Verfügbarkeit: Algorithmic game theory

Algorithmic game theory:

Gespeichert in:

Bibliographische Detailangaben
Format:	Buch
Sprache:	English
Veröffentlicht:	Cambridge [u.a.] Cambridge Univ. Pr. 2007
Ausgabe:	1. publ.
Schlagworte:	Algorithmes Théorie des jeux Game theory Algorithms Spieltheorie Algorithmus
Online-Zugang:	Table of contents only Publisher description Contributor biographical information Inhaltsverzeichnis
Beschreibung:	XXI, 754 S. graph. Darst.
ISBN:	0521872820 9780521872829

Internformat

MARC


LEADER	00000nam a2200000zc 4500
001	BV022961661
003	DE-604
005	20190124
007	t
008	071113s2007 xxud\|\|\| \|\|\|\| 00\|\|\| eng d
010			\|a 2007014231
020			\|a 0521872820 \|c hardback \|9 0-521-87282-0
020			\|a 9780521872829 \|9 978-0-521-87282-9
035			\|a (OCoLC)122526907
035			\|a (DE-599)BVBBV022961661
040			\|a DE-604 \|b ger \|e aacr
041	0		\|a eng
044			\|a xxu \|c US
049			\|a DE-703 \|a DE-92 \|a DE-706 \|a DE-20 \|a DE-634 \|a DE-83 \|a DE-11 \|a DE-2070s \|a DE-384 \|a DE-91
050		0	\|a QA269
082	0		\|a 519.3
084			\|a QH 430 \|0 (DE-625)141581: \|2 rvk
084			\|a SK 860 \|0 (DE-625)143264: \|2 rvk
084			\|a ST 134 \|0 (DE-625)143590: \|2 rvk
084			\|a 91Axx \|2 msc
084			\|a MAT 920f \|2 stub
245	1	0	\|a Algorithmic game theory \|c ed. by Noam Nisan ...
250			\|a 1. publ.
264		1	\|a Cambridge [u.a.] \|b Cambridge Univ. Pr. \|c 2007
300			\|a XXI, 754 S. \|b graph. Darst.
336			\|b txt \|2 rdacontent
337			\|b n \|2 rdamedia
338			\|b nc \|2 rdacarrier
650		4	\|a Algorithmes
650		4	\|a Théorie des jeux
650		4	\|a Game theory
650		4	\|a Algorithms
650	0	7	\|a Spieltheorie \|0 (DE-588)4056243-8 \|2 gnd \|9 rswk-swf
650	0	7	\|a Algorithmus \|0 (DE-588)4001183-5 \|2 gnd \|9 rswk-swf
689	0	0	\|a Spieltheorie \|0 (DE-588)4056243-8 \|D s
689	0	1	\|a Algorithmus \|0 (DE-588)4001183-5 \|D s
689	0		\|5 DE-604
700	1		\|a Nisan, Noam \|d 1961- \|e Sonstige \|0 (DE-588)137125372 \|4 oth
700	1		\|a Roughgarden, Tim \|e Sonstige \|4 oth
700	1		\|a Tardos, Éva \|d 1957- \|e Sonstige \|0 (DE-588)140445382 \|4 oth
856	4		\|u http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0715/2007014231.html \|3 Table of contents only
856	4		\|u http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0729/2007014231-d.html \|3 Publisher description
856	4		\|u http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0729/2007014231-b.html \|3 Contributor biographical information
856	4	2	\|m HBZ Datenaustausch \|q application/pdf \|u http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016166036&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA \|3 Inhaltsverzeichnis
999			\|a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016166036

Datensatz im Suchindex

_version_	1804137208833114112
adam_text	Contents Foreword page xiii Preface xvii Contributors xix I Computing in Games 1 Basic Solution Concepts and Computational Issues 3 Eva Tardos and Vijay V. Vazirani 1.1 Games, Old and New 3 1.2 Games, Strategies, Costs, and Payoffs 9 1.3 Basic Solution Concepts 10 1.4 Finding Equilibria and Learning in Games 16 1.5 Refinement of Nash: Games with Turns and Subgame Perfect Equilibrium 18 1.6 Nash Equilibrium without Full Information: Bayesian Games 20 1.7 Cooperative Games 20 1.8 Markets and Their Algorithmic Issues 22 Acknowledgments 26 Bibliography 26 Exercises 26 2 The Complexity of Finding Nash Equilibria 29 Christos H. Papadimitriou 2.1 Introduction 29 2.2 Is the Nash Equilibrium Problem NP Complete? 31 2.3 The Lemke Howson Algorithm 33 2.4 The Class PPAD 36 2.5 Succinct Representations of Games 39 2.6 The Reduction 41 2.7 Correlated Equilibria 45 2.8 Concluding Remarks 49 Acknowledgment 50 Bibliography 50 vi CONTENTS 3 Equilibrium Computation for Two Player Games in Strategic and Extensive Form 53 Bernhard von Stengel 3.1 Introduction ¦ 3.2 Bimatrix Games and the Best Response Condition 54 3.3 Equilibria via Labeled Polytopes 57 3.4 The Lemke Howson Algorithm 61 3.5 Integer Pivoting 63 3.6 Degenerate Games 65 3.7 Extensive Games and Their Strategic Form 66 3.8 Subgame Perfect Equilibria 68 3.9 Reduced Strategic Form 69 3.10 The Sequence Form 70 3.11 Computing Equilibria with the Sequence Form 73 3.12 Further Reading 75 3.13 Discussion and Open Problems 75 Bibliography 76 Exercises 77 4 Learning, Regret Minimization, and Equilibria 79 Avrim Blum and Yishay Mansour 4.1 Introduction 79 4.2 Model and Preliminaries 81 4.3 External Regret Minimization 82 4.4 Regret Minimization and Game Theory 88 4.5 Generic Reduction from External to Swap Regret 92 4.6 The Partial Information Model 94 4.7 On Convergence of Regret Minimizing Strategies to Nash Equilibrium in Routing Games 96 4.8 Notes 99 Bibliography 99 Exercises 101 5 Combinatorial Algorithms for Market Equilibria 103 Vijay V. Vazirani 5.1 Introduction 103 5.2 Fisher s Linear Case and the Eisenberg Gale Convex Program 105 5.3 Checking If Given Prices Are Equilibrium Prices 108 5.4 Two Crucial Ingredients of the Algorithm 109 5.5 The Primal Dual Schema in the Enhanced Setting 109 5.6 Tight Sets and the Invariant 111 5.7 Balanced Flows 111 5.8 The Main Algorithm 115 5.9 Finding Tight Sets 117 5.10 Running Time of the Algorithm 118 5.11 The Linear Case of the Arrow Debreu Model 121 5.12 An Auction Based Algorithm 122 5.13 Resource Allocation Markets 124 CONTENTS Vil 5.14 Algorithm for Single Source Multiple Sink Markets 126 5.15 Discussion and Open Problems 131 Bibliography 132 Exercises 133 6 Computation of Market Equilibria by Convex Programming 135 Bruno Codenotti and Kasturi Varadarajan 6.1 Introduction 135 6.2 Fisher Model with Homogeneous Consumers 141 6.3 Exchange Economies Satisfying WGS 142 6.4 Specific Utility Functions 148 6.5 Limitations 150 6.6 Models with Production 152 6.7 Bibliographic Notes 155 Bibliography 156 Exercises 158 7 Graphical Games 159 Michael Kearns 7.1 Introduction 159 7.2 Preliminaries 161 7.3 Computing Nash Equilibria in Tree Graphical Games 164 7.4 Graphical Games and Correlated Equilibria 169 7.5 Graphical Exchange Economies 176 7.6 Open Problems and Future Research 177 7.7 Bibliographic Notes 177 Acknowledgments 179 Bibliography 179 8 Cryptography and Game Theory 181 Yevgeniy Dodis and Tal Rabin 8.1 Cryptographic Notions and Settings 181 8.2 Game Theory Notions and Settings 187 8.3 Contrasting MPC and Games 189 8.4 Cryptographic Influences on Game Theory 191 8.5 Game Theoretic Influences on Cryptography 197 8.6 Conclusions 202 8.7 Notes 203 Acknowledgments 204 Bibliography 204 II Algorithmic Mechanism Design 9 Introduction to Mechanism Design (for Computer Scientists) 209 Noam Nisan 9.1 Introduction 209 9.2 Social Choice 211 9.3 Mechanisms with Money 216 9.4 Implementation in Dominant Strategies 222 Viii CONTENTS 9.5 Characterizations of Incentive Compatible Mechanisms 225 9.6 Bayesian Nash Implementation 233 9.7 Further Models 238 9.8 Notes 239 Acknowledgments 240 Bibliography 241 10 Mechanism Design without Money 243 James Schummer and Rakesh V. Vohra 10.1 Introduction 243 10.2 Single Peaked Preferences over Policies 244 10.3 House Allocation Problem 253 10.4 Stable Matchings 255 10.5 Future Directions 262 10.6 Notes and References 263 Bibliography 264 Exercises 264 11 Combinatorial Auctions 267 Liad Blumrosen and Noam Nisan 11.1 Introduction 267 11.2 The Single Minded Case 270 11.3 Walrasian Equilibrium and the LP Relaxation 275 11.4 Bidding Languages 279 11.5 Iterative Auctions: The Query Model 283 11.6 Communication Complexity 287 11.7 Ascending Auctions 289 11.8 Bibliographic Notes 295 Acknowledgments 296 Bibliography 296 Exercises 298 12 Computationally Efficient Approximation Mechanisms 301 Ron Lavi 12.1 Introduction 301 12.2 Single Dimensional Domains: Job Scheduling 303 12.3 Multidimensional Domains: Combinatorial Auctions 310 12.4 Impossibilities of Dominant Strategy Implementability 317 12.5 Alternative Solution Concepts 321 12.6 Bibliographic Notes 327 Bibliography 327 Exercises 328 13 Profit Maximization in Mechanism Design 331 Jason D. Hartline and Anna R. Karlin 13.1 Introduction 331 13.2 Bayesian Optimal Mechanism Design 335 13.3 Prior Free Approximations to the Optimal Mechanism 339 13.4 Prior Free Optimal Mechanism Design 344 CONTENTS IX 13.5 Frugality 350 13.6 Conclusions and Other Research Directions 354 13.7 Notes 357 Bibliography 358 Exercises 360 14 Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design 363 Joan Feigenbaum, Michael Schapira, and Scott Shenker 14.1 Introduction 363 14.2 Two Examples of DAMD 366 14.3 Interdomain Routing 370 14.4 Conclusion and Open Problems 379 14.5 Notes 380 Acknowledgments 381 Bibliography 381 Exercises 383 15 Cost Sharing 385 Kamal Jain and Mohammad Mahdian 15.1 Cooperative Games and Cost Sharing 385 15.2 Core of Cost Sharing Games 387 15.3 Group Strategyproof Mechanisms and Cross Monotonic Cost Sharing Schemes 391 15.4 Cost Sharing via the Primal Dual Schema 394 15.5 Limitations of Cross Monotonic Cost Sharing Schemes 400 15.6 The Shapley Value and the Nash Bargaining Solution 402 15.7 Conclusion 405 15.8 Notes 406 Acknowledgments 408 Bibliography 408 Exercises 410 16 Online Mechanisms 411 David C. Parkes 16.1 Introduction 411 16.2 Dynamic Environments and Online MD 413 16.3 Single Valued Online Domains 417 16.4 Bayesian Implementation in Online Domains 431 16.5 Conclusions 435 16.6 Notes 436 Acknowledgments 437 Bibliography 437 Exercises 439 III Quantifying the Inefficiency of Equilibria 17 Introduction to the Inefficiency of Equilibria 443 Tim Roughgarden and £.va Tardos 17.1 Introduction 443 x CONTENTS 17.2 Fundamental Network Examples 446 17.3 Inefficiency of Equilibria as a Design Metric 454 17.4 Notes 456 Bibliography 457 Exercises 459 18 Routing Games 461 Tim Roughgarden 18.1 Introduction 461 18.2 Models and Examples 462 18.3 Existence, Uniqueness, and Potential Functions 468 18.4 The Price of Anarchy of Selfish Routing 472 18.5 Reducing the Price of Anarchy 478 18.6 Notes 480 Bibliography 483 Exercises 484 19 Network Formation Games and the Potential Function Method 487 Eva Tardos and Tom Wexler 19.1 Introduction 487 19.2 The Local Connection Game 489 19.3 Potential Games and a Global Connection Game 494 19.4 Facility Location 502 19.5 Notes 506 Acknowledgments 511 Bibliography 511 Exercises 513 20 Selfish Load Balancing 517 Berthold Vocking 20.1 Introduction 517 20.2 Pure Equilibria for Identical Machines 522 20.3 Pure Equilibria for Uniformly Related Machines 524 20.4 Mixed Equilibria on Identical Machines 529 20.5 Mixed Equilibria on Uniformly Related Machines 533 20.6 Summary and Discussion 537 20.7 Bibliographic Notes 538 Bibliography 540 Exercises 542 21 The Price of Anarchy and the Design of Scalable Resource Allocation Mechanisms 543 Ramesh Johari 21.1 Introduction 543 21.2 The Proportional Allocation Mechanism 544 213 A Characterization Theorem 551 21.4 The Vickrey Clarke Groves Approach 559 21.5 Chapter Summary and Further Directions 564 CONTENTS Xi 21.6 Notes 565 Bibliography 566 Exercises 567 IV Additional Topics 22 Incentives and Pricing in Communications Networks 571 Asuman Ozdaglar andR. Srikant 22.1 Large Networks Competitive Models 572 22.2 Pricing and Resource Allocation Game Theoretic Models 578 22.3 Alternative Pricing and Incentive Approaches 587 Bibliography 590 23 Incentives in Peer to Peer Systems 593 Moshe Babaioff, John Chuang, and Michal Feldman 23.1 Introduction 593 23.2 The p2p File Sharing Game 594 23.3 Reputation 596 23.4 A Barter Based System: BitTorrent 600 23.5 Currency 601 23.6 Hidden Actions in p2p Systems 602 23.7 Conclusion 608 23.8 Bibliographic Notes 608 Bibliography 609 Exercises • 610 24 Cascading Behavior in Networks: Algorithmic and Economic Issues 613 Jon Kleinberg 24.1 Introduction 613 24.2 A First Model: Networked Coordination Games 614 24.3 More General Models of Social Contagion 618 24.4 Finding Influential Sets of Nodes 622 24.5 Empirical Studies of Cascades in Online Data 627 24.6 Notes and Further Reading 630 Bibliography 631 Exercises 632 25 Incentives and Information Security 633 Ross Anderson, Tyler Moore, Shishir Nagaraja, and Andy Ozment 25.1 Introduction 633 25.2 Misaligned Incentives 634 25.3 Informational Asymmetries 636 25.4 The Economics of Censorship Resistance 640 25.5 Complex Networks and Topology 643 25.6 Conclusion 646 25.7 Notes 647 Bibliography 648 xji CONTENTS 26 Computational Aspects of Prediction Markets 651 David M, Pennock and Rahul Sami 26.1 Introduction: What Is a Prediction Market? 651 26.2 Background 652 26.3 Combinatorial Prediction Markets 657 26.4 Automated Market Makers 662 26.5 Distributed Computation through Markets 665 26.6 Open Questions 670 26.7 Bibliographic Notes 671 Acknowledgments 672 Bibliography 672 Exercises 674 27 Manipulation Resistant Reputation Systems 677 Eric Friedman, Paul Resnick, and Rahul Sami 27.,1 Introduction: Why Are Reputation Systems Important? 677 27.2 The Effect of Reputations 680 27.3 Whitewashing 682 27.4 Eliciting Effort and Honest Feedback 683 27.5 Reputations Based on Transitive Trust 689 27.6 Conclusion and Extensions 693 27.7 Bibliographic Notes 694 Bibliography 695 Exercises 696 28 Sponsored Search Auctions 699 Sebastien Lahaie, David M. Pennock, Amin Saberi, and Rakesh V. Vohra 28.1 Introduction 699 28.2 Existing Models and Mechanisms 701 28.3 A Static Model 702 28.4 Dynamic Aspects 707 28.5 Open Questions 711 28.6 Bibliographic Notes 712 Bibliography 713 Exercises 715 29 Computational Evolutionary Game Theory 717 Siddharth Suri 29.1 Evolutionary Game Theory 717 29.2 The Computational Complexity of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies 720 29.3 Evolutionary Dynamics Applied to Selfish Routing 723 29.4 Evolutionary Game Theory over Graphs 728 29.5 Future Work 733 29.6 Notes 733 Acknowledgments 734 Bibliography 734 Exercises 735 Index 737
adam_txt	Contents Foreword page xiii Preface xvii Contributors xix I Computing in Games 1 Basic Solution Concepts and Computational Issues 3 Eva Tardos and Vijay V. Vazirani 1.1 Games, Old and New 3 1.2 Games, Strategies, Costs, and Payoffs 9 1.3 Basic Solution Concepts 10 1.4 Finding Equilibria and Learning in Games 16 1.5 Refinement of Nash: Games with Turns and Subgame Perfect Equilibrium 18 1.6 Nash Equilibrium without Full Information: Bayesian Games 20 1.7 Cooperative Games 20 1.8 Markets and Their Algorithmic Issues 22 Acknowledgments 26 Bibliography 26 Exercises 26 2 The Complexity of Finding Nash Equilibria 29 Christos H. Papadimitriou 2.1 Introduction 29 2.2 Is the Nash Equilibrium Problem NP Complete? 31 2.3 The Lemke Howson Algorithm 33 2.4 The Class PPAD 36 2.5 Succinct Representations of Games 39 2.6 The Reduction 41 2.7 Correlated Equilibria 45 2.8 Concluding Remarks 49 Acknowledgment 50 Bibliography 50 vi CONTENTS 3 Equilibrium Computation for Two Player Games in Strategic and Extensive Form 53 Bernhard von Stengel 3.1 Introduction ¦' ' 3.2 Bimatrix Games and the Best Response Condition 54 3.3 Equilibria via Labeled Polytopes 57 3.4 The Lemke Howson Algorithm 61 3.5 Integer Pivoting 63 3.6 Degenerate Games 65 3.7 Extensive Games and Their Strategic Form 66 3.8 Subgame Perfect Equilibria 68 3.9 Reduced Strategic Form 69 3.10 The Sequence Form 70 3.11 Computing Equilibria with the Sequence Form 73 3.12 Further Reading 75 3.13 Discussion and Open Problems 75 Bibliography 76 Exercises 77 4 Learning, Regret Minimization, and Equilibria 79 Avrim Blum and Yishay Mansour 4.1 Introduction 79 4.2 Model and Preliminaries 81 4.3 External Regret Minimization 82 4.4 Regret Minimization and Game Theory 88 4.5 Generic Reduction from External to Swap Regret 92 4.6 The Partial Information Model 94 4.7 On Convergence of Regret Minimizing Strategies to Nash Equilibrium in Routing Games 96 4.8 Notes 99 Bibliography 99 Exercises 101 5 Combinatorial Algorithms for Market Equilibria 103 Vijay V. Vazirani 5.1 Introduction 103 5.2 Fisher's Linear Case and the Eisenberg Gale Convex Program 105 5.3 Checking If Given Prices Are Equilibrium Prices 108 5.4 Two Crucial Ingredients of the Algorithm 109 5.5 The Primal Dual Schema in the Enhanced Setting 109 5.6 Tight Sets and the Invariant 111 5.7 Balanced Flows 111 5.8 The Main Algorithm 115 5.9 Finding Tight Sets 117 5.10 Running Time of the Algorithm 118 5.11 The Linear Case of the Arrow Debreu Model 121 5.12 An Auction Based Algorithm 122 5.13 Resource Allocation Markets 124 CONTENTS Vil 5.14 Algorithm for Single Source Multiple Sink Markets 126 5.15 Discussion and Open Problems 131 Bibliography 132 Exercises 133 6 Computation of Market Equilibria by Convex Programming 135 Bruno Codenotti and Kasturi Varadarajan 6.1 Introduction 135 6.2 Fisher Model with Homogeneous Consumers 141 6.3 Exchange Economies Satisfying WGS 142 6.4 Specific Utility Functions 148 6.5 Limitations 150 6.6 Models with Production 152 6.7 Bibliographic Notes 155 Bibliography 156 Exercises 158 7 Graphical Games 159 Michael Kearns 7.1 Introduction 159 7.2 Preliminaries 161 7.3 Computing Nash Equilibria in Tree Graphical Games 164 7.4 Graphical Games and Correlated Equilibria 169 7.5 Graphical Exchange Economies 176 7.6 Open Problems and Future Research 177 7.7 Bibliographic Notes 177 Acknowledgments 179 Bibliography 179 8 Cryptography and Game Theory 181 Yevgeniy Dodis and Tal Rabin 8.1 Cryptographic Notions and Settings 181 8.2 Game Theory Notions and Settings 187 8.3 Contrasting MPC and Games 189 8.4 Cryptographic Influences on Game Theory 191 8.5 Game Theoretic Influences on Cryptography 197 8.6 Conclusions 202 8.7 Notes 203 Acknowledgments 204 Bibliography 204 II Algorithmic Mechanism Design 9 Introduction to Mechanism Design (for Computer Scientists) 209 Noam Nisan 9.1 Introduction 209 9.2 Social Choice 211 9.3 Mechanisms with Money 216 9.4 Implementation in Dominant Strategies 222 Viii CONTENTS 9.5 Characterizations of Incentive Compatible Mechanisms 225 9.6 Bayesian Nash Implementation 233 9.7 Further Models 238 9.8 Notes 239 Acknowledgments 240 Bibliography 241 10 Mechanism Design without Money 243 James Schummer and Rakesh V. Vohra 10.1 Introduction 243 10.2 Single Peaked Preferences over Policies 244 10.3 House Allocation Problem 253 10.4 Stable Matchings 255 10.5 Future Directions 262 10.6 Notes and References 263 Bibliography 264 Exercises 264 11 Combinatorial Auctions 267 Liad Blumrosen and Noam Nisan 11.1 Introduction 267 11.2 The Single Minded Case 270 11.3 Walrasian Equilibrium and the LP Relaxation 275 11.4 Bidding Languages 279 11.5 Iterative Auctions: The Query Model 283 11.6 Communication Complexity 287 11.7 Ascending Auctions 289 11.8 Bibliographic Notes 295 Acknowledgments 296 Bibliography 296 Exercises 298 12 Computationally Efficient Approximation Mechanisms 301 Ron Lavi 12.1 Introduction 301 12.2 Single Dimensional Domains: Job Scheduling 303 12.3 Multidimensional Domains: Combinatorial Auctions 310 12.4 Impossibilities of Dominant Strategy Implementability 317 12.5 Alternative Solution Concepts 321 12.6 Bibliographic Notes 327 Bibliography 327 Exercises 328 13 Profit Maximization in Mechanism Design 331 Jason D. Hartline and Anna R. Karlin 13.1 Introduction 331 13.2 Bayesian Optimal Mechanism Design 335 13.3 Prior Free Approximations to the Optimal Mechanism 339 13.4 Prior Free Optimal Mechanism Design 344 CONTENTS IX 13.5 Frugality 350 13.6 Conclusions and Other Research Directions 354 13.7 Notes 357 Bibliography 358 Exercises 360 14 Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design 363 Joan Feigenbaum, Michael Schapira, and Scott Shenker 14.1 Introduction 363 14.2 Two Examples of DAMD 366 14.3 Interdomain Routing 370 14.4 Conclusion and Open Problems 379 14.5 Notes 380 Acknowledgments 381 Bibliography 381 Exercises 383 15 Cost Sharing 385 Kamal Jain and Mohammad Mahdian 15.1 Cooperative Games and Cost Sharing 385 15.2 Core of Cost Sharing Games 387 15.3 Group Strategyproof Mechanisms and Cross Monotonic Cost Sharing Schemes 391 15.4 Cost Sharing via the Primal Dual Schema 394 15.5 Limitations of Cross Monotonic Cost Sharing Schemes 400 15.6 The Shapley Value and the Nash Bargaining Solution 402 15.7 Conclusion 405 15.8 Notes 406 Acknowledgments 408 Bibliography 408 Exercises 410 16 Online Mechanisms 411 David C. Parkes 16.1 Introduction 411 16.2 Dynamic Environments and Online MD 413 16.3 Single Valued Online Domains 417 16.4 Bayesian Implementation in Online Domains 431 16.5 Conclusions 435 16.6 Notes 436 Acknowledgments 437 Bibliography 437 Exercises 439 III Quantifying the Inefficiency of Equilibria 17 Introduction to the Inefficiency of Equilibria 443 Tim Roughgarden and £.va Tardos 17.1 Introduction 443 x CONTENTS 17.2 Fundamental Network Examples 446 17.3 Inefficiency of Equilibria as a Design Metric 454 17.4 Notes 456 Bibliography 457 Exercises 459 18 Routing Games 461 Tim Roughgarden 18.1 Introduction 461 18.2 Models and Examples 462 18.3 Existence, Uniqueness, and Potential Functions 468 18.4 The Price of Anarchy of Selfish Routing 472 18.5 Reducing the Price of Anarchy 478 18.6 Notes 480 Bibliography 483 Exercises 484 19 Network Formation Games and the Potential Function Method 487 Eva Tardos and Tom Wexler 19.1 Introduction 487 19.2 The Local Connection Game 489 19.3 Potential Games and a Global Connection Game 494 19.4 Facility Location 502 19.5 Notes 506 Acknowledgments 511 Bibliography 511 Exercises 513 20 Selfish Load Balancing 517 Berthold Vocking 20.1 Introduction 517 20.2 Pure Equilibria for Identical Machines 522 20.3 Pure Equilibria for Uniformly Related Machines 524 20.4 Mixed Equilibria on Identical Machines 529 20.5 Mixed Equilibria on Uniformly Related Machines 533 20.6 Summary and Discussion 537 20.7 Bibliographic Notes 538 Bibliography 540 Exercises 542 21 The Price of Anarchy and the Design of Scalable Resource Allocation Mechanisms 543 Ramesh Johari 21.1 Introduction 543 21.2 The Proportional Allocation Mechanism 544 213 A Characterization Theorem 551 21.4 The Vickrey Clarke Groves Approach 559 21.5 Chapter Summary and Further Directions 564 CONTENTS Xi 21.6 Notes 565 Bibliography 566 Exercises 567 IV Additional Topics 22 Incentives and Pricing in Communications Networks 571 Asuman Ozdaglar andR. Srikant 22.1 Large Networks Competitive Models 572 22.2 Pricing and Resource Allocation Game Theoretic Models 578 22.3 Alternative Pricing and Incentive Approaches 587 Bibliography 590 23 Incentives in Peer to Peer Systems 593 Moshe Babaioff, John Chuang, and Michal Feldman 23.1 Introduction 593 23.2 The p2p File Sharing Game 594 23.3 Reputation 596 23.4 A Barter Based System: BitTorrent 600 23.5 Currency 601 23.6 Hidden Actions in p2p Systems 602 23.7 Conclusion 608 23.8 Bibliographic Notes 608 Bibliography 609 Exercises • 610 24 Cascading Behavior in Networks: Algorithmic and Economic Issues 613 Jon Kleinberg 24.1 Introduction 613 24.2 A First Model: Networked Coordination Games 614 24.3 More General Models of Social Contagion 618 24.4 Finding Influential Sets of Nodes 622 24.5 Empirical Studies of Cascades in Online Data 627 24.6 Notes and Further Reading 630 Bibliography 631 Exercises 632 25 Incentives and Information Security 633 Ross Anderson, Tyler Moore, Shishir Nagaraja, and Andy Ozment 25.1 Introduction 633 25.2 Misaligned Incentives 634 25.3 Informational Asymmetries 636 25.4 The Economics of Censorship Resistance 640 25.5 Complex Networks and Topology 643 25.6 Conclusion 646 25.7 Notes 647 Bibliography 648 xji CONTENTS 26 Computational Aspects of Prediction Markets 651 David M, Pennock and Rahul Sami 26.1 Introduction: What Is a Prediction Market? 651 26.2 Background 652 26.3 Combinatorial Prediction Markets 657 26.4 Automated Market Makers 662 26.5 Distributed Computation through Markets 665 26.6 Open Questions 670 26.7 Bibliographic Notes 671 Acknowledgments 672 Bibliography 672 Exercises 674 27 Manipulation Resistant Reputation Systems 677 Eric Friedman, Paul Resnick, and Rahul Sami 27.,1 Introduction: Why Are Reputation Systems Important? 677 27.2 The Effect of Reputations 680 27.3 Whitewashing 682 27.4 Eliciting Effort and Honest Feedback 683 27.5 Reputations Based on Transitive Trust 689 27.6 Conclusion and Extensions 693 27.7 Bibliographic Notes 694 Bibliography 695 Exercises 696 28 Sponsored Search Auctions 699 Sebastien Lahaie, David M. Pennock, Amin Saberi, and Rakesh V. Vohra 28.1 Introduction 699 28.2 Existing Models and Mechanisms 701 28.3 A Static Model 702 28.4 Dynamic Aspects 707 28.5 Open Questions 711 28.6 Bibliographic Notes 712 Bibliography 713 Exercises 715 29 Computational Evolutionary Game Theory 717 Siddharth Suri 29.1 Evolutionary Game Theory 717 29.2 The Computational Complexity of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies 720 29.3 Evolutionary Dynamics Applied to Selfish Routing 723 29.4 Evolutionary Game Theory over Graphs 728 29.5 Future Work 733 29.6 Notes 733 Acknowledgments 734 Bibliography 734 Exercises 735 Index 737
any_adam_object	1
any_adam_object_boolean	1
author_GND	(DE-588)137125372 (DE-588)140445382
building	Verbundindex
bvnumber	BV022961661
callnumber-first	Q - Science
callnumber-label	QA269
callnumber-raw	QA269
callnumber-search	QA269
callnumber-sort	QA 3269
callnumber-subject	QA - Mathematics
classification_rvk	QH 430 SK 860 ST 134
classification_tum	MAT 920f
ctrlnum	(OCoLC)122526907 (DE-599)BVBBV022961661
dewey-full	519.3
dewey-hundreds	500 - Natural sciences and mathematics
dewey-ones	519 - Probabilities and applied mathematics
dewey-raw	519.3
dewey-search	519.3
dewey-sort	3519.3
dewey-tens	510 - Mathematics
discipline	Informatik Mathematik Wirtschaftswissenschaften
discipline_str_mv	Informatik Mathematik Wirtschaftswissenschaften
edition	1. publ.
format	Book
fullrecord	<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>02221nam a2200565zc 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV022961661</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20190124 </controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">071113s2007 xxud\|\|\| \|\|\|\| 00\|\|\| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="010" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">2007014231</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">0521872820</subfield><subfield code="c">hardback</subfield><subfield code="9">0-521-87282-0</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9780521872829</subfield><subfield code="9">978-0-521-87282-9</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)122526907</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV022961661</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">aacr</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="044" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">xxu</subfield><subfield code="c">US</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-703</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-92</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-706</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-20</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-634</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-83</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-11</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-2070s</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-384</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-91</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="050" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">QA269</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">519.3</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">QH 430</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)141581:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SK 860</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)143264:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ST 134</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)143590:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">91Axx</subfield><subfield code="2">msc</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">MAT 920f</subfield><subfield code="2">stub</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Algorithmic game theory</subfield><subfield code="c">ed. by Noam Nisan ...</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="250" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1. publ.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Cambridge [u.a.]</subfield><subfield code="b">Cambridge Univ. Pr.</subfield><subfield code="c">2007</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">XXI, 754 S.</subfield><subfield code="b">graph. Darst.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Algorithmes</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Théorie des jeux</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Game theory</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Algorithms</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Spieltheorie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4056243-8</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Algorithmus</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4001183-5</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Spieltheorie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4056243-8</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Algorithmus</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4001183-5</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Nisan, Noam</subfield><subfield code="d">1961-</subfield><subfield code="e">Sonstige</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)137125372</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Roughgarden, Tim</subfield><subfield code="e">Sonstige</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Tardos, Éva</subfield><subfield code="d">1957-</subfield><subfield code="e">Sonstige</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)140445382</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0715/2007014231.html</subfield><subfield code="3">Table of contents only</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0729/2007014231-d.html</subfield><subfield code="3">Publisher description</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0729/2007014231-b.html</subfield><subfield code="3">Contributor biographical information</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="m">HBZ Datenaustausch</subfield><subfield code="q">application/pdf</subfield><subfield code="u">http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016166036&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA</subfield><subfield code="3">Inhaltsverzeichnis</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016166036</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
id	DE-604.BV022961661
illustrated	Illustrated
index_date	2024-07-02T19:04:58Z
indexdate	2024-07-09T21:08:39Z
institution	BVB
isbn	0521872820 9780521872829
language	English
lccn	2007014231
oai_aleph_id	oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016166036
oclc_num	122526907
open_access_boolean
owner	DE-703 DE-92 DE-706 DE-20 DE-634 DE-83 DE-11 DE-2070s DE-384 DE-91 DE-BY-TUM
owner_facet	DE-703 DE-92 DE-706 DE-20 DE-634 DE-83 DE-11 DE-2070s DE-384 DE-91 DE-BY-TUM
physical	XXI, 754 S. graph. Darst.
publishDate	2007
publishDateSearch	2007
publishDateSort	2007
publisher	Cambridge Univ. Pr.
record_format	marc
spelling	Algorithmic game theory ed. by Noam Nisan ... 1. publ. Cambridge [u.a.] Cambridge Univ. Pr. 2007 XXI, 754 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Algorithmes Théorie des jeux Game theory Algorithms Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd rswk-swf Algorithmus (DE-588)4001183-5 gnd rswk-swf Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 s Algorithmus (DE-588)4001183-5 s DE-604 Nisan, Noam 1961- Sonstige (DE-588)137125372 oth Roughgarden, Tim Sonstige oth Tardos, Éva 1957- Sonstige (DE-588)140445382 oth http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0715/2007014231.html Table of contents only http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0729/2007014231-d.html Publisher description http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0729/2007014231-b.html Contributor biographical information HBZ Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016166036&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis
spellingShingle	Algorithmic game theory Algorithmes Théorie des jeux Game theory Algorithms Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd Algorithmus (DE-588)4001183-5 gnd
subject_GND	(DE-588)4056243-8 (DE-588)4001183-5
title	Algorithmic game theory
title_auth	Algorithmic game theory
title_exact_search	Algorithmic game theory
title_exact_search_txtP	Algorithmic game theory
title_full	Algorithmic game theory ed. by Noam Nisan ...
title_fullStr	Algorithmic game theory ed. by Noam Nisan ...
title_full_unstemmed	Algorithmic game theory ed. by Noam Nisan ...
title_short	Algorithmic game theory
title_sort	algorithmic game theory
topic	Algorithmes Théorie des jeux Game theory Algorithms Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd Algorithmus (DE-588)4001183-5 gnd
topic_facet	Algorithmes Théorie des jeux Game theory Algorithms Spieltheorie Algorithmus
url	http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0715/2007014231.html http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0729/2007014231-d.html http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0729/2007014231-b.html http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016166036&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA
work_keys_str_mv	AT nisannoam algorithmicgametheory AT roughgardentim algorithmicgametheory AT tardoseva algorithmicgametheory

Verfügbarkeit

Es ist kein Print-Exemplar vorhanden.

Fernleihe Bestellen Achtung: Nicht im THWS-Bestand! Inhaltsverzeichnis

MARC

Datensatz im Suchindex

Es ist kein Print-Exemplar vorhanden.

Ähnliche Einträge