Decentralization in Ecuador: actors, institutions, and incentives
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Baden-Baden
Nomos
2007
|
| Ausgabe: | 1. Aufl. |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | Zugl.: Potsdam, Univ., Diss., 2004 |
| Beschreibung: | 327 S. graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 9783832927080 3832927085 |
Internformat
MARC
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| 020 | |a 3832927085 |c Pb. : EUR 69.00, sfr 117.00 |9 3-8329-2708-5 | ||
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| 100 | 1 | |a Frank, Jonas |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Decentralization in Ecuador |b actors, institutions, and incentives |c Jonas Frank |
| 250 | |a 1. Aufl. | ||
| 264 | 1 | |a Baden-Baden |b Nomos |c 2007 | |
| 300 | |a 327 S. |b graph. Darst. | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 500 | |a Zugl.: Potsdam, Univ., Diss., 2004 | ||
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Dezentralisation |0 (DE-588)4012005-3 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Akteur |0 (DE-588)4360006-2 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Politischer Prozess |0 (DE-588)4175043-3 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 651 | 7 | |a Ecuador |0 (DE-588)4129321-6 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
| 655 | 7 | |0 (DE-588)4113937-9 |a Hochschulschrift |2 gnd-content | |
| 689 | 0 | 0 | |a Ecuador |0 (DE-588)4129321-6 |D g |
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| 689 | 0 | 2 | |a Politischer Prozess |0 (DE-588)4175043-3 |D s |
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| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016243765 | ||
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804137268429979648 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | Contents
Figures
and
Tables
....................................................................................................13
Acronyms
..................................................................................................................17
Summary
...................................................................................................................19
Introduction
...............................................................................................................27
The Why and the How of Decentralization
..................................................27
Actors, Institutions, and Incentives for Decentralization:
Experiencing Real-Life Games
...........................................................................31
Definitions and Scope of Analysis
......................................................................34
Research Methods
...............................................................................................35
Structure
..............................................................................................................36
Section A: Theoretical Underpinnings and Explanatory Framework
...............39
1.
The Why of Decentralization: Five Schools of Thought
................................40
1.1.
Public Choice
..............................................................................................40
1.2.
Crisis Theories
.............................................................................................44
1.3.
Globalization and Localization
...................................................................51
1.4.
Social and Cultural Theories
.......................................................................55
1.5.
Determinism
................................................................................................59
1.6.
Conclusion
...................................................................................................63
2.
The Explanatory Framework: Actors, Institutions and Incentives
......................65
2.1.
The Explanatory Framework and its Principal Elements
............................66
2.1.1.
Propositions and Assumptions
.........................................................66
2.1.2.
Decentralization and Institutional Change
.......................................67
2.1.3.
Observing Institutional Change: Methodological Aspects
..............69
2.2.
Individual Actor-Level
................................................................................72
2.2.1.
Interests, Incentives, and Distributional Goals
................................72
2.2.2.
Incentives and Disincentives for Presidents, Legislators,
and Regional Governors
..................................................................73
2.2.3.
Conclusion
.......................................................................................75
2.3.
Collective- Choice Level
.............................................................................76
2.3.1.
Entry and Exit Rules
........................................................................77
2.3.2.
Position Rules
..................................................................................79
2.3.3.
Interaction Rules
..............................................................................80
2.3.4.
Decision Rules
.................................................................................82
2.3.5.
Implementation Rules
......................................................................90
2.3.6.
Types of Collective Choice Arenas
.................................................95
2.4.
Actors, Incentives and the Sequencing of Decentralization
........................99
3.
ANew Look at Decentralization
.......................................................................103
3.1.
The Why of Decentralization
.................................................................103
3.2.
The How of Decentralization
.................................................................104
Section
В:
Decentralization in Ecuador: Actors, Institutions,
and Incentives
........................................................................................................109
The Ecuador Case: Introduction
..............................................................................110
1.
When Things Fall Apart-Actor Equilibrium One, 1830to
1963-.................113
1.1.
Emergence of a Decentralized State:
1830-1924.......................................114
1.1.1.
The Regional Equilibrium:
Guayas, Azuay,
and Quito
...................114
1.1.2.
Central Government Responses to Regional Demands
.................120
1.2.
Non-cooperative Equilibrium:
1925-1948................................................125
1.3.
The Return to the Previous Regional Equilibrium:
1948-1963.................127
1.4.
Conclusion
.................................................................................................135
2.
Petropolitics: Attempts at Co-optation
-
Actor Equilibrium Two,
1964
to
1978 -..................................................................................................137
2.1.
Centralization in an Arena of Hierarchy:
1964-1966................................138
2.2.
Threat to the Equilibrium: Return to Democratic Rule
1967-1972...........141
2.3.
Consolidation of the Arena of Hierarchy:
1972-1978...............................142
2.3.1.
Reforms to the Intergovernmental System
.....................................142
2.3.2.
Shaping the Arena: New Position and Interaction Rules
...............145
2.3.3.
Attempts at Co-optation
.................................................................147
2.4.
Conclusion
.................................................................................................157
3.
The Return to Democracy: New Rules, Old Players
-
Actor
Equilibrium Three,
1979
to
1987-...................................................................161
3.1.
Institutions in aNewly Democratizing Unitary State
...............................162
3.1.1.
Games Played between Mayors, Prefects, and Legislators
............163
3.1.2.
Games Played between Legislators and Presidents
.......................169
3.2.
Actors, Interests, and Decentralization Outcomes
1979-1987..................172
3.2.1.
Responses from President
Roídos
(1979-1981).............................175
3.2.2.
Responses from President
Hurtado
(1981-1984)...........................178
3.2.3.
Responses from
Febres
Cordero
(1984-1988)...............................180
3.2.4.
Assessment
.....................................................................................184
3.3.
Conclusion
.................................................................................................184
4.
Successful Failure-Actor Equilibrium Four,
1988
to
1992-..........................187
4.1.
The Reform Coalition and the Collective Choice Arena
...........................188
4.2.
Reform Attempts
.......................................................................................192
4.2.1.
Formula-Driven Transfers versus Discretionary Transfers
............192
4.2.2.
Distribution of Revenue (Transfers) between Municipalities
and Provincial Councils
.................................................................198
4.2.3.
Transfers: Earmarked Revenue versus Non-Earmarked
Revenue
..........................................................................................199
4.2.4.
Distribution of Expenditure Responsibilities between Central
and Local Levels
............................................................................202
4.3.
Conclusion
.................................................................................................206
5.
Hidden Agendas: Veto-Players and Free-Riders
-
Actor
Equilibrium Five,
1993
to
1997 -.....................................................................209
5.1.
Actors, Interests, and the Collective Choice Arena
...................................210
5.2.
The New Role for
Guayas
Province
.........................................................213
5.2.1.
Party Politics and Decentralization Arenas
....................................214
5.2.2.
Political, Administrative and Fiscal Goals
of Guayaquil Leaders
.....................................................................216
5.2.3.
The Role of
Guayas
vis-à-vis
other Provinces
...............................221
5.3.
Sub-game between Municipalities and Provincial Councils
.....................222
5.4.
The Congressional Decentralization Committee
.......................................224
5.5.
Stakeholders in Central Government
........................................................227
5.6.
Indigenous People
.....................................................................................231
5.7.
Conclusion
.................................................................................................233
6.
Winners Take All-Actor Equilibrium Six,
1998
to
2003 -.............................237
6.1.
The Sub-game and Equilibrium among Municipalities
and Provincial Councils
............................................................................244
6.1.1.
The Provincial Bias of Decentralization
........................................244
6.1.2.
Responses from Municipalities
......................................................245
6.1.3.
The Equilibrium between Provincial Councils
and Municipalities
..........................................................................247
6.2.
Sub-game and Equilibrium between Sub-national
and Central Government
...........................................................................248
6.2.1.
Incentives for Sub-national Government to Bargain
for Transfers
...................................................................................250
6.2.2.
Central Government Responses
.....................................................254
6.2.3.
The Equilibrium between Sub-national and Central
Government
....................................................................................262
6.3.
Partial Decentralization Equilibrium
.........................................................263
6.4.
Conclusion
.................................................................................................266
7.
The Path and Sequence of Decentralization
......................................................269
7.1.
The Why of Decentralization: Actors and Incentives
............................269
7.2.
The How of Decentralization: Inefficiencies
.........................................272
Section C: Conclusion and Outlook: New Twist to the Old Game?
The Role of External Actors
.................................................................................279
Conclusion and Outlook: New Twist to the Old Game?
The Role of External Actors
...................................................................................280
1.
Entry and Exit Rules
.........................................................................................282
2.
Position Rules
....................................................................................................283
2.1.
Highly Asymmetric Fiscal Capacity across Regions
................................283
2.2.
Blurred Position Rules across Levels of Government
...............................285
2.3.
Distributional Coalition: Games Played between Mayors,
Prefects and Legislators
............................................................................286
2.4.
Pugna de Poderes:
Games
Played between Presidents
and Legislators
..........................................................................................287
2.5.
The Partial Decentralization Equilibrium
(1997-2003):
New Incentives for the Winners?
..............................................................288
3.
Interaction Rules
...............................................................................................290
3.1.
Ideological Deadlock: the Symbol
οι
Autonomía ..................................
290
3.2.
Withholding
ofinformation......................................................................
291
3.3.
Distrust between Actors and the Tragedy of the Commons:
Excessive Earmarking
...............................................................................292
4.
Decision Rules
...................................................................................................293
4.1.
Non-Cooperation and Unilateral Decisions: Threats to Secession?
..........293
4.2.
Bargaining: New Incentives for the Veto-Players?
...................................294
4.3.
Majority Decisions
....................................................................................296
4.4.
Hierarchical Decisions
..............................................................................296
5.
Implementation Rules
.......................................................................................296
5.1.
Veto-Players and Implementation
.............................................................297
5.2.
Volatility and Short-term Incentives
..........................................................297
5.3.
Weak Budget Constraints and Fiscal Responsibility
.................................299
5.4.
Weak Enforcement of Sanctions
...............................................................300
6.
Assessment and Outlook
...................................................................................300
Bibliography
...........................................................................................................303
Annexes
Interview Partners for the Ecuador Case Study
..........................................................
II
Annex to Section B.
1:..............................................................................................
IV
Annex to Section B.2:
.................................................................................................
X
Annex to Section B.3:
............................................................................................XXI
Annex to Section B.4:
........................................................................................XXXII
Annex to Section B.5:
...........................................................................................XLII
Annex to Section B.
6:................................................................................................
LI
|
| adam_txt |
Contents
Figures
and
Tables
.13
Acronyms
.17
Summary
.19
Introduction
.27
The "Why" and the "How" of Decentralization
.27
Actors, Institutions, and Incentives for Decentralization:
Experiencing Real-Life Games
.31
Definitions and Scope of Analysis
.34
Research Methods
.35
Structure
.36
Section A: Theoretical Underpinnings and Explanatory Framework
.39
1.
The "Why" of Decentralization: Five Schools of Thought
.40
1.1.
Public Choice
.40
1.2.
Crisis Theories
.44
1.3.
Globalization and Localization
.51
1.4.
Social and Cultural Theories
.55
1.5.
Determinism
.59
1.6.
Conclusion
.63
2.
The Explanatory Framework: Actors, Institutions and Incentives
.65
2.1.
The Explanatory Framework and its Principal Elements
.66
2.1.1.
Propositions and Assumptions
.66
2.1.2.
Decentralization and Institutional Change
.67
2.1.3.
Observing Institutional Change: Methodological Aspects
.69
2.2.
Individual Actor-Level
.72
2.2.1.
Interests, Incentives, and Distributional Goals
.72
2.2.2.
Incentives and Disincentives for Presidents, Legislators,
and Regional Governors
.73
2.2.3.
Conclusion
.75
2.3.
Collective- Choice Level
.76
2.3.1.
Entry and Exit Rules
.77
2.3.2.
Position Rules
.79
2.3.3.
Interaction Rules
.80
2.3.4.
Decision Rules
.82
2.3.5.
Implementation Rules
.90
2.3.6.
Types of Collective Choice Arenas
.95
2.4.
Actors, Incentives and the Sequencing of Decentralization
.99
3.
ANew Look at Decentralization
.103
3.1.
The "Why" of Decentralization
.103
3.2.
The "How" of Decentralization
.104
Section
В:
Decentralization in Ecuador: Actors, Institutions,
and Incentives
.109
The Ecuador Case: Introduction
.110
1.
When Things Fall Apart-Actor Equilibrium One, 1830to
1963-.113
1.1.
Emergence of a Decentralized State:
1830-1924.114
1.1.1.
The Regional Equilibrium:
Guayas, Azuay,
and Quito
.114
1.1.2.
Central Government Responses to Regional Demands
.120
1.2.
Non-cooperative Equilibrium:
1925-1948.125
1.3.
The Return to the Previous Regional Equilibrium:
1948-1963.127
1.4.
Conclusion
.135
2.
Petropolitics: Attempts at Co-optation
-
Actor Equilibrium Two,
1964
to
1978 -.137
2.1.
Centralization in an Arena of Hierarchy:
1964-1966.138
2.2.
Threat to the Equilibrium: Return to Democratic Rule
1967-1972.141
2.3.
Consolidation of the Arena of Hierarchy:
1972-1978.142
2.3.1.
Reforms to the Intergovernmental System
.142
2.3.2.
Shaping the Arena: New Position and Interaction Rules
.145
2.3.3.
Attempts at Co-optation
.147
2.4.
Conclusion
.157
3.
The Return to Democracy: New Rules, Old Players
-
Actor
Equilibrium Three,
1979
to
1987-.161
3.1.
Institutions in aNewly Democratizing Unitary State
.162
3.1.1.
Games Played between Mayors, Prefects, and Legislators
.163
3.1.2.
Games Played between Legislators and Presidents
.169
3.2.
Actors, Interests, and Decentralization Outcomes
1979-1987.172
3.2.1.
Responses from President
Roídos
(1979-1981).175
3.2.2.
Responses from President
Hurtado
(1981-1984).178
3.2.3.
Responses from
Febres
Cordero
(1984-1988).180
3.2.4.
Assessment
.184
3.3.
Conclusion
.184
4.
Successful Failure-Actor Equilibrium Four,
1988
to
1992-.187
4.1.
The Reform Coalition and the Collective Choice Arena
.188
4.2.
Reform Attempts
.192
4.2.1.
Formula-Driven Transfers versus Discretionary Transfers
.192
4.2.2.
Distribution of Revenue (Transfers) between Municipalities
and Provincial Councils
.198
4.2.3.
Transfers: Earmarked Revenue versus Non-Earmarked
Revenue
.199
4.2.4.
Distribution of Expenditure Responsibilities between Central
and Local Levels
.202
4.3.
Conclusion
.206
5.
Hidden Agendas: Veto-Players and Free-Riders
-
Actor
Equilibrium Five,
1993
to
1997 -.209
5.1.
Actors, Interests, and the Collective Choice Arena
.210
5.2.
The New Role for
Guayas
Province
.213
5.2.1.
Party Politics and Decentralization Arenas
.214
5.2.2.
Political, Administrative and Fiscal Goals
of Guayaquil Leaders
.216
5.2.3.
The Role of
Guayas
vis-à-vis
other Provinces
.221
5.3.
Sub-game between Municipalities and Provincial Councils
.222
5.4.
The Congressional Decentralization Committee
.224
5.5.
Stakeholders in Central Government
.227
5.6.
Indigenous People
.231
5.7.
Conclusion
.233
6.
Winners Take All-Actor Equilibrium Six,
1998
to
2003 -.237
6.1.
The Sub-game and Equilibrium among Municipalities
and Provincial Councils
.244
6.1.1.
The Provincial Bias of Decentralization
.244
6.1.2.
Responses from Municipalities
.245
6.1.3.
The Equilibrium between Provincial Councils
and Municipalities
.247
6.2.
Sub-game and Equilibrium between Sub-national
and Central Government
.248
6.2.1.
Incentives for Sub-national Government to Bargain
for Transfers
.250
6.2.2.
Central Government Responses
.254
6.2.3.
The Equilibrium between Sub-national and Central
Government
.262
6.3.
Partial Decentralization Equilibrium
.263
6.4.
Conclusion
.266
7.
The Path and Sequence of Decentralization
.269
7.1.
The "Why" of Decentralization: Actors and Incentives
.269
7.2.
The "How" of Decentralization: Inefficiencies
.272
Section C: Conclusion and Outlook: New Twist to the Old Game?
The Role of External Actors
.279
Conclusion and Outlook: New Twist to the Old Game?
The Role of External Actors
.280
1.
Entry and Exit Rules
.282
2.
Position Rules
.283
2.1.
Highly Asymmetric Fiscal Capacity across Regions
.283
2.2.
Blurred Position Rules across Levels of Government
.285
2.3.
Distributional Coalition: Games Played between Mayors,
Prefects and Legislators
.286
2.4.
"Pugna de Poderes:
"
Games
Played between Presidents
and Legislators
.287
2.5.
The Partial Decentralization Equilibrium
(1997-2003):
New Incentives for the Winners?
.288
3.
Interaction Rules
.290
3.1.
Ideological Deadlock: the Symbol
οι
"Autonomía".
290
3.2.
Withholding
ofinformation.
291
3.3.
Distrust between Actors and the "Tragedy of the Commons:"
Excessive Earmarking
.292
4.
Decision Rules
.293
4.1.
Non-Cooperation and Unilateral Decisions: Threats to Secession?
.293
4.2.
Bargaining: New Incentives for the Veto-Players?
.294
4.3.
Majority Decisions
.296
4.4.
Hierarchical Decisions
.296
5.
Implementation Rules
.296
5.1.
Veto-Players and Implementation
.297
5.2.
Volatility and Short-term Incentives
.297
5.3.
Weak Budget Constraints and Fiscal Responsibility
.299
5.4.
Weak Enforcement of Sanctions
.300
6.
Assessment and Outlook
.300
Bibliography
.303
Annexes
Interview Partners for the Ecuador Case Study
.
II
Annex to Section B.
1:.
IV
Annex to Section B.2:
.
X
Annex to Section B.3:
.XXI
Annex to Section B.4:
.XXXII
Annex to Section B.5:
.XLII
Annex to Section B.
6:.
LI |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| any_adam_object_boolean | 1 |
| author | Frank, Jonas |
| author_facet | Frank, Jonas |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Frank, Jonas |
| author_variant | j f jf |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV023040200 |
| classification_rvk | MI 86000 MI 86963 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)239601930 (DE-599)DNB985032235 |
| dewey-full | 320.609866 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 320 - Political science (Politics and government) |
| dewey-raw | 320.609866 |
| dewey-search | 320.609866 |
| dewey-sort | 3320.609866 |
| dewey-tens | 320 - Political science (Politics and government) |
| discipline | Politologie |
| discipline_str_mv | Politologie |
| edition | 1. Aufl. |
| format | Book |
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| genre | (DE-588)4113937-9 Hochschulschrift gnd-content |
| genre_facet | Hochschulschrift |
| geographic | Ecuador (DE-588)4129321-6 gnd |
| geographic_facet | Ecuador |
| id | DE-604.BV023040200 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T19:20:22Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:09:36Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9783832927080 3832927085 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016243765 |
| oclc_num | 239601930 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-824 DE-739 DE-12 |
| owner_facet | DE-824 DE-739 DE-12 |
| physical | 327 S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 2007 |
| publishDateSearch | 2007 |
| publishDateSort | 2007 |
| publisher | Nomos |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Frank, Jonas Verfasser aut Decentralization in Ecuador actors, institutions, and incentives Jonas Frank 1. Aufl. Baden-Baden Nomos 2007 327 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Zugl.: Potsdam, Univ., Diss., 2004 Dezentralisation (DE-588)4012005-3 gnd rswk-swf Akteur (DE-588)4360006-2 gnd rswk-swf Politischer Prozess (DE-588)4175043-3 gnd rswk-swf Ecuador (DE-588)4129321-6 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4113937-9 Hochschulschrift gnd-content Ecuador (DE-588)4129321-6 g Dezentralisation (DE-588)4012005-3 s Politischer Prozess (DE-588)4175043-3 s Akteur (DE-588)4360006-2 s DE-604 Digitalisierung UB Passau application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016243765&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Frank, Jonas Decentralization in Ecuador actors, institutions, and incentives Dezentralisation (DE-588)4012005-3 gnd Akteur (DE-588)4360006-2 gnd Politischer Prozess (DE-588)4175043-3 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4012005-3 (DE-588)4360006-2 (DE-588)4175043-3 (DE-588)4129321-6 (DE-588)4113937-9 |
| title | Decentralization in Ecuador actors, institutions, and incentives |
| title_auth | Decentralization in Ecuador actors, institutions, and incentives |
| title_exact_search | Decentralization in Ecuador actors, institutions, and incentives |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Decentralization in Ecuador actors, institutions, and incentives |
| title_full | Decentralization in Ecuador actors, institutions, and incentives Jonas Frank |
| title_fullStr | Decentralization in Ecuador actors, institutions, and incentives Jonas Frank |
| title_full_unstemmed | Decentralization in Ecuador actors, institutions, and incentives Jonas Frank |
| title_short | Decentralization in Ecuador |
| title_sort | decentralization in ecuador actors institutions and incentives |
| title_sub | actors, institutions, and incentives |
| topic | Dezentralisation (DE-588)4012005-3 gnd Akteur (DE-588)4360006-2 gnd Politischer Prozess (DE-588)4175043-3 gnd |
| topic_facet | Dezentralisation Akteur Politischer Prozess Ecuador Hochschulschrift |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016243765&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT frankjonas decentralizationinecuadoractorsinstitutionsandincentives |