Terroryzm jako zagrożenie dla bezpieczeństwa cywilizacji zachodniej w XXI wieku:
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | Polish |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Toruń
Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek
2007
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Abstract |
| Beschreibung: | Zsfassung in engl. Sprache |
| Beschreibung: | 222 s. 23 cm |
| ISBN: | 9788374415453 |
Internformat
MARC
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| 100 | 1 | |a Kosta, Raul Andrzej |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Terroryzm jako zagrożenie dla bezpieczeństwa cywilizacji zachodniej w XXI wieku |c Raul Andrzej Kosta |
| 264 | 1 | |a Toruń |b Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek |c 2007 | |
| 300 | |a 222 s. |c 23 cm | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 500 | |a Zsfassung in engl. Sprache | ||
| 505 | 0 | |a Bibliogr. s. 201-214 | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Terroryzm / 21 w |2 jhpk | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Terroryzm / zwalczanie / 1990- |2 jhpk | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe / 21 w |2 jhpk | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe - 21 w |2 jhpk | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Terroryzm - 21 w |2 jhpk | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Terroryzm - zwalczanie - 1990- |2 jhpk | |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Internationaler Terrorismus |0 (DE-588)4162078-1 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
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| 856 | 4 | 2 | |m Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen |q application/pdf |u http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016441299&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |3 Abstract |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804137561777504256 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | Spis
tresei
Wstęp
......................................................... 5
Rozdziel
1
Stan wiedzy o terroryzmie
......................................... 11
1.1.
Geneza terroryzmu
.......................................... 11
1.2.
Zrodia
terroryzmu
........................................... 23
1.3.
Rodzaje terroryzmu
.......................................... 28
1.4.
Terrotyzm a działania militarne
................................. 33
Rozdział
2
Konflikt cywilizacyjny jako źródło terroryzmu
........................ 53
2.1.
Rodzaje eksplikacji źródeł (uwarunkowań)
konfliktu cywilizacyjnego
..................................... 53
2.2.
Tendencje w przebiegu współczesnego konfliktu globalnego
......... 66
2.3.
Sposoby rozwiązywania globalnego konfliktu cywilizacyjnego
......... 76
2.4.
Zastosowanie sił zbrojnych w rozwiązywaniu konfliktów zbrojnych
..... 81
2.4.1.
Afganistan
............................................ 82
2.4.2.
Irak
................................................. 94
Rozdział
3
Metody zwalczania terroryzmu
..................................... 102
3.1.
Polityczne zwalczanie terroryzmu
...................,,.,,....... 102
3.2.
Militarne zwalczanie terroryzmu
................................ 111
3.3.
Zmienne (cywilno-wojskowe) zwalczanie terroryzmu
................ 117
Rozdział
4
Znaczenie państw średniej wielkości
w zapewnieniu bezpieczeństwa cywilizacji zachodniej
.................. 130
4.1.
Rola państw średniej wielkości w systemie bezpieczeństwa
cywilizacji zachodniej
........................................ 130
4.2.
Rola państw średniej wielkości w
ΝΛΤΟ
......................... 142
4.3.
Rola państw średniej wielkości w Unii Europejskiej
................. 151
AA. Perspektywy państw średniej wielkości
w systemie bezpieczeństwa globalnego
.......................... 160
Rozdział
5
Rola polskiej polityki bezpieczeństwa i przeciwdziałaniu terroryzmowi
.... 165
5.1.
Stosunek polskiej polityki zagranicznej wobec terroryzmu
............ 165
5.2.
Udział Polski w walce z terroryzmem
............................ 172
5.3.
Stosowane metody zwalczania terroryzmu
........................ 180
Zakończenie
.................................................... 187
Bibliografía
..................................................... 201
Summary.......................................................
215
Summary
Vuľľ^
l °ne of the tarsets thut
Ле
author
hadin mbd. Sho-
gk
terrori!m bec°™ng
a substitute topic threatens stability of our dviliza-
Г
k ľ
ÏStraCtf
,public attention from othef t0Pks was mother. The author
also shows how the problems of their imperial greatness of former colonial potenta¬
tes may hmder their functioning in new geopolitical reality.
1
eace is always a value that is worth fighting for. The above statement, altho-
ugn
it is a good and expected motif in many monographs and articles
-
contains a
contradiction, because it combines two opposite phenomena, peace and fighting,
which we sometimes understand as war. With the reservation that fighting is not
always war. Both phenomena seem to be as old as the history of mankind. It is not,
however, absolutely true. From the beginning of his history, man fought, first for
survival and adaptation to the changing reality of his current environment, later, after
ne
had adapted to, he went on fighting, forming structures that later became states,
and
m
consequence of conflicts with his neighbours, empires. Then fighting went
on
ror
preservation of the status quo, until there appeared a competitor strong eno-
U° ,,reaten the
štence
and survival of a state. To sum up, the period we
would pall peace was a kind of break between wars, in compliance with the
negatíve
1ľ
k°n
rá
l^e term·
k
was on*ythe Period connected with the two world wars
that changed the attitude, but not completely. When we analyse past and present
conflicts, we can certain constant element
-
the desire to dominate and aspire to the
name of a superpower regardless of the fact whether the state in question has means
to cover the cost of its aspirations or not. After the World War
П,
and also at the
time of what was called the Cold War it seemed
к
seemeâ
that there is nothing
worse than a state, which cherishes its desire to dominated the world by means of
its distorted ideology and historical justice which was incomprehensible to others
and was quite uniquely understood by the state itself. Terrorist attacks, and particu¬
larly their scale and extent, changed this kind of attitude. One may ask why did it
change. After all, the phenomenon of terrorism has been a constant element of func¬
tioning of human communities for over two thousand years if one sees the sect of
Zealots as terrorists,
lbe
answer seems
m
simple as to smack of banality and is
contained in the statement, the essence of which is the fact that in modern times and
ín
the world undergoing globalisation, a state has lost its monopoly for domination.
Nowadays,
al
Qaeda
(Base), founded by Osama bin Laden, a veteran of the Afghan
war and multimillionaire at the same time. ITie organisation has a supranational struc¬
ture and its branches attempt to play significant role in the policy of different sta¬
tes. This means that fighting against the organisation, and I do not mean war, may
be practically impossible. It is not, however, that the threatened states do not have
means to invigilate and destroy individual training camps. The problem is that we
216 ______
Summary
_____________________________
try too hard to understand motifs of their actions in terms of Western Civilisation
created and understood in Huntingtonian terms. That is
,
we combine a variety of
cultures into one Civilisation and confront it with Islam, the civilisation in which
the terrorists are rooted, and which is assumed to be the same kind of monolith as
the Western Civilisation. Therefore, a number of very matter-of-fact, scientific ana¬
lyses focus on discussing consequences, not sources of the phenomenon.
Being unable to explain the reasons, we believe that terrorists are beasts making
use of barbarian methods which are degenerate and take their root directly in the
war method. It is by all means the correct attitude if we remember that is derived
from the European way of perceiving the world and therefore it must be right
-
otherwise everything we believe in would fall apart. And this is exactly what the
al
Qaeda
terrorists want to achieve. They do not conduct lengthy philosophical or po¬
litical disputes
-
their war strategy seems simple, transparent and clear. The core of
their strategy is to provoke the enemy by any means. To do this they must strike at
what their enemy (the West) loves. Consequently, the enemy may act rashly and in¬
cautiously. Striking without appropriate recce may result in elimination of those who
would have to be eliminated anyway if
al
Qaeda
were successful, which does not
mean that terrorists can openly manifest their satisfaction with such course of events.
On the contrary, they not only tend to, but actually must, take advantage of such a
course of events.
In the reasoning discussed above, the most evident element is cynicism, which
is an integral part of the strategy. The cynicism is, to a certain extent, tinged with
Machiavellian political ideology. The ideology is in its ideal (pure) form the target
to achieve and a value in itself for many politicians all over the world. The fact that
terrorists try to take advantage of it is only evidence of their intelligence. Not only
that, however. First of all, they are dangerous enemies because they are products
-
children of modern times. The bosses of such an organisation usually hold a tele¬
phone
ín
one hand, using it to give orders as to the place and time of a successive
attack, and another telephone in the other hand, using it to conduct different kinds
of financial or stock exchange transactions. They are mostly well educated and af¬
fluent people. Maybe it is one of the reasons for their masterful use of the highest
human instincts as well as ideology and religion to achieve their targets. This is why
it is conjectured that their strength is indeed weakness of the West. And it is not an
unidentified weakness. There is a number of weaknesses of different kinds: politi¬
cal, ideological, social, military. They concern each aspect of life of communities of
the West. For example, many people believe that Christian religion keeps trying to
force its way to politics, which in the West is reserved for lay people. In reference
to Christianity, the accusation seems to be poorly founded. It is enough to read the
New Testament from the words
„Kender
to Caesar the things that are Caesar s, and to
God the things that are Cod s , to understand that separation of religion from poli¬
tics has been one of the basics since the moment the religion was created. There
were, admittedly, numerous religious wars or crusades in the history of Christiani¬
ty, but they were rather consequence of aspirations of consolidating and extending
power of rulers of those times than of religious differences. Establishing the fact of
lust for power is essential here, because the were able, like Osama bin Laden today,
________________
Summary
_____________________217
to instil ideology
-
to make the sense of war more clear to their subjects. The conc¬
lusion that is evident from the above reasoning is as controversial as it is alarming.
Namely, the reason for many wars and conflicts was ignorance which concerned not
only direct neighbours, but first of all representatives of other cultures. It seems quite
obvious that if we do not understand our neighbours, who follow similar values,
then we are completely unable to understand people who have a different idea of
their own being and the world around. Democracy was to be a chance to change
the trend
-
through globalisation of its values it was to win and introduce peaceml
order in the world. It was to be an ideal system. An ideal system that man is unable
to implement. An ideal system that remains political
fiction
and should not be taken
into consideration in any serious scientific dispute.
Human nature, as well as human mentality is difficult to change. Stereotypes
and xenophobia rooted in it are difficult to uproot and they create certain image
through which one evaluates one s contemporary environment. That is why this type
of mentality is a constant element of functioning of a society
-
like war throughout
the ages. Of course, it does not mean that it will replace war. One should rather say
that most of post-Cold War conflicts would not have occurred without it. This is
why establishing dialogue is so difficult
-
especially when one tries to find quick
and easy solution in
w
complicated way. A phenomenon, whose apogee is marked
by terrorist attacks is easy to evaluate by bringing charges of barbarism or brutality.
It is a very useful method of social engineering. The results of using it may be much
different from the expected ones, however. The result is that if we accuse terrorists
that because of breaking our rules they are inhuman, we make a serious mistake.
Violence, which is their weapon is only too human. It has its roots in the hidden
primary human instinct. It is also connected with the way of upbringing and educa¬
tion of a given society. This is why the assumption, against Huntington s theses,
that it is not religion that is responsible for the spreading evil, but the method of
educating people seems quite logical. If the system of education is faulty, it is very
difficult to change the outlook on the world instilled by the system. It pertains to
both Islam and the West. As well as any other civilisation. If the west really wants to
beat
al
Qaeda,
it is not enough to trace and eliminate its leaders. The problem is
elsewhere. One should think how to change the process of education, starting from
the basic unit of society, that is starting from family level. At the same time, the
change must be implemented in such a way as not to destroy its tradition, as brutal
interference into the sphere of sacrum is not allowed. The change and new functio¬
ning of the system must be implemented in such a way as to prevent „production
of successive lost people who, following an appropriate dose of indoctrination beco¬
me ideal killing machines. Implementation of educational reform is necessary, but
its success depends mainly on common sense and caution of those who will be able
to take up the task.
This is why, in this work the author tries to pinpoint the essence of the pro¬
blems which must be solved and dealt with in the first place and the ones that can
be solved later
-
so that the west is not bathed in blood as is
al Qaeda s
target. It is
worth to start this part of pondering with certain assumption, namely: Each man
may at certain period of time yield to the lust of power or to an illusion of posses-
218______________________
Summary
_____________________
sing, which, of course, is not blameworthy in itself. The key point
ís,
however, how
the (possessed) power is going to be used. The principle functions at each stage of
existence
-
of an individual s being part of the society. The process starts in one s
family, where the power is most often held by the father, the chief bread-winner of
the family. The model holds in the Arab world, but not in the West. In the USA or
in Europe there are numerous cases where one person is unable to support the who¬
le family, especially it is a multi-generation or large family, like in the Arab world.
Apart from that, it is noteworthy that Europeans usually hide true reasons for
their conduct, dressing them in aptly created ideologies or theories, such as the fa¬
mous German school of geographical determinism, the basic assumption of which
was justifying colonialism and, consequently, methods of dealing with the conqu¬
ered communities.
It should be noted, however, that none of the theories is dangerous until an in¬
dividual or a group shows interest in it. Then the theory becomes, to a certain de¬
gree, degenerated by the desire to apply it in practice. This makes it change in com¬
pliance with a given political reality. In this way, something that has been
a lund
of
political metaphor, becomes reality. It is logical, that such a statement, which is at
the same time an evaluation and summing up of the last two hundred years of histo¬
ry of mankind, must give rise to a kind of resistance. One of the reasons for this
state of things is oversimplifying ideological discussion. We often hear voices that
justify or criticise such ideological systems as: communism, fascism, nanism, or,
currently, globalisation or Islamic fundamentalism. Even the fact of making such a
comparison seems an exaggeration. We just have to bear in mind that a sociologist,
political scientist and a military
-
analysing contemporary issues connected with phe¬
nomena like peace, war and, consequently, safety, real facts are important, not wi¬
shful thinking. Before it is put into practice, each theory is created to provide peace
and prosperity to mankind. And the fact that most often in disputes of this type
(justifying the theory) the term „mankind means compatriots of the author of the
theory in not generally considered. What is more, it is considered to be of little
importance. Especially, when the author of a theory, writing about merits and flaws
of a given community glorified not the one in which he lived and which applied his
theory into practice, but the one that he originated from, and which became the
victim of his conception. It was then that extreme perversions mentioned above hap¬
pened
.
However, the process of adaptation of theory is not a simple task. The ide¬
ology created on its base must be passed to the public in such a way as to be most
effective.
Recapitulating, each information is modified depending on from who is its so¬
urce and to whom it is directed. In the discussed case (and in any other case) the
party that is considered to be weaker is, by definition, in a better situation than the
other party. Besides, in the strategy assumed so far important elements were com¬
pletely passed over or disregarded. Elements that determine and decide the course
of war with terrorism.
What is most important, it does not really matter that
al
Qaeda
is an organisa¬
tion not a state. It arises from the fact that the conflict is very much like numerous
internal conflicts within states. In each of those conflicts, the government, apart from
Summary
219
fighting against the armed opposition, has to deal with current affairs of the state;
such as state economy among other things. Opposition in such a situation has a much
simpler task. They only need to prove that the state governed by their opponents is
an inefficient organism, breaking the rights and freedoms of its citizens. Having
won over the minds and hearts of the people, it is enough then to beat the weake¬
ned government army in open combat. For
al
Qaeda,
the world
Ís
their state and
the population of the state are Muslims scattered all over the world. It is for them
that properly modified instruments of political marketing, the core of which is war
with the
infidel,
are applied. What is problematic in this slogan is whether war aga¬
inst the infidel is the real issue. Or is it just fighting for the sake of fighting? There
were dictators in each era of human history whose only target in life was ensuring
constant peace to their fellow countrymen. The means that they used to reach their
target cost the lives of hundreds, thousands, sometimes millions of human beings.
AI Qaeda
is no exception here. Its style and method of acting is just multiplication
of such ideas. If the method is different, though not quite innovative, does not result
from the genius of their leader. They are rather conditioned by the dynamics of
changes on the geopolitical map of the world. Maintaining that the language of the¬
ir propaganda is a land of post-war political marketing may give rise to different
controversies. Nevertheless, after thorough examination of the language, it is worth¬
while to ponder on the possibility of adopting such a term, because in the classical
version no-one has ever tried to encourage us to exterminate another nation. Classi¬
cal attitude involved mainly aggressive competition and rivalry
-
at times verging on
illegal, often brutal and unfair. In the version proposed by
al
Qaeda
it is genocidal
in the first place. The West must never forget about it. If it does forget, it is not
only the civilisation that will lose, but the entire mankind. Especially, that the oppo¬
nent does not think about the political situation in the world if terrorists did win.
The only thing they are really experts at is killing other people. I do not mean their
leaders but ordinary members of terrorist organisations. That is why seeing threats
resulting from their propaganda is so important. Until now, the West concentrated
mainly on implementation of the basic assumptions of the war method and achie¬
ved a disputable success. There are two solutions: consequently implement the stra¬
tegy applied so far
-
which theoretically can, but need not result in success. Or
choose another variant, much longer and more difficult
-
but more effective becau¬
se of that. Its basic assumptions can be reduced to the statement that little by little
does the trick
-
that is, as we have mentioned above. We need slow systematic change
of the system of education combined with educational dialogue between civilisations.
The dialogue must lead to a similar change in mentality within the Islamic commu¬
nities. Change effected only by one side is a misunderstanding
-
and also lack of
understanding for the reality and it would be harmful in the long perspective.
After assuming this point of view one can ask about the sense of applying some¬
thing that is on the verge of
utopia - or
is
utopia.
It should be noted here that de¬
mocracy is often said to be the worst of all systems. The system that gave power to
Hitler, for example. ParadoxicaUy, the same people add almost on the same breath
that a better system is still to be invented. This comparison may be an oversimplifi¬
cation, but it is not the most important issue at the moment. What is important is
220_________________________
Summary
_____________________________
understanding that as the crisis gets worse the number of possible alternatives dimi¬
nishes instead of growing. Consequently, there are only those solutions left whose
existence we have negated or did not recognise. In the new situation that has ensu¬
ed they become real and effective solutions. Everything depends on the will and
intentions of the politician who would be able to bring about sanctioning and esta¬
blishing realistic instruments of implementation of the method. A lot of time will
pass, however, before it comes to that. The same happened in the past during the
conflicts in
Indo-China,
the Middle east and Africa and there is no hint that the
situation is going to be different this time. This is why the propaganda of
al
Qaeda
is so effective. This is also the reason why the reaction of the West is so ineffective.
The coming years will prove whether
al
Qaeda will
be more effective or whether the
politicians and the miHtary will develop a new strategy. The one that until now has
seemed quite unreal, because only a new strategy can (though it is not guaranteed)
result in defeating the post-war marketing of
al
Qaeda.
Otherwise, the number of
solutions is reduced to nil. This is also something to bear in mind when analysing
contemporary conflicts. Will it really be so, however? It will take some time before
we know the answer. It does not change the sense of contents of this work, though.
The model of fighting terrorism as a slogan is complete misunderstanding. Where¬
as the struggle against people obsessed by extreme fundamentalist ideas
ís
the requ¬
irement of the moment. This is why the author sees the need for educating the
society. Especially when it has become evident that the leaders of
al
Qaeda
fight for
the sake of fighting. It is contrary to the Aristotelian understanding of the struggle
for power, where war is an instrument, whereas for
al
Qaeda
it seems to be the
target. It is evident from the methods of action employed by
al
Qaeda in
Iraq, where
the self-appointed leader of the organisation was recognised by Osama bin Laden
as his representative. In a different situation,
ifit
were not for the combat situation,
bin Laden would appoint one of his close co-workers as the head of the Iraqi branch
of
al
Qaeda.
Now, however, his priorities are different. Now that the marines have
killed
al
Zarkawi, he will, after some time, be acclaimed a martyr who died for his
faith. This will result in escalation of military activities. This work was meant as an
occasion to reveal imprecision of the applied strategy. It also proves that it is not the
term terrorism, but the extreme fundamentalists applying it are dangerous. Changes
proposed by the author are probably not a recipe for success, but in his opinion can
at least contribute to the final success.
Education, diplomacy, and only then fighting, and even then after modifica¬
tion of the strategy used do far
-
these are the main aspects stressed by the author,
as well as the fact that when dealing with a problem (not only the one that is the
subject of this paper) one should first examine the reasons and then eliminate them,
if possible.
Analysis of results is an analysis for analysis sake, contributing very little to prac¬
tice. Such an analysis just extends theoretical knowledge. Theory cannot exist wi¬
thout being put into practice. It must be, as the author showed, a cautious and com¬
plex process. A misrepresented theory can do more harm than good, as was clearly
shown by the way of interpreting Koran by extreme fundamentalists. This is why
flexibility when creating a strategy is the only chance for the West s victory in their
____________________
Summary
___________________________221
struggle against terrorism. On condition that it is going to be a common strategy,
however. And this totally excludes treating states like Poland as performers of orde¬
red given by the superpowers. Nothing but abandoning the master
-
liege system
can take the
al
Qaeda
terrorists by surprise. The element of surprise of the enemy
is the first step to victory. This is the only trait that makes this war similar to other
military conflicts. If the forces of the West are unpredictable, that is if they change
their course of action by
180œ,
then
al
Qaeda
really is bound to suffer defeat.
This is why the basic conclusion of the author is that in order to win and elimi¬
nate the danger that is represented by the fanatics
-
it is necessary to be flexible
and adroit. This is what strategy of the struggle must be like and this is why it
has to contain the elements determined by the author as the mixed method. Other¬
wise we will get entangles in years of fighting which does not guarantee victory of
either side of the conflict.
Power is a notion that is permanently assigned to the history of mankind. Each
human being keeps trying, to a certain degree, to win and keep power over other
П
keinBs Tbis is how the illusion f hin pr i created The term illu
g p yg, degree, to win and keep p
ш,
keinBs· Tbis is how the illusion of having power is created. The term illu¬
sion seems more accurate when we realise that it is in fact impossible to keep and
maintain absolute power. There is always a coincidence, a series of events that will
turn the possessed power into illusion
-
a kind of soap bubble. The experiment with
different kinds of attempts at holding power and subordinating other people has
been going on for centuries. This specific experiment has been going on on all
continents and within all the communities inhabiting the continents. Monarchy, dic¬
tatorship, democracy are just successive stages of the cycle. To make it run efficien¬
tly, people striving for power created different kinds of doctrines, philosophies, the¬
ories, which were supposed, to a certain extent, to justify their actions. The method
was noulways successful. If they were not, there was always the traditional method
or convincing people left
-
i.e. the armed forces. The armed forces are always in
the centre of action
-
in any struggle for domination. Ideologies keep changing,
doctrines evolve, systems of government fell and the armed forces stayed. In fact, it
does not really matter whether it is a totalitarian dictatorship or democracy. The
army is always the only stable and lasting element. The difference between the sys¬
tems arises out of one basic principle
-
in
non-
democratic systems the army can be
a tool in the hands of politicians and the tool can be used to fight the opposition. In
democratic systems, the army is the institution that is supposed to guard democra¬
tic values and it is almost impossible to use it in political games. Not everybody
understands that, of course. Recently, when discussing, writing about or debating
security, it is impossible not to mention the army. It was the army that President of
the USA, George W. Bush, used when he chose the power play to solve the pro¬
blem of terrorism. The problem, therefore, is not whether there is or there is not
the issue of the army, as the key to understanding contemporary situation is some¬
where else.
Each war comes to an end one day and the military are replaced by politicians,
diplomats, and at lower levels representatives of other trades and professions whose
task it is to rebuild the country after the ravages of war. No one or almost no one
takes care of the hundreds of thousands of demobilised soldiers. The war in Afgha-
222_________________________
Summary
_____________________________
nistan was a clear example of that as was the war in Vietnam earlier. But it was
Afghanistan that became a problem, because veterans of the war who fought on the
mujahed side lost their jobs after the war. No one was waiting for them and they
became a problem for their countries of origin. Life, however, does not go on in a
void. Not making use of military specialists backfired earlier than anyone expected.
It does not really matter whether it was the question of neglect, disregard or at¬
tempts at marginalizing the issue, The essential thing was that in view of lack of job
offers from their home country, they accepted the offers put forward by their bro¬
ther in arms, Osama bin Laden. That is how
al
Qaeda
came into life. It was a side-
effect of military activities in Afghanistan. When building a system of security, one
should always remember that the army itself is not enough to win a war, nor is just
diplomacy. Military forces as well as the diplomatic corps are two sides of a coin.
None of them can function separately from the other. This is why the state admini¬
stration must not forget the veterans, because they are also an element of the system
of security. Terrorists, criminals, private companies
-
anyone can make use of the
knowledge and skills of the ex-military. It is in the interest of the state not to allow
such situations to happen. Another conclusion that can be drawn from this analysis
-
the last but not least. The thesis that the demobilised soldiers should be adapted
by the society may draw derisive comments, because it smacks of banality. Howe¬
ver, if it is so obviously logical, why the states, especially those situated in the Mid¬
dle East cannot cope with it. It is worth noting here, that the above situation is not
only the problem of the army. It pertains to each branch of industry
-
any kind of
jobs. It is very difficult for people who spent years on doing a job to change their
occupation. There are few programs aimed at retraining such people. One should
remember, however, that there may always be a person who will take advantage of
the state s negligence. Then we say that an organisation is virtual and its leaders
hard to uncover. In such cases, it is quite likely that they are elusive, because they
have been trained by the former military experts
-
with rich experience in guerrilla
warfare. This was first revealed in Afghanistan and proved
ín
Iraq, where a large
number of people fighting against the USA are former soldiers connected with the
toppled regime of BASS party. It should be borne in mind by anyone, who plans
anti-terrorist actions.
The final conclusion that can be drawn from this work is that in each conflict,
apart from efficient armed forces and a team of experts in diplomacy, it is neces¬
sary to have efficient intelligence, Not only the bureaucratic one, where crowds of
clerks analyse the captured documents. First of all, they must be field-workers go¬
ing places and analysing situation on the spot. Intelligence must always be three steps
ahead of the enemy, so cooperation and exchange
ofinformation
between its indi¬
vidual units must be constant and fluent. Assuming that all possible leaks can be
eliminated. In the author s opinion, the remarks included in this work should faci¬
litate selection of the right way to act, which is necessary in the face of more and
more exacerbated situation
ín
the Middle East and on the African continent.
Bayerische ]
Staatsbibliothek
München
J
|
| adam_txt |
Spis
tresei
Wstęp
. 5
Rozdziel
1
Stan wiedzy o terroryzmie
. 11
1.1.
Geneza terroryzmu
. 11
1.2.
Zrodia
terroryzmu
. 23
1.3.
Rodzaje terroryzmu
. 28
1.4.
Terrotyzm a działania militarne
. 33
Rozdział
2
Konflikt cywilizacyjny jako źródło terroryzmu
. 53
2.1.
Rodzaje eksplikacji źródeł (uwarunkowań)
konfliktu cywilizacyjnego
. 53
2.2.
Tendencje w przebiegu współczesnego konfliktu globalnego
. 66
2.3.
Sposoby rozwiązywania globalnego konfliktu cywilizacyjnego
. 76
2.4.
Zastosowanie sił zbrojnych w rozwiązywaniu konfliktów zbrojnych
. 81
2.4.1.
Afganistan
. 82
2.4.2.
Irak
. 94
Rozdział
3
Metody zwalczania terroryzmu
. 102
3.1.
Polityczne zwalczanie terroryzmu
.,,.,,. 102
3.2.
Militarne zwalczanie terroryzmu
. 111
3.3.
Zmienne (cywilno-wojskowe) zwalczanie terroryzmu
. 117
Rozdział
4
Znaczenie państw średniej wielkości
w zapewnieniu bezpieczeństwa cywilizacji zachodniej
. 130
4.1.
Rola państw średniej wielkości w systemie bezpieczeństwa
cywilizacji zachodniej
. 130
4.2.
Rola państw średniej wielkości w
ΝΛΤΟ
. 142
4.3.
Rola państw średniej wielkości w Unii Europejskiej
. 151
AA. Perspektywy państw średniej wielkości
w systemie bezpieczeństwa globalnego
. 160
Rozdział
5
Rola polskiej polityki bezpieczeństwa i przeciwdziałaniu terroryzmowi
. 165
5.1.
Stosunek polskiej polityki zagranicznej wobec terroryzmu
. 165
5.2.
Udział Polski w walce z terroryzmem
. 172
5.3.
Stosowane metody zwalczania terroryzmu
. 180
Zakończenie
. 187
Bibliografía
. 201
Summary.
215
Summary
Vuľľ^
l °ne of the tarsets thut
Ле
author
hadin mbd. Sho-
gk
terrori!m bec°™ng
a substitute topic threatens stability of our dviliza-
Г'
k ľ
"
ÏStraCtf
,public attention from othef t0Pks was mother. The author
also shows how the problems of their imperial greatness of former colonial potenta¬
tes may hmder their functioning in new geopolitical reality.
1
eace is always a value that is worth fighting for. The above statement, altho-
ugn
it is a good and expected motif in many monographs and articles
-
contains a
contradiction, because it combines two opposite phenomena, peace and fighting,
which we sometimes understand as war. With the reservation that fighting is not
always war. Both phenomena seem to be as old as the history of mankind. It is not,
however, absolutely true. From the beginning of his history, man fought, first for
survival and adaptation to the changing reality of his current environment, later, after
ne
had adapted to, he went on fighting, forming structures that later became states,
and
m
consequence of conflicts with his neighbours, empires. Then fighting went
on
ror
preservation of the status quo, until there appeared a competitor strong eno-
U° ,,reaten the
štence
and survival of a state. To sum up, the period we
would pall peace was a kind of break between wars, in compliance with the
negatíve
1ľ
k°n
rá
l^e term·
k
was on*ythe Period connected with the two world wars
that changed the attitude, but not completely. When we analyse past and present
conflicts, we can certain constant element
-
the desire to dominate and aspire to the
name of a superpower regardless of the fact whether the state in question has means
to cover the cost of its aspirations or not. After the World War
П,
and also at the
time of what was called the Cold War it seemed
к
seemeâ
that there is nothing
worse than a state, which cherishes its desire to dominated the world by means of
its distorted ideology and historical justice which was incomprehensible to others
and was quite uniquely understood by the state itself. Terrorist attacks, and particu¬
larly their scale and extent, changed this kind of attitude. One may ask why did it
change. After all, the phenomenon of terrorism has been a constant element of func¬
tioning of human communities for over two thousand years if one sees the sect of
Zealots as terrorists,
lbe
answer seems
m
simple as to smack of banality and is
contained in the statement, the essence of which is the fact that in modern times and
ín
the world undergoing globalisation, a state has lost its monopoly for domination.
Nowadays,
al
Qaeda
(Base), founded by Osama bin Laden, a veteran of the Afghan
war and multimillionaire at the same time. ITie organisation has a supranational struc¬
ture and its branches attempt to play significant role in the policy of different sta¬
tes. This means that fighting against the organisation, and I do not mean war, may
be practically impossible. It is not, however, that the threatened states do not have
means to invigilate and destroy individual training camps. The problem is that we
216 _
Summary
_
try too hard to understand motifs of their actions in terms of Western Civilisation
created and understood in Huntingtonian terms. That is
,
we combine a variety of
cultures into one Civilisation and confront it with Islam, the civilisation in which
the terrorists are rooted, and which is assumed to be the same kind of monolith as
the Western Civilisation. Therefore, a number of very matter-of-fact, scientific ana¬
lyses focus on discussing consequences, not sources of the phenomenon.
Being unable to explain the reasons, we believe that terrorists are beasts making
use of barbarian methods which are degenerate and take their root directly in the
war method. It is by all means the correct attitude if we remember that is derived
from the European way of perceiving the world and therefore it must be right
-
otherwise everything we believe in would fall apart. And this is exactly what the
al
Qaeda
terrorists want to achieve. They do not conduct lengthy philosophical or po¬
litical disputes
-
their war strategy seems simple, transparent and clear. The core of
their strategy is to provoke the enemy by any means. To do this they must strike at
what their enemy (the West) loves. Consequently, the enemy may act rashly and in¬
cautiously. Striking without appropriate recce may result in elimination of those who
would have to be eliminated anyway if
al
Qaeda
were successful, which does not
mean that terrorists can openly manifest their satisfaction with such course of events.
On the contrary, they not only tend to, but actually must, take advantage of such a
course of events.
In the reasoning discussed above, the most evident element is cynicism, which
is an integral part of the strategy. The cynicism is, to a certain extent, tinged with
Machiavellian political ideology. The ideology is in its ideal (pure) form the target
to achieve and a value in itself for many politicians all over the world. The fact that
terrorists try to take advantage of it is only evidence of their intelligence. Not only
that, however. First of all, they are dangerous enemies because they are products
-
children of modern times. The bosses of such an organisation usually hold a tele¬
phone
ín
one hand, using it to give orders as to the place and time of a successive
attack, and another telephone in the other hand, using it to conduct different kinds
of financial or stock exchange transactions. They are mostly well educated and af¬
fluent people. Maybe it is one of the reasons for their masterful use of the highest
human instincts as well as ideology and religion to achieve their targets. This is why
it is conjectured that their strength is indeed weakness of the West. And it is not an
unidentified weakness. There is a number of weaknesses of different kinds: politi¬
cal, ideological, social, military. They concern each aspect of life of communities of
the West. For example, many people believe that Christian religion keeps trying to
force its way to politics, which in the West is reserved for lay people. In reference
to Christianity, the accusation seems to be poorly founded. It is enough to read the
New Testament from the words
„Kender
to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to
God the things that are Cod's", to understand that separation of religion from poli¬
tics has been one of the basics since the moment the religion was created. There
were, admittedly, numerous religious wars or crusades in the history of Christiani¬
ty, but they were rather consequence of aspirations of consolidating and extending
power of rulers of those times than of religious differences. Establishing the fact of
lust for power is essential here, because the were able, like Osama bin Laden today,
_
Summary
_217
to instil ideology
-
to make the sense of war more clear to their subjects. The conc¬
lusion that is evident from the above reasoning is as controversial as it is alarming.
Namely, the reason for many wars and conflicts was ignorance which concerned not
only direct neighbours, but first of all representatives of other cultures. It seems quite
obvious that if we do not understand our neighbours, who follow similar values,
then we are completely unable to understand people who have a different idea of
their own being and the world around. Democracy was to be a chance to change
the trend
-
through globalisation of its values it was to win and introduce peaceml
order in the world. It was to be an ideal system. An ideal system that man is unable
to implement. An ideal system that remains political
fiction
and should not be taken
into consideration in any serious scientific dispute.
Human nature, as well as human mentality is difficult to change. Stereotypes
and xenophobia rooted in it are difficult to uproot and they create certain image
through which one evaluates one's contemporary environment. That is why this type
of mentality is a constant element of functioning of a society
-
like war throughout
the ages. Of course, it does not mean that it will replace war. One should rather say
that most of post-Cold War conflicts would not have occurred without it. This is
why establishing dialogue is so difficult
-
especially when one tries to find quick
and easy solution in
w
complicated way. A phenomenon, whose apogee is marked
by terrorist attacks is easy to evaluate by bringing charges of barbarism or brutality.
It is a very useful method of social engineering. The results of using it may be much
different from the expected ones, however. The result is that if we accuse terrorists
that because of breaking our rules they are inhuman, we make a serious mistake.
Violence, which is their weapon is only too human. It has its roots in the hidden
primary human instinct. It is also connected with the way of upbringing and educa¬
tion of a given society. This is why the assumption, against Huntington's theses,
that it is not religion that is responsible for the spreading evil, but the method of
educating people seems quite logical. If the system of education is faulty, it is very
difficult to change the outlook on the world instilled by the system. It pertains to
both Islam and the West. As well as any other civilisation. If the west really wants to
beat
al
Qaeda,
it is not enough to trace and eliminate its leaders. The problem is
elsewhere. One should think how to change the process of education, starting from
the basic unit of society, that is starting from family level. At the same time, the
change must be implemented in such a way as not to destroy its tradition, as brutal
interference into the sphere of sacrum is not allowed. The change and new functio¬
ning of the system must be implemented in such a way as to prevent „production"
of successive lost people who, following an appropriate dose of indoctrination beco¬
me ideal killing machines. Implementation of educational reform is necessary, but
its success depends mainly on common sense and caution of those who will be able
to take up the task.
This is why, in this work the author tries to pinpoint the essence of the pro¬
blems which must be solved and dealt with in the first place and the ones that can
be solved later
-
so that the west is not bathed in blood as is
al Qaeda's
target. It is
worth to start this part of pondering with certain assumption, namely: Each man
may at certain period of time yield to the lust of power or to an illusion of posses-
218_
Summary
_
sing, which, of course, is not blameworthy in itself. The key point
ís,
however, how
the (possessed) power is going to be used. The principle functions at each stage of
existence
-
of an individual's being part of the society. The process starts in one's
family, where the power is most often held by the father, the chief bread-winner of
the family. The model holds in the Arab world, but not in the West. In the USA or
in Europe there are numerous cases where one person is unable to support the who¬
le family, especially it is a multi-generation or large family, like in the Arab world.
Apart from that, it is noteworthy that Europeans usually hide true reasons for
their conduct, dressing them in aptly created ideologies or theories, such as the fa¬
mous German school of geographical determinism, the basic assumption of which
was justifying colonialism and, consequently, methods of dealing with the conqu¬
ered communities.
It should be noted, however, that none of the theories is dangerous until an in¬
dividual or a group shows interest in it. Then the theory becomes, to a certain de¬
gree, degenerated by the desire to apply it in practice. This makes it change in com¬
pliance with a given political reality. In this way, something that has been
a lund
of
political metaphor, becomes reality. It is logical, that such a statement, which is at
the same time an evaluation and summing up of the last two hundred years of histo¬
ry of mankind, must give rise to a kind of resistance. One of the reasons for this
state of things is oversimplifying ideological discussion. We often hear voices that
justify or criticise such ideological systems as: communism, fascism, nanism, or,
currently, globalisation or Islamic fundamentalism. Even the fact of making such a
comparison seems an exaggeration. We just have to bear in mind that a sociologist,
political scientist and a military
-
analysing contemporary issues connected with phe¬
nomena like peace, war and, consequently, safety, real facts are important, not wi¬
shful thinking. Before it is put into practice, each theory is created to provide peace
and prosperity to mankind. And the fact that most often in disputes of this type
(justifying the theory) the term „mankind" means compatriots of the author of the
theory in not generally considered. "What is more, it is considered to be of little
importance. Especially, when the author of a theory, writing about merits and flaws
of a given community glorified not the one in which he lived and which applied his
theory into practice, but the one that he originated from, and which became the
victim of his conception. It was then that extreme perversions mentioned above hap¬
pened
.
However, the process of adaptation of theory is not a simple task. The ide¬
ology created on its base must be passed to the public in such a way as to be most
effective.
Recapitulating, each information is modified depending on from who is its so¬
urce and to whom it is directed. In the discussed case (and in any other case) the
party that is considered to be weaker is, by definition, in a better situation than the
other party. Besides, in the strategy assumed so far important elements were com¬
pletely passed over or disregarded. Elements that determine and decide the course
of war with terrorism.
What is most important, it does not really matter that
al
Qaeda
is an organisa¬
tion not a state. It arises from the fact that the conflict is very much like numerous
internal conflicts within states. In each of those conflicts, the government, apart from
Summary
219
fighting against the armed opposition, has to deal with current affairs of the state;
such as state economy among other things. Opposition in such a situation has a much
simpler task. They only need to prove that the state governed by their opponents is
an inefficient organism, breaking the rights and freedoms of its citizens. Having
won over the minds and hearts of the people, it is enough then to beat the weake¬
ned government army in open combat. For
al
Qaeda,
the world
Ís
their state and
the population of the state are Muslims scattered all over the world. It is for them
that properly modified instruments of political marketing, the core of which is war
with the
infidel,
are applied. What is problematic in this slogan is whether war aga¬
inst the infidel is the real issue. Or is it just fighting for the sake of fighting? There
were dictators in each era of human history whose only target in life was ensuring
constant peace to their fellow countrymen. The means that they used to reach their
target cost the lives of hundreds, thousands, sometimes millions of human beings.
AI Qaeda
is no exception here. Its style and method of acting is just multiplication
of such ideas. If the method is different, though not quite innovative, does not result
from the genius of their leader. They are rather conditioned by the dynamics of
changes on the geopolitical map of the world. Maintaining that the language of the¬
ir propaganda is a land of post-war political marketing may give rise to different
controversies. Nevertheless, after thorough examination of the language, it is worth¬
while to ponder on the possibility of adopting such a term, because in the classical
version no-one has ever tried to encourage us to exterminate another nation. Classi¬
cal attitude involved mainly aggressive competition and rivalry
-
at times verging on
illegal, often brutal and unfair. In the version proposed by
al
Qaeda
it is genocidal
in the first place. The West must never forget about it. If it does forget, it is not
only the civilisation that will lose, but the entire mankind. Especially, that the oppo¬
nent does not think about the political situation in the world if terrorists did win.
The only thing they are really experts at is killing other people. I do not mean their
leaders but ordinary members of terrorist organisations. That is why seeing threats
resulting from their propaganda is so important. Until now, the West concentrated
mainly on implementation of the basic assumptions of the war method and achie¬
ved a disputable success. There are two solutions: consequently implement the stra¬
tegy applied so far
-
which theoretically can, but need not result in success. Or
choose another variant, much longer and more difficult
-
but more effective becau¬
se of that. Its basic assumptions can be reduced to the statement that little by little
does the trick
-
that is, as we have mentioned above. We need slow systematic change
of the system of education combined with educational dialogue between civilisations.
The dialogue must lead to a similar change in mentality within the Islamic commu¬
nities. Change effected only by one side is a misunderstanding
-
and also lack of
understanding for the reality and it would be harmful in the long perspective.
After assuming this point of view one can ask about the sense of applying some¬
thing that is on the verge of
utopia - or
is
utopia.
It should be noted here that de¬
mocracy is often said to be the worst of all systems. The system that gave power to
Hitler, for example. ParadoxicaUy, the same people add almost on the same breath
that a better system is still to be invented. This comparison may be an oversimplifi¬
cation, but it is not the most important issue at the moment. What is important is
220_
Summary
_
understanding that as the crisis gets worse the number of possible alternatives dimi¬
nishes instead of growing. Consequently, there are only those solutions left whose
existence we have negated or did not recognise. In the new situation that has ensu¬
ed they become real and effective solutions. Everything depends on the will and
intentions of the politician who would be able to bring about sanctioning and esta¬
blishing realistic instruments of implementation of the method. A lot of time will
pass, however, before it comes to that. The same happened in the past during the
conflicts in
Indo-China,
the Middle east and Africa and there is no hint that the
situation is going to be different this time. This is why the propaganda of
al
Qaeda
is so effective. This is also the reason why the reaction of the West is so ineffective.
The coming years will prove whether
al
Qaeda will
be more effective or whether the
politicians and the miHtary will develop a new strategy. The one that until now has
seemed quite unreal, because only a new strategy can (though it is not guaranteed)
result in defeating the post-war marketing of
al
Qaeda.
Otherwise, the number of
solutions is reduced to nil. This is also something to bear in mind when analysing
contemporary conflicts. "Will it really be so, however? It will take some time before
we know the answer. It does not change the sense of contents of this work, though.
The model of fighting terrorism as a slogan is complete misunderstanding. Where¬
as the struggle against people obsessed by extreme fundamentalist ideas
ís
the requ¬
irement of the moment. This is why the author sees the need for educating the
society. Especially when it has become evident that the leaders of
al
Qaeda
fight for
the sake of fighting. It is contrary to the Aristotelian understanding of the struggle
for power, where war is an instrument, whereas for
al
Qaeda
it seems to be the
target. It is evident from the methods of action employed by
al
Qaeda in
Iraq, where
the self-appointed leader of the organisation was recognised by Osama bin Laden
as his representative. In a different situation,
ifit
were not for the combat situation,
bin Laden would appoint one of his close co-workers as the head of the Iraqi branch
of
al
Qaeda.
Now, however, his priorities are different. Now that the marines have
killed
al
Zarkawi, he will, after some time, be acclaimed a martyr who died for his
faith. This will result in escalation of military activities. This work was meant as an
occasion to reveal imprecision of the applied strategy. It also proves that it is not the
term terrorism, but the extreme fundamentalists applying it are dangerous. Changes
proposed by the author are probably not a recipe for success, but in his opinion can
at least contribute to the final success.
Education, diplomacy, and only then fighting, and even then after modifica¬
tion of the strategy used do far
-
these are the main aspects stressed by the author,
as well as the fact that when dealing with a problem (not only the one that is the
subject of this paper) one should first examine the reasons and then eliminate them,
if possible.
Analysis of results is an analysis for analysis sake, contributing very little to prac¬
tice. Such an analysis just extends theoretical knowledge. Theory cannot exist wi¬
thout being put into practice. It must be, as the author showed, a cautious and com¬
plex process. A misrepresented theory can do more harm than good, as was clearly
shown by the way of interpreting Koran by extreme fundamentalists. This is why
flexibility when creating a strategy is the only chance for the West's victory in their
_
Summary
_221
struggle against terrorism. On condition that it is going to be a common strategy,
however. And this totally excludes treating states like Poland as performers of orde¬
red given by the superpowers. Nothing but abandoning the master
-
liege system
can take the
al
Qaeda
terrorists by surprise. The element of surprise of the enemy
is the first step to victory. This is the only trait that makes this war similar to other
military conflicts. If the forces of the West are unpredictable, that is if they change
their course of action by
180œ,
then
al
Qaeda
really is bound to suffer defeat.
This is why the basic conclusion of the author is that in order to win and elimi¬
nate the danger that is represented by the fanatics
-
it is necessary to be flexible
and adroit. This is what strategy of the struggle must be like and this is why it
has to contain the elements determined by the author as the mixed method. Other¬
wise we will get entangles in years of fighting which does not guarantee victory of
either side of the conflict.
Power is a notion that is permanently assigned to the history of mankind. Each
human being keeps trying, to a certain degree, to win and keep power over other
П
keinBs Tbis is how the illusion f hin pr i created The term "illu
g p yg, degree, to win and keep p
ш,
keinBs· Tbis is how the illusion of having power is created. The term "illu¬
sion seems more accurate when we realise that it is in fact impossible to keep and
maintain absolute power. There is always a coincidence, a series of events that will
turn the possessed power into illusion
-
a kind of soap bubble. The experiment with
different kinds of attempts at holding power and subordinating other people has
been going on for centuries. This specific experiment has been going on on all
continents and within all the communities inhabiting the continents. Monarchy, dic¬
tatorship, democracy are just successive stages of the cycle. To make it run efficien¬
tly, people striving for power created different kinds of doctrines, philosophies, the¬
ories, which were supposed, to a certain extent, to justify their actions. The method
was noulways successful. If they were not, there was always the traditional method
or convincing people left
-
i.e. the armed forces. The armed forces are always in
the centre of action
-
in any struggle for domination. Ideologies keep changing,
doctrines evolve, systems of government fell and the armed forces stayed. In fact, it
does not really matter whether it is a totalitarian dictatorship or democracy. The
army is always the only stable and lasting element. The difference between the sys¬
tems arises out of one basic principle
-
in
non-
democratic systems the army can be
a tool in the hands of politicians and the tool can be used to fight the opposition. In
democratic systems, the army is the institution that is supposed to guard democra¬
tic values and it is almost impossible to use it in political games. Not everybody
understands that, of course. Recently, when discussing, writing about or debating
security, it is impossible not to mention the army. It was the army that President of
the USA, George W. Bush, used when he chose the power play to solve the pro¬
blem of terrorism. The problem, therefore, is not whether there is or there is not
the issue of the army, as the key to understanding contemporary situation is some¬
where else.
Each war comes to an end one day and the military are replaced by politicians,
diplomats, and at lower levels representatives of other trades and professions whose
task it is to rebuild the country after the ravages of war. No one or almost no one
takes care of the hundreds of thousands of demobilised soldiers. The war in Afgha-
222_
Summary
_
nistan was a clear example of that as was the war in Vietnam earlier. But it was
Afghanistan that became a problem, because veterans of the war who fought on the
mujahed side lost their jobs after the war. No one was waiting for them and they
became a problem for their countries of origin. Life, however, does not go on in a
void. Not making use of military specialists backfired earlier than anyone expected.
It does not really matter whether it was the question of neglect, disregard or at¬
tempts at marginalizing the issue, The essential thing was that in view of lack of job
offers from their home country, they accepted the offers put forward by their bro¬
ther in arms, Osama bin Laden. That is how
al
Qaeda
came into life. It was a side-
effect of military activities in Afghanistan. When building a system of security, one
should always remember that the army itself is not enough to win a war, nor is just
diplomacy. Military forces as well as the diplomatic corps are two sides of a coin.
None of them can function separately from the other. This is why the state admini¬
stration must not forget the veterans, because they are also an element of the system
of security. Terrorists, criminals, private companies
-
anyone can make use of the
knowledge and skills of the ex-military. It is in the interest of the state not to allow
such situations to happen. Another conclusion that can be drawn from this analysis
-
the last but not least. The thesis that the demobilised soldiers should be adapted
by the society may draw derisive comments, because it smacks of banality. Howe¬
ver, if it is so obviously logical, why the states, especially those situated in the Mid¬
dle East cannot cope with it. It is worth noting here, that the above situation is not
only the problem of the army. It pertains to each branch of industry
-
any kind of
jobs. It is very difficult for people who spent years on doing a job to change their
occupation. There are few programs aimed at retraining such people. One should
remember, however, that there may always be a person who will take advantage of
the state's negligence. Then we say that an organisation is virtual and its leaders
hard to uncover. In such cases, it is quite likely that they are elusive, because they
have been trained by the former military experts
-
with rich experience in guerrilla
warfare. This was first revealed in Afghanistan and proved
ín
Iraq, where a large
number of people fighting against the USA are former soldiers connected with the
toppled regime of BASS party. It should be borne in mind by anyone, who plans
anti-terrorist actions.
The final conclusion that can be drawn from this work is that in each conflict,
apart from efficient armed forces and a team of experts in diplomacy, it is neces¬
sary to have efficient intelligence, Not only the bureaucratic one, where crowds of
clerks analyse the captured documents. First of all, they must be field-workers go¬
ing places and analysing situation on the spot. Intelligence must always be three steps
ahead of the enemy, so cooperation and exchange
ofinformation
between its indi¬
vidual units must be constant and fluent. Assuming that all possible leaks can be
eliminated. In the author's opinion, the remarks included in this work should faci¬
litate selection of the right way to act, which is necessary in the face of more and
more exacerbated situation
ín
the Middle East and on the African continent.
Bayerische ]
Staatsbibliothek
München
J |
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| author | Kosta, Raul Andrzej |
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| contents | Bibliogr. s. 201-214 |
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| id | DE-604.BV023256019 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T20:29:51Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:14:15Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9788374415453 |
| language | Polish |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016441299 |
| oclc_num | 169872920 |
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| physical | 222 s. 23 cm |
| publishDate | 2007 |
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| publisher | Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek |
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| spelling | Kosta, Raul Andrzej Verfasser aut Terroryzm jako zagrożenie dla bezpieczeństwa cywilizacji zachodniej w XXI wieku Raul Andrzej Kosta Toruń Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek 2007 222 s. 23 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Zsfassung in engl. Sprache Bibliogr. s. 201-214 Terroryzm / 21 w jhpk Terroryzm / zwalczanie / 1990- jhpk Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe / 21 w jhpk Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe - 21 w jhpk Terroryzm - 21 w jhpk Terroryzm - zwalczanie - 1990- jhpk Internationaler Terrorismus (DE-588)4162078-1 gnd rswk-swf Internationaler Terrorismus (DE-588)4162078-1 s DE-604 Digitalisierung BSBMuenchen application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016441299&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016441299&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Abstract |
| spellingShingle | Kosta, Raul Andrzej Terroryzm jako zagrożenie dla bezpieczeństwa cywilizacji zachodniej w XXI wieku Bibliogr. s. 201-214 Terroryzm / 21 w jhpk Terroryzm / zwalczanie / 1990- jhpk Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe / 21 w jhpk Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe - 21 w jhpk Terroryzm - 21 w jhpk Terroryzm - zwalczanie - 1990- jhpk Internationaler Terrorismus (DE-588)4162078-1 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4162078-1 |
| title | Terroryzm jako zagrożenie dla bezpieczeństwa cywilizacji zachodniej w XXI wieku |
| title_auth | Terroryzm jako zagrożenie dla bezpieczeństwa cywilizacji zachodniej w XXI wieku |
| title_exact_search | Terroryzm jako zagrożenie dla bezpieczeństwa cywilizacji zachodniej w XXI wieku |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Terroryzm jako zagrożenie dla bezpieczeństwa cywilizacji zachodniej w XXI wieku |
| title_full | Terroryzm jako zagrożenie dla bezpieczeństwa cywilizacji zachodniej w XXI wieku Raul Andrzej Kosta |
| title_fullStr | Terroryzm jako zagrożenie dla bezpieczeństwa cywilizacji zachodniej w XXI wieku Raul Andrzej Kosta |
| title_full_unstemmed | Terroryzm jako zagrożenie dla bezpieczeństwa cywilizacji zachodniej w XXI wieku Raul Andrzej Kosta |
| title_short | Terroryzm jako zagrożenie dla bezpieczeństwa cywilizacji zachodniej w XXI wieku |
| title_sort | terroryzm jako zagrozenie dla bezpieczenstwa cywilizacji zachodniej w xxi wieku |
| topic | Terroryzm / 21 w jhpk Terroryzm / zwalczanie / 1990- jhpk Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe / 21 w jhpk Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe - 21 w jhpk Terroryzm - 21 w jhpk Terroryzm - zwalczanie - 1990- jhpk Internationaler Terrorismus (DE-588)4162078-1 gnd |
| topic_facet | Terroryzm / 21 w Terroryzm / zwalczanie / 1990- Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe / 21 w Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe - 21 w Terroryzm - 21 w Terroryzm - zwalczanie - 1990- Internationaler Terrorismus |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016441299&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016441299&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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