Katastrofa wielkiej armii Napoleona w Rosji w 1812 roku:
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
---|---|
Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | Polish |
Veröffentlicht: |
Łódź
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego
2007
|
Ausgabe: | Wyd. 1. |
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Abstract |
Beschreibung: | Zsfassung in engl. Sprache u.d.T.: Disaster of the Great Army in Russia in 1812 |
Beschreibung: | 495, [1] s., [4] k. map il. 24 cm |
ISBN: | 9788375250374 |
Internformat
MARC
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245 | 1 | 0 | |a Katastrofa wielkiej armii Napoleona w Rosji w 1812 roku |c Rafał Kowalczyk |
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264 | 1 | |a Łódź |b Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego |c 2007 | |
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337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
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500 | |a Zsfassung in engl. Sprache u.d.T.: Disaster of the Great Army in Russia in 1812 | ||
505 | 0 | |a Bibliogr. s. [272]-276. Indeksy | |
648 | 7 | |a Geschichte |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
650 | 7 | |a Wojny napoleońskie (1800-1815) / kampanie i bitwy / Rosja |2 jhpk | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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---|---|
adam_text | Spis
tresei
WSTĘP
............................................ 7
ROZDZIAŁ I. Przed opuszczeniem przez Rosjan Moskwy
8
września
-
14
września
1812
r
................................... 15
ROZDZIAŁ
II.
Pobyt Wielkiej Armii w Moskwie
14
września
- 23
października
1812
r.
40
ROZDZIAŁ III. Wojna czy pokój? Próba pokojowego zakończenia wojny
1812
r.
. . . 90
ROZDZIAŁ
IV.
Manewr w kierunku Kaługi
19
października
- 26
października
1812
r.
109
ROZDZIAŁ
V.
Od Możajska do Stachowa
28
października
- 28
listopada
1812
r.
. . 185
ZAKOŃCZENIE
................................... ........ 267
BIBLIOGRAFIA
.......................................... 272
WYKAZ NAJWAŻNIEJSZYCH STOSOWANYCH W OPRACOWANIU SKRÓTÓW
. . 277
ZAŁĄCZNIKI
Ordre de bataille
Wielkiej Armii na dzień
1
sierpnia
1812
r
............. 278
Ordre de bataille
Wielkiej Armii na dzień
9
września
1812
г............
315
Organizacja wojsk rosyjskich na dzień
6
sierpnia
1812
r
............... 360
Organizacja wojsk rosyjskich na dzień
9
września
1812
r
............... 377
Ilustracje
............................................ 409
DISASTER OF THE GREAT ARMY IN RUSSIA IN
1812................ 457
INDEKS OSOBOWY.......................................
459
INDEKS NAZW GEOGRAFICZNYCH
............................. 490
f
Bayerisch^
I
Staatsbibliothek
l
München
Disaster of the Great Army in Russia in
1812
(Summary)
The campaign of
1812
was very interesting because of the strength of engaged
armies and the issue of Napoleon s domination in continental Europe in case of his
victory. In press titles of Napoleon s Europe we can find official news of propaganda as
well as reports of soldiers in Russia. Near immediately after the end of the war interest
of the campaign increased. The reason was that the campaign of
1812
was a turning
point in European history. Such a mass extermination of armies was something excep¬
tional in history and this fact became the main subject of studies. Because of the results
of this war the interest focused on casualties in Napoleon s army. Casualties in Russian
army were not so interesting though they were significant. There were many reports
showing individual stages of the campaign, especially the retreat of the Great Army.
The war of
1812
became subject of interest of many European historians and strategists.
The reason of disaster of the Great Army was not only the execution of the
retreat maneuver. The beginning of the process took place after the battle of Mozhaysk.
The main cause was not enormous fatigue of the Great Army in long and extremely
difficult campaign. It involved Napoleon s attitude, who allowed Kutuzov to execute
his strategy (which was in fact worked out by gen. Barclay
de
Tolly). That was
why Kutuzov was able to mislead tzar Alexander I that battle of Mozhaysk was
not a defeat of Russian army so he did not want to sign peace treaty with Napoleon.
Kutuzov even wrote Moscow and its inhabitants off for his strategy. He did it to
protect his army after the battle of Mozhaysk which was unable to continue fighting
against the Great Army. On the other hand Kutuzov managed to mislead Napoleon,
who was sure that Alexander I would start negotiating. Even Napoleon s generals
and soldiers were convinced of it. They thought that capturing Moscow would be
the crowning achievement of the campaign.
This conviction was so strong than Napoleon decided to stay in Moscow for
6
weeks.
The Great Army stayed there in spite of the great fire that destroyed most of the city
which was inspired and prepared by Fiodor Wasiljewicz Rostopczyn, the war governor
of Moscow. The fire did not destroy the Great Army but caused irreparable moral
disintegration. Thousands of French soldiers and their commanders started to plunder
the city. In this extremely complicated situation Napoleon believed it was possible to
make peace treaty with tzar Alexander I. Kutuzov managed to confirm Napoleon in
conviction that it was possible. To do it Kutuzov did not let Napoleon negotiate with
tzar directly and convinced him that Russian army had more casualties than in reality.
On the other hand Kutuzov reorganized his troops during the six weeks stay of the
Great Army in Moscow. He used the whole reserves of the Russian Empire which were
458
concentrated near Kaluga and Tula. At the same time he concentrated recruits from
the whole Russia in this area.
Only the change of weather in the middle of October
1812
induced Napoleon to
depart from Moscow. He planned the maneuver to Kaluga by the new track. But the
condition of the Great Army interfered with this plan. The Great Army was not able
to move fast. The most important reason of the fiasco of capturing Maloyaroslavets
was Napoleon s attitude. He assigned insufficient forces of the viceroy of Italy, Eugene
de
Beauharnais, to execute his plans. As a result French forces from IV corps were
dislodged by gen. Dochturov s Russian VI corps. Heroic attitude of prince Eugene s
Italian forces that dislodged Russians from Maloyaroslavets did not save the Great
Army from disaster. Napoleon during his conference in Horodnia did not decide to make
a great battle against Kutuzov s army and this sealed his catastrophe in Russia. It
was shocking because near Maloyaroslavets Napoleon could turn the fate of the war
by crushing the main Russian forces. Napoleon also did not make use of Kutuzov s
maneuver through Koryca river to fortified positions on the other shore of the river.
Coming back to the old road to Smolensk, low temperatures and lack of food accelerated
the process of the Great Army s catastrophe. As a result several days later the Great
Army did not recognize the troops from Maloyaroslavets. Its rescue during battle of
Vyazma the Great Army owed to ambiguous attitude of Kutuzov. Napoleon was not
able to save his army when it was more and more frosty and there was insufficient
reserve of food. The only real Napoleon s contribution to saving his army was during
battle of
Krasne
when he used his Guard.
In fact only few survivors of the Great Army got our from
Krasne.
The power of
the Great Army near Berezyna was caused by reinforcements from corps operating on
the left flank and soldiers from neighbouring garrisons. The crossing of Berezyna was
Napoleon s great success because the main part of the army managed to cross the river.
Napoleon confirmed his great strategic skills in this operation. It did not change the
fact that catastrophe of the Great Army took place before reaching Berezyna. Total
extermination of the Great Army took place several days later in Lithuania where even
Emperor s Guard did not survive.
|
adam_txt |
Spis
tresei
WSTĘP
. 7
ROZDZIAŁ I. Przed opuszczeniem przez Rosjan Moskwy
8
września
-
14
września
1812
r
. 15
ROZDZIAŁ
II.
Pobyt Wielkiej Armii w Moskwie
14
września
- 23
października
1812
r.
40
ROZDZIAŁ III. Wojna czy pokój? Próba pokojowego zakończenia wojny
1812
r.
. . . 90
ROZDZIAŁ
IV.
Manewr w kierunku Kaługi
19
października
- 26
października
1812
r.
109
ROZDZIAŁ
V.
Od Możajska do Stachowa
28
października
- 28
listopada
1812
r.
. . 185
ZAKOŃCZENIE
. . 267
BIBLIOGRAFIA
. 272
WYKAZ NAJWAŻNIEJSZYCH STOSOWANYCH W OPRACOWANIU SKRÓTÓW
. . 277
ZAŁĄCZNIKI
Ordre de bataille
Wielkiej Armii na dzień
1
sierpnia
1812
r
. 278
Ordre de bataille
Wielkiej Armii na dzień
9
września
1812
г.
315
Organizacja wojsk rosyjskich na dzień
6
sierpnia
1812
r
. 360
Organizacja wojsk rosyjskich na dzień
9
września
1812
r
. 377
Ilustracje
. 409
DISASTER OF THE GREAT ARMY IN RUSSIA IN
1812. 457
INDEKS OSOBOWY.
459
INDEKS NAZW GEOGRAFICZNYCH
. 490
f
Bayerisch^
I
Staatsbibliothek
l
München
Disaster of the Great Army in Russia in
1812
(Summary)
The campaign of
1812
was very interesting because of the strength of engaged
armies and the issue of Napoleon's domination in continental Europe in case of his
victory. In press titles of Napoleon's Europe we can find official news of propaganda as
well as reports of soldiers in Russia. Near immediately after the end of the war interest
of the campaign increased. The reason was that the campaign of
1812
was a turning
point in European history. Such a mass extermination of armies was something excep¬
tional in history and this fact became the main subject of studies. Because of the results
of this war the interest focused on casualties in Napoleon's army. Casualties in Russian
army were not so interesting though they were significant. There were many reports
showing individual stages of the campaign, especially the retreat of the Great Army.
The war of
1812
became subject of interest of many European historians and strategists.
The reason of disaster of the Great Army was not only the execution of the
retreat maneuver. The beginning of the process took place after the battle of Mozhaysk.
The main cause was not enormous fatigue of the Great Army in long and extremely
difficult campaign. It involved Napoleon's attitude, who allowed Kutuzov to execute
his strategy (which was in fact worked out by gen. Barclay
de
Tolly). That was
why Kutuzov was able to mislead tzar Alexander I that battle of Mozhaysk was
not a defeat of Russian army so he did not want to sign peace treaty with Napoleon.
Kutuzov even wrote Moscow and its inhabitants off for his strategy. He did it to
protect his army after the battle of Mozhaysk which was unable to continue fighting
against the Great Army. On the other hand Kutuzov managed to mislead Napoleon,
who was sure that Alexander I would start negotiating. Even Napoleon's generals
and soldiers were convinced of it. They thought that capturing Moscow would be
the crowning achievement of the campaign.
This conviction was so strong than Napoleon decided to stay in Moscow for
6
weeks.
The Great Army stayed there in spite of the great fire that destroyed most of the city
which was inspired and prepared by Fiodor Wasiljewicz Rostopczyn, the war governor
of Moscow. The fire did not destroy the Great Army but caused irreparable moral
disintegration. Thousands of French soldiers and their commanders started to plunder
the city. In this extremely complicated situation Napoleon believed it was possible to
make peace treaty with tzar Alexander I. Kutuzov managed to confirm Napoleon in
conviction that it was possible. To do it Kutuzov did not let Napoleon negotiate with
tzar directly and convinced him that Russian army had more casualties than in reality.
On the other hand Kutuzov reorganized his troops during the six weeks stay of the
Great Army in Moscow. He used the whole reserves of the Russian Empire which were
458
concentrated near Kaluga and Tula. At the same time he concentrated recruits from
the whole Russia in this area.
Only the change of weather in the middle of October
1812
induced Napoleon to
depart from Moscow. He planned the maneuver to Kaluga by the new track. But the
condition of the Great Army interfered with this plan. The Great Army was not able
to move fast. The most important reason of the fiasco of capturing Maloyaroslavets
was Napoleon's attitude. He assigned insufficient forces of the viceroy of Italy, Eugene
de
Beauharnais, to execute his plans. As a result French forces from IV corps were
dislodged by gen. Dochturov's Russian VI corps. Heroic attitude of prince Eugene's
Italian forces that dislodged Russians from Maloyaroslavets did not save the Great
Army from disaster. Napoleon during his conference in Horodnia did not decide to make
a great battle against Kutuzov's army and this sealed his catastrophe in Russia. It
was shocking because near Maloyaroslavets Napoleon could turn the fate of the war
by crushing the main Russian forces. Napoleon also did not make use of Kutuzov's
maneuver through Koryca river to fortified positions on the other shore of the river.
Coming back to the old road to Smolensk, low temperatures and lack of food accelerated
the process of the Great Army's catastrophe. As a result several days later the Great
Army did not recognize the troops from Maloyaroslavets. Its rescue during battle of
Vyazma the Great Army owed to ambiguous attitude of Kutuzov. Napoleon was not
able to save his army when it was more and more frosty and there was insufficient
reserve of food. The only real Napoleon's contribution to saving his army was during
battle of
Krasne
when he used his Guard.
In fact only few survivors of the Great Army got our from
Krasne.
The power of
the Great Army near Berezyna was caused by reinforcements from corps operating on
the left flank and soldiers from neighbouring garrisons. The crossing of Berezyna was
Napoleon's great success because the main part of the army managed to cross the river.
Napoleon confirmed his great strategic skills in this operation. It did not change the
fact that catastrophe of the Great Army took place before reaching Berezyna. Total
extermination of the Great Army took place several days later in Lithuania where even
Emperor's Guard did not survive. |
any_adam_object | 1 |
any_adam_object_boolean | 1 |
author | Kowalczyk, Rafał Wiktor 1975- |
author_GND | (DE-588)1293544493 |
author_facet | Kowalczyk, Rafał Wiktor 1975- |
author_role | aut |
author_sort | Kowalczyk, Rafał Wiktor 1975- |
author_variant | r w k rw rwk |
building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | BV023196528 |
contents | Bibliogr. s. [272]-276. Indeksy |
ctrlnum | (OCoLC)189424313 (DE-599)BVBBV023196528 |
edition | Wyd. 1. |
era | Geschichte gnd |
era_facet | Geschichte |
format | Book |
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id | DE-604.BV023196528 |
illustrated | Not Illustrated |
index_date | 2024-07-02T20:06:34Z |
indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:12:49Z |
institution | BVB |
isbn | 9788375250374 |
language | Polish |
oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016382836 |
oclc_num | 189424313 |
open_access_boolean | |
owner | DE-12 |
owner_facet | DE-12 |
physical | 495, [1] s., [4] k. map il. 24 cm |
publishDate | 2007 |
publishDateSearch | 2007 |
publishDateSort | 2007 |
publisher | Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego |
record_format | marc |
spelling | Kowalczyk, Rafał Wiktor 1975- Verfasser (DE-588)1293544493 aut 8,2 Katastrofa wielkiej armii Napoleona w Rosji w 1812 roku Rafał Kowalczyk Wyd. 1. Łódź Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego 2007 495, [1] s., [4] k. map il. 24 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Zsfassung in engl. Sprache u.d.T.: Disaster of the Great Army in Russia in 1812 Bibliogr. s. [272]-276. Indeksy Geschichte gnd rswk-swf Wojny napoleońskie (1800-1815) / kampanie i bitwy / Rosja jhpk Wojny napoleońskie (1800-1815) - kampanie i bitwy - Rosja jhpk Russlandfeldzug 1812 (DE-588)4133863-7 gnd rswk-swf Russlandfeldzug 1812 (DE-588)4133863-7 s Geschichte z DE-604 Digitalisierung BSBMuenchen application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016382836&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016382836&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Abstract |
spellingShingle | Kowalczyk, Rafał Wiktor 1975- Katastrofa wielkiej armii Napoleona w Rosji w 1812 roku Bibliogr. s. [272]-276. Indeksy Wojny napoleońskie (1800-1815) / kampanie i bitwy / Rosja jhpk Wojny napoleońskie (1800-1815) - kampanie i bitwy - Rosja jhpk Russlandfeldzug 1812 (DE-588)4133863-7 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4133863-7 |
title | Katastrofa wielkiej armii Napoleona w Rosji w 1812 roku |
title_alt | 8,2 |
title_auth | Katastrofa wielkiej armii Napoleona w Rosji w 1812 roku |
title_exact_search | Katastrofa wielkiej armii Napoleona w Rosji w 1812 roku |
title_exact_search_txtP | Katastrofa wielkiej armii Napoleona w Rosji w 1812 roku |
title_full | Katastrofa wielkiej armii Napoleona w Rosji w 1812 roku Rafał Kowalczyk |
title_fullStr | Katastrofa wielkiej armii Napoleona w Rosji w 1812 roku Rafał Kowalczyk |
title_full_unstemmed | Katastrofa wielkiej armii Napoleona w Rosji w 1812 roku Rafał Kowalczyk |
title_short | Katastrofa wielkiej armii Napoleona w Rosji w 1812 roku |
title_sort | katastrofa wielkiej armii napoleona w rosji w 1812 roku |
topic | Wojny napoleońskie (1800-1815) / kampanie i bitwy / Rosja jhpk Wojny napoleońskie (1800-1815) - kampanie i bitwy - Rosja jhpk Russlandfeldzug 1812 (DE-588)4133863-7 gnd |
topic_facet | Wojny napoleońskie (1800-1815) / kampanie i bitwy / Rosja Wojny napoleońskie (1800-1815) - kampanie i bitwy - Rosja Russlandfeldzug 1812 |
url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016382836&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016382836&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
work_keys_str_mv | AT kowalczykrafałwiktor 82 AT kowalczykrafałwiktor katastrofawielkiejarmiinapoleonawrosjiw1812roku |