Ceo centrality:
We investigate the relationship between CEO centrality -- the relative importance of the CEO within the top executive team in terms of ability, contribution, or power -- and the value and behavior of public firms. Our proxy for CEO centrality is the fraction of the top-five compensation captured by...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2007
|
| Schriftenreihe: | NBER working paper series
13701 |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | We investigate the relationship between CEO centrality -- the relative importance of the CEO within the top executive team in terms of ability, contribution, or power -- and the value and behavior of public firms. Our proxy for CEO centrality is the fraction of the top-five compensation captured by the CEO. We find that CEO centrality is negatively associated with firm value (as measured by industry-adjusted Tobin's Q). Greater CEO centrality is also correlated with (i) lower (industry-adjusted) accounting profitability, (ii) lower stock returns accompanying acquisitions announced by the firm and higher likelihood of a negative stock return accompanying such announcements, (iii) higher odds of the CEO's receiving a 'lucky' option grant at the lowest price of the month, (iv) greater tendency to reward the CEO for luck in the form of positive industry-wide shocks, (v) lower likelihood of CEO turnover controlling for performance, and (vi) lower firm-specific variability of stock returns over time. Overall, our results indicate that differences in CEO centrality are an aspect of firm management and governance that deserves the attention of researchers. |
| Beschreibung: | 47 S. |
Internformat
MARC
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| 520 | |a We investigate the relationship between CEO centrality -- the relative importance of the CEO within the top executive team in terms of ability, contribution, or power -- and the value and behavior of public firms. Our proxy for CEO centrality is the fraction of the top-five compensation captured by the CEO. We find that CEO centrality is negatively associated with firm value (as measured by industry-adjusted Tobin's Q). Greater CEO centrality is also correlated with (i) lower (industry-adjusted) accounting profitability, (ii) lower stock returns accompanying acquisitions announced by the firm and higher likelihood of a negative stock return accompanying such announcements, (iii) higher odds of the CEO's receiving a 'lucky' option grant at the lowest price of the month, (iv) greater tendency to reward the CEO for luck in the form of positive industry-wide shocks, (v) lower likelihood of CEO turnover controlling for performance, and (vi) lower firm-specific variability of stock returns over time. Overall, our results indicate that differences in CEO centrality are an aspect of firm management and governance that deserves the attention of researchers. | ||
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| author | Bebchuk, Lucian A. 1955- Cremers, Martijn Peyer, Urs C. |
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| id | DE-604.BV023090278 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T19:40:39Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:10:47Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
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| publishDate | 2007 |
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| publisher | National Bureau of Economic Research |
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| series | NBER working paper series |
| series2 | NBER working paper series |
| spelling | Bebchuk, Lucian A. 1955- Verfasser (DE-588)124080219 aut Ceo centrality Lucian A. Bebchuk ; Martijn Cremers ; Urs Peyer Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2007 47 S. txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier NBER working paper series 13701 We investigate the relationship between CEO centrality -- the relative importance of the CEO within the top executive team in terms of ability, contribution, or power -- and the value and behavior of public firms. Our proxy for CEO centrality is the fraction of the top-five compensation captured by the CEO. We find that CEO centrality is negatively associated with firm value (as measured by industry-adjusted Tobin's Q). Greater CEO centrality is also correlated with (i) lower (industry-adjusted) accounting profitability, (ii) lower stock returns accompanying acquisitions announced by the firm and higher likelihood of a negative stock return accompanying such announcements, (iii) higher odds of the CEO's receiving a 'lucky' option grant at the lowest price of the month, (iv) greater tendency to reward the CEO for luck in the form of positive industry-wide shocks, (v) lower likelihood of CEO turnover controlling for performance, and (vi) lower firm-specific variability of stock returns over time. Overall, our results indicate that differences in CEO centrality are an aspect of firm management and governance that deserves the attention of researchers. Cremers, Martijn Verfasser aut Peyer, Urs C. Verfasser (DE-588)130393673 aut NBER working paper series 13701 (DE-604)BV013267645 13701 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13701.pdf Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Bebchuk, Lucian A. 1955- Cremers, Martijn Peyer, Urs C. Ceo centrality NBER working paper series |
| title | Ceo centrality |
| title_auth | Ceo centrality |
| title_exact_search | Ceo centrality |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Ceo centrality |
| title_full | Ceo centrality Lucian A. Bebchuk ; Martijn Cremers ; Urs Peyer |
| title_fullStr | Ceo centrality Lucian A. Bebchuk ; Martijn Cremers ; Urs Peyer |
| title_full_unstemmed | Ceo centrality Lucian A. Bebchuk ; Martijn Cremers ; Urs Peyer |
| title_short | Ceo centrality |
| title_sort | ceo centrality |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13701.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV013267645 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT bebchukluciana ceocentrality AT cremersmartijn ceocentrality AT peyerursc ceocentrality |