Oružane snage NDH: sveukupni ustroj
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | Croatian |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Zagreb
Nova Stvarnost [u.a.]
2004
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Abstract |
| Beschreibung: | Zsfassung in engl. Sprache |
| Beschreibung: | 326 S. Ill. |
| ISBN: | 9536562235 |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Oružane snage NDH |b sveukupni ustroj |c Damir Jug |
| 264 | 1 | |a Zagreb |b Nova Stvarnost [u.a.] |c 2004 | |
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| 500 | |a Zsfassung in engl. Sprache | ||
| 610 | 2 | 4 | |a Ustaša, hrvatska revolucionarna organizacija |
| 648 | 7 | |a Geschichte 1941-1945 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Geschichte | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Weltkrieg (1939-1945) | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1806961762795257856 |
|---|---|
| adam_text |
SADRŽAJ
UVOD
. 1
Kratak pregled hrvatske povijesti od
1918.
do napada na
Kraljevinu Jugoslaviju u travnju
1941. 1
Napad na Jugoslaviju, tzv. „Travanjski rat"
. 4
Proglašenje, međunarodno priznanje i organizacija vlasti u NDH
. 7
DOMOBRANSTVO
.11
Ministarstvo hrvatskog domobranstva i Ministarstvo oružanih snaga
(MINDOM
I MINORS)
.24
Kopnena vojska
.59
Vojno teritorijalna organizacija NDH
.59
Razvitak postrojbi kopnene vojske Domobranstva
.63
Prvo razdoblje
.64
Drugo razdoblje
.75
Treće razdoblje
.90
Četvrto razdoblje
.111
Popuna ljudstvom (novačenje, vojni stališi, činored) i brojdbeni
pokazatelji stanja kopnene vojske Domobranstva od
1941.
do
1945 . 124
Zrakoplovstvo NDH
(1941.-1945.) .142
Zapovjedništvo zrakoplovstva
-
razvitak
.142
Zrakoplovne postrojbe ili „letačtvo"
.148
1.
zrakoplovna luka
-
Zagreb (Borongaj)
.149
2.
zrakoplovna luka
-
Sarajevo (Rajlovac)
.150
5.
zrakoplovna luka
-
Banja Luka
.152
3.
zrakoplovna luka
-
Mostar
.153
Protuzrakoplovna obrana
-
PZO
.154
Zrakoplovno dojavništvo
.156
Mornarica NDH
.157
XV
Damir Jug: Oružane snage NDH sveukuni ustroj
ORUŽNIŠTVO
.163
USTAŠKA VOJNICA
.177
Stvaranje i razvitak ustaških vojnih postrojbi u emigraciji
.178
Razvitak postrojbi, sustav zapovijedanja i osobni poslovi u
ustaškoj vojnici u NDH
.193
Ustaška vojnica u užem smislu
.194
Prvo razdoblje, stvaranje postrojbi Ustaške vojnice
(travanj-kolovoz
1941.) .195
Drugo razdoblje u razvitku Ustaške vojnice
(razdoblje ljeto
1941. -
ljeto
1942.) .208
Treće razdoblje u razvitku Ustaške vojnice
(od ljeta
1942.
do jeseni
1944.) .219
Četvrto razdoblje u razvitku Ustaške vojnice
-
sjedinjavanje
oružanih snaga u
HOS
(studeni
1944. -
svibanj
1945.) .233
Poglavnikov tjelesni zdrug (PTS)
.243
Razdoblje bojne
(PTB)
.244
Razdoblje razvitka Poglavnikova tjelesnoga zdruga (PTS-a)
. 249
Ustrojavanje divizija i zbora
.254
Paravojne ustaške postrojbe (ustaška milicija, seoske straže
ili tzv. „divlji ustaše")
.257
Zapovijedanje u ustaškoj vojnici
.262
Glavni stožer Ustaške vojnice i Glavni stan Poglavnika (GSP)
. 263
Zapovjedništvo Ustaške vojnice (ZUVOJ)
.266
LEGIONARSKE POSTROJBE
.273
Legionarske postrojbe u sastavu oružanih snaga NDH
.274
Kopnene snage Hrvatske legije
.275
Pojačana
369.
pješačka pukovnija
.275
Lako
prevozní
zdrug hrvatske legije (LPZ)
.283
Zrakoplovna legija NDH ili „Hrvatska zrakoplovna legija"
.287
4.
lovačka skupina
.290
5.
bombarderska skupina
.293
Legija mornarice NDH, „Hrvatski pomorski sklop"
.295
Legionarske postrojbe u sastavu njemačke vojske
.297
Hrvatske legionarske divizije u sastavu
Wehrmachta.298
Legionarske divizije u sklopu
Waffen
SS-a
.301
ZAKLJUČAK
.305
SUMMARY
.311
SKRAĆENICE
.319
IZVORI I LITERATURA
.323
XVI
SUMMARY
I believe with this work, taking into account the data and source material
being available, I explained and described the military structure, relationships
and other matters regarding the armed forces of the Independent State of Croa¬
tia (ISC) as a whole through the period of its existence from April of
1941
until
May of
1945.
This entity is represented in all its parts (included in its framework are the
branches and services), The Regular Croatin Army
(Domobranstvo),
The Mili¬
tary Police, and The Ustashi Army respectively, and particularly the units
known as the legionary.
The State of the ISC was established primarily due to the circumstances
created by World War II, and the attack of Axis Forces on the Kingdom of Yu¬
goslavia in April of
1941
following the general Simovich military coup on March
27, 1941
since the Kingdom of Yugoslavia posed a threat to the right flank of
the German Army according to its plans designed for the South-east (with an
intention to attack Greece) and on the East
-
an attack on the USSR.
Another assumption that could have been realized only upon the prerequisi¬
te of the above mentioned, namely a decision on the attack and tearing apart of
Yugoslavia, were aspirations and activities of the radical nationalistic circles ini¬
tially united around the Ustashi organisation officially known under the name
of the Ustashi Croatian Revolutionary Organisation (UCRO) which operated in
emigration (Italy) and whose idea was to establish an independent Croatian Sta¬
te. This could in their opinion be brought about only through tearing Yugoslavi-
a apart so they worked in coordination with the policy of Mussolini's Italy po¬
licy, that offered them a refuge in turn.
Almost until before the military coup the Germans supported the integrity
of Yugoslavia, but faced with the need of bringing to a close the war against Yu¬
goslavia in the quickest possible way, the Germans agreed with the idea of Cro¬
atian independence. They were reluctant to leave the Italians with control in
the region for they beared the brunt of war against The Yugoslav Army, they
placed emphasis on the Ustashi oriented circles in Croatia, gathered around
311
Damir Jug: Oružane snage NDH sveukuni ustroj
Slávko Kvaternik,
the former
Austro-
Hungarian officer, who didn't favour the
Italians. This is what led to the Declaration of the ISC (10th of April,
1941)
an¬
nounced by
Slávko
Kvaternik on behalf of Ante
Pavelić
as a President since
Croatia could hardly ignore Italy's interest as its major military ally.
On the 5th of May,
Pavelić,
who was believed by the Germans to be an «Ita¬
lian man» arrived in Zagreb only a day after the first Government of the State
was appointed, which was called the ISC ever since. The rivalry between the
Germans and the Italians continued throughout the war until Italy collapsed (in
September of
1943),
and this was the event that significantly affected the life of
the State in general, and particularly, the development of its armed forces,
which is the primary concern of this book.
The ISC armed forces were officially formed on the very first day the Decla¬
ration of Croatian independence occurred and virtually even earlier in emigrati¬
on (the Ustashi military camps in Italy and Hungary). They were divided in ac¬
cordance with the practises of the axis partners to form the regular state army
(RCA,
domobranstvo)
on one hand and on the other hand the party Army (PA)
(the Ustashi).
As far as the Croatian state of that period was concerned they were The
Do¬
mobranstvo
namely The Regular Croatian Army and The Ustashi Army as a
part of the Ustashi movement. In addition, as a special component, there was
the Military police, too, that arose from ex-gendarmery, and which fell within
the framework of The regular Croatian Army, and later within into The Usta-
shy Army.
The formation of the RCA followed soon after the anouncement of the ISC
and it was designed to form the main part of its armed forces, by way of mobili¬
zation and manning out of the collapsed ex-Yugoslavian Royal Army and exclu¬
sively its Croatian personnel, and the compulsory military service out of its citi¬
zens, respectively.
This practice was applied to «the racially pure Croats» of the Catholic, Gre¬
ek-catholic and Muslim faith, while excluded were the orthodox Serbs and more
specifically, the Jews.
As was the case with the rest of armies, the RCA consisted of branches and
services. The branches were: The Army, The Air Force and The Navy. While
The RCA Army constituted the main body and its dominant part, The Air For¬
ces hardly even existed, and The Navy actually didn't even exist.
The supreme commanding and administrative body of the RCA (and for¬
mally of the armed forces as a whole) was initially The Ministry of the Croatian
RCA, later on renamed into The Ministry of the RCA (MINDOM), and since
1943
The Ministry of the Armed Forces (MINORS). The development of the
RCA and the armed forces (including units and agencies) as a whole falls gene¬
rally into four periods. Whether it was the matter of progress in the sense of ac¬
complishing the better is highly questionable. Though there was a tendency to
permanent improvement in the organisational sense of the development of the
RCA, as well as of the other parts of the armed forces, all tending towards effec¬
tiveness, there are elements that suggest that it was actually a weakening pro¬
cess at work, and even that of disintegration.
312
Summary
Anyway, each of these periods had some kind of own significance which was
determined by the conditions and factors of internal and external nature.
The first and in my opinion the fundamental role was played by the presen¬
ce of the German and Italian Armies, as well as their views at different courses
of development of the armed forces of the ISC.
Secondly, this process should be looked at from the perspective of the ove¬
rall wartime situation, namely, considering the execution of the operation on
European and other grounds, but also war activities in the area of the ISC
(
the
Chetnik movement on one side and the Partisan's so-called «people's liberation
movement», on the other).
The German interest was to relieve their divisions for war operations in the
East and in this respect they supported the development of the RC and MP abo¬
ve all, at first partly and later on to a larger extent, which would warrant the
pacification of one segment of the European South East.
This was the course of the overall development of the RCA regarding mili¬
tary and territorial organisation as well as the organisation of the units, prima¬
rily the ground forces. The development of command institutions followed the
above course, and the Ministry respectively, which subsequently created more
and more specific divisions breaking down into sections and departments.
The State was divided into
16
division areas at first, with regiments as its
basic units, of which
16
were formed. Most of this depended on the weaponry
and equipment available, procured mostly by Germans. Until the summer of
1941,
the process was rather rapid and successful, and continued later on by
formation of divisions
(6),
corps
(3),
within the framework of three military dis¬
tricts. It should be mentioned, however, that the ISC was from its very begin¬
ning divided into two spheres of military influence: German and Italian (the
line of division went from the north-east towards the south-east partitioning the
ISC into two roughly equal parts).
A part of the Dalmatian region was occupied by the Italians, while the se¬
cond demilitarized zone streched out across the rest of the coast and the main¬
land, and up to the line of the German military control, the third (Italian) zone.
In the same area in the South, the II
Armata
was deployed, later on named Su-
persloda with approximately
20
divisions, while the Germans had only
2
divisi¬
ons in the north though of lower quality (the
ÏIS"1
and 714th infantry division).
The original development of the RCA and the UA was made possible due to
the areas under the German sphere of influence, while the Italian military aut¬
horities hindered and even made this development impossible. It was particu¬
larly more true of the Ustashi units which were completely paralysed in the se¬
cond zone. Such an Italian policy reflected their desire to outrun the Germans
but it was also a counteraction to the anti-Italian posture of the military com¬
mand of the RCA headed by the Minister, and the Commander-in-Chief (Mar¬
shall)
Slávko Kvaternik.
The German military policy and their interests in the ISC respectively, con¬
sisted primarily of maintaining communications towards Greece as well as exer¬
cising control over the important sources of raw materials.
313
Damir Jug: Oružane snage NDH sveukuni ustroj
Thirdly, the process of development of the ISC armed forces was seriously
affected by the civil war, namely the rise of arms against the «occupier» as the
Germans and Italians were commonly called by the insurgents, including the
ISC as their ally, but also against the ISC per
se.
The war itself, that is to say
the uprising was started by groups which had by different political and ideologi¬
cal convictions though it wasn't easy to tell the difference between them at the
beginning since they worked together. But eventually their alliance broke up
and they confronted each other. The Partisans waged war against the «fascist
occupiers» and their allies (the ISC), and they named their resistance movement
«The People's Liberation Army»
(NOP),
which was led by the communists. The
other, the Chetnicks, were «the army in the home land» and they represented
option of Greater Serbia and the Yugoslav court and government, who defected
to western ally protection.
The afore mentioned, acting as a destabilizing factor upon the ISC and the
force opposing the Partisans, were significantly supported and armed by the Ita¬
lians in the
1st
and
2nd
zone. The army of the ISC, specifically the RCA, as the
civil war continued from the summer of
1941
onward, with its inert and immo¬
bile division organisation, wasn't able to crush it, what on one side generated
German discontent forcing them to engage their new divisions, and on the ot¬
her, imposed a need to reorganize the ISC Army. Throughout the period of the
ISC the three of such reorganisations were performed. As the civil war continu¬
ed and the Germans faced ever growing adverse circumstances in different thea¬
ters of war so all of these reorganisations were less the result of well designed
concepts and
plannings, but
more the adjustments or responses to the require¬
ments imposed by the war situation.
Parallel with this change, those leaders of the armed forces were replaced as
were the ministers. The first «victim» of the military failure, as well as of the
internal conflicts and intrigues, happened to be the First Secretary of the RCA,
the Commander-in-Chief,
Slávko Kvaternik,
whose role of the secretary in the
name of the President was assummed by general
Vinko Begić.
Afterwards, following his replacement, the Ministry transformed into the
Ministry of Armed Forces, with general
Miroslav
F. Navrátil
appointed as its
minister, and in turn his replacement
-
colonel (and
«krilnik»
-
general) Ante
Vokić
assumed the same post, until so-called «the military coup
Vokić-Lorković»
in August of
1944,
the army now reunited
(HOS
-
Croatian Armed Forces), fi¬
nally comes under control of both Ante
Pavelić
himself and his headquarters.
The fourth, not less important reason, which affected the processes in the
armed forces of the ISC, posed a continuous antagonism and animosity between
Ustashi and RCA circles, the Ustashi and RCA, respectively. The Ustashi army
was considered at first a «back-up force», but gradually, with the increasing
support of
Pavelić
himself, and enforced by the establishment it appeared as the
major force of the ISC, The aspiration behind the enforcement was namely
«ustashification» of the entire armed forces of the ISC. On the other hand, the
RCA who were strongly supported by the regional representatives of
Wehr¬
macht,
and who had a lot of specialty military personnel, backed by the Mini¬
ster
Navrátil,
even came upon the idea of dissolving the UA to the interests of
314
Summary
the «Unified Croatian Army», now the main body of the Croatian Armed forces.
But due to strong opposition of Ustashi circles the idea turned out to be a failu¬
re, and along with it Minister Navaratil failed, too. He was replaced by the
Ustashi man, Ante
Vokić,
who was expected to command the Army governed by
the Ustashi idea, but realizing «that the cause is lost» he desired to redirect the
Army and the State as well in favour of the Western allies. Since the Ustashi
Army couldn't make it, his idea was to create a uniform and strong army that
would have a capability to strike Germans «from behind» at the appropriate
moment, and that would accordingly be united under the RCA as a more accep¬
table Army in the view of the Allies (non-Ustashi nature, linked to the politicial
party of
HSS,
and the like).
Nevertheless, due to
Pavelić's
unwillingness as well as to the objective una-
bility of executing the military coup plans, in the given circumstances, when the
Germans, with the Italians already capitulated, were extremly sensitive to fur¬
ther internal weakening, the plan itself along with general
Vokić
failed, so as a
result the ISC followed the route of the only ally left, the Germans, who finally
agreed to accept the Army of the ISC with its Ustashi nature, and the process
was carried out through unification of all the forces into «The Croatian Armed
Forces» now that
Pavelić
himself personally assumed the role of Commander-in-
Chief. In addition, the RCA itself witnessed the animosity between the old-fashi¬
oned Austro-Hungarian officers, on one side and the ex-officers of the Royal Yu¬
goslav Army on the other, of which the latter were younger and more familiari¬
zed with the modern military structure and war operations.
But as late as the autumn of
1942,
in the period of
Slávko
Kvaternik's man¬
date, the Austro-Hungarian officers were considered «politically acceptable» and
subsequently promoted, privileged and therefore appointed the highest military
posts. But the logic of conducting war operations required changes, in the first
place, personnel, which was naturally followed by organisational changes. Divisi¬
ons were gradually withdrawn in favor of the brigades which were considered
more suitable against guerilla fighting, so the first alpine ones were immedia-
telly formed and later on the combat ones (hunting brigades), as well as some
other types (infantry, base-installed brigades).
This process started with the third period and during the second re-organi¬
sation of the ISC armed forces.
As late as the summer of
1943,
the divisions were discontinued (the 6th one
was an exception) along with the corps, while the only things remaining were
the military districts.
The Germans then gradually took initiative in conducting war operations
and commanding the RCA units, above all the ones regarded as being of the
highest quality, namely the alpine and the hunting brigades.
The legionary divisions (369th, 373rd, 392nd) were formed, consisting of Croati¬
an draftees trained in Germany within the framework of
Wehrmacht,
(in fact
the German Army), which were to replace original German units and bear the
brunt of war in Croatia and Bosnia.
They primarily performed it due to the lack of confidence in the fragmented
ISC army, weakened through internal conflicts (and among its leaders) and se-
315
Damir Jug: Oružane snage NDH sveukuni ustroj
condly
to avoid the Italian reproaches for gradually building up the arms of the
Croatian State Army and by doing so, reduce their already poor control over it.
From that time on, the Croatian Armed forces, especially the ECA and the
MP, lose their independence and turn into a back-up, poorly equipped and man¬
ned army. The Military Police is made marginal by the fact of introducing and
forming
SS
police forces. The Ustashi Army had been developed ever since the
days of emigration. It was autonomous and virtually, though not formally, inde¬
pendent of the supreme military commanding institutions
-
the Ministry. At the
beginning it had its own separate headquarters, but eventually it was subordi¬
nated to the organisational plan of the Ustashi command, since disorganisation
and self-will became a prevalent practice of some particular commanders
(rasovi
-
ras-es).
Although this command (ZUVOJ) constituted a counterbalance to the RCA
Ministry, and had its own military structure, it was soon to be withdrawn (sum¬
mer,
1943),
due to the impossibility of keeping in line, and to subordinate some
particular commanders to the regular military line of command (hierachy), who
had their «private» units and who contacted directly the President
(Pavelić),
whatever the issue.
The Ustashi Army was composed of three individual parts: the Ustashi
Army in a limited sense, The Presidents Security Batallion and the paramilitary
Ustashi units known as the «wild Ustashi» and the «village watch» which were
organized and armed by the Ustashi officials on the ground.
The units developed from companies, batallions through brigades. Their
common characteristic is that all of them operated on the particular area, so
they were called standing brigades. The
Pavelich
security battalion was a stan¬
ding unit, too, which eventually developed into a corps, most of the time opera¬
ting as the
Pavelich
security force, sometimes safeguarding various structures.
The lack of specialty personnel was another flaw as well as the lack of officers,
which were mostly selected from among the RCA personnel, and who in turn
experienced humiliation and harrassment by the Ustashi counterparts. The rea¬
son of this disorganiation of the Ustashi Army in the first place I blame on the
way the political system functioned in the ISC (the Ustashi being the privileged
and for the autocracy being excessively emphasised as a value) and also in the
fact that the Ustashi
-
the emigrants, who were being trained in the military
camps since
1934,
were very soon made into prisoners, and thus the develop¬
ment of the Ustashi military organisation came to an end. In the period to
come, in the wake of their arrival to Croatia, they were in a quick manner as¬
sembled and formed into companies and battallions. Unaccustomed to any form
of military discipline more than badly shaped and affected the individuals and
the Ustashi units, and later on led to their falling into troubles for not being
able to obey military courtesey.
I can't hardly claim that regarding the military profession there were none
skillfull, good and successful commanders, on the contrary, but to their very
end, the issues just mentioned, remained notorious for the Ustashi units.
316
Summary
However, if we are to single out any of the units, it would certainly be the
President's Security Forces, that had been hghly invested into, but some of the
standing brigades must be emphasised, too.
The very end of the war, toward the end of
1944
and the beginning of
1945,
the circumstances of the overall withdrawal of the German forces out of Greece,
brought about the third reorganisation of the ISC forces. At that time a signifi¬
cant part of the territory of the ISC was under the control of the Partisans, whi¬
le in the north of the river
Drava,
the troops of the The Red Army were on the
offensive. It became urgent to form, or shall we say, improvise the formation of
units even capable of keeping the line of defence by their own might at some
defense segments and thus cover the overall Axis Forces withdrawal. The reality
of the war, taking the above into consideration, brought about the need to form
Croatian divisions with one crack division on top.
All of them,
18
in number, fit into the framework of the military districts,
and finally into the framework of the five Ustashi corps.
These describe the circumstances at the end of the war in April as, well as
the course of the CAF (Croatian Armed Forces) withdrawal in May of
1945.
Ac¬
cording to some source materials «The Croatian Armed Forces» numbered
240,000
military personnel, though the data on the number of personnel of
some particular segments of the armed forces through the entire period of the
war, were considered rather unreliable, due to the lack of the complete formati¬
on manning of the units, and since officially operated data never matched those
on the ground. And last but not least, those particular units which were formed
to be deployed to the eastern front must be mentioned, either at the request
and suggestion of the Germans or by the initiative of the ISC leadership (being
formerly accepted by the Germans). They are the Croatian legionary units, the
ground, air force and naval units, that operated within the framework of the
German or Italian divisions on the eastern front. Some of them stood out signi¬
ficantly: the reinforced 369th regiment and one squadron of the air force legion.
In spite of the fact that all of this legions operated within the framework of The
Axis Forces units, formally they fell under the command of MINDOM and MI¬
NORS, and virtually represented a part of the armed forces of the ISC.
They, since organisationally
de
facto constituting a part of the German
Army, should be distinguished from legionary divisions which were a compo¬
nent of
Wehrmacht
or
Waffen
SS.
317 |
| adam_txt |
SADRŽAJ
UVOD
. 1
Kratak pregled hrvatske povijesti od
1918.
do napada na
Kraljevinu Jugoslaviju u travnju
1941. 1
Napad na Jugoslaviju, tzv. „Travanjski rat"
. 4
Proglašenje, međunarodno priznanje i organizacija vlasti u NDH
. 7
DOMOBRANSTVO
.11
Ministarstvo hrvatskog domobranstva i Ministarstvo oružanih snaga
(MINDOM
I MINORS)
.24
Kopnena vojska
.59
Vojno teritorijalna organizacija NDH
.59
Razvitak postrojbi kopnene vojske Domobranstva
.63
Prvo razdoblje
.64
Drugo razdoblje
.75
Treće razdoblje
.90
Četvrto razdoblje
.111
Popuna ljudstvom (novačenje, vojni stališi, činored) i brojdbeni
pokazatelji stanja kopnene vojske Domobranstva od
1941.
do
1945 . 124
Zrakoplovstvo NDH
(1941.-1945.) .142
Zapovjedništvo zrakoplovstva
-
razvitak
.142
Zrakoplovne postrojbe ili „letačtvo"
.148
1.
zrakoplovna luka
-
Zagreb (Borongaj)
.149
2.
zrakoplovna luka
-
Sarajevo (Rajlovac)
.150
5.
zrakoplovna luka
-
Banja Luka
.152
3.
zrakoplovna luka
-
Mostar
.153
Protuzrakoplovna obrana
-
PZO
.154
Zrakoplovno dojavništvo
.156
Mornarica NDH
.157
XV
Damir Jug: Oružane snage NDH sveukuni ustroj
ORUŽNIŠTVO
.163
USTAŠKA VOJNICA
.177
Stvaranje i razvitak ustaških vojnih postrojbi u emigraciji
.178
Razvitak postrojbi, sustav zapovijedanja i osobni poslovi u
ustaškoj vojnici u NDH
.193
Ustaška vojnica u užem smislu
.194
Prvo razdoblje, stvaranje postrojbi Ustaške vojnice
(travanj-kolovoz
1941.) .195
Drugo razdoblje u razvitku Ustaške vojnice
(razdoblje ljeto
1941. -
ljeto
1942.) .208
Treće razdoblje u razvitku Ustaške vojnice
(od ljeta
1942.
do jeseni
1944.) .219
Četvrto razdoblje u razvitku Ustaške vojnice
-
sjedinjavanje
oružanih snaga u
HOS
(studeni
1944. -
svibanj
1945.) .233
Poglavnikov tjelesni zdrug (PTS)
.243
Razdoblje bojne
(PTB)
.244
Razdoblje razvitka Poglavnikova tjelesnoga zdruga (PTS-a)
. 249
Ustrojavanje divizija i zbora
.254
Paravojne ustaške postrojbe (ustaška milicija, seoske straže
ili tzv. „divlji ustaše")
.257
Zapovijedanje u ustaškoj vojnici
.262
Glavni stožer Ustaške vojnice i Glavni stan Poglavnika (GSP)
. 263
Zapovjedništvo Ustaške vojnice (ZUVOJ)
.266
LEGIONARSKE POSTROJBE
.273
Legionarske postrojbe u sastavu oružanih snaga NDH
.274
Kopnene snage Hrvatske legije
.275
Pojačana
369.
pješačka pukovnija
.275
Lako
prevozní
zdrug hrvatske legije (LPZ)
.283
Zrakoplovna legija NDH ili „Hrvatska zrakoplovna legija"
.287
4.
lovačka skupina
.290
5.
bombarderska skupina
.293
Legija mornarice NDH, „Hrvatski pomorski sklop"
.295
Legionarske postrojbe u sastavu njemačke vojske
.297
Hrvatske legionarske divizije u sastavu
Wehrmachta.298
Legionarske divizije u sklopu
Waffen
SS-a
.301
ZAKLJUČAK
.305
SUMMARY
.311
SKRAĆENICE
.319
IZVORI I LITERATURA
.323
XVI
SUMMARY
I believe with this work, taking into account the data and source material
being available, I explained and described the military structure, relationships
and other matters regarding the armed forces of the Independent State of Croa¬
tia (ISC) as a whole through the period of its existence from April of
1941
until
May of
1945.
This entity is represented in all its parts (included in its framework are the
branches and services), The Regular Croatin Army
(Domobranstvo),
The Mili¬
tary Police, and The Ustashi Army respectively, and particularly the units
known as the legionary.
The State of the ISC was established primarily due to the circumstances
created by World War II, and the attack of Axis Forces on the Kingdom of Yu¬
goslavia in April of
1941
following the general Simovich military coup on March
27, 1941
since the Kingdom of Yugoslavia posed a threat to the right flank of
the German Army according to its plans designed for the South-east (with an
intention to attack Greece) and on the East
-
an attack on the USSR.
Another assumption that could have been realized only upon the prerequisi¬
te of the above mentioned, namely a decision on the attack and tearing apart of
Yugoslavia, were aspirations and activities of the radical nationalistic circles ini¬
tially united around the Ustashi organisation officially known under the name
of the Ustashi Croatian Revolutionary Organisation (UCRO) which operated in
emigration (Italy) and whose idea was to establish an independent Croatian Sta¬
te. This could in their opinion be brought about only through tearing Yugoslavi-
a apart so they worked in coordination with the policy of Mussolini's Italy po¬
licy, that offered them a refuge in turn.
Almost until before the military coup the Germans supported the integrity
of Yugoslavia, but faced with the need of bringing to a close the war against Yu¬
goslavia in the quickest possible way, the Germans agreed with the idea of Cro¬
atian independence. They were reluctant to leave the Italians with control in
the region for they beared the brunt of war against The Yugoslav Army, they
placed emphasis on the Ustashi oriented circles in Croatia, gathered around
311
Damir Jug: Oružane snage NDH sveukuni ustroj
Slávko Kvaternik,
the former
Austro-
Hungarian officer, who didn't favour the
Italians. This is what led to the Declaration of the ISC (10th of April,
1941)
an¬
nounced by
Slávko
Kvaternik on behalf of Ante
Pavelić
as a President since
Croatia could hardly ignore Italy's interest as its major military ally.
On the 5th of May,
Pavelić,
who was believed by the Germans to be an «Ita¬
lian man» arrived in Zagreb only a day after the first Government of the State
was appointed, which was called the ISC ever since. The rivalry between the
Germans and the Italians continued throughout the war until Italy collapsed (in
September of
1943),
and this was the event that significantly affected the life of
the State in general, and particularly, the development of its armed forces,
which is the primary concern of this book.
The ISC armed forces were officially formed on the very first day the Decla¬
ration of Croatian independence occurred and virtually even earlier in emigrati¬
on (the Ustashi military camps in Italy and Hungary). They were divided in ac¬
cordance with the practises of the axis partners to form the regular state army
(RCA,
domobranstvo)
on one hand and on the other hand the party Army (PA)
(the Ustashi).
As far as the Croatian state of that period was concerned they were The
Do¬
mobranstvo
namely The Regular Croatian Army and The Ustashi Army as a
part of the Ustashi movement. In addition, as a special component, there was
the Military police, too, that arose from ex-gendarmery, and which fell within
the framework of The regular Croatian Army, and later within into The Usta-
shy Army.
The formation of the RCA followed soon after the anouncement of the ISC
and it was designed to form the main part of its armed forces, by way of mobili¬
zation and manning out of the collapsed ex-Yugoslavian Royal Army and exclu¬
sively its Croatian personnel, and the compulsory military service out of its citi¬
zens, respectively.
This practice was applied to «the racially pure Croats» of the Catholic, Gre¬
ek-catholic and Muslim faith, while excluded were the orthodox Serbs and more
specifically, the Jews.
As was the case with the rest of armies, the RCA consisted of branches and
services. The branches were: The Army, The Air Force and The Navy. While
The RCA Army constituted the main body and its dominant part, The Air For¬
ces hardly even existed, and The Navy actually didn't even exist.
The supreme commanding and administrative body of the RCA (and for¬
mally of the armed forces as a whole) was initially The Ministry of the Croatian
RCA, later on renamed into The Ministry of the RCA (MINDOM), and since
1943
The Ministry of the Armed Forces (MINORS). The development of the
RCA and the armed forces (including units and agencies) as a whole falls gene¬
rally into four periods. Whether it was the matter of progress in the sense of ac¬
complishing the better is highly questionable. Though there was a tendency to
permanent improvement in the organisational sense of the development of the
RCA, as well as of the other parts of the armed forces, all tending towards effec¬
tiveness, there are elements that suggest that it was actually a weakening pro¬
cess at work, and even that of disintegration.
312
Summary
Anyway, each of these periods had some kind of own significance which was
determined by the conditions and factors of internal and external nature.
The first and in my opinion the fundamental role was played by the presen¬
ce of the German and Italian Armies, as well as their views at different courses
of development of the armed forces of the ISC.
Secondly, this process should be looked at from the perspective of the ove¬
rall wartime situation, namely, considering the execution of the operation on
European and other grounds, but also war activities in the area of the ISC
(
the
Chetnik movement on one side and the Partisan's so-called «people's liberation
movement», on the other).
The German interest was to relieve their divisions for war operations in the
East and in this respect they supported the development of the RC and MP abo¬
ve all, at first partly and later on to a larger extent, which would warrant the
pacification of one segment of the European South East.
This was the course of the overall development of the RCA regarding mili¬
tary and territorial organisation as well as the organisation of the units, prima¬
rily the ground forces. The development of command institutions followed the
above course, and the Ministry respectively, which subsequently created more
and more specific divisions breaking down into sections and departments.
The State was divided into
16
division areas at first, with regiments as its
basic units, of which
16
were formed. Most of this depended on the weaponry
and equipment available, procured mostly by Germans. Until the summer of
1941,
the process was rather rapid and successful, and continued later on by
formation of divisions
(6),
corps
(3),
within the framework of three military dis¬
tricts. It should be mentioned, however, that the ISC was from its very begin¬
ning divided into two spheres of military influence: German and Italian (the
line of division went from the north-east towards the south-east partitioning the
ISC into two roughly equal parts).
A part of the Dalmatian region was occupied by the Italians, while the se¬
cond demilitarized zone streched out across the rest of the coast and the main¬
land, and up to the line of the German military control, the third (Italian) zone.
In the same area in the South, the II
Armata
was deployed, later on named Su-
persloda with approximately
20
divisions, while the Germans had only
2
divisi¬
ons in the north though of lower quality (the
ÏIS"1
and 714th infantry division).
The original development of the RCA and the UA was made possible due to
the areas under the German sphere of influence, while the Italian military aut¬
horities hindered and even made this development impossible. It was particu¬
larly more true of the Ustashi units which were completely paralysed in the se¬
cond zone. Such an Italian policy reflected their desire to outrun the Germans
but it was also a counteraction to the anti-Italian posture of the military com¬
mand of the RCA headed by the Minister, and the Commander-in-Chief (Mar¬
shall)
Slávko Kvaternik.
The German military policy and their interests in the ISC respectively, con¬
sisted primarily of maintaining communications towards Greece as well as exer¬
cising control over the important sources of raw materials.
313
Damir Jug: Oružane snage NDH sveukuni ustroj
Thirdly, the process of development of the ISC armed forces was seriously
affected by the civil war, namely the rise of arms against the «occupier» as the
Germans and Italians were commonly called by the insurgents, including the
ISC as their ally, but also against the ISC per
se.
The war itself, that is to say
the uprising was started by groups which had by different political and ideologi¬
cal convictions though it wasn't easy to tell the difference between them at the
beginning since they worked together. But eventually their alliance broke up
and they confronted each other. The Partisans waged war against the «fascist
occupiers» and their allies (the ISC), and they named their resistance movement
«The People's Liberation Army»
(NOP),
which was led by the communists. The
other, the Chetnicks, were «the army in the home land» and they represented
option of Greater Serbia and the Yugoslav court and government, who defected
to western ally protection.
The afore mentioned, acting as a destabilizing factor upon the ISC and the
force opposing the Partisans, were significantly supported and armed by the Ita¬
lians in the
1st
and
2nd
zone. The army of the ISC, specifically the RCA, as the
civil war continued from the summer of
1941
onward, with its inert and immo¬
bile division organisation, wasn't able to crush it, what on one side generated
German discontent forcing them to engage their new divisions, and on the ot¬
her, imposed a need to reorganize the ISC Army. Throughout the period of the
ISC the three of such reorganisations were performed. As the civil war continu¬
ed and the Germans faced ever growing adverse circumstances in different thea¬
ters of war so all of these reorganisations were less the result of well designed
concepts and
plannings, but
more the adjustments or responses to the require¬
ments imposed by the war situation.
Parallel with this change, those leaders of the armed forces were replaced as
were the ministers. The first «victim» of the military failure, as well as of the
internal conflicts and intrigues, happened to be the First Secretary of the RCA,
the Commander-in-Chief,
Slávko Kvaternik,
whose role of the secretary in the
name of the President was assummed by general
Vinko Begić.
Afterwards, following his replacement, the Ministry transformed into the
Ministry of Armed Forces, with general
Miroslav
F. Navrátil
appointed as its
minister, and in turn his replacement
-
colonel (and
«krilnik»
-
general) Ante
Vokić
assumed the same post, until so-called «the military coup
Vokić-Lorković»
in August of
1944,
the army now reunited
(HOS
-
Croatian Armed Forces), fi¬
nally comes under control of both Ante
Pavelić
himself and his headquarters.
The fourth, not less important reason, which affected the processes in the
armed forces of the ISC, posed a continuous antagonism and animosity between
Ustashi and RCA circles, the Ustashi and RCA, respectively. The Ustashi army
was considered at first a «back-up force», but gradually, with the increasing
support of
Pavelić
himself, and enforced by the establishment it appeared as the
major force of the ISC, The aspiration behind the enforcement was namely
«ustashification» of the entire armed forces of the ISC. On the other hand, the
RCA who were strongly supported by the regional representatives of
Wehr¬
macht,
and who had a lot of specialty military personnel, backed by the Mini¬
ster
Navrátil,
even came upon the idea of dissolving the UA to the interests of
314
Summary
the «Unified Croatian Army», now the main body of the Croatian Armed forces.
But due to strong opposition of Ustashi circles the idea turned out to be a failu¬
re, and along with it Minister Navaratil failed, too. He was replaced by the
Ustashi man, Ante
Vokić,
who was expected to command the Army governed by
the Ustashi idea, but realizing «that the cause is lost» he desired to redirect the
Army and the State as well in favour of the Western allies. Since the Ustashi
Army couldn't make it, his idea was to create a uniform and strong army that
would have a capability to strike Germans «from behind» at the appropriate
moment, and that would accordingly be united under the RCA as a more accep¬
table Army in the view of the Allies (non-Ustashi nature, linked to the politicial
party of
HSS,
and the like).
Nevertheless, due to
Pavelić's
unwillingness as well as to the objective una-
bility of executing the military coup plans, in the given circumstances, when the
Germans, with the Italians already capitulated, were extremly sensitive to fur¬
ther internal weakening, the plan itself along with general
Vokić
failed, so as a
result the ISC followed the route of the only ally left, the Germans, who finally
agreed to accept the Army of the ISC with its Ustashi nature, and the process
was carried out through unification of all the forces into «The Croatian Armed
Forces» now that
Pavelić
himself personally assumed the role of Commander-in-
Chief. In addition, the RCA itself witnessed the animosity between the old-fashi¬
oned Austro-Hungarian officers, on one side and the ex-officers of the Royal Yu¬
goslav Army on the other, of which the latter were younger and more familiari¬
zed with the modern military structure and war operations.
But as late as the autumn of
1942,
in the period of
Slávko
Kvaternik's man¬
date, the Austro-Hungarian officers were considered «politically acceptable» and
subsequently promoted, privileged and therefore appointed the highest military
posts. But the logic of conducting war operations required changes, in the first
place, personnel, which was naturally followed by organisational changes. Divisi¬
ons were gradually withdrawn in favor of the brigades which were considered
more suitable against guerilla fighting, so the first alpine ones were immedia-
telly formed and later on the combat ones (hunting brigades), as well as some
other types (infantry, base-installed brigades).
This process started with the third period and during the second re-organi¬
sation of the ISC armed forces.
As late as the summer of
1943,
the divisions were discontinued (the 6th one
was an exception) along with the corps, while the only things remaining were
the military districts.
The Germans then gradually took initiative in conducting war operations
and commanding the RCA units, above all the ones regarded as being of the
highest quality, namely the alpine and the hunting brigades.
The legionary divisions (369th, 373rd, 392nd) were formed, consisting of Croati¬
an draftees trained in Germany within the framework of
Wehrmacht,
(in fact
the German Army), which were to replace original German units and bear the
brunt of war in Croatia and Bosnia.
They primarily performed it due to the lack of confidence in the fragmented
ISC army, weakened through internal conflicts (and among its leaders) and se-
315
Damir Jug: Oružane snage NDH sveukuni ustroj
condly
to avoid the Italian reproaches for gradually building up the arms of the
Croatian State Army and by doing so, reduce their already poor control over it.
From that time on, the Croatian Armed forces, especially the ECA and the
MP, lose their independence and turn into a back-up, poorly equipped and man¬
ned army. The Military Police is made marginal by the fact of introducing and
forming
SS
police forces. The Ustashi Army had been developed ever since the
days of emigration. It was autonomous and virtually, though not formally, inde¬
pendent of the supreme military commanding institutions
-
the Ministry. At the
beginning it had its own separate headquarters, but eventually it was subordi¬
nated to the organisational plan of the Ustashi command, since disorganisation
and self-will became a prevalent practice of some particular commanders
(rasovi
-
ras-es).
Although this command (ZUVOJ) constituted a counterbalance to the RCA
Ministry, and had its own military structure, it was soon to be withdrawn (sum¬
mer,
1943),
due to the impossibility of keeping in line, and to subordinate some
particular commanders to the regular military line of command (hierachy), who
had their «private» units and who contacted directly the President
(Pavelić),
whatever the issue.
The Ustashi Army was composed of three individual parts: the Ustashi
Army in a limited sense, The Presidents Security Batallion and the paramilitary
Ustashi units known as the «wild Ustashi» and the «village watch» which were
organized and armed by the Ustashi officials on the ground.
The units developed from companies, batallions through brigades. Their
common characteristic is that all of them operated on the particular area, so
they were called standing brigades. The
Pavelich
security battalion was a stan¬
ding unit, too, which eventually developed into a corps, most of the time opera¬
ting as the
Pavelich
security force, sometimes safeguarding various structures.
The lack of specialty personnel was another flaw as well as the lack of officers,
which were mostly selected from among the RCA personnel, and who in turn
experienced humiliation and harrassment by the Ustashi counterparts. The rea¬
son of this disorganiation of the Ustashi Army in the first place I blame on the
way the political system functioned in the ISC (the Ustashi being the privileged
and for the autocracy being excessively emphasised as a value) and also in the
fact that the Ustashi
-
the emigrants, who were being trained in the military
camps since
1934,
were very soon made into prisoners, and thus the develop¬
ment of the Ustashi military organisation came to an end. In the period to
come, in the wake of their arrival to Croatia, they were in a quick manner as¬
sembled and formed into companies and battallions. Unaccustomed to any form
of military discipline more than badly shaped and affected the individuals and
the Ustashi units, and later on led to their falling into troubles for not being
able to obey military courtesey.
I can't hardly claim that regarding the military profession there were none
skillfull, good and successful commanders, on the contrary, but to their very
end, the issues just mentioned, remained notorious for the Ustashi units.
316
Summary
However, if we are to single out any of the units, it would certainly be the
President's Security Forces, that had been hghly invested into, but some of the
standing brigades must be emphasised, too.
The very end of the war, toward the end of
1944
and the beginning of
1945,
the circumstances of the overall withdrawal of the German forces out of Greece,
brought about the third reorganisation of the ISC forces. At that time a signifi¬
cant part of the territory of the ISC was under the control of the Partisans, whi¬
le in the north of the river
Drava,
the troops of the The Red Army were on the
offensive. It became urgent to form, or shall we say, improvise the formation of
units even capable of keeping the line of defence by their own might at some
defense segments and thus cover the overall Axis Forces withdrawal. The reality
of the war, taking the above into consideration, brought about the need to form
Croatian divisions with one crack division on top.
All of them,
18
in number, fit into the framework of the military districts,
and finally into the framework of the five Ustashi corps.
These describe the circumstances at the end of the war in April as, well as
the course of the CAF (Croatian Armed Forces) withdrawal in May of
1945.
Ac¬
cording to some source materials «The Croatian Armed Forces» numbered
240,000
military personnel, though the data on the number of personnel of
some particular segments of the armed forces through the entire period of the
war, were considered rather unreliable, due to the lack of the complete formati¬
on manning of the units, and since officially operated data never matched those
on the ground. And last but not least, those particular units which were formed
to be deployed to the eastern front must be mentioned, either at the request
and suggestion of the Germans or by the initiative of the ISC leadership (being
formerly accepted by the Germans). They are the Croatian legionary units, the
ground, air force and naval units, that operated within the framework of the
German or Italian divisions on the eastern front. Some of them stood out signi¬
ficantly: the reinforced 369th regiment and one squadron of the air force legion.
In spite of the fact that all of this legions operated within the framework of The
Axis Forces units, formally they fell under the command of MINDOM and MI¬
NORS, and virtually represented a part of the armed forces of the ISC.
They, since organisationally
de
facto constituting a part of the German
Army, should be distinguished from legionary divisions which were a compo¬
nent of
Wehrmacht
or
Waffen
SS.
317 |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| any_adam_object_boolean | 1 |
| author | Jug, Damir |
| author_facet | Jug, Damir |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Jug, Damir |
| author_variant | d j dj |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV023207513 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)77488227 (DE-599)BVBBV023207513 |
| era | Geschichte 1941-1945 gnd |
| era_facet | Geschichte 1941-1945 |
| format | Book |
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| geographic | Croatia Armed Forces History Croatia History 1918-1945 Croatia History, Military Kroatien (DE-588)4073841-3 gnd |
| geographic_facet | Croatia Armed Forces History Croatia History 1918-1945 Croatia History, Military Kroatien |
| id | DE-604.BV023207513 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T20:10:40Z |
| indexdate | 2024-08-10T01:23:43Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9536562235 |
| language | Croatian |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016393644 |
| oclc_num | 77488227 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 |
| owner_facet | DE-12 |
| physical | 326 S. Ill. |
| publishDate | 2004 |
| publishDateSearch | 2004 |
| publishDateSort | 2004 |
| publisher | Nova Stvarnost [u.a.] |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Jug, Damir Verfasser aut Oružane snage NDH sveukupni ustroj Damir Jug Zagreb Nova Stvarnost [u.a.] 2004 326 S. Ill. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Zsfassung in engl. Sprache Ustaša, hrvatska revolucionarna organizacija Geschichte 1941-1945 gnd rswk-swf Geschichte Weltkrieg (1939-1945) World War, 1939-1945 Croatia Militär (DE-588)4039305-7 gnd rswk-swf Croatia Armed Forces History Croatia History 1918-1945 Croatia History, Military Kroatien (DE-588)4073841-3 gnd rswk-swf Kroatien (DE-588)4073841-3 g Militär (DE-588)4039305-7 s Geschichte 1941-1945 z DE-604 Digitalisierung BSBMuenchen application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016393644&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016393644&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Abstract |
| spellingShingle | Jug, Damir Oružane snage NDH sveukupni ustroj Ustaša, hrvatska revolucionarna organizacija Geschichte Weltkrieg (1939-1945) World War, 1939-1945 Croatia Militär (DE-588)4039305-7 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4039305-7 (DE-588)4073841-3 |
| title | Oružane snage NDH sveukupni ustroj |
| title_auth | Oružane snage NDH sveukupni ustroj |
| title_exact_search | Oružane snage NDH sveukupni ustroj |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Oružane snage NDH sveukupni ustroj |
| title_full | Oružane snage NDH sveukupni ustroj Damir Jug |
| title_fullStr | Oružane snage NDH sveukupni ustroj Damir Jug |
| title_full_unstemmed | Oružane snage NDH sveukupni ustroj Damir Jug |
| title_short | Oružane snage NDH |
| title_sort | oruzane snage ndh sveukupni ustroj |
| title_sub | sveukupni ustroj |
| topic | Ustaša, hrvatska revolucionarna organizacija Geschichte Weltkrieg (1939-1945) World War, 1939-1945 Croatia Militär (DE-588)4039305-7 gnd |
| topic_facet | Ustaša, hrvatska revolucionarna organizacija Geschichte Weltkrieg (1939-1945) World War, 1939-1945 Croatia Militär Croatia Armed Forces History Croatia History 1918-1945 Croatia History, Military Kroatien |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016393644&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016393644&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT jugdamir oruzanesnagendhsveukupniustroj |