Investor protection and interest group politics:
We model how lobbying by interest groups affects the level of investor protection. In our model, insiders in existing public companies, institutional investors (financial intermediaries), and entrepreneurs who plan to take companies public in the future, compete for influence over the politicians se...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2007
|
| Schriftenreihe: | NBER working paper series
13702 |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | We model how lobbying by interest groups affects the level of investor protection. In our model, insiders in existing public companies, institutional investors (financial intermediaries), and entrepreneurs who plan to take companies public in the future, compete for influence over the politicians setting the level of investor protection. We identify conditions under which this lobbying game has an inefficiently low equilibrium level of investor protection. Factors that operate to reduce investor protection below its efficient level include the ability of corporate insiders to use the corporate assets they control to influence politicians, as well as the inability of institutional investors to capture the full value that efficient investor protection would produce for outside investors. The interest that entrepreneurs (and existing public firms) have in raising equity capital in the future reduces but does not eliminate the distortions arising from insiders' interest in extracting rents from the capital public firms already have. Our analysis generates testable predictions, and can explain existing empirical evidence, regarding the way in which investor protection varies over time and around the world. |
| Beschreibung: | 43 S. graph. Darst. |
Internformat
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| 520 | |a We model how lobbying by interest groups affects the level of investor protection. In our model, insiders in existing public companies, institutional investors (financial intermediaries), and entrepreneurs who plan to take companies public in the future, compete for influence over the politicians setting the level of investor protection. We identify conditions under which this lobbying game has an inefficiently low equilibrium level of investor protection. Factors that operate to reduce investor protection below its efficient level include the ability of corporate insiders to use the corporate assets they control to influence politicians, as well as the inability of institutional investors to capture the full value that efficient investor protection would produce for outside investors. The interest that entrepreneurs (and existing public firms) have in raising equity capital in the future reduces but does not eliminate the distortions arising from insiders' interest in extracting rents from the capital public firms already have. Our analysis generates testable predictions, and can explain existing empirical evidence, regarding the way in which investor protection varies over time and around the world. | ||
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| id | DE-604.BV023099680 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T19:44:09Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:11:00Z |
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| language | English |
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| spelling | Bebchuk, Lucian A. 1955- Verfasser (DE-588)124080219 aut Investor protection and interest group politics Lucian A. Bebchuk ; Zvika Neeman Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2007 43 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier NBER working paper series 13702 We model how lobbying by interest groups affects the level of investor protection. In our model, insiders in existing public companies, institutional investors (financial intermediaries), and entrepreneurs who plan to take companies public in the future, compete for influence over the politicians setting the level of investor protection. We identify conditions under which this lobbying game has an inefficiently low equilibrium level of investor protection. Factors that operate to reduce investor protection below its efficient level include the ability of corporate insiders to use the corporate assets they control to influence politicians, as well as the inability of institutional investors to capture the full value that efficient investor protection would produce for outside investors. The interest that entrepreneurs (and existing public firms) have in raising equity capital in the future reduces but does not eliminate the distortions arising from insiders' interest in extracting rents from the capital public firms already have. Our analysis generates testable predictions, and can explain existing empirical evidence, regarding the way in which investor protection varies over time and around the world. Neeman, Zvika Verfasser aut NBER working paper series 13702 (DE-604)BV002801238 13702 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13702.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Bebchuk, Lucian A. 1955- Neeman, Zvika Investor protection and interest group politics NBER working paper series |
| title | Investor protection and interest group politics |
| title_auth | Investor protection and interest group politics |
| title_exact_search | Investor protection and interest group politics |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Investor protection and interest group politics |
| title_full | Investor protection and interest group politics Lucian A. Bebchuk ; Zvika Neeman |
| title_fullStr | Investor protection and interest group politics Lucian A. Bebchuk ; Zvika Neeman |
| title_full_unstemmed | Investor protection and interest group politics Lucian A. Bebchuk ; Zvika Neeman |
| title_short | Investor protection and interest group politics |
| title_sort | investor protection and interest group politics |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13702.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
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