
66
(b) Arguments for the Analytic Viewpoint
67
(1)
Argument of Clear Cases
61
(2)
Argument of the Empirical Discernibility of
Meaning
61
(3)
Argument of Possible Corrections
68
(iii)
The Structuring Legal Theory Position
68
(a) Putting Rules in Specific Terms and the Limits of
the Normative Program
68
(b) Arguments in Support of Structuring Legal Theory
68
(1)
Argument of the Indefiniteness of the Legal Text
68
(2)
Argument of Legal Culture
68
(iv)
Arguments Against the Limits of the Wording
69
(a) Argument of Practical Ineffectiveness
69
(b) Argument of Necessary Failure
69
(c) Argument of the Lacking Normative Necessity
69
(d) Argument of Reversal
69
(e) The Language Game Argument
70
( 1 )
Argument of Openness
70
(2)
Argument of Innovation
70
(3)
Argument of Context Dependency
70
(4)
Argument of Circularity
70
(f) Argument that Meaning Remains Unclarified
71
(1)
Argument of Objectivism
71
(2)
Argument of Features Semantics
71
(3)
Argument of the Incorrect Reception of the
Speech Act Theory
71
(4)
Argument of Excessive Commitment
71
(5)
Argument of the Impossibility of the Empirical
Determination of Meaning
71
B. Criticism
72
(i) Analytic Versus Post-Positivistic Legal Theory
72
xii
Table
of Contents
(ii)
A Critical Look at Structuring Legal Theory
73
(a) The Basic Norm
74
(b) Circularity
75
(c) Normal and Exceptional Cases
76
(d) Commitment to the Majority Opinion
77
(e) Inconsistency
78
(f) Concluding Remarks
79
(iii)
Controversial Issues
81
Chapter
2:
Normativity and Objectivity of Linguistic Meaning
87
I. Introduction
87
A. Meaning Scepticism and the Indeterminacy Thesis
87
B. Meaning as a Problem of the Philosophy of Language
89
C. Language-Philosophical Theories of Meaning
90
(i) Classification in Categories
91
(a) Referent, Idea, and Behaviour
91
(b) Realism and Anti-Realism
93
(c) Functions of Language
94
(ii) Significance for the Limits of the Wording
94
D. An
Integrative
Theory of Meaning
94
II. The Normativity of Linguistic Meaning
96
A. The Concept of Semantic Normativity
96
(i) The General Thesis of Normativity
96
(ii) The Three Conditions for Normativity Theories
98
(a) The Condition of Anti-Reductionist Supervenience
98
(b) The Condition of Internality
99
(c) The Condition of Possible Semantic Mistakes
100
(iii)
Four Strategies of Arguing Semantic Normativity
100
(a) Normativity and Truth
101
(b) Normativity and Internal Relation
103
(c) Normativity and Rationality
104
(d) Normativity and Regularity
106
(1)
Semantic Normativity According to the
Rule Model
106
(2)
Objection of the Analytic Priority of
Individualism
107
(3)
Objection of the Incoherence of Prescriptivity
and Constitutivity
109
(iv)
Normativity and Connection Thesis
114
B. Brandom s Linguistic Normativity
115
(i) Normative Pragmatics yj
(a) Anthropologie
Basis and Implicit Normativity
117
Table
of Contents
xiii
(b)
Normative Attitudes and Sanctions
119
(c) Result:
Principie
of Instituting Norms through
Social Practice
122
(ii) Inferential Semantics
122
(a) The Pragmatic Priority of Propositionai Meaning
122
(b) Meaning and Material Inference
123
(c) Result: The Principle of the Normative Significance
of Conceptual Systems
125
(iii)
Interlocking Normative Pragmatics and Inferential
Semantics in a Discursive Practice Model
126
(a) Commitment and Entitlement as Deontic Statuses
127
(b) Three Types and Three Dimensions of Inferential
Structure
129
(c) The Deontic Score-keeping Model
131
(d) Propositionai Meaning in Discursive Practice
133
(iv)
Theory of the Meaning of Subsenrential Expressions
134
(a) Substitution
135
(b) Anaphora
139
(c) Results of the Theory of the Meaning of
Subsentential Expressions
140
C. Objections against the Theory of Normativity
141
(i) Kripke s Theory of Rule-Following
142
(a) Kripke s Sceptical Paradox
142
(b) Kripke s Sceptical Solution
145
(c) Criticism
145
(1)
Normativity and Agreement
146
(2)
Naturalism, Reductionism, and Regress
147
(ii) The Objection of Semantic Holism
151
(a) The Doctrine of Semantic Holism
151
(b)
WVO Quine s
Two Dogmas of Empiricism
152
(c) Criticism
156
(1)
The Central Chains of Argument
157
(2)
Reversibility and the Status of Logical Laws
158
(3)
Dummett s Argument of the Possibility of
Communication
165
(4)
Canonical Standards in Moderate Holism
166
(iii)
The Objection of the Impossibility of Analyticity
167
(a) Analyticity, Aprioricity, Modality
168
(b)
WVO
Quine s Word and Object
169
(c) Criticism
173
( 1 )
Relativity and Normativity
174
(2)
Analyticity s Triadic Relativity
175
(3)
OLOL Analyticity
179
D. Result for the Normativity of Linguistic Meaning
180
xiv
Table
of Contents
III. The Objectivity of Linguistic Meaning
181
A. The Concept of Objectivity
181
B. Objectivity as Reference
183
(i) Reference and Inference
184
(ii)
Frege
s
Analysis of Picking out Objects
185
(iii)
Reference and
de re
Ascriptions
187
(iv)
Doxastic Gap and Objectivity
189
(v) Reference and Interpersonal Anaphora
191
C. Objectivity as Inters
u
bjectí vity
192
(і)
The Social
Perspectivai
Character of Conceptual Content
193
(ii) The Paradox of Relative Objectivity
193
D. Objections to the Objectivity Theory
196
(i) Quine s Objection of the Indeterminism of Reference
197
(ii) The Objection of the Special Role Played by
Theoretical Terms
197
(ІІЇ)
Wright s Objection of the Impossibility of a
Conventional Objectivity Theory
198
(a) Subjective Attitude and Objective Status
199
(b) The Possibility of Communal Errors
200
(iv)
The Objection of Incompatibility
201
(v) The Objection that There Is No Objective World
203
E. Conclusion on the Objectivity of Linguistic Meaning
205
IV.
The Results of the Second Chapter
207
A. The Three Dimensions of Linguistic Meaning
207
B. The Universality Challenge
208
C. Scope and Role of Language-Analytical Discourse
208
Chapter
3:
Semantic Normativity in the Law
211
I. Addressing the Three Central Issues
211
A. Clear and Unclear Cases
212
(i) The Relevance in Legal Theory of the Distinction
Between Clear and Unclear Cases
212
(ii) The Concept of the Clear Case
212
(a) Semantic Clarity and Juridical Clarity
212
(b) Constitutive Clarity and
Epistemic
Clarity
213
(iii)
Semantic Clarity in Accordance with the Model of
Deontic Scorekeeping
213
(a) Semantic Clarity in the First Inferential Dimension
214
(b) Semantic Clarity in the Second Inferential Dimension
215
(c) Semantic Clarity in the Third Inferential Dimension
215
(d) Result
215
(iv)
The Existence of Semantically-Clear Cases
216
Table
of
Contents
xv
(v)
Limitations
in Hard Cases
218
(vi)
Result on the First Issue
218
B. The
Epistemic
Openness of the Meaning of Norms
219
(i) Rejection of the Critical Arguments
220
(ii) Confirmation of the Argument of
Epistemic
Openness
222
(a) Semantic Normativity and Rules for the Use of
Words
222
(b) Semantic Object-Relatedness and the Theory of
Meaning of Koch and of
Rüßmann 224
(c)
The Objection of the Reification of the Law
226
(iii)
Result on the Second Issue
227
C. The Objectivity of the Meaning of Norms
229
D. Result Regarding the Three Central Issues
229
II. The Theory of the Limits of the Wording
230
A. The Relationship Between Semantic Clarity and
Semantically-Unclear Meaning
230
B. The Limits of the Wording with Constitutive Semantic
Clarity
231
(i) The Function of Rules for the Use of Words in the
Internal Justification
231
(ii) Semantic Limits in the First Linguistic Dimension
233
(a) The Four Limits of Inferential Relations
233
(1)
Conditional Commitment Limit
233
(2)
Conditional Entitlement Limit
236
(3)
Consequential Commitment Limit
238
(4)
Consequential Entitlement Limit
242
(5)
The System and Function of the Inferential
Limits
243
(b) The Inferential Limits at Subsentential Level
248
(iii)
Semantic Limits in the Second Linguistic Dimension
250
(iv)
Semantic Limits in the Third Linguistic Dimension
252
(v) The System of Semantic Limits
254
С
The Limits of the Wording with Constitutive
Semantically-Unclear Meaning
255
(i) The Classification of Semantically-Unclear Cases in
Inferential Semantics
256
(a) The Concept
oí
Vagueness
256
(b) The Concept of Ambiguity
262
(c) The Concept of Inconsistency
263
(d) The Concept of Evaluative Openness
263
(e) Result on the Classification of Unclear Cases
264
(ii) Semantic Limits in the Case of Vagueness
265
xvi
Table
of
Contents
(a) Connection
Between the Three-Candidate Model
and the Model of Rules for the Use of Words
265
(1)
Preliminary Considerations
265
(2)
The Scheme of the Positive Limits of the
Wording
267
(3)
The Scheme of the Negative Limits of the
Wording
268
(4)
Summary
269
(b) The System of Semantic Limits with Vagueness
270
(iii)
Semantic Limits with Ambiguity
270
(iv)
Semantic Limits with Evaluatively-Open Concepts
272
D. Result on the Theory of the Limits of the Wording
273
III. The Results of the Third Chapter
274
A. Results
274
B. The Rehabilitation of Semantic Argumentation in the Law
276
C. The Objectivity of Legal Rulings
278
Bibliography
283
Index
301
|
| adam_txt |
Table
of Contents
Preface
vii
Introduction
1
I. The Doctrine of the Limits of the Wording
4
A. Interpretation as a Legal Method
4
B. Judicial Development of the Law
5
С
Why the Differentiation Matters
6
II. Interpretation and Invention in English Legal Reasoning
7
A. Statutory Interpretation and Democracy
7
(i) The Purposive Versus the Literal Approach
7
(ii) Law-Applying Versus Law-Making
9
(iii)
The Missing Method: Judicial Development of the Law
12
B. Human Rights Act: What Is Possible?
13
C. Result
14
III. Towards a Common European Approach
15
IV. The Possibility of the Rule of Law Defended
18
V. The Sceptical Challenge: Indeterminacy and Vagueness
19
A. The Concept of Indeterminacy
20
B. Vagueness as Boundarylessness
20
(i) Higher-order Vagueness
21
(ii) The Significance of Interpretation in the Law
22
C. Scepticism in Law
22
VI. The Rationality and Objectivity of Legal Reasoning
23
A. Justification, Rationality and Legitimacy
24
B. The Dworkin-Fish Controversy
25
C. 'B' Semantics versus
'KP'
Semantics
26
D. The Objectivity of Law Defended
27
VII.
At a Glance
27
A. General Approach
27
B. Chapter
1 28
C. Chapter
2 29
D. Chapter
3 31
x
Table of Contents
Chapter
1:
The Doctrine of the Limits of the Wording
33
I. The Limits of the Wording in Hermeneutic Legal Theory
33
A. The Reception of Ontological Hermeneutics in Legal Theory
33
(i) The Limits of the Wording and Pre-Judgements
35
(a) Ontological Prerequisites for the Understanding of
Normative Texts
35
(b) Significance for the Application of Law in General
36
(c) Significance for the Limits of the Wording
37
(ii) Limits of the Wording and Typology
40
(iii)
The Limits of the Wording and the
Analogicity
of
Language
42
B. Hermeneutics and Legal Interpretation
43
II. The Limits of the Wording in Analytic Legal Theory
44
A. The Clarification of the Limits of the Wording by Koch,
Rüßmann,
and
Herberger
44
(і)
Establishing and Assigning Meaning
45
(ii) Classification of Unclear Usage Rules
46
(a) Ambiguity
47
(b) Inconsistency
47
(c) Vagueness
48
(iii)
The Limits of the Wording According to Koch,
Rüßmann,
and
Herberger
48
B.
The Role of the Limits of the Wording in Alexy's Theory
of Legal Argumentation
50
(Ї)
The Discursive Character of Interpretation
50
(ii) Main Features of the Theory of Legal Argumentation
51
(a) Internal Justification and the Word Usage Rule
51
(b) External Justification and Semantic Arguments
52
III. The Deconstructivistic Challenge of the Structuring Legal Theory
54
A. Basic Premises of Structuring Legal Theory
54
B. Criticism of New Hermeneutics
56
C. Criticism of the Theory of Legal Reasoning According to
Koch and
Rüßmann 56
Ό.
Criticism of Alexy's Theory of Legal Argumentation
58
E. Structuring Legal Theory and the Limits of the Wording
59
(i) The Limits of the Wording as a Result of the
Concrétisation
of Rules
59
(ii) Binding Effects of Legal Culture
60
(iii)
The Limits of the Wording as the Limits of the
Normative Program
62
(iv)
The Role of the Limits of the Normative Program
63
Table
of Contents
xi
F.
Structuring Legal Theory
—
Summary
63
TV. The Results of the First Chapter
64
A. State of Research
64
(i) The Hermeneutic Position
65
(a) Pre-Judgements and Typology
65
(b) Arguments in Support of the Hermeneutic Position
65
(1)
Argument of
О
ntological Hermeneutics
65
(2)
Argument of
Analogicity
66
(3)
Argument of Procedural Correctness
66
(4)
Argument of Normative Necessity
66
(ii) The Analytic Position
66
(a) Establishing and Assigning Meaning
66
(b) Arguments for the Analytic Viewpoint
67
(1)
Argument of Clear Cases
61
(2)
Argument of the Empirical Discernibility of
Meaning
61
(3)
Argument of Possible Corrections
68
(iii)
The Structuring Legal Theory Position
68
(a) Putting Rules in Specific Terms and the Limits of
the Normative Program
68
(b) Arguments in Support of Structuring Legal Theory
68
(1)
Argument of the Indefiniteness of the Legal Text
68
(2)
Argument of Legal Culture
68
(iv)
Arguments Against the Limits of the Wording
69
(a) Argument of Practical Ineffectiveness
69
(b) Argument of Necessary Failure
69
(c) Argument of the Lacking Normative Necessity
69
(d) Argument of Reversal
69
(e) The Language Game Argument
70
( 1 )
Argument of Openness
70
(2)
Argument of Innovation
70
(3)
Argument of Context Dependency
70
(4)
Argument of Circularity
70
(f) Argument that Meaning Remains Unclarified
71
(1)
Argument of Objectivism
71
(2)
Argument of Features Semantics
71
(3)
Argument of the Incorrect Reception of the
Speech Act Theory
71
(4)
Argument of Excessive Commitment
71
(5)
Argument of the Impossibility of the Empirical
Determination of Meaning
71
B. Criticism
72
(i) Analytic Versus Post-Positivistic Legal Theory
72
xii
Table
of Contents
(ii)
A Critical Look at Structuring Legal Theory
73
(a) The Basic Norm
74
(b) Circularity
75
(c) Normal and Exceptional Cases
76
(d) Commitment to the Majority Opinion
77
(e) Inconsistency
78
(f) Concluding Remarks
79
(iii)
Controversial Issues
81
Chapter
2:
Normativity and Objectivity of Linguistic Meaning
87
I. Introduction
87
A. Meaning Scepticism and the Indeterminacy Thesis
87
B. Meaning as a Problem of the Philosophy of Language
89
C. Language-Philosophical Theories of Meaning
90
(i) Classification in Categories
91
(a) Referent, Idea, and Behaviour
91
(b) Realism and Anti-Realism
93
(c) Functions of Language
94
(ii) Significance for the Limits of the Wording
94
D. An
Integrative
Theory of Meaning
94
II. The Normativity of Linguistic Meaning
96
A. The Concept of Semantic Normativity
96
(i) The General Thesis of Normativity
96
(ii) The Three Conditions for Normativity Theories
98
(a) The Condition of Anti-Reductionist Supervenience
98
(b) The Condition of Internality
99
(c) The Condition of Possible Semantic Mistakes
100
(iii)
Four Strategies of Arguing Semantic Normativity
100
(a) Normativity and Truth
101
(b) Normativity and Internal Relation
103
(c) Normativity and Rationality
104
(d) Normativity and Regularity
106
(1)
Semantic Normativity According to the
Rule Model
106
(2)
Objection of the Analytic Priority of
Individualism
107
(3)
Objection of the Incoherence of Prescriptivity
and Constitutivity
109
(iv)
Normativity and Connection Thesis
114
B. Brandom's Linguistic Normativity
115
(i) Normative Pragmatics \yj
(a) Anthropologie
Basis and Implicit Normativity
117
Table
of Contents
xiii
(b)
Normative Attitudes and Sanctions
119
(c) Result:
Principie
of Instituting Norms through
Social Practice
122
(ii) Inferential Semantics
122
(a) The Pragmatic Priority of Propositionai Meaning
122
(b) Meaning and Material Inference
123
(c) Result: The Principle of the Normative Significance
of Conceptual Systems
125
(iii)
Interlocking Normative Pragmatics and Inferential
Semantics in a Discursive Practice Model
126
(a) Commitment and Entitlement as Deontic Statuses
127
(b) Three Types and Three Dimensions of Inferential
Structure
129
(c) The Deontic Score-keeping Model
131
(d) Propositionai Meaning in Discursive Practice
133
(iv)
Theory of the Meaning of Subsenrential Expressions
134
(a) Substitution
135
(b) Anaphora
139
(c) Results of the Theory of the Meaning of
Subsentential Expressions
140
C. Objections against the Theory of Normativity
141
(i) Kripke's Theory of Rule-Following
142
(a) Kripke's Sceptical Paradox
142
(b) Kripke's Sceptical Solution
145
(c) Criticism
145
(1)
Normativity and Agreement
146
(2)
Naturalism, Reductionism, and Regress
147
(ii) The Objection of Semantic Holism
151
(a) The Doctrine of Semantic Holism
151
(b)
WVO Quine's
Two Dogmas of Empiricism
152
(c) Criticism
156
(1)
The Central Chains of Argument
157
(2)
Reversibility and the Status of Logical Laws
158
(3)
Dummett's Argument of the Possibility of
Communication
165
(4)
Canonical Standards in Moderate Holism
166
(iii)
The Objection of the Impossibility of Analyticity
167
(a) Analyticity, Aprioricity, Modality
168
(b)
WVO
Quine's Word and Object
169
(c) Criticism
173
( 1 )
Relativity and Normativity
174
(2)
Analyticity's Triadic Relativity
175
(3)
OLOL Analyticity
179
D. Result for the Normativity of Linguistic Meaning
180
xiv
Table
of Contents
III. The Objectivity of Linguistic Meaning
181
A. The Concept of Objectivity
181
B. Objectivity as Reference
183
(i) Reference and Inference
184
(ii)
Frege
's
Analysis of Picking out Objects
185
(iii)
Reference and
de re
Ascriptions
187
(iv)
Doxastic Gap and Objectivity
189
(v) Reference and Interpersonal Anaphora
191
C. Objectivity as Inters
u
bjectí vity
192
(і)
The Social
Perspectivai
Character of Conceptual Content
193
(ii) The Paradox of Relative Objectivity
193
D. Objections to the Objectivity Theory
196
(i) Quine's Objection of the Indeterminism of Reference
197
(ii) The Objection of the Special Role Played by
Theoretical Terms
197
(ІІЇ)
Wright's Objection of the Impossibility of a
Conventional Objectivity Theory
198
(a) Subjective Attitude and Objective Status
199
(b) The Possibility of Communal Errors
200
(iv)
The Objection of Incompatibility
201
(v) The Objection that There Is No Objective World
203
E. Conclusion on the Objectivity of Linguistic Meaning
205
IV.
The Results of the Second Chapter
207
A. The Three Dimensions of Linguistic Meaning
207
B. The Universality Challenge
208
C. Scope and Role of Language-Analytical Discourse
208
Chapter
3:
Semantic Normativity in the Law
211
I. Addressing the Three Central Issues
211
A. Clear and Unclear Cases
212
(i) The Relevance in Legal Theory of the Distinction
Between Clear and Unclear Cases
212
(ii) The Concept of the Clear Case
212
(a) Semantic Clarity and Juridical Clarity
212
(b) Constitutive Clarity and
Epistemic
Clarity
213
(iii)
Semantic Clarity in Accordance with the Model of
Deontic Scorekeeping
213
(a) Semantic Clarity in the First Inferential Dimension
214
(b) Semantic Clarity in the Second Inferential Dimension
215
(c) Semantic Clarity in the Third Inferential Dimension
215
(d) Result
215
(iv)
The Existence of Semantically-Clear Cases
216
Table
of
Contents
xv
(v)
Limitations
in Hard Cases
218
(vi)
Result on the First Issue
218
B. The
Epistemic
Openness of the Meaning of Norms
219
(i) Rejection of the Critical Arguments
220
(ii) Confirmation of the Argument of
Epistemic
Openness
222
(a) Semantic Normativity and Rules for the Use of
Words
222
(b) Semantic Object-Relatedness and the Theory of
Meaning of Koch and of
Rüßmann 224
(c)
The Objection of the Reification of the Law
226
(iii)
Result on the Second Issue
227
C. The Objectivity of the Meaning of Norms
229
D. Result Regarding the Three Central Issues
229
II. The Theory of the Limits of the Wording
230
A. The Relationship Between Semantic Clarity and
Semantically-Unclear Meaning
230
B. The Limits of the Wording with Constitutive Semantic
Clarity
231
(i) The Function of Rules for the Use of Words in the
Internal Justification
231
(ii) Semantic Limits in the First Linguistic Dimension
233
(a) The Four Limits of Inferential Relations
233
(1)
Conditional Commitment Limit
233
(2)
Conditional Entitlement Limit
236
(3)
Consequential Commitment Limit
238
(4)
Consequential Entitlement Limit
242
(5)
The System and Function of the Inferential
Limits
243
(b) The Inferential Limits at Subsentential Level
248
(iii)
Semantic Limits in the Second Linguistic Dimension
250
(iv)
Semantic Limits in the Third Linguistic Dimension
252
(v) The System of Semantic Limits
254
С
The Limits of the Wording with Constitutive
Semantically-Unclear Meaning
255
(i) The Classification of Semantically-Unclear Cases in
Inferential Semantics
256
(a) The Concept
oí
Vagueness
256
(b) The Concept of Ambiguity
262
(c) The Concept of Inconsistency
263
(d) The Concept of Evaluative Openness
263
(e) Result on the Classification of Unclear Cases
264
(ii) Semantic Limits in the Case of Vagueness
265
xvi
Table
of
Contents
(a) Connection
Between the Three-Candidate Model
and the Model of Rules for the Use of Words
265
(1)
Preliminary Considerations
265
(2)
The Scheme of the Positive Limits of the
Wording
267
(3)
The Scheme of the Negative Limits of the
Wording
268
(4)
Summary
269
(b) The System of Semantic Limits with Vagueness
270
(iii)
Semantic Limits with Ambiguity
270
(iv)
Semantic Limits with Evaluatively-Open Concepts
272
D. Result on the Theory of the Limits of the Wording
273
III. The Results of the Third Chapter
274
A. Results
274
B. The Rehabilitation of Semantic Argumentation in the Law
276
C. The Objectivity of Legal Rulings
278
Bibliography
283
Index
301 |
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| author | Klatt, Matthias 1973- |
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| id | DE-604.BV023309713 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T20:49:48Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:15:33Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9781841134918 1841134910 |
| language | English German |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016494005 |
| oclc_num | 216663245 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-M382 DE-12 DE-29 DE-188 DE-703 DE-521 |
| owner_facet | DE-M382 DE-12 DE-29 DE-188 DE-703 DE-521 |
| physical | XVI, 303 S. |
| publishDate | 2008 |
| publishDateSearch | 2008 |
| publishDateSort | 2008 |
| publisher | Hart |
| record_format | marc |
| series | European Academy of Legal Theory monograph series |
| series2 | European Academy of Legal Theory monograph series |
| spelling | Klatt, Matthias 1973- Verfasser (DE-588)142128821 aut Theorie der Wortlautgrenze Making the law explicit the normativity of legal argumentation Matthias Klatt Oxford [u.a.] Hart 2008 XVI, 303 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier European Academy of Legal Theory monograph series 7 Law / Methodology Philosophie Recht Sprache Language and languages Philosophy Law Language Law Methodology Semantics (Law) Semantics (Philosophy) European Academy of Legal Theory monograph series 7 (DE-604)BV039536633 7 Digitalisierung UB Bayreuth - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016494005&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Klatt, Matthias 1973- Making the law explicit the normativity of legal argumentation European Academy of Legal Theory monograph series Law / Methodology Philosophie Recht Sprache Language and languages Philosophy Law Language Law Methodology Semantics (Law) Semantics (Philosophy) |
| title | Making the law explicit the normativity of legal argumentation |
| title_alt | Theorie der Wortlautgrenze |
| title_auth | Making the law explicit the normativity of legal argumentation |
| title_exact_search | Making the law explicit the normativity of legal argumentation |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Making the law explicit the normativity of legal argumentation |
| title_full | Making the law explicit the normativity of legal argumentation Matthias Klatt |
| title_fullStr | Making the law explicit the normativity of legal argumentation Matthias Klatt |
| title_full_unstemmed | Making the law explicit the normativity of legal argumentation Matthias Klatt |
| title_short | Making the law explicit |
| title_sort | making the law explicit the normativity of legal argumentation |
| title_sub | the normativity of legal argumentation |
| topic | Law / Methodology Philosophie Recht Sprache Language and languages Philosophy Law Language Law Methodology Semantics (Law) Semantics (Philosophy) |
| topic_facet | Law / Methodology Philosophie Recht Sprache Language and languages Philosophy Law Language Law Methodology Semantics (Law) Semantics (Philosophy) |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016494005&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV039536633 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT klattmatthias theoriederwortlautgrenze AT klattmatthias makingthelawexplicitthenormativityoflegalargumentation |