Holdings: Propaganda Milana Stojadinovića

Propaganda Milana Stojadinovića:

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author:	Simić, Bojan (Author)
Format:	Book
Published:	Beograd Inst. za Noviju Istoriju Srbije 2007
Series:	Biblioteka "Studije i monografije" / Institut za Noviju Istoriju Srbije 39
Subjects:	Stojadinović, Milan > 1888-1961 Geschichte 1935-1939 Propaganda Jugoslawien
Online Access:	Inhaltsverzeichnis Abstract
Item Description:	In kyrill. Schr., serb. - Zsfassung in engl. Sprache
Physical Description:	348 S. Ill., graph. Darst.

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adam_text	Садржај Предговор ................................................................ 7 Увод - Појам, историјат и врете пропаганде ......................... 17 ПРВИДЕО Милан Стојадиновић и влада Милана Стојадиновића .............. 25 ДРУГИ ДЕО Организаций пропаганде у европским државама тридесетих година двадесетог века .................................... 49 ТРЕЋИДЕО Организација и начин извођења пропаганде Милана Стојадиновића ................................................. 79 Централни прес-биро ............................................... 79 Агенција „Авала ..................................................... юз Штампа ...............................................................121 Радио ...................................................................144 Партијски прес-биро................................................ 155 Филм ...................................................................159 Страначке, омладинске и друге организације у служби пропаганде ..................................................164 ЧЕТВРТИДЕО Манифестанта пропаганде Милана Стојадиновића и њени циљеви ............................................................. іб5 Пропаганда у привреди .............................................167 Пропаганда о опозицији и према њој .............................. і8і Пропаганда намењена иностранству ........................... J93 Пропаганда према верским заједницама ........................209 Пропаганда према националним мањинама ....................217 Пропаганда у култури и просвети ...............................221 ПЕТИДЕО Предизборна пропаганда ...............................................231 Избори у Краљевипи Југосаавији - правила, прайса, резултати ..................................................231 Пропаганда Милана Стојадиновића на Парламентарним изборимаісзй- године ........................242 Закључак ..................................................................293 Резиме на енглеском језику ............................................303 Прилогбр. ι ..............................................................313 ПрИЛОГбр. 2..............................................................321 Извори и литература .................................................... 327 Изводи из рецеизија ....................................................339 Белешка о аутору ........................................................ 341 Именски регистар .............................................,..........343 Пропаганда Милана Cmo/t Summary Throughout the nineteen thirties propaganda, for many governments, .nportant means of staying in power and manipulating the public. This xue of the Government of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia which was presided ¿Шап Stojadínovíc from June 1935 to February 1939, The Prime Minister ¿jadinovic was a modern politician who represented a new generation on ie Yugoslav political scene, Being aware of the importance of propaganda, ле paid special attention to it and worked on its implementation ob daily basis. He reorganized the existing institutions, he was in charge of selecting the attaches for the press with the Yugoslav Embassies, he gave instructions on what should be written and how, he encouraged the development of the new media (radio and film). His influence on what conld be called developing and executing propaganda was so important that it can be justifiably called the propaganda of Milan Stojadmovic . His was a very organized type of propaganda, a system in which everyone foiew exactly what to teil, when to tell it, to -whom and to what extent to reveal the given information. Practically ail state and Party institutions took part in propaganda execution during Stojadinovic s government The most important among these were the Centrai Prese-Bureau (СРВ), the state Telegraphic Agency Avala and the Party Press-Bareau of the ruling parły, the Yugoslav Radical Union (JRZ), The Central Press-Bureau was founded by a special decree in 939 in the form of a state information service . The Bureau had its roots à the practice already established in the Princedom of Serbia, that is in the institution of the „Press Bureau which had bees founded during the rule of bince Mihaüo Obrenovic. The activities of which the Central Press-Bure^ as щ charge were specified by the decree of its funding, as well as by tf Sooks of Regulations of 1931 and 1935. During the time of the government Mum Stojadmovic its organizational structure and activities were wider b head of the Central Press-Bureau was a high official with the title 0 CbiefofCPB, who was in chargeof controlling and monitoring all the act f the institution. He was appointed by the Government aad he repo¬ se Prime Minister in person. Practically throughout the whole pe Stojadmovic s government the person in the position of the head ot eneneed journalist Kosta Lulravoc. The institution was åmåe мр Бојан Симић Administrative, the Information and the Publicist Department throughout the most of its existence. These departments executed the tasks proscribed by the Book of Regulations and they were divided into sections. The most important of the three abovementioned was the Information Department. It was in charge of the key tasks such as pre-release proofing of the issues of the press (actions which practically amounted to censorship) and informing the home media of the situation in the country and abroad. Almost all the papers which were published in the country had to be pre-emptively proofread be¬ fore release and in the towns where there were no representatives of СРВ this task was fulfilled by the state prosecution offices or the officials of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The information released on the part of СРВ were obligatory for all the media in the state. Their going along with this practice was achieved through warnings, and sometimes even through threats and blackmailing. Apart from the central institution, important job was also done by the correspondents who were stationed in the most important European cities and in the centers oí banovinas in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. СРВ had a significant number of civil servants and this number was usually round 150. Among them there were those who were officially employed (on regular salary) and those who were secret associates because of the nature of their tasks (on secret salary). The institution was financed from the budget which was a part of the budget of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. СРВ was financed on regular basis. It usually received an approximately similar amount of money (slightly over 18 million dinars), considerable financial means at the time. In comparison with the neighboring countries the received financial means were higher than those of their similar institutions of approximately the same size (Bulgarian, Greek, Turkish and Czechoslovakian). Still, they were far from the financial means those more developed European countries, such as Germany, England and Italy, spent on such institutions. This can also be said of some of the neighboring countries which put considerable financial means into development of their propaganda (the case of Hungary, for example). The importance and role of the propaganda of Milan Stojadinovic and his Government was so huge that we can talk of СРВ playing the role of the Ministry of Propaganda, although the name was officially different. The picture created by СРВ was a projection of reality, that is a mixture of reality and the desired state of affairs. That certainly does not mean that all the information offered by СРВ were lies, only that Stojadinovic s wishes had a priority over the truth. The Avala Agency was one of the European state telegraphic agencies. According to the European practice it was transformed into a joint stock company but with the state as the dominant owner of the capital (over 90 96). 304 Пропаганда Милана Стојадиновића Apart form the central institution in Belgrade, Avala had its expositions in Ljubljana, Zagreb, Novi Sad and Skopje (for a short time). The Agency received the annual donation from the state which amounted to 5 million dinars, but this sum did not satisfy its needs. The financial means were often not spend purposefully, so Avala , almost constantly, worked with losses. Its main tasks were informing the public at home and abroad in accordance to the public state interest , making the official announcements, import and distribution of the foreign newspapers and journals. Nevertheless, its most important role was to transmit official information which came from the top of the governing structures. Everybody knew that the information released by the Avala Agency were official and checked . In comparison to СРВ the Agency did not have the instruments to ensure that the newspapers published the received information. One of the strongholds of Stojadinovic s propaganda was the press. It was not free in this period and it was under supervision and tutorship of the ruling structures. Notwithstanding this, the number of the papers constantly grew. Their number varied because many of them were banned permanently and some were founded again. The number of the newspapers in different banovinas was different, as well. For example, in Sava banovina (Croatia) during 1938,389 papers were published and in Vrbas banovina (Bosnia) only four. Stojadonovic s government controlled the papers in two ways. The first one regarded the pre-emptive censorship, and the second one regarded the banning of the paper, if it was concluded that its writing was harmful for the interests of the President, the Government or the Party in power. The reason for extinguishing the most papers were Communist tendencies or contents. It was especially the case with the Croatian papers, but other regions were not spared this, at the time, usual practice, either. The most important papers which were in charge of spreading Sto¬ jadinovic s propaganda were the Vreme and the Samouprava . Belgrade newspaper Vreme was practically owned by Stojadinovic himself, since the main share holders were members of his family or his friends. It was a widely read paper, second only to the Politika when it came to the number of sold copies. Considerable means were invested into the founding of this newspaper and the most modern printing house in the Balkans equiped with German and American machinery was built for these purposes. The Prime Minister himself took part in creating the recognizable visual image and the contents of the paper and, according to one of his associates, he spent a few hours every day on its editing. The Vreme was supposed to represent a model newspaper and to bring Stojadinovic s outlook on the political reality - both in the country and abroad, since the events in Europe started to influence the situation in the country more and more. Although attempts were made 305 мр Bojmi Симић to represent the Vreme as a neutral paper it slowly gained the label of the Government s paper, which influenced the drop in its sales. The Samouprava was the main Party newspaper and all the other papers were under it in the hierarchy of the Party press. The very title which was taken from the old Radical newspaper was meant to imply that the newly founded JRZ was the only real inheritor of the old Radical Party from the time of the Kingdom of Serbia. Although it had low sales, the importance of this paper was not insignificant, since its texts were taken over and published by many provincial papers throughout the country. Among other newspapers which spread the propaganda of Milan Stojadinovic the most important ones were the Vrbaske novine from Banja Luka, the Vardar from Skopje, the Narodni list from Cetinje, the Narodna samouprava from Kragujevac, the Država from Split. The Party Press-Bureau of the JRZ was closely connected to the press. This Party organ was founded in 1936 and its main task was to be the central institution of all the Party and friendly papers. It sent information to be published to the provincial press and, not rarely, complete texts. The Press-Bureau saw to the sent articles being published on the covers of the papers, as well as to synchronizing their appearance. The number of papers it cooperated with was round 35, but they published almost everything they received from the Press-Bureau. The head of this institution was Milan Jovanovic Stoimirovic, the editor in chief of the Samouprava . Tlie Press- Bureau shared its premises with the Samouprava almost untili the end of 1938 and the same associates worked in both institutions. The spreading of propaganda through radio broadcasting was a no¬ velty at the time. The radio broadcasting had started only a few years earlier on short frequencies, which widened its reach out of the state borders and even to another continents. Realizing in time the importance of this media, Stojadinovic put considerable efforts into development of radiophony in the country. During his government the capacity of the Radio Belgrade was raised from 2.5 to 20 kilowatts. A new short-frequency radio station was also founded. It started operating in the beginning of March 1936 and became the center of the radio propaganda. The task of monitoring and editing of its programme was taken over by СРВ. Already throughout 1937 the broadcasting for abroad was initiated and starting from the next year it became the regular activity. The main task of the short-frequency radio station was broadcasting the news. It had more than 1.000 hours of news broadcasting in a year which raised the number of news broadcasts in Yugoslav media by more than 300%. This radio station practically became the one to which all the others were subordinated when it came to the news of political nature. Considering the fact that those news were created in the CPB s kitchen they had the 306 Пропаганда Милана Стојадиновића aim to serve, above all, the interests of the ruling Party and its president. Notwithstanding the advancement of the radio broadcasting in Yugoslavia, it was still listed amongst the lowest of all the European countries in this field of advancement with one radio per more than 100 people. The only countries that lagged behind Yugoslavia in this field were Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria (the last one only regarding the number of the subscribers). Film in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia had served, even before, the pro¬ paganda purposes of the ruling circles, that is the royal family of Karadjor- djevics. The novelty introduced during the government of Milan Stojadinovic was making the special Party propaganda film On the way of restoration - Yugoslavia yesterday, today and tomorrow . This movie, which was edited in Germany by the experts from the Nazi Party, was specially prepared for the pre-election campaign of the elections of December 1938. Considering the backwardness and lack of education of a great number of citizens in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia at the time, one can assume that this technological miracle had an important political impact on many of them. Various Party and Youth organizations spread propaganda for the government of Milan Stojadinovic, as well. The most important amongst these were the Section for the Interior Political Action and Propaganda and the Club of Students of JRZ Slovenski jug . These organizations were in charge of creating propaganda, organizing political activities of the Party, of assemblies and rallies, as well as for publishing and distributing the propagandistic material. The propaganda of Milan Stojadinovic manifested itself in all the spheres of social life in the country. Considering the fact that the Government Put great efforts into economical restoration of the country propaganda in the field of economy and propaganda regarding economy were the most developed ones. By proclaiming the new economic policy the creators of the propaganda wanted to prove that the Government was, on the one hand, ci etihbl i ^theotherstrengthenmg gthebasisforthepeoplesprosperiy^ he national industiy and protecting the borders and independence of Yugoslavia . This propaganda had Stojadinovic s personal signature, as well. His numerous appearances at factories and plants openings and at the occasions of laying cornerstones were used by all the media to emphasize his Wleindevelopmentandtopresenthisplansforthe restoration of the OTuntiy. The Prime Minister himself, being a man from the economic circles, paid a lQt of attention to cooperation with the representatives from economy. He Reived various delegations, visited the business enterprises and improved Personal contacts with officials from economy gained throughout years, не ţed to present himself as someone from their surroundings who understood leir needs and who worked for them. 307 мр Бојан Симић The propaganda towards the opposition was exclusively negative. It abounded in scorns and criticism, which was often exaggerated, sometimes inappropriate, but witty comments appeared from time to time as well. The sward of criticism was pointed, above all, towards the political opponents in the country. The propaganda of Milan Stojadinovic divided the opposition into several groups. The first one consisted of the Yugoslav National Party (JNS), that is the representatives of the former governing elite. The second was the United Opposition (UO). The third one was the Croatian Peasant Party (HSS). The fourth one was the pro-fascist group of Dimitrije Ljotic and the fifth one were the Communists. The criticism pointed towards the first group was based on mentions of the poor way in which they had previously governed the country. According to propaganda this was the main reason for the difficult circumstances in the country at the time. The leaders of JNS were accused of dictatorial, non-democratic anti anti-state tendencies. As regards the UO, Stojadinovic s propaganda refused them the possibility of any positive action, it emphasised their insignificance, selfishness and self-sufficiency. Their bad internal relations, rivalry and immorality were particularly underlined. Something that the propaganda regarding both groups had in common were constant emphases on their alienation from the people, lack of understanding of their aspirations and of people s being . We should point out that the focus of the negative propaganda throughout 1936 was the JNS. The focus was switched to the members of the UO thro¬ ughout 1937 and this can be claimed of the period after the treaty of Farkasic in particular. The press played a prominent role in the criticism of the opposition and caricature, above all, was an effective means often utilized for these purposes. The propaganda towards HSS and its leader Macek was somewhat different. The existence of the Croatian question was acknowledged and, by virtue of that, the need for a compromise. However, the responsibility for the failure to achieve it was ascribed to Macek and his indecisiveness. He was given credit for leading the Croatian movement, but the efforts to discredit him as much as possible were continuous. The criticism of Ljotic and Zbor were rare. That intention was to belittle the movement and to treat it with disdain by showing that its activities were not even worth mentioning. The propaganda towards the Communist movement was most brutal and least attention was paid to the culture of speech when it came to criticizing this group of opponents. Communism was treated as a disease and the greatest threat to the wellbeing of the state. This attitude was rein¬ forced by the fact that the three leading politicians in the country were fervent anti-Communists: Prince Pavle, Stojadinovic and Korosec, the Minister of Interior. 308 Пропаганда Милана Сгпојадиноеића Since Stoj ácimo vic was the Minister of Foreign Affairs, a great amount of energy was put into developing propaganda for abroad. This propaganda carried a characteristic signature of the Prime Minister. Stojadinovic ma¬ de numerous trips abroad and received many foreign officials, which gave Mm an opportunity to try and leave the desired impression. Taking into consideration the strained relations in Europe at the time, this kind of pro¬ paganda was carefully planned and developed. Thus, Stojadinovic presented himself differently in different countries . In Great Britain he was the advocate of a two-party system, in the USA a follower of Rooseveiťs economic pro¬ gramme, in Italy and Germany an authoritarian leader who had Fascism ία his heart, etc. This sort of propaganda was accepted and executed by numerous correspondents from abroad, foreign journalists who were on the Government s payroll, the newspapers financed by the Government, citizens with good intentions , etc. A lot of attention was paid to cooperation with ík foreign writers and journalists who came to our country. Their wishes were fulfilled to the greatest extent possible regarding moral and financiai concerns. In all of this the high officials of СРВ and the Avala Agency took џп} as well The propaganda pointed towards the national minorities had its particularities in comparison to that towards the Yugoslavs. It was, above all, based on concrete agreements with leaders of the national minorities, much more than on regular propagandistic activities. Apart írom this, good dations with the mother countries made it possible for the Government to get the votes of the minorities in exchange for small favours, This allowed fer propaganda being directed towards other administrative districts and towards the leading constituent peoples. The constant thing as regards religious communities was repetition of the desire of the Government for the religious equality. Most attention was paid to the three dominant religious communities; the Orthodox, the Catholic and the Muslim. The projected policy of religious equality was not a accordance with reality. This became apparent during the Concordat crisis wbidb culminated in summer of 1937- The desire to legally formulate the Nations with the Catholic church, motivated by political reasons oí internai «atare, resulted in the concessions which the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC) regarded as intolerable and which, according to its opmior ι went Wnst the proclaimed equality. The great efforts of the f nme Muiteend f the propaganda machinery to prove the legality of the Concorda tpioved J> be unsuccessful The great quantities of propagandne material used on both sides, as well as the human activity itself during to clash ^Ы Itt ^ће fusion that, at the time, a real propaganda war was ragmg » ^^ ^edefeatmthisconfrontationhadlastmgconsequencesfortheGovermnent aiî<ï for Stojadinovic himself. 309 мр Бојан Симић Under regular circumstances during the Government of Milan Sto- jadinovic propaganda towards religious communities was not the dominant one. More attention to this kind of propaganda was paid in religiously mixed communities, whereas it rarely came to surface in nationally homogeneous ones. During Stojadinovic s government the Islamic religious community was allowed its own legislature, as well as its own faculty and religious edu¬ cation. The person practically in charge of all the affairs regarding the Islamic community was Mehmed Spaho. He was the Minister for Traffic, who used his position to make his brother the head of the Community. In this case also the propaganda of the Prime Minister focused on the regions populated by Serbs, or, in this particular instance, with the Orthodox. The propaganda regarding culture and education was adapted to the existing circumstances. It emphasized the successes of the Government in these fields, which ranged from settling the affairs in the sphere of elementary education to opening high educational science and arts institutions. Even the Prime Minister Stojadinovic had a prominent role in propaganda in this field through his patronage of the artistic events, charity donations to various cultural societies, visits to the cultural manifestations, etc. Although the idea of a three-tribal nation and Yugolsavianism was practically abandoned in reality, the propaganda still tried to emphasize the loyalty to the state and national unity . The Prime Minister also insisted on this, even though he was more than aware of the existing circumstances in the creation of which he himself played an important role. Yugoslavianism was one of the issues regarding which the discrepency between the propaganda context and the reality was greatest. Propaganda activities were most heated during the election campa¬ igns. During Stojadinovic s government two elections were held - the regio¬ nal elections by the end of 1936 and the parliamentary ones of December 1938. The propaganda during the parliamentary elections was the peak of the so far established practice and the crown of the already trodden path which the propaganda followed. The parliamentary elections were held with the slogan One king, one nation, one state, prosperity, peace at the borders . This slogan was supposed to represent both the program of the Party and its most important achievements at the same time. The rhythm of the pre¬ election campaign was dictated by Milan Stojadinovic himself. He created the campaign, he was the one who accepted or refused propositions, gave advice and instructions. The pre-election propaganda, apart from the usual repertoire, was reinforced by a travelling exhibition, a propagandistic film, leaflets thrown from the air, special brochures, numerous gatherings, etc. This kind of propaganda had as its target audience mainly the members of the Serbian national community. The consequence of this practice was leaving 310 Пропаганда Милана Стојадиновића the Croatian parts in Macek s firm embrace. On the territory of Croatia there were no larger rallies, there was no exhibition and no greater significant activities of the, not so numerous, JRZ members. Public voting, apart from ¡Es advantages for Government, brought about a selling of the votes of the sort, increased the level of corruption, created unrests and perturbations. Altogether, the results of the elections, as well as the results of the propaganda, were not satisfactory, but they still gave Stojadinovic a certain advantage over his opponents. That was, nevertheless, not enough for staying inpower. Less then two months after the elections Stojadinovic was forced to resign due to the internal governmental crisis incited by Prince Pavle. What followed was a short term oppositional activity, imprisonment, exile and death far from the homeland. After the mastermind of the propaganda left the position of the Prime Minister, the political propaganda in Yugoslavia in that form and shape disappeared forever. The propaganda of Milan Stojadinovic used the experience of the Fascist and Nazi spin doctors combined with the local specificities. Its main task was to serve political aims of the party in power, JRZ, and especially oí ^president Stojadinovic. It often consisted of exaggerated, wmte-and-black «presentations, belittling of the political opponents, inappropriate selt- gloriücation, etc. The use of great amount of the propagandistic material, brochures, leaflets and posters can be likened to the contemporary elee ion Practice. Considering all the abovementioned facts, we can conclude mat ^propaganda of Milan Stojadinovic was way too modern for the îuŞ°^Y society of the nineteen thirties. One gets the impression that this luna οι Propaganda was meant for the more educated strata of the population wnicn was a very small audience in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Ł In the end we could perhaps mention the words ^™ imself regarding the relation between the propaganda and the леашу Yugoslavia of the time. He said the following at the assembly of JUGORAS ltlAPrili938: „The situation is better today than it was three years ago it was very bad! Therefore, today s better is betta i to that bad . , , . ThisdescriptionofferedbytheP^^^ W», is the most indicative of the real situation in Je ^ff Which istic attitude pronounced here is in contrast with the ^iopagan been inspired and controlled by the same man who had uttered 311
adam_txt	Садржај Предговор . 7 Увод - Појам, историјат и врете пропаганде . 17 ПРВИДЕО Милан Стојадиновић и влада Милана Стојадиновића . 25 ДРУГИ ДЕО Организаций пропаганде у европским државама тридесетих година двадесетог века . 49 ТРЕЋИДЕО Организација и начин извођења пропаганде Милана Стојадиновића . 79 Централни прес-биро . 79 Агенција „Авала" . юз Штампа .121 Радио .144 Партијски прес-биро. 155 Филм .159 Страначке, омладинске и друге организације у служби пропаганде .164 ЧЕТВРТИДЕО Манифестанта пропаганде Милана Стојадиновића и њени циљеви . іб5 Пропаганда у привреди .167 Пропаганда о опозицији и према њој . і8і Пропаганда намењена иностранству . J93 Пропаганда према верским заједницама .209 Пропаганда према националним мањинама .217 Пропаганда у култури и просвети .221 ПЕТИДЕО Предизборна пропаганда .231 Избори у Краљевипи Југосаавији - правила, прайса, резултати .231 Пропаганда Милана Стојадиновића на Парламентарним изборимаісзй- године .242 Закључак .293 Резиме на енглеском језику .303 Прилогбр. ι .313 ПрИЛОГбр. 2.321 Извори и литература . 327 Изводи из рецеизија .339 Белешка о аутору . 341 Именски регистар .,.343 Пропаганда Милана Cmo/t Summary Throughout the nineteen thirties propaganda, for many governments, .nportant means of staying in power and manipulating the public. This xue of the Government of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia which was presided ¿Шап Stojadínovíc from June 1935 to February 1939, The Prime Minister ¿jadinovic was a modern politician who represented a new generation on ie Yugoslav political scene, Being aware of the importance of propaganda, ле paid special attention to it and worked on its implementation ob daily basis. He reorganized the existing institutions, he was in charge of selecting the attaches for the press with the Yugoslav Embassies, he gave instructions on what should be written and how, he encouraged the development of the new media (radio and film). His influence on what conld be called developing and executing propaganda was so important that it can be justifiably called 'the propaganda of Milan Stojadmovic'. His was a very organized type of propaganda, a system in which everyone foiew exactly what to teil, when to tell it, to -whom and to what extent to reveal the given information. Practically ail state and Party institutions took part in propaganda execution during Stojadinovic's government The most important among these were the Centrai Prese-Bureau (СРВ), the state Telegraphic Agency "Avala" and the Party Press-Bareau of the ruling parły, the Yugoslav Radical Union (JRZ), The Central Press-Bureau was founded by a special decree in 939 in the form of a "state information service". The Bureau had its roots à the practice already established in the Princedom of Serbia, that is in the institution of the „Press Bureau" which had bees founded during the rule of bince Mihaüo Obrenovic. The activities of which the Central Press-Bure^ as щ charge were specified by the decree of its funding, as well as by tf Sooks of Regulations of 1931 and 1935. During the time of the government Mum Stojadmovic its organizational structure and activities were wider 'b head of the Central Press-Bureau was a high official with the title 0 CbiefofCPB, who was in chargeof controlling and monitoring all the act' f the institution. He was appointed by the Government aad he repo¬ se Prime Minister in person. Practically throughout the whole pe Stojadmovic's government the person in the position of the head ot eneneed journalist Kosta Lulravoc. The institution was åmåe мр Бојан Симић Administrative, the Information and the Publicist Department throughout the most of its existence. These departments executed the tasks proscribed by the Book of Regulations and they were divided into sections. The most important of the three abovementioned was the Information Department. It was in charge of the key tasks such as pre-release proofing of the issues of the press (actions which practically amounted to censorship) and informing the home media of the situation in the country and abroad. Almost all the papers which were published in the country had to be pre-emptively proofread be¬ fore release and in the towns where there were no representatives of СРВ this task was fulfilled by the state prosecution offices or the officials of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The information released on the part of СРВ were obligatory for all the media in the state. Their going along with this practice was achieved through warnings, and sometimes even through threats and blackmailing. Apart from the central institution, important job was also done by the correspondents who were stationed in the most important European cities and in the centers oí banovinas in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. СРВ had a significant number of civil servants and this number was usually round 150. Among them there were those who were officially employed (on regular salary) and those who were secret associates because of the nature of their tasks (on secret salary). The institution was financed from the budget which was a part of the budget of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. СРВ was financed on regular basis. It usually received an approximately similar amount of money (slightly over 18 million dinars), considerable financial means at the time. In comparison with the neighboring countries the received financial means were higher than those of their similar institutions of approximately the same size (Bulgarian, Greek, Turkish and Czechoslovakian). Still, they were far from the financial means those more developed European countries, such as Germany, England and Italy, spent on such institutions. This can also be said of some of the neighboring countries which put considerable financial means into development of their propaganda (the case of Hungary, for example). The importance and role of the propaganda of Milan Stojadinovic and his Government was so huge that we can talk of СРВ playing the role of the Ministry of Propaganda, although the name was officially different. The picture created by СРВ was a projection of reality, that is a mixture of reality and the desired state of affairs. That certainly does not mean that all the information offered by СРВ were lies, only that Stojadinovic's wishes had a priority over the truth. The "Avala" Agency was one of the European state telegraphic agencies. According to the European practice it was transformed into a joint stock company but with the state as the dominant owner of the capital (over 90 96). 304 Пропаганда Милана Стојадиновића Apart form the central institution in Belgrade, "Avala" had its expositions in Ljubljana, Zagreb, Novi Sad and Skopje (for a short time). The Agency received the annual donation from the state which amounted to 5 million dinars, but this sum did not satisfy its needs. The financial means were often not spend purposefully, so "Avala", almost constantly, worked with losses. Its main tasks were informing the public at home and abroad "in accordance to the public state interest", making the official announcements, import and distribution of the foreign newspapers and journals. Nevertheless, its most important role was to transmit official information which came from the top of the governing structures. Everybody knew that the information released by the "Avala" Agency were official and "checked". In comparison to СРВ the Agency did not have the instruments to ensure that the newspapers published the received information. One of the strongholds of Stojadinovic's propaganda was the press. It was not free in this period and it was under supervision and tutorship of the ruling structures. Notwithstanding this, the number of the papers constantly grew. Their number varied because many of them were banned permanently and some were founded again. The number of the newspapers in different banovinas was different, as well. For example, in Sava banovina (Croatia) during 1938,389 papers were published and in Vrbas banovina (Bosnia) only four. Stojadonovic's government controlled the papers in two ways. The first one regarded the pre-emptive censorship, and the second one regarded the banning of the paper, if it was concluded that its writing was harmful for the interests of the President, the Government or the Party in power. The reason for extinguishing the most papers were Communist tendencies or contents. It was especially the case with the Croatian papers, but other regions were not spared this, at the time, usual practice, either. The most important papers which were in charge of spreading Sto¬ jadinovic's propaganda were the "Vreme" and the "Samouprava". Belgrade newspaper "Vreme" was practically owned by Stojadinovic himself, since the main share holders were members of his family or his friends. It was a widely read paper, second only to the "Politika" when it came to the number of sold copies. Considerable means were invested into the founding of this newspaper and the most modern printing house in the Balkans equiped with German and American machinery was built for these purposes. The Prime Minister himself took part in creating the recognizable visual image and the contents of the paper and, according to one of his associates, he spent a few hours every day on its editing. The "Vreme" was supposed to represent a model newspaper and to bring Stojadinovic's outlook on the political reality - both in the country and abroad, since the events in Europe started to influence the situation in the country more and more. Although attempts were made 305 мр Bojmi Симић to represent the 'Vreme" as a neutral paper it slowly gained the label of the Government's paper, which influenced the drop in its sales. The "Samouprava" was the main Party newspaper and all the other papers were under it in the hierarchy of the Party press. The very title which was taken from the old Radical newspaper was meant to imply that the newly founded JRZ was the only real inheritor of the old Radical Party from the time of the Kingdom of Serbia. Although it had low sales, the importance of this paper was not insignificant, since its texts were taken over and published by many provincial papers throughout the country. Among other newspapers which spread the propaganda of Milan Stojadinovic the most important ones were the "Vrbaske novine" from Banja Luka, the "Vardar" from Skopje, the "Narodni list" from Cetinje, the "Narodna samouprava" from Kragujevac, the "Država" from Split. The Party Press-Bureau of the JRZ was closely connected to the press. This Party organ was founded in 1936 and its main task was to be the central institution of all the Party and "friendly" papers. It sent information to be published to the provincial press and, not rarely, complete texts. The Press-Bureau saw to the sent articles being published on the covers of the papers, as well as to synchronizing their appearance. The number of papers it cooperated with was round 35, but they published almost everything they received from the Press-Bureau. The head of this institution was Milan Jovanovic Stoimirovic, the editor in chief of the "Samouprava". Tlie Press- Bureau shared its premises with the "Samouprava" almost untili the end of 1938 and the same associates worked in both institutions. The spreading of propaganda through radio broadcasting was a no¬ velty at the time. The radio broadcasting had started only a few years earlier on short frequencies, which widened its reach out of the state borders and even to another continents. Realizing in time the importance of this media, Stojadinovic put considerable efforts into development of radiophony in the country. During his government the capacity of the Radio Belgrade was raised from 2.5 to 20 kilowatts. A new short-frequency radio station was also founded. It started operating in the beginning of March 1936 and became the center of the radio propaganda. The task of monitoring and editing of its programme was taken over by СРВ. Already throughout 1937 the broadcasting for abroad was initiated and starting from the next year it became the regular activity. The main task of the short-frequency radio station was broadcasting the news. It had more than 1.000 hours of news broadcasting in a year which raised the number of news broadcasts in Yugoslav media by more than 300%. This radio station practically became the one to which all the others were subordinated when it came to the news of political nature. Considering the fact that those news were created "in the CPB's kitchen" they had the 306 Пропаганда Милана Стојадиновића aim to serve, above all, the interests of the ruling Party and its president. Notwithstanding the advancement of the radio broadcasting in Yugoslavia, it was still listed amongst the lowest of all the European countries in this field of advancement with one radio per more than 100 people. The only countries that lagged behind Yugoslavia in this field were Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria (the last one only regarding the number of the subscribers). Film in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia had served, even before, the pro¬ paganda purposes of the ruling circles, that is the royal family of Karadjor- djevics. The novelty introduced during the government of Milan Stojadinovic was making the special Party propaganda film "On the way of restoration - Yugoslavia yesterday, today and tomorrow". This movie, which was edited in Germany by the experts from the Nazi Party, was specially prepared for the pre-election campaign of the elections of December 1938. Considering the backwardness and lack of education of a great number of citizens in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia at the time, one can assume that this "technological miracle" had an important political impact on many of them. Various Party and Youth organizations spread propaganda for the government of Milan Stojadinovic, as well. The most important amongst these were the Section for the Interior Political Action and Propaganda and the Club of Students of JRZ "Slovenski jug". These organizations were in charge of creating propaganda, organizing political activities of the Party, of assemblies and rallies, as well as for publishing and distributing the propagandistic material. The propaganda of Milan Stojadinovic manifested itself in all the spheres of social life in the country. Considering the fact that the Government Put great efforts into "economical restoration of the country" propaganda in the field of economy and propaganda regarding economy were the most developed ones. By proclaiming the new "economic policy" the creators of the propaganda wanted to prove that the Government was, on the one hand, "ci'etihbl'i'^theotherstrengthenmg gthebasisforthepeoplesprosperiy^ he national industiy and "protecting the borders and independence of Yugoslavia". This propaganda had Stojadinovic's personal signature, as well. His numerous appearances at factories' and plants' openings and at the occasions of laying cornerstones were used by all the media to emphasize his Wleindevelopmentandtopresenthisplansforthe restoration of the OTuntiy. The Prime Minister himself, being a man from the economic circles, paid a lQt of attention to cooperation with the representatives from economy. He Reived various delegations, visited the business enterprises and improved Personal contacts with officials from economy gained throughout years, не ţed to present himself as someone from their surroundings who understood "leir needs and who worked for them. 307 мр Бојан Симић The propaganda towards the opposition was exclusively negative. It abounded in scorns and criticism, which was often exaggerated, sometimes inappropriate, but witty comments appeared from time to time as well. The sward of criticism was pointed, above all, towards the political opponents in the country. The propaganda of Milan Stojadinovic divided the opposition into several groups. The first one consisted of the Yugoslav National Party (JNS), that is the representatives of the former governing elite. The second was the United Opposition (UO). The third one was the Croatian Peasant Party (HSS). The fourth one was the pro-fascist group of Dimitrije Ljotic and the fifth one were the Communists. The criticism pointed towards the first group was based on mentions of the poor way in which they had previously governed the country. According to propaganda this was the main reason for the difficult circumstances in the country at the time. The leaders of JNS were accused of dictatorial, non-democratic anti anti-state tendencies. As regards the UO, Stojadinovic's propaganda refused them the possibility of any positive action, it emphasised their insignificance, selfishness and self-sufficiency. Their bad internal relations, rivalry and immorality were particularly underlined. Something that the propaganda regarding both groups had in common were constant emphases on their alienation from the people, lack of understanding of their aspirations and of "people's being". We should point out that the focus of the negative propaganda throughout 1936 was the JNS. The focus was switched to the members of the UO thro¬ ughout 1937 and this can be claimed of the period after the treaty of Farkasic in particular. The press played a prominent role in the criticism of the opposition and caricature, above all, was an effective means often utilized for these purposes. The propaganda towards HSS and its leader Macek was somewhat different. The existence of the "Croatian question" was acknowledged and, by virtue of that, the need for a compromise. However, the responsibility for the failure to achieve it was ascribed to Macek and his indecisiveness. He was given credit for leading the Croatian movement, but the efforts to discredit him as much as possible were continuous. The criticism of Ljotic and "Zbor" were rare. That intention was to belittle the movement and to treat it with disdain by showing that its activities were not even worth mentioning. The propaganda towards the Communist movement was most brutal and least attention was paid to the culture of speech when it came to criticizing this group of opponents. Communism was treated as a "disease" and the greatest threat to the wellbeing of the state. This attitude was rein¬ forced by the fact that the three leading politicians in the country were fervent anti-Communists: Prince Pavle, Stojadinovic and Korosec, the Minister of Interior. 308 Пропаганда Милана Сгпојадиноеића Since Stoj ácimo vic was the Minister of Foreign Affairs, a great amount of energy was put into developing propaganda for abroad. This propaganda carried a characteristic signature of the Prime Minister. Stojadinovic ma¬ de numerous trips abroad and received many foreign officials, which gave Mm an opportunity to try and leave the desired impression. Taking into consideration the strained relations in Europe at the time, this kind of pro¬ paganda was carefully planned and developed. Thus, Stojadinovic presented himself differently in different countries . In Great Britain he was the advocate of a two-party system, in the USA a follower of Rooseveiťs economic pro¬ gramme, in Italy and Germany an authoritarian leader who had Fascism ία his heart, etc. This sort of propaganda was accepted and executed by numerous correspondents from abroad, foreign journalists who were on the Government's payroll, the newspapers financed by the Government, citizens with "good intentions", etc. A lot of attention was paid to cooperation with ík foreign writers and journalists who came to our country. Their wishes were fulfilled to the greatest extent possible regarding moral and financiai concerns. In all of this the high officials of СРВ and the "Avala" Agency took џп} as well The propaganda pointed towards the national minorities had its particularities in comparison to that towards the Yugoslavs. It was, above all, based on concrete agreements with leaders of the national minorities, much more than on regular propagandistic activities. Apart írom this, good dations with the mother countries made it possible for the Government to get the votes of the minorities in exchange for small favours, This allowed fer propaganda being directed towards other administrative districts and towards the leading constituent peoples. The constant thing as regards religious communities was repetition of the desire of the Government for the religious equality. Most attention was paid to the three dominant religious communities; the Orthodox, the Catholic and the Muslim. The projected policy of religious equality was not a accordance with reality. This became apparent during the Concordat crisis wbidb culminated in summer of 1937- The desire to legally formulate the Nations with the Catholic church, motivated by political reasons oí internai «atare, resulted in the concessions which the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC) regarded as intolerable and which, according to its opmior ι went Wnst the proclaimed equality. The great efforts of the f nme Muiteend f the propaganda machinery to prove the legality of the Concorda tpioved J> be unsuccessful The great quantities of propagandne material used on both sides, as well as the human activity itself during to clash ^Ы Itt ^ће fusion that, at the time, a real propaganda war was ragmg » ^^ ^edefeatmthisconfrontationhadlastmgconsequencesfortheGovermnent aiî<ï for Stojadinovic himself. 309 мр Бојан Симић Under "regular" circumstances during the Government of Milan Sto- jadinovic propaganda towards religious communities was not the dominant one. More attention to this kind of propaganda was paid in religiously mixed communities, whereas it rarely came to surface in nationally homogeneous ones. During Stojadinovic's government the Islamic religious community was allowed its own legislature, as well as its own faculty and religious edu¬ cation. The person practically in charge of all the affairs regarding the Islamic community was Mehmed Spaho. He was the Minister for Traffic, who used his position to make his brother the head of the Community. In this case also the propaganda of the Prime Minister focused on the regions populated by Serbs, or, in this particular instance, with the Orthodox. The propaganda regarding culture and education was adapted to the existing circumstances. It emphasized the successes of the Government in these fields, which ranged from settling the affairs in the sphere of elementary education to opening high educational science and arts institutions. Even the Prime Minister Stojadinovic had a prominent role in propaganda in this field through his patronage of the artistic events, charity donations to various cultural societies, visits to the cultural manifestations, etc. Although the idea of a "three-tribal" nation and Yugolsavianism was practically abandoned in reality, the propaganda still tried to emphasize the loyalty to the "state and national unity". The Prime Minister also insisted on this, even though he was more than aware of the existing circumstances in the creation of which he himself played an important role. Yugoslavianism was one of the issues regarding which the discrepency between the propaganda context and the reality was greatest. Propaganda activities were most heated during the election campa¬ igns. During Stojadinovic's government two elections were held - the regio¬ nal elections by the end of 1936 and the parliamentary ones of December 1938. The propaganda during the parliamentary elections was the peak of the so far established practice and the crown of the already trodden path which the propaganda followed. The parliamentary elections were held with the slogan 'One king, one nation, one state, prosperity, peace at the borders". This slogan was supposed to represent both the program of the Party and its most important achievements at the same time. The rhythm of the pre¬ election campaign was dictated by Milan Stojadinovic himself. He created the campaign, he was the one who accepted or refused propositions, gave advice and instructions. The pre-election propaganda, apart from the usual repertoire, was reinforced by a travelling exhibition, a propagandistic film, leaflets thrown from the air, special brochures, numerous gatherings, etc. This kind of propaganda had as its target audience mainly the members of the Serbian national community. The consequence of this practice was leaving 310 Пропаганда Милана Стојадиновића the Croatian parts in Macek's firm embrace. On the territory of Croatia there were no larger rallies, there was no exhibition and no greater significant activities of the, not so numerous, JRZ members. Public voting, apart from ¡Es advantages for Government, brought about a selling of the votes of the sort, increased the level of corruption, created unrests and perturbations. Altogether, the results of the elections, as well as the results of the propaganda, were not satisfactory, but they still gave Stojadinovic a certain advantage over his opponents. That was, nevertheless, not enough for staying inpower. Less then two months after the elections Stojadinovic was forced to resign due to the internal governmental crisis incited by Prince Pavle. What followed was a short term oppositional activity, imprisonment, exile and death far from the homeland. After the mastermind of the propaganda left the position of the Prime Minister, the political propaganda in Yugoslavia in that form and shape disappeared forever. The propaganda of Milan Stojadinovic used the experience of the Fascist and Nazi spin doctors combined with the local specificities. Its main task was to serve political aims of the party in power, JRZ, and especially oí ^president Stojadinovic. It often consisted of exaggerated, wmte-and-black «presentations, belittling of the political opponents, inappropriate selt- gloriücation, etc. The use of great amount of the propagandistic material, brochures, leaflets and posters can be likened to the contemporary elee ion Practice. Considering all the abovementioned facts, we can conclude mat ^propaganda of Milan Stojadinovic was way too modern for the îuŞ°^Y society of the nineteen thirties. One gets the impression that this luna οι Propaganda was meant for the more educated strata of the population wnicn was a very small audience in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Ł In the end we could perhaps mention the words ^™ imself regarding the relation between the propaganda and the леашу Yugoslavia of the time. He said the following at the assembly of JUGORAS ltlAPrili938: „The situation is better today than it was three years ago it was very bad! Therefore, today's "better' is betta i to that 'bad'". , , . ThisdescriptionofferedbytheP^^^ W», is the most indicative of the real situation in Je ^ff Which istic attitude pronounced here is in contrast with the ^iopagan been inspired and controlled by the same man who had uttered 311
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author	Simić, Bojan
author_facet	Simić, Bojan
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ctrlnum	(OCoLC)237243859 (DE-599)BVBBV023227385
era	Geschichte 1935-1939 gnd
era_facet	Geschichte 1935-1939
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geographic	Jugoslawien (DE-588)4028966-7 gnd
geographic_facet	Jugoslawien
id	DE-604.BV023227385
illustrated	Illustrated
index_date	2024-07-02T20:18:35Z
indexdate	2024-07-09T21:13:34Z
institution	BVB
oai_aleph_id	oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016413164
oclc_num	237243859
open_access_boolean
owner	DE-12 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR
owner_facet	DE-12 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR
physical	348 S. Ill., graph. Darst.
publishDate	2007
publishDateSearch	2007
publishDateSort	2007
publisher	Inst. za Noviju Istoriju Srbije
record_format	marc
series2	Biblioteka "Studije i monografije" / Institut za Noviju Istoriju Srbije
spelling	Simić, Bojan Verfasser aut Propaganda Milana Stojadinovića Bojan Simić Beograd Inst. za Noviju Istoriju Srbije 2007 348 S. Ill., graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Biblioteka "Studije i monografije" / Institut za Noviju Istoriju Srbije 39 In kyrill. Schr., serb. - Zsfassung in engl. Sprache Stojadinović, Milan 1888-1961 (DE-588)123935822 gnd rswk-swf Geschichte 1935-1939 gnd rswk-swf Propaganda (DE-588)4076374-2 gnd rswk-swf Jugoslawien (DE-588)4028966-7 gnd rswk-swf Stojadinović, Milan 1888-1961 (DE-588)123935822 p Jugoslawien (DE-588)4028966-7 g Propaganda (DE-588)4076374-2 s Geschichte 1935-1939 z DE-604 Institut za Noviju Istoriju Srbije Biblioteka "Studije i monografije" 39 (DE-604)BV011095323 39 Digitalisierung BSBMuenchen application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016413164&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016413164&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Abstract
spellingShingle	Simić, Bojan Propaganda Milana Stojadinovića Stojadinović, Milan 1888-1961 (DE-588)123935822 gnd Propaganda (DE-588)4076374-2 gnd
subject_GND	(DE-588)123935822 (DE-588)4076374-2 (DE-588)4028966-7
title	Propaganda Milana Stojadinovića
title_auth	Propaganda Milana Stojadinovića
title_exact_search	Propaganda Milana Stojadinovića
title_exact_search_txtP	Propaganda Milana Stojadinovića
title_full	Propaganda Milana Stojadinovića Bojan Simić
title_fullStr	Propaganda Milana Stojadinovića Bojan Simić
title_full_unstemmed	Propaganda Milana Stojadinovića Bojan Simić
title_short	Propaganda Milana Stojadinovića
title_sort	propaganda milana stojadinovica
topic	Stojadinović, Milan 1888-1961 (DE-588)123935822 gnd Propaganda (DE-588)4076374-2 gnd
topic_facet	Stojadinović, Milan 1888-1961 Propaganda Jugoslawien
url	http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016413164&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016413164&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA
volume_link	(DE-604)BV011095323
work_keys_str_mv	AT simicbojan propagandamilanastojadinovica

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