Propaganda Milana Stojadinovića:
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Beograd
Inst. za Noviju Istoriju Srbije
2007
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Biblioteka "Studije i monografije" / Institut za Noviju Istoriju Srbije
39 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Abstract |
| Beschreibung: | In kyrill. Schr., serb. - Zsfassung in engl. Sprache |
| Beschreibung: | 348 S. Ill., graph. Darst. |
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| 100 | 1 | |a Simić, Bojan |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Propaganda Milana Stojadinovića |c Bojan Simić |
| 264 | 1 | |a Beograd |b Inst. za Noviju Istoriju Srbije |c 2007 | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804137518299348992 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | Садржај
Предговор
................................................................ 7
Увод
-
Појам, историјат
и врете пропаганде
......................... 17
ПРВИДЕО
Милан
Стојадиновић
и
влада
Милана
Стојадиновића
.............. 25
ДРУГИ ДЕО
Организаций пропаганде у европским државама
тридесетих година двадесетог века
.................................... 49
ТРЕЋИДЕО
Организација
и начин
извођења
пропаганде
Милана
Стојадиновића
................................................. 79
Централни прес-биро
............................................... 79
Агенција
„Авала
.....................................................
юз
Штампа
...............................................................121
Радио
...................................................................144
Партијски
прес-биро................................................
155
Филм
...................................................................159
Страначке, омладинске и друге
организације
у
служби
пропаганде
..................................................164
ЧЕТВРТИДЕО
Манифестанта пропаганде Милана
Стојадиновића
и
њени циљеви
.............................................................
іб5
Пропаганда у привреди
.............................................167
Пропаганда о
опозицији
и према
њој
..............................
і8і
Пропаганда
намењена
иностранству
...........................
J93
Пропаганда према верским
заједницама
........................209
Пропаганда према националним
мањинама
....................217
Пропаганда у
култури
и просвети
...............................221
ПЕТИДЕО
Предизборна пропаганда
...............................................231
Избори у
Краљевипи Југосаавији
-
правила,
прайса,
резултати
..................................................231
Пропаганда Милана
Стојадиновића
на
Парламентарним изборимаісзй-
године
........................242
Закључак
..................................................................293
Резиме на енглеском
језику
............................................303
Прилогбр.
ι
..............................................................313
ПрИЛОГбр.
2..............................................................321
Извори
и литература
....................................................
327
Изводи из
рецеизија
....................................................339
Белешка о аутору
........................................................
341
Именски регистар
.............................................,..........343
Пропаганда Милана
Cmo/t
Summary
Throughout the nineteen thirties propaganda, for many governments,
.nportant means of staying in power and manipulating the public. This
xue of the Government of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia which was presided
¿Шап
Stojadínovíc
from June
1935
to February
1939,
The Prime Minister
¿jadinovic was a modern politician who represented a new generation on
ie Yugoslav political scene, Being aware of the importance of propaganda,
ле
paid special attention to it and worked on its implementation
ob
daily
basis. He reorganized the existing institutions, he was in charge of selecting
the attaches for the press with the Yugoslav Embassies, he gave instructions
on what should be written and how, he encouraged the development of the
new media (radio and film). His influence on what conld be called developing
and executing propaganda was so important that it can be justifiably called
the propaganda of Milan Stojadmovic . His was a very organized type of
propaganda, a system in which everyone foiew exactly what to
teil,
when to
tell it, to -whom and to what extent to reveal the given information.
Practically ail state and Party institutions took part in propaganda
execution during Stojadinovic s government The most important among
these were the
Centrai Prese-Bureau
(СРВ),
the state Telegraphic Agency
Avala
and the Party Press-Bareau of the ruling
parły,
the Yugoslav Radical
Union (JRZ), The Central Press-Bureau was founded by a special decree in
*939 in the form of a state information service . The Bureau had its roots
à
the practice already established in the Princedom of Serbia, that is in the
institution of the „Press Bureau which had bees founded during the rule of
bince
Mihaüo Obrenovic.
The activities of which the Central
Press-Bure^
*as
щ
charge were specified by the decree of its funding, as well as by tf
Sooks of Regulations of
1931
and
1935.
During the time of the government
Mum Stojadmovic its organizational structure and activities were wider
*b head of the Central Press-Bureau was a high official with the title
0
CbiefofCPB, who was in chargeof controlling and monitoring all the act
f
the institution. He was appointed by the Government aad he repo¬
se Prime Minister in person. Practically throughout the whole pe
Stojadmovic s government the person in the position of the head ot
eneneed
journalist
Kosta
Lulravoc. The institution was
åmåe
мр Бојан Симић
Administrative,
the Information and the Publicist Department throughout
the most of its existence. These departments executed the tasks proscribed
by the Book of Regulations and they were divided into sections. The most
important of the three abovementioned was the Information Department. It
was in charge of the key tasks such as pre-release proofing of the issues of the
press (actions which practically amounted to censorship) and informing the
home media of the situation in the country and abroad. Almost all the papers
which were published in the country had to be pre-emptively proofread be¬
fore release and in the towns where there were no representatives of
СРВ
this task was fulfilled by the state prosecution offices or the officials of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs. The information released on the part of
СРВ
were
obligatory for all the media in the state. Their going along with this practice
was achieved through warnings, and sometimes even through threats and
blackmailing. Apart from the central institution, important job was also done
by the correspondents who were stationed in the most important European
cities and in the centers
oí
banovinas
in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.
СРВ
had
a significant number of civil servants and this number was usually round
150.
Among them there were those who were officially employed (on regular salary)
and those who were secret associates because of the nature of their tasks (on
secret salary). The institution was financed from the budget which was a part
of the budget of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers.
СРВ
was financed
on regular basis. It usually received an approximately similar amount of
money (slightly over
18
million dinars), considerable financial means at the
time. In comparison with the neighboring countries the received financial
means were higher than those of their similar institutions of approximately
the same size (Bulgarian, Greek, Turkish and Czechoslovakian). Still, they
were far from the financial means those more developed European countries,
such as Germany, England and Italy, spent on such institutions. This can
also be said of some of the neighboring countries which put considerable
financial means into development of their propaganda (the case of Hungary,
for example).
The importance and role of the propaganda of Milan Stojadinovic
and his Government was so huge that we can talk of
СРВ
playing the role of
the Ministry of Propaganda, although the name was officially different. The
picture created by
СРВ
was a projection of reality, that is a mixture of reality
and the desired state of affairs. That certainly does not mean that all the
information offered by
СРВ
were lies, only that Stojadinovic s wishes had a
priority over the truth.
The
Avala
Agency was one of the European state telegraphic agencies.
According to the European practice it was transformed into a joint stock
company but with the state as the dominant owner of the capital (over
90 96).
304
Пропаганда
Милана
Стојадиновића
Apart form the central institution in Belgrade,
Avala
had its expositions
in Ljubljana, Zagreb,
Novi
Sad and Skopje (for a short time). The Agency
received the annual donation from the state which amounted to
5
million
dinars, but this sum did not satisfy its needs. The financial means were often
not spend purposefully, so
Avala ,
almost constantly, worked with losses.
Its main tasks were informing the public at home and abroad in accordance
to the public state interest , making the official announcements, import and
distribution of the foreign newspapers and journals. Nevertheless, its most
important role was to transmit official information which came from the top
of the governing structures. Everybody knew that the information released
by the
Avala
Agency were official and checked . In comparison to
СРВ
the
Agency did not have the instruments to ensure that the newspapers published
the received information.
One of the strongholds of Stojadinovic s propaganda was the press. It
was not free in this period and it was under supervision and tutorship of the
ruling structures. Notwithstanding this, the number of the papers constantly
grew. Their number varied because many of them were banned permanently
and some were founded again. The number of the newspapers in different
banovinas
was different, as well. For example, in
Sava banovina
(Croatia)
during
1938,389
papers were published and in
Vrbas banovina
(Bosnia) only
four. Stojadonovic s government controlled the papers in two ways. The first
one regarded the pre-emptive censorship, and the second one regarded the
banning of the paper, if it was concluded that its writing was harmful for the
interests of the President, the Government or the Party in power. The reason
for extinguishing the most papers were Communist tendencies or contents.
It was especially the case with the Croatian papers, but other regions were
not spared this, at the time, usual practice, either.
The most important papers which were in charge of spreading Sto¬
jadinovic s propaganda were the
Vreme
and the
Samouprava .
Belgrade
newspaper
Vreme
was practically owned by Stojadinovic himself, since the
main share holders were members of his family or his friends. It was a widely
read paper, second only to the
Politika
when it came to the number of sold
copies. Considerable means were invested into the founding of this newspaper
and the most modern printing house in the Balkans equiped with German
and American machinery was built for these purposes. The Prime Minister
himself took part in creating the recognizable visual image and the contents
of the paper and, according to one of his associates, he spent a few hours
every day on its editing. The
Vreme
was supposed to represent a model
newspaper and to bring Stojadinovic s outlook on the political reality
-
both
in the country and abroad, since the events in Europe started to influence
the situation in the country more and more. Although attempts were made
305
мр
Bojmi
Симић
to represent the
Vreme
as a neutral paper it slowly gained the label of the
Government s paper, which influenced the drop in its sales.
The
Samouprava
was the main Party newspaper and all the other
papers were under it in the hierarchy of the Party press. The very title which
was taken from the old Radical newspaper was meant to imply that the newly
founded JRZ was the only real inheritor of the old Radical Party from the
time of the Kingdom of Serbia. Although it had low sales, the importance of
this paper was not insignificant, since its texts were taken over and published
by many provincial papers throughout the country. Among other newspapers
which spread the propaganda of Milan Stojadinovic the most important ones
were the
Vrbaske novine
from
Banja Luka,
the
Vardar
from
Skopje,
the
Narodni
list from
Cetinje,
the
Narodna samouprava
from Kragujevac, the
Država
from
Split.
The Party Press-Bureau of the JRZ was closely connected to the
press. This Party organ was founded in
1936
and its main task was to be the
central institution of all the Party and friendly papers. It sent information
to be published to the provincial press and, not rarely, complete texts. The
Press-Bureau saw to the sent articles being published on the covers of the
papers, as well as to synchronizing their appearance. The number of papers
it cooperated with was round
35,
but they published almost everything they
received from the Press-Bureau. The head of this institution was Milan
Jovanovic Stoimirovic, the editor in chief of the
Samouprava .
Tlie
Press-
Bureau shared its premises with the
Samouprava
almost
untili
the end of
1938
and the same associates worked in both institutions.
The spreading of propaganda through radio broadcasting was a no¬
velty at the time. The radio broadcasting had started only a few years earlier
on short frequencies, which widened its reach out of the state borders and
even to another continents. Realizing in time the importance of this media,
Stojadinovic put considerable efforts into development of radiophony in
the country. During his government the capacity of the Radio Belgrade was
raised from
2.5
to
20
kilowatts. A new short-frequency radio station was also
founded. It started operating in the beginning of March
1936
and became
the center of the radio propaganda. The task of monitoring and editing of its
programme was taken over by
СРВ.
Already throughout
1937
the broadcasting
for abroad was initiated and starting from the next year it became the regular
activity. The main task of the short-frequency radio station was broadcasting
the news. It had more than
1.000
hours of news broadcasting in a year which
raised the number of news broadcasts in Yugoslav media by more than
300%.
This radio station practically became the one to which all the others
were subordinated when it came to the news of political nature. Considering
the fact that those news were created in the CPB s kitchen they had the
306
Пропаганда
Милана
Стојадиновића
aim to serve, above all, the interests of the ruling Party and its president.
Notwithstanding the advancement of the radio broadcasting in Yugoslavia, it
was still listed amongst the lowest of all the European countries in this field
of advancement with one radio per more than
100
people. The only countries
that lagged behind Yugoslavia in this field were Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria
(the last one only regarding the number of the subscribers).
Film in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia had served, even before, the pro¬
paganda purposes of the ruling circles, that is the royal family of Karadjor-
djevics. The novelty introduced during the government of Milan Stojadinovic
was making the special Party propaganda film On the way of restoration
-
Yugoslavia yesterday, today and tomorrow . This movie, which was edited
in Germany by the experts from the Nazi Party, was specially prepared for
the pre-election campaign of the elections of December
1938.
Considering
the backwardness and lack of education of a great number of citizens in the
Kingdom of Yugoslavia at the time, one can assume that this technological
miracle had an important political impact on many of them.
Various Party and Youth organizations spread propaganda for the
government of Milan Stojadinovic, as well. The most important amongst
these were the Section for the Interior Political Action and Propaganda and
the Club of Students of JRZ
Slovenski jug .
These organizations were in
charge of creating propaganda, organizing political activities of the Party,
of assemblies and rallies, as well as for publishing and distributing the
propagandistic
material.
The propaganda of Milan Stojadinovic manifested itself in all the
spheres of social life in the country. Considering the fact that the Government
Put great efforts into economical restoration of the country propaganda
in the field of economy and propaganda regarding economy were the most
developed ones. By proclaiming the new economic policy the creators of
the propaganda wanted to prove that the Government was, on the one hand,
ci etihbl i ^theotherstrengthenmg
gthebasisforthepeoplesprosperiy^
he national industiy and protecting the borders and independence of
Yugoslavia . This propaganda had Stojadinovic s personal signature, as well.
His numerous appearances at factories and plants openings and at the
occasions of laying cornerstones were used by all the media to emphasize his
Wleindevelopmentandtopresenthisplansforthe restoration of the OTuntiy.
The Prime Minister himself, being a man from the economic circles, paid a
lQt of attention to cooperation with the representatives from economy. He
Reived various delegations, visited the business enterprises and improved
Personal contacts with officials from economy gained throughout years,
не
ţed
to present himself as someone from their surroundings who understood
leir needs and who worked for them.
307
мр Бојан Симић
The propaganda towards the opposition was exclusively negative. It
abounded in scorns and criticism, which was often exaggerated, sometimes
inappropriate, but witty comments appeared from time to time as well. The
sward of criticism was pointed, above all, towards the political opponents in
the country. The propaganda of Milan Stojadinovic divided the opposition
into several groups. The first one consisted of the Yugoslav National Party
(JNS), that is the representatives of the former governing elite. The second
was the United Opposition (UO). The third one was the Croatian Peasant
Party
(HSS).
The fourth one was the pro-fascist group of Dimitrije Ljotic and
the fifth one were the Communists. The criticism pointed towards the first
group was based on mentions of the poor way in which they had previously
governed the country. According to propaganda this was the main reason
for the difficult circumstances in the country at the time. The leaders of
JNS were accused of dictatorial, non-democratic
anti
anti-state tendencies.
As regards the UO, Stojadinovic s propaganda refused them the possibility
of any positive action, it emphasised their insignificance, selfishness and
self-sufficiency. Their bad internal relations, rivalry and immorality were
particularly underlined. Something that the propaganda regarding both
groups had in common were constant emphases on their alienation from the
people, lack of understanding of their aspirations and of people s being .
We should point out that the focus of the negative propaganda throughout
1936
was the JNS. The focus was switched to the members of the UO thro¬
ughout
1937
and this can be claimed of the period after the treaty of Farkasic
in particular. The press played a prominent role in the criticism of the
opposition and caricature, above all, was an effective means often utilized for
these purposes.
The propaganda towards
HSS
and its leader
Macek
was somewhat
different. The existence of the Croatian question was acknowledged and,
by virtue of that, the need for a compromise. However, the responsibility for
the failure to achieve it was ascribed to
Macek
and his indecisiveness. He was
given credit for leading the Croatian movement, but the efforts to discredit
him as much as possible were continuous. The criticism of Ljotic and
Zbor
were rare. That intention was to belittle the movement and to treat it with
disdain by showing that its activities were not even worth mentioning.
The propaganda towards the Communist movement was most
brutal and least attention was paid to the culture of speech when it came to
criticizing this group of opponents. Communism was treated as a disease
and the greatest threat to the wellbeing of the state. This attitude was rein¬
forced by the fact that the three leading politicians in the country were fervent
anti-Communists: Prince
Pavle,
Stojadinovic and Korosec, the Minister of
Interior.
308
Пропаганда Милана
Сгпојадиноеића
Since
Stoj
ácimo
vic
was the Minister of Foreign Affairs, a great amount
of energy was put into developing propaganda for abroad. This propaganda
carried a characteristic signature of the Prime Minister. Stojadinovic ma¬
de numerous trips abroad and received many foreign officials, which gave
Mm an opportunity to try and leave the desired impression. Taking into
consideration the strained relations in Europe at the time, this kind of pro¬
paganda was carefully planned and developed. Thus, Stojadinovic presented
himself differently in different countries
.
In Great Britain he was the advocate
of a two-party system, in the USA a follower of
Rooseveiťs
economic pro¬
gramme, in Italy and Germany an authoritarian leader who had Fascism
ία
his heart, etc. This sort of propaganda was accepted and executed by
numerous correspondents from abroad, foreign journalists who were on the
Government s payroll, the newspapers financed by the Government, citizens
with good intentions , etc. A lot of attention was paid to cooperation with
ík
foreign writers and journalists who came to our country. Their wishes
were fulfilled to the greatest extent possible regarding moral and
financiai
concerns. In all of this the high officials of
СРВ
and the
Avala
Agency took
џп}
as well
The propaganda pointed towards the national minorities had its
particularities in comparison to that towards the Yugoslavs. It was, above
all, based on concrete agreements with leaders of the national minorities,
much more than on regular
propagandistic
activities. Apart
írom
this, good
dations
with the mother countries made it possible for the Government to
get the votes of the minorities in exchange for small favours, This allowed
fer
propaganda being directed towards other administrative districts and
towards the leading constituent peoples.
The
constant
thing as regards religious communities was repetition
of the desire of the Government for the religious equality. Most attention
was paid to the three dominant religious communities; the Orthodox, the
Catholic and the Muslim. The projected policy of religious equality was not
a accordance with reality. This became apparent during the Concordat crisis
wbidb culminated in summer of 1937- The desire to legally formulate the
Nations with the Catholic church, motivated by political reasons
oí
internai
«atare,
resulted in the concessions which the Serbian Orthodox Church
(SPC)
regarded as intolerable and which, according to its opmior
ι
went
Wnst the proclaimed equality. The great
efforts
of the
f
nme
Muiteend
f the propaganda
machinery to prove the legality of the
Concorda
tpioved
J> be unsuccessful The great quantities of
propagandne
material used on
both sides, as well as the human activity itself during to clash
^Ы
Itt
^ће
fusion that, at the time, a real propaganda war was ragmg
»
^^
^edefeatmthisconfrontationhadlastmgconsequencesfortheGovermnent
aiî<ï
for Stojadinovic himself.
309
мр Бојан Симић
Under regular circumstances during the Government of Milan Sto-
jadinovic propaganda towards religious communities was not the dominant
one. More attention to this kind of propaganda was paid in religiously mixed
communities, whereas it rarely came to surface in nationally homogeneous
ones. During Stojadinovic s government the Islamic religious community
was allowed its own legislature, as well as its own faculty and religious edu¬
cation. The person practically in charge of all the affairs regarding the Islamic
community was Mehmed Spaho. He was the Minister for Traffic, who used
his position to make his brother the head of the Community. In this case also
the propaganda of the Prime Minister focused on the regions populated by
Serbs, or, in this particular instance, with the Orthodox.
The propaganda regarding culture and education was adapted to the
existing circumstances. It emphasized the successes of the Government in
these fields, which ranged from settling the affairs in the sphere of elementary
education to opening high educational science and arts institutions. Even
the Prime Minister Stojadinovic had a prominent role in propaganda in this
field through his patronage of the artistic events, charity donations to various
cultural societies, visits to the cultural manifestations, etc.
Although the idea of a three-tribal nation and Yugolsavianism was
practically abandoned in reality, the propaganda still tried to emphasize the
loyalty to the state and national unity . The Prime Minister also insisted on
this, even though he was more than aware of the existing circumstances in the
creation of which he himself played an important role. Yugoslavianism was
one of the issues regarding which the discrepency between the propaganda
context and the reality was greatest.
Propaganda activities were most heated during the election campa¬
igns. During Stojadinovic s government two elections were held
-
the regio¬
nal elections by the end of
1936
and the parliamentary ones of December
1938.
The propaganda during the parliamentary elections was the peak of
the so far established practice and the crown of the already trodden path
which the propaganda followed. The parliamentary elections were held with
the slogan One king, one nation, one state, prosperity, peace at the borders .
This slogan was supposed to represent both the program of the Party and
its most important achievements at the same time. The rhythm of the pre¬
election campaign was dictated by Milan Stojadinovic himself. He created
the campaign, he was the one who accepted or refused propositions, gave
advice and instructions. The pre-election propaganda, apart from the usual
repertoire, was reinforced by a travelling exhibition,
a propagandistic
film,
leaflets thrown from the air, special brochures, numerous gatherings, etc.
This kind of propaganda had as its target audience mainly the members of the
Serbian national community. The consequence of this practice was leaving
310
Пропаганда
Милана
Стојадиновића
the Croatian parts in Macek s firm embrace. On the territory of Croatia there
were no larger rallies, there was no exhibition and no greater significant
activities of the, not so numerous, JRZ members. Public voting, apart from
¡Es
advantages for Government, brought about a selling of the votes of the
sort, increased the level of corruption, created unrests and perturbations.
Altogether, the results of the elections, as well as the results of the
propaganda, were not satisfactory, but they still gave Stojadinovic a certain
advantage over his opponents. That was, nevertheless, not enough for staying
inpower.
Less then two months after the elections Stojadinovic was forced to
resign due to the internal governmental crisis incited by Prince
Pavle.
What
followed was a short term oppositional activity, imprisonment, exile and
death far from the homeland. After the mastermind of the propaganda left
the position of the Prime Minister, the political propaganda in Yugoslavia in
that form and shape disappeared forever.
The propaganda of Milan Stojadinovic used the experience of the
Fascist and Nazi spin doctors combined with the local specificities. Its main
task was to serve political aims of the party in power, JRZ, and especially
oí
^president Stojadinovic. It often consisted of exaggerated, wmte-and-black
«presentations, belittling of the political opponents, inappropriate selt-
gloriücation,
etc. The use of great amount of the
propagandistic
material,
brochures, leaflets and posters can be likened to the contemporary
elee
ion
Practice. Considering all the abovementioned facts, we can conclude mat
^propaganda of Milan Stojadinovic was way too modern for the
îuŞ°^Y
society of the nineteen thirties. One gets the impression that this
luna
οι
Propaganda was meant for the more educated strata of the population wnicn
was a very small audience in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.
Ł
In the end we could perhaps mention the words
*
^™
imself regarding the relation between the propaganda and the
леашу
Yugoslavia of the time. He said the following at the assembly of JUGORAS
ltlAPrili938:
„The situation is better today than it was three years
ago it was very bad! Therefore, today s better is
betta i
to that bad .
, ,
.
ThisdescriptionofferedbytheP^^^
W»,
is the most indicative of the real
situation in Je
^ff
Which
istic attitude pronounced here is in contrast with the
^iopagan
been
inspired and controlled by the same man who had uttered
311
|
| adam_txt |
Садржај
Предговор
. 7
Увод
-
Појам, историјат
и врете пропаганде
. 17
ПРВИДЕО
Милан
Стојадиновић
и
влада
Милана
Стојадиновића
. 25
ДРУГИ ДЕО
Организаций пропаганде у европским државама
тридесетих година двадесетог века
. 49
ТРЕЋИДЕО
Организација
и начин
извођења
пропаганде
Милана
Стојадиновића
. 79
Централни прес-биро
. 79
Агенција
„Авала"
.
юз
Штампа
.121
Радио
.144
Партијски
прес-биро.
155
Филм
.159
Страначке, омладинске и друге
организације
у
служби
пропаганде
.164
ЧЕТВРТИДЕО
Манифестанта пропаганде Милана
Стојадиновића
и
њени циљеви
.
іб5
Пропаганда у привреди
.167
Пропаганда о
опозицији
и према
њој
.
і8і
Пропаганда
намењена
иностранству
.
J93
Пропаганда према верским
заједницама
.209
Пропаганда према националним
мањинама
.217
Пропаганда у
култури
и просвети
.221
ПЕТИДЕО
Предизборна пропаганда
.231
Избори у
Краљевипи Југосаавији
-
правила,
прайса,
резултати
.231
Пропаганда Милана
Стојадиновића
на
Парламентарним изборимаісзй-
године
.242
Закључак
.293
Резиме на енглеском
језику
.303
Прилогбр.
ι
.313
ПрИЛОГбр.
2.321
Извори
и литература
.
327
Изводи из
рецеизија
.339
Белешка о аутору
.
341
Именски регистар
.,.343
Пропаганда Милана
Cmo/t
Summary
Throughout the nineteen thirties propaganda, for many governments,
.nportant means of staying in power and manipulating the public. This
xue of the Government of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia which was presided
¿Шап
Stojadínovíc
from June
1935
to February
1939,
The Prime Minister
¿jadinovic was a modern politician who represented a new generation on
ie Yugoslav political scene, Being aware of the importance of propaganda,
ле
paid special attention to it and worked on its implementation
ob
daily
basis. He reorganized the existing institutions, he was in charge of selecting
the attaches for the press with the Yugoslav Embassies, he gave instructions
on what should be written and how, he encouraged the development of the
new media (radio and film). His influence on what conld be called developing
and executing propaganda was so important that it can be justifiably called
'the propaganda of Milan Stojadmovic'. His was a very organized type of
propaganda, a system in which everyone foiew exactly what to
teil,
when to
tell it, to -whom and to what extent to reveal the given information.
Practically ail state and Party institutions took part in propaganda
execution during Stojadinovic's government The most important among
these were the
Centrai Prese-Bureau
(СРВ),
the state Telegraphic Agency
"Avala"
and the Party Press-Bareau of the ruling
parły,
the Yugoslav Radical
Union (JRZ), The Central Press-Bureau was founded by a special decree in
*939 in the form of a "state information service". The Bureau had its roots
à
the practice already established in the Princedom of Serbia, that is in the
institution of the „Press Bureau" which had bees founded during the rule of
bince
Mihaüo Obrenovic.
The activities of which the Central
Press-Bure^
*as
щ
charge were specified by the decree of its funding, as well as by tf
Sooks of Regulations of
1931
and
1935.
During the time of the government
Mum Stojadmovic its organizational structure and activities were wider
'*b head of the Central Press-Bureau was a high official with the title
0
CbiefofCPB, who was in chargeof controlling and monitoring all the act'
f
the institution. He was appointed by the Government aad he repo¬
se Prime Minister in person. Practically throughout the whole pe
Stojadmovic's government the person in the position of the head ot
eneneed
journalist
Kosta
Lulravoc. The institution was
åmåe
мр Бојан Симић
Administrative,
the Information and the Publicist Department throughout
the most of its existence. These departments executed the tasks proscribed
by the Book of Regulations and they were divided into sections. The most
important of the three abovementioned was the Information Department. It
was in charge of the key tasks such as pre-release proofing of the issues of the
press (actions which practically amounted to censorship) and informing the
home media of the situation in the country and abroad. Almost all the papers
which were published in the country had to be pre-emptively proofread be¬
fore release and in the towns where there were no representatives of
СРВ
this task was fulfilled by the state prosecution offices or the officials of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs. The information released on the part of
СРВ
were
obligatory for all the media in the state. Their going along with this practice
was achieved through warnings, and sometimes even through threats and
blackmailing. Apart from the central institution, important job was also done
by the correspondents who were stationed in the most important European
cities and in the centers
oí
banovinas
in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.
СРВ
had
a significant number of civil servants and this number was usually round
150.
Among them there were those who were officially employed (on regular salary)
and those who were secret associates because of the nature of their tasks (on
secret salary). The institution was financed from the budget which was a part
of the budget of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers.
СРВ
was financed
on regular basis. It usually received an approximately similar amount of
money (slightly over
18
million dinars), considerable financial means at the
time. In comparison with the neighboring countries the received financial
means were higher than those of their similar institutions of approximately
the same size (Bulgarian, Greek, Turkish and Czechoslovakian). Still, they
were far from the financial means those more developed European countries,
such as Germany, England and Italy, spent on such institutions. This can
also be said of some of the neighboring countries which put considerable
financial means into development of their propaganda (the case of Hungary,
for example).
The importance and role of the propaganda of Milan Stojadinovic
and his Government was so huge that we can talk of
СРВ
playing the role of
the Ministry of Propaganda, although the name was officially different. The
picture created by
СРВ
was a projection of reality, that is a mixture of reality
and the desired state of affairs. That certainly does not mean that all the
information offered by
СРВ
were lies, only that Stojadinovic's wishes had a
priority over the truth.
The
"Avala"
Agency was one of the European state telegraphic agencies.
According to the European practice it was transformed into a joint stock
company but with the state as the dominant owner of the capital (over
90 96).
304
Пропаганда
Милана
Стојадиновића
Apart form the central institution in Belgrade,
"Avala"
had its expositions
in Ljubljana, Zagreb,
Novi
Sad and Skopje (for a short time). The Agency
received the annual donation from the state which amounted to
5
million
dinars, but this sum did not satisfy its needs. The financial means were often
not spend purposefully, so
"Avala",
almost constantly, worked with losses.
Its main tasks were informing the public at home and abroad "in accordance
to the public state interest", making the official announcements, import and
distribution of the foreign newspapers and journals. Nevertheless, its most
important role was to transmit official information which came from the top
of the governing structures. Everybody knew that the information released
by the
"Avala"
Agency were official and "checked". In comparison to
СРВ
the
Agency did not have the instruments to ensure that the newspapers published
the received information.
One of the strongholds of Stojadinovic's propaganda was the press. It
was not free in this period and it was under supervision and tutorship of the
ruling structures. Notwithstanding this, the number of the papers constantly
grew. Their number varied because many of them were banned permanently
and some were founded again. The number of the newspapers in different
banovinas
was different, as well. For example, in
Sava banovina
(Croatia)
during
1938,389
papers were published and in
Vrbas banovina
(Bosnia) only
four. Stojadonovic's government controlled the papers in two ways. The first
one regarded the pre-emptive censorship, and the second one regarded the
banning of the paper, if it was concluded that its writing was harmful for the
interests of the President, the Government or the Party in power. The reason
for extinguishing the most papers were Communist tendencies or contents.
It was especially the case with the Croatian papers, but other regions were
not spared this, at the time, usual practice, either.
The most important papers which were in charge of spreading Sto¬
jadinovic's propaganda were the
"Vreme"
and the
"Samouprava".
Belgrade
newspaper
"Vreme"
was practically owned by Stojadinovic himself, since the
main share holders were members of his family or his friends. It was a widely
read paper, second only to the
"Politika"
when it came to the number of sold
copies. Considerable means were invested into the founding of this newspaper
and the most modern printing house in the Balkans equiped with German
and American machinery was built for these purposes. The Prime Minister
himself took part in creating the recognizable visual image and the contents
of the paper and, according to one of his associates, he spent a few hours
every day on its editing. The
"Vreme"
was supposed to represent a model
newspaper and to bring Stojadinovic's outlook on the political reality
-
both
in the country and abroad, since the events in Europe started to influence
the situation in the country more and more. Although attempts were made
305
мр
Bojmi
Симић
to represent the
'Vreme"
as a neutral paper it slowly gained the label of the
Government's paper, which influenced the drop in its sales.
The
"Samouprava"
was the main Party newspaper and all the other
papers were under it in the hierarchy of the Party press. The very title which
was taken from the old Radical newspaper was meant to imply that the newly
founded JRZ was the only real inheritor of the old Radical Party from the
time of the Kingdom of Serbia. Although it had low sales, the importance of
this paper was not insignificant, since its texts were taken over and published
by many provincial papers throughout the country. Among other newspapers
which spread the propaganda of Milan Stojadinovic the most important ones
were the
"Vrbaske novine"
from
Banja Luka,
the
"Vardar"
from
Skopje,
the
"Narodni
list" from
Cetinje,
the
"Narodna samouprava"
from Kragujevac, the
"Država"
from
Split.
The Party Press-Bureau of the JRZ was closely connected to the
press. This Party organ was founded in
1936
and its main task was to be the
central institution of all the Party and "friendly" papers. It sent information
to be published to the provincial press and, not rarely, complete texts. The
Press-Bureau saw to the sent articles being published on the covers of the
papers, as well as to synchronizing their appearance. The number of papers
it cooperated with was round
35,
but they published almost everything they
received from the Press-Bureau. The head of this institution was Milan
Jovanovic Stoimirovic, the editor in chief of the
"Samouprava".
Tlie
Press-
Bureau shared its premises with the
"Samouprava"
almost
untili
the end of
1938
and the same associates worked in both institutions.
The spreading of propaganda through radio broadcasting was a no¬
velty at the time. The radio broadcasting had started only a few years earlier
on short frequencies, which widened its reach out of the state borders and
even to another continents. Realizing in time the importance of this media,
Stojadinovic put considerable efforts into development of radiophony in
the country. During his government the capacity of the Radio Belgrade was
raised from
2.5
to
20
kilowatts. A new short-frequency radio station was also
founded. It started operating in the beginning of March
1936
and became
the center of the radio propaganda. The task of monitoring and editing of its
programme was taken over by
СРВ.
Already throughout
1937
the broadcasting
for abroad was initiated and starting from the next year it became the regular
activity. The main task of the short-frequency radio station was broadcasting
the news. It had more than
1.000
hours of news broadcasting in a year which
raised the number of news broadcasts in Yugoslav media by more than
300%.
This radio station practically became the one to which all the others
were subordinated when it came to the news of political nature. Considering
the fact that those news were created "in the CPB's kitchen" they had the
306
Пропаганда
Милана
Стојадиновића
aim to serve, above all, the interests of the ruling Party and its president.
Notwithstanding the advancement of the radio broadcasting in Yugoslavia, it
was still listed amongst the lowest of all the European countries in this field
of advancement with one radio per more than
100
people. The only countries
that lagged behind Yugoslavia in this field were Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria
(the last one only regarding the number of the subscribers).
Film in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia had served, even before, the pro¬
paganda purposes of the ruling circles, that is the royal family of Karadjor-
djevics. The novelty introduced during the government of Milan Stojadinovic
was making the special Party propaganda film "On the way of restoration
-
Yugoslavia yesterday, today and tomorrow". This movie, which was edited
in Germany by the experts from the Nazi Party, was specially prepared for
the pre-election campaign of the elections of December
1938.
Considering
the backwardness and lack of education of a great number of citizens in the
Kingdom of Yugoslavia at the time, one can assume that this "technological
miracle" had an important political impact on many of them.
Various Party and Youth organizations spread propaganda for the
government of Milan Stojadinovic, as well. The most important amongst
these were the Section for the Interior Political Action and Propaganda and
the Club of Students of JRZ
"Slovenski jug".
These organizations were in
charge of creating propaganda, organizing political activities of the Party,
of assemblies and rallies, as well as for publishing and distributing the
propagandistic
material.
The propaganda of Milan Stojadinovic manifested itself in all the
spheres of social life in the country. Considering the fact that the Government
Put great efforts into "economical restoration of the country" propaganda
in the field of economy and propaganda regarding economy were the most
developed ones. By proclaiming the new "economic policy" the creators of
the propaganda wanted to prove that the Government was, on the one hand,
"ci'etihbl'i'^theotherstrengthenmg
gthebasisforthepeoplesprosperiy^
he national industiy and "protecting the borders and independence of
Yugoslavia". This propaganda had Stojadinovic's personal signature, as well.
His numerous appearances at factories' and plants' openings and at the
occasions of laying cornerstones were used by all the media to emphasize his
Wleindevelopmentandtopresenthisplansforthe restoration of the OTuntiy.
The Prime Minister himself, being a man from the economic circles, paid a
lQt of attention to cooperation with the representatives from economy. He
Reived various delegations, visited the business enterprises and improved
Personal contacts with officials from economy gained throughout years,
не
ţed
to present himself as someone from their surroundings who understood
"leir needs and who worked for them.
307
мр Бојан Симић
The propaganda towards the opposition was exclusively negative. It
abounded in scorns and criticism, which was often exaggerated, sometimes
inappropriate, but witty comments appeared from time to time as well. The
sward of criticism was pointed, above all, towards the political opponents in
the country. The propaganda of Milan Stojadinovic divided the opposition
into several groups. The first one consisted of the Yugoslav National Party
(JNS), that is the representatives of the former governing elite. The second
was the United Opposition (UO). The third one was the Croatian Peasant
Party
(HSS).
The fourth one was the pro-fascist group of Dimitrije Ljotic and
the fifth one were the Communists. The criticism pointed towards the first
group was based on mentions of the poor way in which they had previously
governed the country. According to propaganda this was the main reason
for the difficult circumstances in the country at the time. The leaders of
JNS were accused of dictatorial, non-democratic
anti
anti-state tendencies.
As regards the UO, Stojadinovic's propaganda refused them the possibility
of any positive action, it emphasised their insignificance, selfishness and
self-sufficiency. Their bad internal relations, rivalry and immorality were
particularly underlined. Something that the propaganda regarding both
groups had in common were constant emphases on their alienation from the
people, lack of understanding of their aspirations and of "people's being".
We should point out that the focus of the negative propaganda throughout
1936
was the JNS. The focus was switched to the members of the UO thro¬
ughout
1937
and this can be claimed of the period after the treaty of Farkasic
in particular. The press played a prominent role in the criticism of the
opposition and caricature, above all, was an effective means often utilized for
these purposes.
The propaganda towards
HSS
and its leader
Macek
was somewhat
different. The existence of the "Croatian question" was acknowledged and,
by virtue of that, the need for a compromise. However, the responsibility for
the failure to achieve it was ascribed to
Macek
and his indecisiveness. He was
given credit for leading the Croatian movement, but the efforts to discredit
him as much as possible were continuous. The criticism of Ljotic and
"Zbor"
were rare. That intention was to belittle the movement and to treat it with
disdain by showing that its activities were not even worth mentioning.
The propaganda towards the Communist movement was most
brutal and least attention was paid to the culture of speech when it came to
criticizing this group of opponents. Communism was treated as a "disease"
and the greatest threat to the wellbeing of the state. This attitude was rein¬
forced by the fact that the three leading politicians in the country were fervent
anti-Communists: Prince
Pavle,
Stojadinovic and Korosec, the Minister of
Interior.
308
Пропаганда Милана
Сгпојадиноеића
Since
Stoj
ácimo
vic
was the Minister of Foreign Affairs, a great amount
of energy was put into developing propaganda for abroad. This propaganda
carried a characteristic signature of the Prime Minister. Stojadinovic ma¬
de numerous trips abroad and received many foreign officials, which gave
Mm an opportunity to try and leave the desired impression. Taking into
consideration the strained relations in Europe at the time, this kind of pro¬
paganda was carefully planned and developed. Thus, Stojadinovic presented
himself differently in different countries
.
In Great Britain he was the advocate
of a two-party system, in the USA a follower of
Rooseveiťs
economic pro¬
gramme, in Italy and Germany an authoritarian leader who had Fascism
ία
his heart, etc. This sort of propaganda was accepted and executed by
numerous correspondents from abroad, foreign journalists who were on the
Government's payroll, the newspapers financed by the Government, citizens
with "good intentions", etc. A lot of attention was paid to cooperation with
ík
foreign writers and journalists who came to our country. Their wishes
were fulfilled to the greatest extent possible regarding moral and
financiai
concerns. In all of this the high officials of
СРВ
and the
"Avala"
Agency took
џп}
as well
The propaganda pointed towards the national minorities had its
particularities in comparison to that towards the Yugoslavs. It was, above
all, based on concrete agreements with leaders of the national minorities,
much more than on regular
propagandistic
activities. Apart
írom
this, good
dations
with the mother countries made it possible for the Government to
get the votes of the minorities in exchange for small favours, This allowed
fer
propaganda being directed towards other administrative districts and
towards the leading constituent peoples.
The
constant
thing as regards religious communities was repetition
of the desire of the Government for the religious equality. Most attention
was paid to the three dominant religious communities; the Orthodox, the
Catholic and the Muslim. The projected policy of religious equality was not
a accordance with reality. This became apparent during the Concordat crisis
wbidb culminated in summer of 1937- The desire to legally formulate the
Nations with the Catholic church, motivated by political reasons
oí
internai
«atare,
resulted in the concessions which the Serbian Orthodox Church
(SPC)
regarded as intolerable and which, according to its opmior
ι
went
Wnst the proclaimed equality. The great
efforts
of the
f
nme
Muiteend
f the propaganda
machinery to prove the legality of the
Concorda
tpioved
J> be unsuccessful The great quantities of
propagandne
material used on
both sides, as well as the human activity itself during to clash
^Ы
Itt
^ће
fusion that, at the time, a real propaganda war was ragmg
»
^^
^edefeatmthisconfrontationhadlastmgconsequencesfortheGovermnent
aiî<ï
for Stojadinovic himself.
309
мр Бојан Симић
Under "regular" circumstances during the Government of Milan Sto-
jadinovic propaganda towards religious communities was not the dominant
one. More attention to this kind of propaganda was paid in religiously mixed
communities, whereas it rarely came to surface in nationally homogeneous
ones. During Stojadinovic's government the Islamic religious community
was allowed its own legislature, as well as its own faculty and religious edu¬
cation. The person practically in charge of all the affairs regarding the Islamic
community was Mehmed Spaho. He was the Minister for Traffic, who used
his position to make his brother the head of the Community. In this case also
the propaganda of the Prime Minister focused on the regions populated by
Serbs, or, in this particular instance, with the Orthodox.
The propaganda regarding culture and education was adapted to the
existing circumstances. It emphasized the successes of the Government in
these fields, which ranged from settling the affairs in the sphere of elementary
education to opening high educational science and arts institutions. Even
the Prime Minister Stojadinovic had a prominent role in propaganda in this
field through his patronage of the artistic events, charity donations to various
cultural societies, visits to the cultural manifestations, etc.
Although the idea of a "three-tribal" nation and Yugolsavianism was
practically abandoned in reality, the propaganda still tried to emphasize the
loyalty to the "state and national unity". The Prime Minister also insisted on
this, even though he was more than aware of the existing circumstances in the
creation of which he himself played an important role. Yugoslavianism was
one of the issues regarding which the discrepency between the propaganda
context and the reality was greatest.
Propaganda activities were most heated during the election campa¬
igns. During Stojadinovic's government two elections were held
-
the regio¬
nal elections by the end of
1936
and the parliamentary ones of December
1938.
The propaganda during the parliamentary elections was the peak of
the so far established practice and the crown of the already trodden path
which the propaganda followed. The parliamentary elections were held with
the slogan 'One king, one nation, one state, prosperity, peace at the borders".
This slogan was supposed to represent both the program of the Party and
its most important achievements at the same time. The rhythm of the pre¬
election campaign was dictated by Milan Stojadinovic himself. He created
the campaign, he was the one who accepted or refused propositions, gave
advice and instructions. The pre-election propaganda, apart from the usual
repertoire, was reinforced by a travelling exhibition,
a propagandistic
film,
leaflets thrown from the air, special brochures, numerous gatherings, etc.
This kind of propaganda had as its target audience mainly the members of the
Serbian national community. The consequence of this practice was leaving
310
Пропаганда
Милана
Стојадиновића
the Croatian parts in Macek's firm embrace. On the territory of Croatia there
were no larger rallies, there was no exhibition and no greater significant
activities of the, not so numerous, JRZ members. Public voting, apart from
¡Es
advantages for Government, brought about a selling of the votes of the
sort, increased the level of corruption, created unrests and perturbations.
Altogether, the results of the elections, as well as the results of the
propaganda, were not satisfactory, but they still gave Stojadinovic a certain
advantage over his opponents. That was, nevertheless, not enough for staying
inpower.
Less then two months after the elections Stojadinovic was forced to
resign due to the internal governmental crisis incited by Prince
Pavle.
What
followed was a short term oppositional activity, imprisonment, exile and
death far from the homeland. After the mastermind of the propaganda left
the position of the Prime Minister, the political propaganda in Yugoslavia in
that form and shape disappeared forever.
The propaganda of Milan Stojadinovic used the experience of the
Fascist and Nazi spin doctors combined with the local specificities. Its main
task was to serve political aims of the party in power, JRZ, and especially
oí
^president Stojadinovic. It often consisted of exaggerated, wmte-and-black
«presentations, belittling of the political opponents, inappropriate selt-
gloriücation,
etc. The use of great amount of the
propagandistic
material,
brochures, leaflets and posters can be likened to the contemporary
elee
ion
Practice. Considering all the abovementioned facts, we can conclude mat
^propaganda of Milan Stojadinovic was way too modern for the
îuŞ°^Y
society of the nineteen thirties. One gets the impression that this
luna
οι
Propaganda was meant for the more educated strata of the population wnicn
was a very small audience in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.
Ł
In the end we could perhaps mention the words
*
^™
imself regarding the relation between the propaganda and the
леашу
Yugoslavia of the time. He said the following at the assembly of JUGORAS
ltlAPrili938:
„The situation is better today than it was three years
ago it was very bad! Therefore, today's "better' is
betta i
to that 'bad'".
, ,
.
ThisdescriptionofferedbytheP^^^
W»,
is the most indicative of the real
situation in Je
^ff
Which
istic attitude pronounced here is in contrast with the
^iopagan
been
inspired and controlled by the same man who had uttered
311 |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| any_adam_object_boolean | 1 |
| author | Simić, Bojan |
| author_facet | Simić, Bojan |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Simić, Bojan |
| author_variant | b s bs |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV023227385 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)237243859 (DE-599)BVBBV023227385 |
| era | Geschichte 1935-1939 gnd |
| era_facet | Geschichte 1935-1939 |
| format | Book |
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| geographic | Jugoslawien (DE-588)4028966-7 gnd |
| geographic_facet | Jugoslawien |
| id | DE-604.BV023227385 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T20:18:35Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:13:34Z |
| institution | BVB |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016413164 |
| oclc_num | 237243859 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR |
| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR |
| physical | 348 S. Ill., graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 2007 |
| publishDateSearch | 2007 |
| publishDateSort | 2007 |
| publisher | Inst. za Noviju Istoriju Srbije |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Biblioteka "Studije i monografije" / Institut za Noviju Istoriju Srbije |
| spelling | Simić, Bojan Verfasser aut Propaganda Milana Stojadinovića Bojan Simić Beograd Inst. za Noviju Istoriju Srbije 2007 348 S. Ill., graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Biblioteka "Studije i monografije" / Institut za Noviju Istoriju Srbije 39 In kyrill. Schr., serb. - Zsfassung in engl. Sprache Stojadinović, Milan 1888-1961 (DE-588)123935822 gnd rswk-swf Geschichte 1935-1939 gnd rswk-swf Propaganda (DE-588)4076374-2 gnd rswk-swf Jugoslawien (DE-588)4028966-7 gnd rswk-swf Stojadinović, Milan 1888-1961 (DE-588)123935822 p Jugoslawien (DE-588)4028966-7 g Propaganda (DE-588)4076374-2 s Geschichte 1935-1939 z DE-604 Institut za Noviju Istoriju Srbije Biblioteka "Studije i monografije" 39 (DE-604)BV011095323 39 Digitalisierung BSBMuenchen application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016413164&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016413164&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Abstract |
| spellingShingle | Simić, Bojan Propaganda Milana Stojadinovića Stojadinović, Milan 1888-1961 (DE-588)123935822 gnd Propaganda (DE-588)4076374-2 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)123935822 (DE-588)4076374-2 (DE-588)4028966-7 |
| title | Propaganda Milana Stojadinovića |
| title_auth | Propaganda Milana Stojadinovića |
| title_exact_search | Propaganda Milana Stojadinovića |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Propaganda Milana Stojadinovića |
| title_full | Propaganda Milana Stojadinovića Bojan Simić |
| title_fullStr | Propaganda Milana Stojadinovića Bojan Simić |
| title_full_unstemmed | Propaganda Milana Stojadinovića Bojan Simić |
| title_short | Propaganda Milana Stojadinovića |
| title_sort | propaganda milana stojadinovica |
| topic | Stojadinović, Milan 1888-1961 (DE-588)123935822 gnd Propaganda (DE-588)4076374-2 gnd |
| topic_facet | Stojadinović, Milan 1888-1961 Propaganda Jugoslawien |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016413164&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016413164&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV011095323 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT simicbojan propagandamilanastojadinovica |