Microeconomics of banking:
This is the second edition of an essential text on the microeconomic foundations of banking surveys the latest research in banking theory, with new material that covers recent developments in the field. Over the last thirty years, a new paradigm in banking theory has overturned economists' trad...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass. [u.a.]
MIT Press
2008
|
| Ausgabe: | 2. ed. |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Zusammenfassung: | This is the second edition of an essential text on the microeconomic foundations of banking surveys the latest research in banking theory, with new material that covers recent developments in the field. Over the last thirty years, a new paradigm in banking theory has overturned economists' traditional vision of the banking sector. The asymmetric information model, extremely powerful in many areas of economic theory, has proven useful in banking theory both for explaining the role of banks in the economy and for pointing out structural weaknesses in the banking sector that may justify government intervention.In the past, banking courses in most doctoral programs in economics, business, or finance focused either on management or monetary issues and their macroeconomic consequences; a microeconomic theory of banking did not exist because the Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium model of complete contingent markets (the standard reference at the time) was unable to explain the role of banks in the economy. This text provides students with a guide to the microeconomic theory of banking that has emerged since then, examining the main issues and offering the necessary tools for understanding how they have been modeled.This second edition covers the recent dramatic developments in academic research on the microeconomics of banking, with a focus on four important topics: the theory of two-sided markets and its implications for the payment card industry; "non-price competition" and its effect on the competition-stability tradeoff and the entry of new banks; the transmission of monetary policy and the effect on the functioning of the credit market of capital requirements for banks; and the theoretical foundations of banking regulation, which have been clarified, although recent developments in risk modeling have not yet led to a significant parallel development of economic modeling. |
| Beschreibung: | Literaturangaben |
| Beschreibung: | XXI, 363 S. graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 0262062704 9780262062701 |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nam a2200000 c 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV023301474 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 20160928 | ||
| 007 | t| | ||
| 008 | 080515s2008 xx d||| |||| 00||| eng d | ||
| 020 | |a 0262062704 |c (hbk.) : £38.95 hbk. : £38.95 : CIP entry (Apr.) |9 0-262-06270-4 | ||
| 020 | |a 9780262062701 |9 978-0-262-06270-1 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)255956849 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BSZ278496725 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 049 | |a DE-706 |a DE-703 |a DE-384 |a DE-1051 |a DE-945 |a DE-355 |a DE-19 |a DE-M382 |a DE-523 |a DE-20 |a DE-11 |a DE-91 |a DE-83 |a DE-521 |a DE-473 | ||
| 050 | 0 | |a HG1601 | |
| 082 | 0 | |a 332.1 | |
| 084 | |a QK 000 |0 (DE-625)141630: |2 rvk | ||
| 084 | |a QK 300 |0 (DE-625)141640: |2 rvk | ||
| 084 | |a WIR 165f |2 stub | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Freixas, Xavier |d 1949- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)123139937 |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Microeconomics of banking |c Xavier Freixas and Jean-Charles Rochet |
| 250 | |a 2. ed. | ||
| 264 | 1 | |a Cambridge, Mass. [u.a.] |b MIT Press |c 2008 | |
| 300 | |a XXI, 363 S. |b graph. Darst. | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 500 | |a Literaturangaben | ||
| 520 | 3 | |a This is the second edition of an essential text on the microeconomic foundations of banking surveys the latest research in banking theory, with new material that covers recent developments in the field. Over the last thirty years, a new paradigm in banking theory has overturned economists' traditional vision of the banking sector. The asymmetric information model, extremely powerful in many areas of economic theory, has proven useful in banking theory both for explaining the role of banks in the economy and for pointing out structural weaknesses in the banking sector that may justify government intervention.In the past, banking courses in most doctoral programs in economics, business, or finance focused either on management or monetary issues and their macroeconomic consequences; a microeconomic theory of banking did not exist because the Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium model of complete contingent markets (the standard reference at the time) was unable to explain the role of banks in the economy. This text provides students with a guide to the microeconomic theory of banking that has emerged since then, examining the main issues and offering the necessary tools for understanding how they have been modeled.This second edition covers the recent dramatic developments in academic research on the microeconomics of banking, with a focus on four important topics: the theory of two-sided markets and its implications for the payment card industry; "non-price competition" and its effect on the competition-stability tradeoff and the entry of new banks; the transmission of monetary policy and the effect on the functioning of the credit market of capital requirements for banks; and the theoretical foundations of banking regulation, which have been clarified, although recent developments in risk modeling have not yet led to a significant parallel development of economic modeling. | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Bank | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Banks and banking | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Microeconomics | |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Unternehmenstheorie |0 (DE-588)4078614-6 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Bankgeschäft |0 (DE-588)4112667-1 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Bank |0 (DE-588)4004436-1 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Finanzdienstleistung |0 (DE-588)4212226-0 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Mikroökonomie |0 (DE-588)4039225-9 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 689 | 0 | 0 | |a Bankgeschäft |0 (DE-588)4112667-1 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 1 | |a Mikroökonomie |0 (DE-588)4039225-9 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | |5 DE-604 | |
| 689 | 1 | 0 | |a Bank |0 (DE-588)4004436-1 |D s |
| 689 | 1 | 1 | |a Finanzdienstleistung |0 (DE-588)4212226-0 |D s |
| 689 | 1 | 2 | |a Mikroökonomie |0 (DE-588)4039225-9 |D s |
| 689 | 1 | |8 1\p |5 DE-604 | |
| 689 | 2 | 0 | |a Bank |0 (DE-588)4004436-1 |D s |
| 689 | 2 | 1 | |a Unternehmenstheorie |0 (DE-588)4078614-6 |D s |
| 689 | 2 | |8 2\p |5 DE-604 | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Rochet, Jean-Charles |d 1957- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)120833557 |4 aut | |
| 856 | 4 | 2 | |m HBZ Datenaustausch |q application/pdf |u http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016485925&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |3 Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| 883 | 1 | |8 1\p |a cgwrk |d 20201028 |q DE-101 |u https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk | |
| 883 | 1 | |8 2\p |a cgwrk |d 20201028 |q DE-101 |u https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk | |
| 943 | 1 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016485925 | |
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1820240336104980480 |
|---|---|
| adam_text |
Contents
List of Figures xv
Préface xvii
1 Introduction 1
1.1 What Is a Bank, and What Do Banks Do? 1
1.2 Liquidity and Payment Services 2
1.2.1 Money Changing 3
1.2.2 Payment Services 4
1.3 Transforming Assets 4
1.4 Managing Risks 5
1.4.1 Crédit Risk 5
1.4.2 Interest Rate and Liquidity Risks 5
1.4.3 Off-Balance-Sheet Opérations 6
1.5 Monitoring and Information Processing 6
1.6 The Rôle of Banks in the Resource Allocation Process 7
1.7 Banking in the Arrow-Debreu Model 7
1.7.1 The Consumer 8
1.7.2 TheFirm 9
1.7.3 The Bank 9
1.7.4 General Equilibrium 9
1.8 Outline of the Book 10
2 The Rôle of Financial Intermediaries 15
2.1 Transaction Costs 18
2.1.1 Economies of Scope 18
2.1.2 Economies of Scale 19
2.2 Coalitions of Depositors and Liquidity Insurance 20
2.2.1 The Model 20
viii Contents
2.2.2 Characteristics of the Optimal Allocation 21
2.2.3 Autarky 21
2.2.4 Market Economy 22
2.2.5 Financial Intermediation 23
2.3 Coalitions of Borrowers and the Cost of Capital 24
2.3.1 A Simple Model of Capital Markets with Adverse
Sélection 25
2.3.2 Signaling through Self-Financing and the Cost of Capital 26
2.3.3 Coalitions of Borrowers 28
2.3.4 Suggestions for Further Reading 28
2.4 Financial Intermediation as Delegated Monitoring 30
2.5 The Choice between Market Debt and Bank Debt 34
2.5.1 A Simple Model of the Crédit Market with Moral
Hazard 34
2.5.2 Monitoring and Réputation 36
2.5.3 Monitoring and Capital 39
2.5.4 Financial Architecture 42
2.5.5 Crédit Risk and Dilution Costs 43
2.6 Liquidity Provision to Firms 46
2.7 Suggestions for Further Reading 47
2.8 Problems 49
2.8.1 Stratégie Entrepreneurs and Market Financing 49
2.8.2 Market versus Bank Finance 50
2.8.3 Economies of Scale in Information Production 50
2.8.4 Monitoring as a Public Good and Gresham's Law 51
2.8.5 Intermediation and Search Costs 52
2.8.6 Intertemporal Insurance 53
2.9 Solutions 54
2.9.1 Stratégie Entrepreneurs and Market Financing 54
2.9.2 Market versus Bank Finance 55
2.9.3 Economies of Scale in Information Production 57
2.9.4 Monitoring as a Public Good and Gresham's Law 58
2.9.5 Intermediation and Search Costs 60
2.9.6 Intertemporal Insurance 62
3 The Industrial Organization Approach to Banking 69
3.1 A Model of a Perfect Compétitive Banking Sector 70
3.1.1 The Model 70
Contents ix
3.1.2 The Crédit Multiplier Approach 71
3.1.3 The Behavior of Individual Banks in a Compétitive
Banking Sector 72
3.1.4 The Compétitive Equilibrium of the Banking Sector 75
3.2 The Monti-Klein Model of a Monopolistic Bank 78
3.2.1 The Original Model 78
3.2.2 The Oligopoliste Version 79
3.2.3 Empirical Evidence 80
3.3 Monopolistic Compétition 81
3.3.1 Does Free Compétition Lead to the Optimal Number of
Banks? 81
3.3.2 The Impact of Deposit Rate Régulation on Crédit Rates 84
3.3.3 Bank Network Compatibility 87
3.3.4 Empirical Evidence 88
3.4 The Scope of the Banking Firm 88
3.5 Beyond Price Compétition 89
3.5.1 Risk Taking on Investments 89
3.5.2 Monitoring and Incentives in a Financial Conglomerate 93
3.5.3 Compétition and Screening 95
3.6 Relationship Banking 99
3.6.1 The Ex Post Monopoly of Information 99
3.6.2 Equilibrium with Screening and Relationship Banking 102
3.6.3 Does Compétition Threaten Relationship Banking? 103
3.6.4 Intertemporal Insurance 104
3.6.5 Empirical Tests of Relationship Banking 104
3.7 Payment Cards and Two-Sided Markets 107
3.7.1 A Model of the Payment Card Industry 108
3.7.2 Card Use 109
3.7.3 Monopoly Network 110
3.7.4 Competing Payment Card Networks 111
3.7.5 Welfare Analysis 111
3.8 Problems 112
3.8.1 Extension of the Monti-Klein Model to the Case of
Risky Loans 112
3.8.2 Compatibility between Banking Networks 113
3.8.3 Double Bertrand Compétition 113
3.8.4 Deposit Rate Régulation 114
x Contents
3.9 Solutions 115
3.9.1 Extension of the Monti-Klein Model to the Case of
Risky Loans 115
3.9.2 Compatibility between Banking Networks 116
3.9.3 Double Bertrand Compétition 117
3.9.4 Deposit Rate Régulation 118
4 The Lender-Borrower Relationship 127
4.1 Why Risk Sharing Does Not Explain AH the Features of Bank
Loans 128
4.2 Costly State Vérification 130
4.2.1 Incentive-Compatible Contracts 131
4.2.2 Efficient Incentive-Compatible Contracts 132
4.2.3 Efficient Falsification-Proof Contracts 133
4.3 Incentives to Repay 134
4.3.1 Nonpecuniary Cost of Bankruptcy 134
4.3.2 Threat of Termination 135
4.3.3 Impact of Judicial Enforcement 137
4.3.4 Stratégie Debt Repayment: The Case of a Sovereign
Debtor 139
4.4 Moral Hazard 143
4.5 The Incomplète Contract Approach 146
4.5.1 Private Debtors and the Inalienability of Human Capital 147
4.5.2 Liquidity of Assets and Debt Capacity 149
4.5.3 Soft Budget Constraints and Financial Structure 150
4.6 Collatéral as a Device for Screening Heterogeneous Borrowers 153
4.7 Problems 157
4.7.1 Optimal Risk Sharing with Symmetric Information 157
4.7.2 Optimal Debt Contracts with Moral Hazard 158
4.7.3 The Optimality of Stochastic Auditing Schemes 159
4.7.4 The Rôle of Hard Claims in Constraining Management 160
4.7.5 Collatéral and Rationing 160
4.7.6 Securitization 161
4.8 Solutions 161
4.8.1 Optimal Risk Sharing with Symmetric Information 161
4.8.2 Optimal Debt Contracts with Moral Hazard 162
4.8.3 The Optimality of Stochastic Auditing Schemes 163
4.8.4 The Rôle of Hard Claims in Constraining Management 164
Contents xi
4.8.5 Collatéral and Rationing 164
4.8.6 Securitization 165
5 Equilibrium in the Crédit Market and Its Macroeconomic Implications 171
5.1 Définition of Equilibrium Crédit Rationing 172
5.2 The Backward-Bending Supply of Crédit 173
5.3 Equilibrium Crédit Rationing 175
5.3.1 Adverse Sélection 175
5.3.2 Costly State Vérification 177
5.3.3 Moral Hazard 178
5.4 Equilibrium with a Broader Class of Contracts 181
5.5 Problems 185
5.5.1 The Model of Mankiw 185
5.5.2 Efficient Crédit Rationing 185
5.5.3 Too Much Investment 186
5.6 Solutions 186
5.6.1 The Model of Mankiw 186
5.6.2 Efficient Crédit Rationing 187
5.6.3 Too Much Investment 188
6 The Macroeconomic Conséquences of Financial Imperfections 193
6.1 A Short Historical Perspective 195
6.2 The Transmission Channels of Monetary Policy 196
6.2.1 The Différent Channels 197
6.2.2 A Simple Model 198
6.2.3 Crédit View versus Money View: Justification of the
Assumptions and Empirical Evidence 200
6.2.4 Empirical Evidence on the Crédit View 202
6.3 Financial Fragility and Economie Performance 203
6.4 Financial Development and Economie Growth 209
7 Individual Bank Runs and Systemic Risk 217
7.1 Banking Deposits and Liquidity Insurance 218
7.1.1 A Model of Liquidity Insurance 218
7.1.2 Autarky 219
7.1.3 The Allocation Obtained When a Financial Market Is
Opened 219
7.1.4 The Optimal (Symmetric) Allocation 220
7.1.5 A Fractional Reserve Banking System 220
xii Contents
7.2 The Stability of the Fractional Reserve System and Alternative
Institutional Arrangements 222
7.2.1 The Causes of Instability 222
7.2.2 A First Remedy for Instability: Narrow Banking 222
7.2.3 Regulatory Responses: Suspension of Convertibility or
Deposit Insurance 224
7.2.4 Jacklin's Proposai: Equity versus Deposits 225
7.3 Bank Runs and Renegotiation 227
7.3.1 A Simple Model 227
7.3.2 Pledgeable and Nonpledgeable Cash Flows 228
7.3.3 Bank Runs as a Discipline Device 228
7.3.4 The Rôle of Capital 229
7.4 Efficient Bank Runs 230
7.5 Interbank Markets and the Management of Idiosyncratic
Liquidity Shocks 233
7.5.1 The Model of Bhattacharya and Gale 233
7.5.2 The Rôle of the Interbank Market 234
7.5.3 The Case of Unobservable Liquidity Shocks 234
7.6 Systemic Risk and Contagion 235
7.6.1 Aggregate Liquidity and Banking Crises 236
7.6.2 Payment Systems and OTC Opérations 238
7.6.3 Contagion through Interbank Claims 239
7.7 Lender of Last Resort: A Historical Perspective 242
7.7.1 Views on the LLR Rôle 243
7.7.2 Liquidity and Solvency: A Coordination Game 244
7.7.3 The Practice of LLR Assistance 246
7.7.4 The Effect of LLR and Other Partial Arrangements 247
7.8 Problems 248
7.8.1 Bank Runs and Moral Hazard 248
7.8.2 Bank Runs 249
7.8.3 Information-Based Bank Runs 249
7.8.4 Banks' Suspension of Convertibility 250
7.8.5 Aggregated Liquidity Shocks 251
7.8.6 Charter Value 252
7.9 Solutions 253
7.9.1 Banks Runs and Moral Hazard 253
7.9.2 Bank Runs 253
Contents xjjj
7.9.3 Information-Based Bank Runs 255
7.9.4 Banks' Suspension of Convertibility 255
7.9.5 Aggregated Liquidity Shocks 257
7.9.6 Charter Value 258
8 Managing Risks in the Banking Firm 265
8.1 Crédit Risk 266
8.1.1 Institutional Context 266
8.1.2 Evaluating the Cost of Crédit Risk 267
8.1.3 Regulatory Response to Crédit Risk 271
8.2 Liquidity Risk 273
8.2.1 Reserve Management 274
8.2.2 Introducing Liquidity Risk into the Monti-Klein Model 275
8.2.3 The Bank as a Market Maker 277
8.3 Interest Rate Risk 280
8.3.1 The Term Structure of Interest Rates 281
8.3.2 Measuring Interest Rate Risk Exposure 283
8.3.3 Applications to Asset Liability Management 284
8.4 Market Risk 286
8.4.1 Portfolio Theory: The Capital Asset Pricing Model 286
8.4.2 The Bank as a Portfolio Manager: The Pyle-Hart-Jaffee
Approach 288
8.4.3 An Application of the Portfolio Model: The Impact of
Capital Requirements 291
8.5 Problems 296
8.5.1 The Model of Prisman, Slovin, and Sushka 296
8.5.2 The Risk Structure of Interest Rates 297
8.5.3 Using the CAPM for Loan Pricing 298
8.6 Solutions 298
8.6.1 The Model of Prisman, Slovin, and Sushka 298
8.6.2 The Risk Structure of Interest Rates 300
8.6.3 Using the CAPM for Loan Pricing 301
9 The Régulation of Banks 305
9.1 The Justification for Banking Régulation 306
9.1.1 The General Setting 306
9.1.2 The Fragility of Banks 307
9.1.3 The Protection of Depositors' and Customers' Confidence 308
9.1.4 The Cost of Bank Failures 310
xiv Contents
9.2 A Framework for Regulatory Analysis 310
9.3 Deposit Insurance 313
9.3.1 The Moral Hazard Issue 313
9.3.2 Risk-Related Insurance Premiums 315
9.3.3 Is Fairly Priced Deposit Insurance Possible? 316
9.3.4 The Effects of Deposit Insurance on the Banking
Industry 318
9.4 Solvency Régulations 319
9.4.1 The Portfolio Approach 319
9.4.2 Cost of Bank Capital and Deposit Rate Régulation 320
9.4.3 The Incentive Approach 323
9.4.4 The Incomplète Contract Approach 324
9.4.5 The Three Pillars of Basel II 328
9.5 The Resolution of Bank Failures 329
9.5.1 Resolving Banks' Distress: Instruments and Policies 329
9.5.2 Information Révélation and Managers' Incentives 330
9.5.3 Who Should Décide on Banks' Closure? 332
9.6 Market Discipline 335
9.6.1 Theoretical Framework 336
9.6.2 Empirical Evidence 337
9.7 Suggestions for Further Reading 338
9.8 Problem 340
9.8.1 Moral Hazard and Capital Régulation 340
9.9 Solution 340
9.9.1 Moral Hazard and Capital Régulation 340
Index 349
Figures
1.1 Financial décisions of économie agents. 8
2.1 Bank balance sheet in Bryant-Diamond-Dybvig paradigm. 24
2.2 Direct finance: Each lender monitors its borrower (total cost nmK). 31
2.3 Intermediated finance: Delegated monitoring (total cost nK + Cn). 32
2.4 Firms categorized by type of finance. 42
2.5 Optimal financing choices of firms. 46
3.1 Incréments in aggregated balances of various agents. 72
3.2 Locations on Salop circle. 83
3.3 Costs and benefits of a card transaction. 108
4.1 Optimality of the standard debt contract under costly state vérification. 133
4.2 Optimality of the standard debt contract under nonpecuniary costs of
bankruptcy. 135
4.3 Underinvestment in the case of a stratégie debtor (Allen 1983). 140
4.4 Optimal contract in Innés (1987) moral hazard model. 145
4.5 Borrowers' indifférence curves: low risks AL, high risks Aw. 154
4.6 Optimal menu of loan contracts. 156
4.7 Pareto frontiers with deterministic and stochastic audits. 164
5.1 Expected return to the bank as a function of nominal rate of loan. 173
5.2 Equilibrium crédit rationing. 174
5.3 Profit to the firm as a function of cash flow from project. 176
5.4 Expected return to the bank as a function of R in Bester-Hellwig (1987)
model: Case 1. 179
5.5 Expected return to the bank as a function of R in Bester-Hellwig (1987)
model: Case 2. 180
5.6 Separating equilibrium in Bester (1985) model: The only candidate is
xvi Figures
5.7a Separating equilibrium in Bester (1985) model: Equilibrium exists. 184
5.7b Separating equilibrium in Bester (1985) model: Equilibrium does not
exist. 184
6.1 Timing in Bernanke-Gertler (1990) model. 205
7.1 Différent sets of contracts. 226
7.2 Debt déflation. 236
7.3 Two examples of interbank borrowing architecture. 241
9.1 Banking régulation in perspective. 311
9.2 Best and second-best décision rules (Dewatripont and Tirole 1994, 8.66). 328
9.3 Closure policies. 335 |
| adam_txt |
Contents
List of Figures xv
Préface xvii
1 Introduction 1
1.1 What Is a Bank, and What Do Banks Do? 1
1.2 Liquidity and Payment Services 2
1.2.1 Money Changing 3
1.2.2 Payment Services 4
1.3 Transforming Assets 4
1.4 Managing Risks 5
1.4.1 Crédit Risk 5
1.4.2 Interest Rate and Liquidity Risks 5
1.4.3 Off-Balance-Sheet Opérations 6
1.5 Monitoring and Information Processing 6
1.6 The Rôle of Banks in the Resource Allocation Process 7
1.7 Banking in the Arrow-Debreu Model 7
1.7.1 The Consumer 8
1.7.2 TheFirm 9
1.7.3 The Bank 9
1.7.4 General Equilibrium 9
1.8 Outline of the Book 10
2 The Rôle of Financial Intermediaries 15
2.1 Transaction Costs 18
2.1.1 Economies of Scope 18
2.1.2 Economies of Scale 19
2.2 Coalitions of Depositors and Liquidity Insurance 20
2.2.1 The Model 20
viii Contents
2.2.2 Characteristics of the Optimal Allocation 21
2.2.3 Autarky 21
2.2.4 Market Economy 22
2.2.5 Financial Intermediation 23
2.3 Coalitions of Borrowers and the Cost of Capital 24
2.3.1 A Simple Model of Capital Markets with Adverse
Sélection 25
2.3.2 Signaling through Self-Financing and the Cost of Capital 26
2.3.3 Coalitions of Borrowers 28
2.3.4 Suggestions for Further Reading 28
2.4 Financial Intermediation as Delegated Monitoring 30
2.5 The Choice between Market Debt and Bank Debt 34
2.5.1 A Simple Model of the Crédit Market with Moral
Hazard 34
2.5.2 Monitoring and Réputation 36
2.5.3 Monitoring and Capital 39
2.5.4 Financial Architecture 42
2.5.5 Crédit Risk and Dilution Costs 43
2.6 Liquidity Provision to Firms 46
2.7 Suggestions for Further Reading 47
2.8 Problems 49
2.8.1 Stratégie Entrepreneurs and Market Financing 49
2.8.2 Market versus Bank Finance 50
2.8.3 Economies of Scale in Information Production 50
2.8.4 Monitoring as a Public Good and Gresham's Law 51
2.8.5 Intermediation and Search Costs 52
2.8.6 Intertemporal Insurance 53
2.9 Solutions 54
2.9.1 Stratégie Entrepreneurs and Market Financing 54
2.9.2 Market versus Bank Finance 55
2.9.3 Economies of Scale in Information Production 57
2.9.4 Monitoring as a Public Good and Gresham's Law 58
2.9.5 Intermediation and Search Costs 60
2.9.6 Intertemporal Insurance 62
3 The Industrial Organization Approach to Banking 69
3.1 A Model of a Perfect Compétitive Banking Sector 70
3.1.1 The Model 70
Contents ix
3.1.2 The Crédit Multiplier Approach 71
3.1.3 The Behavior of Individual Banks in a Compétitive
Banking Sector 72
3.1.4 The Compétitive Equilibrium of the Banking Sector 75
3.2 The Monti-Klein Model of a Monopolistic Bank 78
3.2.1 The Original Model 78
3.2.2 The Oligopoliste Version 79
3.2.3 Empirical Evidence 80
3.3 Monopolistic Compétition 81
3.3.1 Does Free Compétition Lead to the Optimal Number of
Banks? 81
3.3.2 The Impact of Deposit Rate Régulation on Crédit Rates 84
3.3.3 Bank Network Compatibility 87
3.3.4 Empirical Evidence 88
3.4 The Scope of the Banking Firm 88
3.5 Beyond Price Compétition 89
3.5.1 Risk Taking on Investments 89
3.5.2 Monitoring and Incentives in a Financial Conglomerate 93
3.5.3 Compétition and Screening 95
3.6 Relationship Banking 99
3.6.1 The Ex Post Monopoly of Information 99
3.6.2 Equilibrium with Screening and Relationship Banking 102
3.6.3 Does Compétition Threaten Relationship Banking? 103
3.6.4 Intertemporal Insurance 104
3.6.5 Empirical Tests of Relationship Banking 104
3.7 Payment Cards and Two-Sided Markets 107
3.7.1 A Model of the Payment Card Industry 108
3.7.2 Card Use 109
3.7.3 Monopoly Network 110
3.7.4 Competing Payment Card Networks 111
3.7.5 Welfare Analysis 111
3.8 Problems 112
3.8.1 Extension of the Monti-Klein Model to the Case of
Risky Loans 112
3.8.2 Compatibility between Banking Networks 113
3.8.3 Double Bertrand Compétition 113
3.8.4 Deposit Rate Régulation 114
x Contents
3.9 Solutions 115
3.9.1 Extension of the Monti-Klein Model to the Case of
Risky Loans 115
3.9.2 Compatibility between Banking Networks 116
3.9.3 Double Bertrand Compétition 117
3.9.4 Deposit Rate Régulation 118
4 The Lender-Borrower Relationship 127
4.1 Why Risk Sharing Does Not Explain AH the Features of Bank
Loans 128
4.2 Costly State Vérification 130
4.2.1 Incentive-Compatible Contracts 131
4.2.2 Efficient Incentive-Compatible Contracts 132
4.2.3 Efficient Falsification-Proof Contracts 133
4.3 Incentives to Repay 134
4.3.1 Nonpecuniary Cost of Bankruptcy 134
4.3.2 Threat of Termination 135
4.3.3 Impact of Judicial Enforcement 137
4.3.4 Stratégie Debt Repayment: The Case of a Sovereign
Debtor 139
4.4 Moral Hazard 143
4.5 The Incomplète Contract Approach 146
4.5.1 Private Debtors and the Inalienability of Human Capital 147
4.5.2 Liquidity of Assets and Debt Capacity 149
4.5.3 Soft Budget Constraints and Financial Structure 150
4.6 Collatéral as a Device for Screening Heterogeneous Borrowers 153
4.7 Problems 157
4.7.1 Optimal Risk Sharing with Symmetric Information 157
4.7.2 Optimal Debt Contracts with Moral Hazard 158
4.7.3 The Optimality of Stochastic Auditing Schemes 159
4.7.4 The Rôle of Hard Claims in Constraining Management 160
4.7.5 Collatéral and Rationing 160
4.7.6 Securitization 161
4.8 Solutions 161
4.8.1 Optimal Risk Sharing with Symmetric Information 161
4.8.2 Optimal Debt Contracts with Moral Hazard 162
4.8.3 The Optimality of Stochastic Auditing Schemes 163
4.8.4 The Rôle of Hard Claims in Constraining Management 164
Contents xi
4.8.5 Collatéral and Rationing 164
4.8.6 Securitization 165
5 Equilibrium in the Crédit Market and Its Macroeconomic Implications 171
5.1 Définition of Equilibrium Crédit Rationing 172
5.2 The Backward-Bending Supply of Crédit 173
5.3 Equilibrium Crédit Rationing 175
5.3.1 Adverse Sélection 175
5.3.2 Costly State Vérification 177
5.3.3 Moral Hazard 178
5.4 Equilibrium with a Broader Class of Contracts 181
5.5 Problems 185
5.5.1 The Model of Mankiw 185
5.5.2 Efficient Crédit Rationing 185
5.5.3 Too Much Investment 186
5.6 Solutions 186
5.6.1 The Model of Mankiw 186
5.6.2 Efficient Crédit Rationing 187
5.6.3 Too Much Investment 188
6 The Macroeconomic Conséquences of Financial Imperfections 193
6.1 A Short Historical Perspective 195
6.2 The Transmission Channels of Monetary Policy 196
6.2.1 The Différent Channels 197
6.2.2 A Simple Model 198
6.2.3 Crédit View versus Money View: Justification of the
Assumptions and Empirical Evidence 200
6.2.4 Empirical Evidence on the Crédit View 202
6.3 Financial Fragility and Economie Performance 203
6.4 Financial Development and Economie Growth 209
7 Individual Bank Runs and Systemic Risk 217
7.1 Banking Deposits and Liquidity Insurance 218
7.1.1 A Model of Liquidity Insurance 218
7.1.2 Autarky 219
7.1.3 The Allocation Obtained When a Financial Market Is
Opened 219
7.1.4 The Optimal (Symmetric) Allocation 220
7.1.5 A Fractional Reserve Banking System 220
xii Contents
7.2 The Stability of the Fractional Reserve System and Alternative
Institutional Arrangements 222
7.2.1 The Causes of Instability 222
7.2.2 A First Remedy for Instability: Narrow Banking 222
7.2.3 Regulatory Responses: Suspension of Convertibility or
Deposit Insurance 224
7.2.4 Jacklin's Proposai: Equity versus Deposits 225
7.3 Bank Runs and Renegotiation 227
7.3.1 A Simple Model 227
7.3.2 Pledgeable and Nonpledgeable Cash Flows 228
7.3.3 Bank Runs as a Discipline Device 228
7.3.4 The Rôle of Capital 229
7.4 Efficient Bank Runs 230
7.5 Interbank Markets and the Management of Idiosyncratic
Liquidity Shocks 233
7.5.1 The Model of Bhattacharya and Gale 233
7.5.2 The Rôle of the Interbank Market 234
7.5.3 The Case of Unobservable Liquidity Shocks 234
7.6 Systemic Risk and Contagion 235
7.6.1 Aggregate Liquidity and Banking Crises 236
7.6.2 Payment Systems and OTC Opérations 238
7.6.3 Contagion through Interbank Claims 239
7.7 Lender of Last Resort: A Historical Perspective 242
7.7.1 Views on the LLR Rôle 243
7.7.2 Liquidity and Solvency: A Coordination Game 244
7.7.3 The Practice of LLR Assistance 246
7.7.4 The Effect of LLR and Other Partial Arrangements 247
7.8 Problems 248
7.8.1 Bank Runs and Moral Hazard 248
7.8.2 Bank Runs 249
7.8.3 Information-Based Bank Runs 249
7.8.4 Banks' Suspension of Convertibility 250
7.8.5 Aggregated Liquidity Shocks 251
7.8.6 Charter Value 252
7.9 Solutions 253
7.9.1 Banks Runs and Moral Hazard 253
7.9.2 Bank Runs 253
Contents xjjj
7.9.3 Information-Based Bank Runs 255
7.9.4 Banks' Suspension of Convertibility 255
7.9.5 Aggregated Liquidity Shocks 257
7.9.6 Charter Value 258
8 Managing Risks in the Banking Firm 265
8.1 Crédit Risk 266
8.1.1 Institutional Context 266
8.1.2 Evaluating the Cost of Crédit Risk 267
8.1.3 Regulatory Response to Crédit Risk 271
8.2 Liquidity Risk 273
8.2.1 Reserve Management 274
8.2.2 Introducing Liquidity Risk into the Monti-Klein Model 275
8.2.3 The Bank as a Market Maker 277
8.3 Interest Rate Risk 280
8.3.1 The Term Structure of Interest Rates 281
8.3.2 Measuring Interest Rate Risk Exposure 283
8.3.3 Applications to Asset Liability Management 284
8.4 Market Risk 286
8.4.1 Portfolio Theory: The Capital Asset Pricing Model 286
8.4.2 The Bank as a Portfolio Manager: The Pyle-Hart-Jaffee
Approach 288
8.4.3 An Application of the Portfolio Model: The Impact of
Capital Requirements 291
8.5 Problems 296
8.5.1 The Model of Prisman, Slovin, and Sushka 296
8.5.2 The Risk Structure of Interest Rates 297
8.5.3 Using the CAPM for Loan Pricing 298
8.6 Solutions 298
8.6.1 The Model of Prisman, Slovin, and Sushka 298
8.6.2 The Risk Structure of Interest Rates 300
8.6.3 Using the CAPM for Loan Pricing 301
9 The Régulation of Banks 305
9.1 The Justification for Banking Régulation 306
9.1.1 The General Setting 306
9.1.2 The Fragility of Banks 307
9.1.3 The Protection of Depositors' and Customers' Confidence 308
9.1.4 The Cost of Bank Failures 310
xiv Contents
9.2 A Framework for Regulatory Analysis 310
9.3 Deposit Insurance 313
9.3.1 The Moral Hazard Issue 313
9.3.2 Risk-Related Insurance Premiums 315
9.3.3 Is Fairly Priced Deposit Insurance Possible? 316
9.3.4 The Effects of Deposit Insurance on the Banking
Industry 318
9.4 Solvency Régulations 319
9.4.1 The Portfolio Approach 319
9.4.2 Cost of Bank Capital and Deposit Rate Régulation 320
9.4.3 The Incentive Approach 323
9.4.4 The Incomplète Contract Approach 324
9.4.5 The Three Pillars of Basel II 328
9.5 The Resolution of Bank Failures 329
9.5.1 Resolving Banks' Distress: Instruments and Policies 329
9.5.2 Information Révélation and Managers' Incentives 330
9.5.3 Who Should Décide on Banks' Closure? 332
9.6 Market Discipline 335
9.6.1 Theoretical Framework 336
9.6.2 Empirical Evidence 337
9.7 Suggestions for Further Reading 338
9.8 Problem 340
9.8.1 Moral Hazard and Capital Régulation 340
9.9 Solution 340
9.9.1 Moral Hazard and Capital Régulation 340
Index 349
Figures
1.1 Financial décisions of économie agents. 8
2.1 Bank balance sheet in Bryant-Diamond-Dybvig paradigm. 24
2.2 Direct finance: Each lender monitors its borrower (total cost nmK). 31
2.3 Intermediated finance: Delegated monitoring (total cost nK + Cn). 32
2.4 Firms categorized by type of finance. 42
2.5 Optimal financing choices of firms. 46
3.1 Incréments in aggregated balances of various agents. 72
3.2 Locations on Salop circle. 83
3.3 Costs and benefits of a card transaction. 108
4.1 Optimality of the standard debt contract under costly state vérification. 133
4.2 Optimality of the standard debt contract under nonpecuniary costs of
bankruptcy. 135
4.3 Underinvestment in the case of a stratégie debtor (Allen 1983). 140
4.4 Optimal contract in Innés (1987) moral hazard model. 145
4.5 Borrowers' indifférence curves: low risks AL, high risks Aw. 154
4.6 Optimal menu of loan contracts. 156
4.7 Pareto frontiers with deterministic and stochastic audits. 164
5.1 Expected return to the bank as a function of nominal rate of loan. 173
5.2 Equilibrium crédit rationing. 174
5.3 Profit to the firm as a function of cash flow from project. 176
5.4 Expected return to the bank as a function of R in Bester-Hellwig (1987)
model: Case 1. 179
5.5 Expected return to the bank as a function of R in Bester-Hellwig (1987)
model: Case 2. 180
5.6 Separating equilibrium in Bester (1985) model: The only candidate is
xvi Figures
5.7a Separating equilibrium in Bester (1985) model: Equilibrium exists. 184
5.7b Separating equilibrium in Bester (1985) model: Equilibrium does not
exist. 184
6.1 Timing in Bernanke-Gertler (1990) model. 205
7.1 Différent sets of contracts. 226
7.2 Debt déflation. 236
7.3 Two examples of interbank borrowing architecture. 241
9.1 Banking régulation in perspective. 311
9.2 Best and second-best décision rules (Dewatripont and Tirole 1994, 8.66). 328
9.3 Closure policies. 335 |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| any_adam_object_boolean | 1 |
| author | Freixas, Xavier 1949- Rochet, Jean-Charles 1957- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)123139937 (DE-588)120833557 |
| author_facet | Freixas, Xavier 1949- Rochet, Jean-Charles 1957- |
| author_role | aut aut |
| author_sort | Freixas, Xavier 1949- |
| author_variant | x f xf j c r jcr |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV023301474 |
| callnumber-first | H - Social Science |
| callnumber-label | HG1601 |
| callnumber-raw | HG1601 |
| callnumber-search | HG1601 |
| callnumber-sort | HG 41601 |
| callnumber-subject | HG - Finance |
| classification_rvk | QK 000 QK 300 |
| classification_tum | WIR 165f |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)255956849 (DE-599)BSZ278496725 |
| dewey-full | 332.1 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 332 - Financial economics |
| dewey-raw | 332.1 |
| dewey-search | 332.1 |
| dewey-sort | 3332.1 |
| dewey-tens | 330 - Economics |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| discipline_str_mv | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| edition | 2. ed. |
| format | Book |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>00000nam a2200000 c 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV023301474</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20160928</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t|</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">080515s2008 xx d||| |||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">0262062704</subfield><subfield code="c">(hbk.) : £38.95 hbk. : £38.95 : CIP entry (Apr.)</subfield><subfield code="9">0-262-06270-4</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9780262062701</subfield><subfield code="9">978-0-262-06270-1</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)255956849</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BSZ278496725</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-706</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-703</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-384</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-1051</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-945</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-355</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-19</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-M382</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-523</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-20</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-11</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-91</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-83</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-521</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-473</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="050" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">HG1601</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">332.1</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">QK 000</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)141630:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">QK 300</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)141640:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">WIR 165f</subfield><subfield code="2">stub</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Freixas, Xavier</subfield><subfield code="d">1949-</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)123139937</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Microeconomics of banking</subfield><subfield code="c">Xavier Freixas and Jean-Charles Rochet</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="250" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">2. ed.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Cambridge, Mass. [u.a.]</subfield><subfield code="b">MIT Press</subfield><subfield code="c">2008</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">XXI, 363 S.</subfield><subfield code="b">graph. Darst.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Literaturangaben</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1="3" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">This is the second edition of an essential text on the microeconomic foundations of banking surveys the latest research in banking theory, with new material that covers recent developments in the field. Over the last thirty years, a new paradigm in banking theory has overturned economists' traditional vision of the banking sector. The asymmetric information model, extremely powerful in many areas of economic theory, has proven useful in banking theory both for explaining the role of banks in the economy and for pointing out structural weaknesses in the banking sector that may justify government intervention.In the past, banking courses in most doctoral programs in economics, business, or finance focused either on management or monetary issues and their macroeconomic consequences; a microeconomic theory of banking did not exist because the Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium model of complete contingent markets (the standard reference at the time) was unable to explain the role of banks in the economy. This text provides students with a guide to the microeconomic theory of banking that has emerged since then, examining the main issues and offering the necessary tools for understanding how they have been modeled.This second edition covers the recent dramatic developments in academic research on the microeconomics of banking, with a focus on four important topics: the theory of two-sided markets and its implications for the payment card industry; "non-price competition" and its effect on the competition-stability tradeoff and the entry of new banks; the transmission of monetary policy and the effect on the functioning of the credit market of capital requirements for banks; and the theoretical foundations of banking regulation, which have been clarified, although recent developments in risk modeling have not yet led to a significant parallel development of economic modeling.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Bank</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Banks and banking</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Microeconomics</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Unternehmenstheorie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4078614-6</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Bankgeschäft</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4112667-1</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Bank</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4004436-1</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Finanzdienstleistung</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4212226-0</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Mikroökonomie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4039225-9</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Bankgeschäft</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4112667-1</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Mikroökonomie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4039225-9</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Bank</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4004436-1</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="1" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Finanzdienstleistung</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4212226-0</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="1" ind2="2"><subfield code="a">Mikroökonomie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4039225-9</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">1\p</subfield><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="2" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Bank</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4004436-1</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="2" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Unternehmenstheorie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4078614-6</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="2" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">2\p</subfield><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Rochet, Jean-Charles</subfield><subfield code="d">1957-</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)120833557</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="m">HBZ Datenaustausch</subfield><subfield code="q">application/pdf</subfield><subfield code="u">http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016485925&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA</subfield><subfield code="3">Inhaltsverzeichnis</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="883" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">1\p</subfield><subfield code="a">cgwrk</subfield><subfield code="d">20201028</subfield><subfield code="q">DE-101</subfield><subfield code="u">https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="883" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">2\p</subfield><subfield code="a">cgwrk</subfield><subfield code="d">20201028</subfield><subfield code="q">DE-101</subfield><subfield code="u">https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="943" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016485925</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV023301474 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T20:46:47Z |
| indexdate | 2025-01-03T15:00:57Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 0262062704 9780262062701 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016485925 |
| oclc_num | 255956849 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-706 DE-703 DE-384 DE-1051 DE-945 DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-M382 DE-523 DE-20 DE-11 DE-91 DE-BY-TUM DE-83 DE-521 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG |
| owner_facet | DE-706 DE-703 DE-384 DE-1051 DE-945 DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-M382 DE-523 DE-20 DE-11 DE-91 DE-BY-TUM DE-83 DE-521 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG |
| physical | XXI, 363 S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 2008 |
| publishDateSearch | 2008 |
| publishDateSort | 2008 |
| publisher | MIT Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Freixas, Xavier 1949- Verfasser (DE-588)123139937 aut Microeconomics of banking Xavier Freixas and Jean-Charles Rochet 2. ed. Cambridge, Mass. [u.a.] MIT Press 2008 XXI, 363 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Literaturangaben This is the second edition of an essential text on the microeconomic foundations of banking surveys the latest research in banking theory, with new material that covers recent developments in the field. Over the last thirty years, a new paradigm in banking theory has overturned economists' traditional vision of the banking sector. The asymmetric information model, extremely powerful in many areas of economic theory, has proven useful in banking theory both for explaining the role of banks in the economy and for pointing out structural weaknesses in the banking sector that may justify government intervention.In the past, banking courses in most doctoral programs in economics, business, or finance focused either on management or monetary issues and their macroeconomic consequences; a microeconomic theory of banking did not exist because the Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium model of complete contingent markets (the standard reference at the time) was unable to explain the role of banks in the economy. This text provides students with a guide to the microeconomic theory of banking that has emerged since then, examining the main issues and offering the necessary tools for understanding how they have been modeled.This second edition covers the recent dramatic developments in academic research on the microeconomics of banking, with a focus on four important topics: the theory of two-sided markets and its implications for the payment card industry; "non-price competition" and its effect on the competition-stability tradeoff and the entry of new banks; the transmission of monetary policy and the effect on the functioning of the credit market of capital requirements for banks; and the theoretical foundations of banking regulation, which have been clarified, although recent developments in risk modeling have not yet led to a significant parallel development of economic modeling. Bank Banks and banking Microeconomics Unternehmenstheorie (DE-588)4078614-6 gnd rswk-swf Bankgeschäft (DE-588)4112667-1 gnd rswk-swf Bank (DE-588)4004436-1 gnd rswk-swf Finanzdienstleistung (DE-588)4212226-0 gnd rswk-swf Mikroökonomie (DE-588)4039225-9 gnd rswk-swf Bankgeschäft (DE-588)4112667-1 s Mikroökonomie (DE-588)4039225-9 s DE-604 Bank (DE-588)4004436-1 s Finanzdienstleistung (DE-588)4212226-0 s 1\p DE-604 Unternehmenstheorie (DE-588)4078614-6 s 2\p DE-604 Rochet, Jean-Charles 1957- Verfasser (DE-588)120833557 aut HBZ Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016485925&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 2\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Freixas, Xavier 1949- Rochet, Jean-Charles 1957- Microeconomics of banking Bank Banks and banking Microeconomics Unternehmenstheorie (DE-588)4078614-6 gnd Bankgeschäft (DE-588)4112667-1 gnd Bank (DE-588)4004436-1 gnd Finanzdienstleistung (DE-588)4212226-0 gnd Mikroökonomie (DE-588)4039225-9 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4078614-6 (DE-588)4112667-1 (DE-588)4004436-1 (DE-588)4212226-0 (DE-588)4039225-9 |
| title | Microeconomics of banking |
| title_auth | Microeconomics of banking |
| title_exact_search | Microeconomics of banking |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Microeconomics of banking |
| title_full | Microeconomics of banking Xavier Freixas and Jean-Charles Rochet |
| title_fullStr | Microeconomics of banking Xavier Freixas and Jean-Charles Rochet |
| title_full_unstemmed | Microeconomics of banking Xavier Freixas and Jean-Charles Rochet |
| title_short | Microeconomics of banking |
| title_sort | microeconomics of banking |
| topic | Bank Banks and banking Microeconomics Unternehmenstheorie (DE-588)4078614-6 gnd Bankgeschäft (DE-588)4112667-1 gnd Bank (DE-588)4004436-1 gnd Finanzdienstleistung (DE-588)4212226-0 gnd Mikroökonomie (DE-588)4039225-9 gnd |
| topic_facet | Bank Banks and banking Microeconomics Unternehmenstheorie Bankgeschäft Finanzdienstleistung Mikroökonomie |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016485925&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT freixasxavier microeconomicsofbanking AT rochetjeancharles microeconomicsofbanking |