One and many in Aristotle's Metaphysics: books alpha - delta
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
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| Beschreibung: | XLI, 524 S. |
| ISBN: | 9781930972216 1930972210 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text | CONTENTS ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS ABBREVIATIONS GLOSSARY
INTRODUCTION CHAPTER 1 THE PROBLEM AND THE METHOD 1.1 AN OVERVIEW
1.1.1METAPHYSICS AND THE ONE 1.1.2ARISTOTLE S SOLUTION 1.1.3THE SOLUTION
IN THE TEXT 1.2 THE PROBLEM 1.3 THE METHOD 1.4 THE LITERATURE 1.4.1
TREATMENTS OF THE ONE/MANY PROBLEM 1.4.2 PROBLEMS IN A-8 CHAPTER 2 THE
WAYS OF BEING ONE 2.1 POLLACHOS LEGOMENA 2.1.1 AN ALTERNATIVE ARGUMENT
FOR THE THREE-COMPONENT ANALYSIS 2.1.2 APPLYING THE THREE-COMPONENT
ANALYSIS TO METAPHYSICS 8: REAL AND NON-CATEGORIAL ESSENCES 2.1.3 THE
WAYS BEING IS SAID 2.2 86: THE WAYS ONE IS SAID 2.2.1 ACCIDENTAL
ONES (1015B16-36) 2.2.2 CONTINUITY (1015B36-1016A17) 2.2.3 SENSIBLE
SUBSTRATE (1016A17-24) 2.2.4 GENERIC SUBSTRATE (1016A24-32) 2.2.5
INDIVISIBLE IN FORMULA (1016A32-B6) 2.2.6 ARISTOTLE S SUMMARY
(1016B6-11) 2.2.7 THE WHOLE (1016B11-17) 2.2.8 OTHER TREATMENTS OF ONE:
METAPHYSICS I 1 AND PHYSICS A 2 2.3 THE ESSENCE OF ONE AND ITS FUNCTIONS
2.4 THE SERIES OF ONES (1016B23-1017A3) 2.5 SAME 2.6 SUMMARY CHAPTER 3
THE PRINCIPLES OF METAPHYSICS: BOOKS A AND OC 3.1 WISDOM AND THE WISE: A
1-2 3.1.1 A 1: NATURAL DESIRE FOR KNOWLEDGE 3.1.2 A 2: THE
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE WISE XI XXV XXVII XXXV 1 1 1 7 14 20 31 43 43 48
53 53 60 66 72 83 86 92 99 105 110 118 125 129 131 135 145 149 153 154
154 164 VIII CONTENTS 3.2 THE NUMBER OF CAUSES: A 3-7 169 3.3 CRITIQUE
OF THE CAUSES: A 8-10 179 3.3.1 A 8 179 3.3.2 A 9: ARISTOTLE S ARGUMENTS
AGAINST THE FORMS 180 3.3.2.1 DOUBLING 181 3.3.2.2 THE MORE AND LESS
ACCURATE ARGUMENTS FOR THE FORMS 186 3.3.2.3 FORMS AS CAUSES 192 3.4
BOOK IX: INFINITE CAUSES, FIRST CAUSES, AND THE EXISTENCE OF METAPHYSICS
196 CHAPTER 4 BOOK B:THE APORIAI 205 4.1 UNITY LANGUAGE: A PARADIGM 216
4.2 THE UNITY OF THE SUBJECT MATTER 220 4.2.1 MANY SCIENCES 220 4.2.2
ONE SCIENCE 226 4.2.3 APORIA FIVE 235 4.2.4 THE POSSIBILITY OF
METAPHYSICS 238 4.3 THE UNITY OF A PRINCIPLE 241 4.4 CANDIDATES FOR THE
FIRST PRINCIPLE 261 4.5 METAPHYSICAL METHOD 270 4.5.1 THE PLATONIC
ORIGIN OF THE APORIAI 270 4.5.2 THE ASSUMPTION ABOUT UNITY 274 4.5.3 THE
LOGIC OF THE APORIAI 280 CHAPTER 5 BOOK R: THE UNITY OF BEING 289 5.1
THE SUBJECT MATTER OF METAPHYSICS 291 5.1.1 R I: A SCIENCEOF BEING 293
5.1.2 ARGUMENT ONE (F 2, 1003A33-B19): THE CAUSES 297 5.2 BEING QUA
BEING 307 5.3 ARGUMENTS TWO AND THREE: OUSIAI 326 5.3.1 ARGUMENT TWO
(1003B19-22) 326 5.3.2 ARGUMENT THREE (1003B22-1004A2) 333 5.3.3
1004A2-9 341 5.4 ARGUMENTS FOUR, FIVE,AND SIX: PER SE ATTRIBUTES 353
5.4.1 ARGUMENT FOUR (1004A9-31) 354 5.4.2 ARGUMENT FIVE (1004A31-B25)
371 5.4.3 ARGUMENT SIX (1004B27-1005A18) 379 5.5 ARGUMENT SEVEN
(1005A19-B8): PRINCIPLES OF DEMONSTRATION 390 5.6 BEING AS THE SUBJECT
OF METAPHYSICS 395 5.7 BEING AND ONE 401 5.8 THE PRINCIPLES OF REASONING
405 5.9 ARGUMENTS FOR NON-CONTRADICTION 420 5.9.1 ARGUMENTS 1-2:
1006BLL-34 425 5.9.2 ARGUMENTS 3-5: 1006B34-1008A2 432 CONTENTS 5.9.3
ARGUMENTS 6-8: CONTRADICTION IN SPEECH 5.9.4 ARGUMENTS 9-10:
CONTRADICTION IN ACTION 5.9.5 R 5: UNIVERSAL EXTENSION 5.9.5.1 THE
ARGUMENT FROM CHANGE 5.9.5.2 THE ARGUMENT FROM SENSATION 5.9.5.3
HERACLITUS ARGUMENT 5.9.6 R 6: RELATIVES 5.9.7 R 7: THE PRINCIPLE OF
THE EXCLUDED MIDDLE 5.9.8 NON-CONTRADICTION AS A PRINCIPLE OF KNOWLEDGE
5.10 CONCLUSION OF BOOK R CHAPTER 6 BOOK LL AGAIN CHAPTER 7 METAPHYSICS:
UNIVERSAL OR SPECIAL 7.1 METAPHYSICAL METHOD 7.2 THE SUBJECT MATTER OF
METAPHYSICS 7.3 THE NATURE OF METAPHYSICS BIBLIOGRAPHY INDEX IX 440 443
445 447 449 451 454 455 457 459 463 471 473 478 490 507 515 ANALYTICAL
TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 CHEPTER 1 THE PROBLEM END THE METHOD 1.1 AN OVERVIEW
1.1.1 METAPHYSICS AND THE ONE THIS SECTION EXPLAINS WHY THE PROBLEM OF
THE ONE AND THE MANY-ARE ALL THINGS ONE OR MANY?-IS INTRINSIC TO
METAPHYSICS AS ARISTOTLE CONCEIVES OF IT. THE ARGU- MENT TURNS ON HIS
REMARKS ON ARCHITECTONIC SCIENCES IN THE ETHICS AND POLITICS, ON PLATO S
SIMILAR FORMULATIONS OF THE PROBLEM OF THE HIGHEST SCIENCE, AND ON
ARISTOTLE S FREQUENT REFERENCES TO THE PROBLEM OF THE ONE AND THE MANY
IN ITS VARIOUS GUISES. 1.1.2 ARISTOTLE S SOLUTION THIS SECTION SKETCHES
ARISTOTLE S SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF THE ONE AND MANY, THAT IS, THE
PROBLEM OF HOW THERE CAN BE A METAPHYSICS AND WHAT IT IS THAT THIS
SCIENCE KNOWS. IT SETS OUT THE PRINCIPAL THESIS AND RESULTS OF THIS
STUDY FOR THE PRESENT VOLUME AND ALSO, MORE BRIEFLY, FOR THE TWO
SUCCEEDING ONES. 1.1.3 THE SOLUTION IN THE TEXT ONE OF THE CLAIMS IN
THIS BOOK IS THAT ARISTOTLE S TEXT IS, FOR THE MOST PART, A CARE- FULLY
CONSTRUCTED AND COGENT SET OF ARGUMENTS THAT WORK TOGETHER TO SUPPORT
HIS CONCLUSIONS. THIS SECTION SHOWS HOW THE TEXT OF THE METAPHYSICS
MAKES A CASE FOR THE SOLUTION PRESENTED IN 1.1.2. 1.2 THE PROBLEM THE
PROBLEM OF THE ONE AND THE MANY IS CENTRAL FOR ARISTOTLE S PHILOSOPHICAL
PRE- DECESSORS. ALTHOUGH HE HIMSELF DOES NOT REGARD IT AS A SINGLE
PROBLEM, HE USES IT IN MANY OF HIS WORKS AS A METHOD OF DETERMINING THE
NATURE THAT THE WORK EXPLORES. ONCE THE NATURE IS DEFINED, THE ONE/MANY
ISSUE RECEDES. IN THE METAPHYSICS, THE PROBLEM TAKES ITS MOST GENERAL
FORM: ARE ALL THINGS ONE OR MANY? ARISTOTLE USES THIS QUESTION TO
EXPLORE WHETHER THERE ARE CAUSES OR NATURES COMMON TO ALL BEINGS, BUT
ULTIMATELY IT TAKES A BACK SEAT TO HIS DOCTRINE OF BEING. HOWEVER, THE
PROBLEM IS IMPORTANT BECAUSE ARISTOTLE USES IT TO ARGUE FOR HIS
METAPHYSICAL DOCTRINES. IT HOLDS A SPECIAL PLACE IN METAPHYSICAL
INQUIRY. 1.3 THE METHOD THE TWO PREVAILING METHODS USED TO INTERPRET THE
METAPHYSICS HAVE BEEN DEVEL- OPMENTALISM AND WHAT I CALL THE ARISTOTLE
AT WORK APPROACH. BOTH EMPHASIZE THE DYNAMIC CHARACTER OF ARISTOTLE S
ENGAGEMENT WITH PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS, BUT NEITHER HAS THE RESOURCES TO
CHOOSE BETWEEN COMPETING INTERPRETATIONS OF PARTICULAR TEXTS. MY
INNOVATION IS TO INTRODUCE THE PROBLEM OF THE ONE AND THE MANY AS A
GUIDING THREAD THROUGH WHICH TO UNDERSTAND AND EVALUATE THE DYNAMIC OF
ARISTOTLE S THOUGHT. XI XII ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.4 THE
LITERATURE 1.4.1 TREATMENTS OF THE ONE/MANY PROBLEM SO LITTLE HAS
APPEARED IN THE LITERATURE ABOUT THE PROBLEM OF THE ONE AND THE MANY IN
THE METAPHYSICS THAT, INSTEAD OF THE USUALLITERATURE SURVEY, THIS
SECTION CONSIDERS WHY SCHOLARS HAVE NEGLECTED IT. IT SUGGESTS THAT THEY
HAVE BEEN DETERRED BY TWO ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE ONE: (1) THAT IT IS
CHARACTERISTIC OF PLATONIC FORM AND THEREFORE NOT PROPERLY ARISTOTELIAN,
AND (2) THAT ONE IS NEARLY IDENTICAL WITH BEING SO THAT ANY TREATMENT OF
THE LATTER IS ALSO A TREAT- MENT OF THE FORMER. 1.4.2 PROBLEMS IN A-!!
THE TWO MOST IMPORTANT SCHOLARLY ISSUES IN METAPHYSICS A-!! ARE: (1)WHAT
METHOD DOES ARISTOTLE USE TO ARRIVE AT AND JUSTIFY HIS CONCLUSIONS? AND
(2) WHAT ARE THE RELATIONS BETWEEN METAPHYSICS AND THE PARTICULAR
SCIENCES AND BETWEEN ITS SUB- JECT MATTER AND THEIRS? A THIRD IMPORTANT
ISSUE IS HOW ARISTOTLE CAN ARGUE FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-CONTRADICTION
(PNC). THIS VOLUME WILL ADDRESS ALL THREE. 2 CHAPTER 2 THE WAYS OF BEING
ONE ONE IS SAID IN MANY WAYS. IT IS NECESSARY TO EXPLORE THESE WAYS
BECAUSE ARISTOTLE OFTEN DOES NOT INDICATE WHICH ONE HE IS USING. THIS
CHAPTER FOLLOWS ARISTOTLE S MOST DETAILED DISCUSSION IN LL 6. 2.1
POLLSCHOS LEGOMENS THIS SECTION ARGUES THAT WHEN ARISTOTLE CLAIMS A TERM
IS SAID IN MANY WAYS HE MEANS TO SAY THAT MANY THINGS ARE CALLED BY
THE SAME TERM IN RESPECT OF DIFFERENT DEFINITIONS OF THOSE THINGS. MY
CASE DEPENDS ON ARGUING AGAINST INTERPRETING THE PHRASE AS EITHER A
DESCRIPTION OF LINGUISTIC USAGE OR A DESIGNATION OF THINGS AND IN FAVOR
OF A THREE-COMPONENT ANALYSIS: THINGS, TERM, AND DEFINITIONS. 2.1.1 AN
ALTERNATIVE ARGUMENT FOR THE THREE-COMPONENT ANALYSIS JOSEPH OWENS ALSO
ARGUES FOR A THREE-COMPONENT ANALYSIS BASED ON THE OPENING CHAPTER OF
THE CATEGORIES, BUT HIS ARGUMENT HAS BEEN DISPUTED FROM PASSAGES IN THE
TOPICS AND THE METAPHYSICS THAT DISCUSS CASES WHERE THINGS ARE NAMED
NON-EQUIVOCALLY BY A TERM SAID IN MANY WAYS. THIS SECTION DEFENDS THE
THREE- COMPONENT ANALYSIS BY SHOWING HOW IT MAKES POSSIBLE THE MIDDLE
GROUND BETWEEN WHAT IS EQUIVOCALLY AND UNIVOCALLY NAMED. 2.1.2 APPLYING
THE THREE-COMPONENT ANALYSIS TO METAPHYSICS LL: REAL AND NON-CATEGORIAL
ESSENCES THE THREE-COMPONENT ANALYSIS SEEMS TO BE AT ODDS WITH
METAPHYSICS LL BECAUSE WHAT IS DISCUSSED THERE DOES NOT FALL UNDER A
SINGLE CATEGORIAL GENUS AND THEREFORE CANNOT HAVE AREAL ESSENCE OR
DEFINITION. MORE THAN A PROBLEM FOR THE THREE-COMPONENT ANALYSIS, THIS
IS A SERIOUS METAPHYSICAL PROBLEM. HOWEVER, ARISTOTLE CLEARLY RECOGNIZES
THAT, AT LEAST, SOME OF THE TERMS DISCUSSED IN LL DO SIGNIFY THINGS WITH
NON-CATEGORIAL ESSENCES. HENCE, THE THREE-COMPONENT ANALYSIS DOES APPLY
TO BOOK LL. 2.1.3 THE WAYS BEING IS SAID ALTHOUGH THE CATEGORIES ARE
MENTIONED MOST OFTEN IN DESCRIPTIONS OF THE WAYS BEING IS SAID, THEY
CONSTITUTE BUT ONE OF THREE SCHEMATA OF PER SE BEINGS. THE OTHERS ARE
TRUE/FALSE AND ACTUALITY /POTENTIALITY. 5INCE THE SAME THINGS ARE CALLED
ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS XIII BEINGS IN RESPECT OF MORE THAN ONE
SCHEMA, THE SCHEMATA CANNOT BE GENERA OF BEINGS. THIS SECTION ARGUES
THAT ARISTOTLE S CHARACTERIZATION OF THESE SCHEMATA AMOUNTS TO
DEFINITIONS AND THAT, CONSEQUENTLY, THE THREE-COMPONENT ANALYSIS APPLIES
TO THE WAYS BEING IS SAID. A THING IS CALLED A BEING BECAUSE IT HAS
SOME CHARACTER, BECAUSE THAT CHARACTER IS FULLY OR LESS THAN FULLY
REALIZED, OR BECAUSE IT EXISTS. 2.2 A 6: THE WEY. ONE I. SEID
COMMENTATORS HAVE DISTINGUISHED BETWEEN ONE-PLACE AND TWO-PLACE WAYS
THAT ONE IS SAID. THIS SECTION ARGUES THAT THIS DISTINCTION IS
SUBSIDIARY TO THE QUESTION OF HOW SOME PARTICULAR THING IS ONE, FOR WE
COULD NOT HAVE TWO THINGS THAT WERE ONE UNLESS EACH OF THEM WERE ITSELF
ONE, NOR COULD WE CONSIDER WHETHER TWO COM- PONENTS CONSTITUTE ONE THING
UNLESS IT IS CLEAR WHAT IT IS TO BE ONE THING. ARISTOTLE RESERVES SAME
FOR TWO-PLACE USES OF ONE ; HENCE, THE SCHEMATA OF L 6 SHOULD BE
UNDERSTOOD AS ONE-PLACE USES. 2.2.1 ACCIDENTAL ONES (1015B16-36) A
COMPOSITE OF ACCIDENTAL ATTRIBUTES AND AN OUSIA IS ACCIDENTALLY ONE. IT
IS CLEAR THAT THE COMPOSITE IS SOME SORT OF CONJUNCTION AND THAT IT IS
ONE BECAUSE THE SUBSTRATE OUSIA IS ONE. A MORE PRECISE ACCOUNT OF THE
UNITY OF OUSIA AND ATTRIBUTES DOES NOT SEEM POSSIBLE. 2.2.2 CONTINUITY
(1015B36-1016A17) SOMETHING IS CONTINUOUS IF ITS MOTION IS INDIVISIBLE
IN TIME. ARISTOTLE GIVES TWO CRITERIA THAT DISTINGUISH THE MORE FROM THE
LESS CONTINUOUS, BUT HE DOES NOT SHOW HOW THEY WORK TOGETHER. THIS
SECTION CONSIDERS HOW TO UNDERSTAND THESE CRITERIA AND SHOWS HOW THEY
SUGGEST A SCHEMA OF TYPES OF CONTINUITY. 2.2.3 SENSIBLE SUBSTRATE
(1016A17-24) SAME SINGLE THING IS ONE IN SENSIBLE SUBSTRATE IF ITS
SUBSTRATE IS INDIVISIBLE IN RESPECT OF SENSATION. THE CLAIM HERE IS THAT
THE CHARACTER OF A THING S MATTER MAKES IT BE ONE BECAUSE MATTER GIVES
IT ITS NATURE AND IDENTITY. THE CHARACTER OF THE MATTER SEEMS TO BE
FUNDAMENTAL BECAUSE IT IS A BEDROCK CHARACTER THAT THE THING COULD NOT
LOSE. ARISTOTLE DISTINGUISHES PROXIMATE AND ULTIMATE SENSIBLE SUBSTRATES
AS A SCHEMA OF THIS TYPE OF UNITY. MAKING SENSE OF THIS DISTINCTION
REQUIRES DEVELOPING A NOTION OF RELATIVE DIVISIBILITY AT WHICH THE TEXT
ONLY HINTS. 2.2.4 GENERIC SUBSTRATE (1016A24-32) A GENUS MAKES A THING
ONE INSOFAR AS THE THING IS A SINGLE INSTANCE OF IT. A CAREFUL
EXAMINATION OF THE TEXT SHOWS THAT ARISTOTLE INTENDS ONE BY GENERIC
SUBSTRATE TO BE PRIMARILY A UNITY OF INDIVIDUAL THINGS OR SPECIES.
ARISTOTLE SUGGESTS A SCHEMA OF PROXIMATE AND ULTIMATE GENERIC
SUBSTRATES, BUT HE DOES NOT EXPLAIN IT NOR DOES HE DECIDE WHICH IS MORE
ONE. 2.2.5 INDIVISIBLE IN FORMULA (1016A32-B6) SOMETHING IS INDIVISIBLE
IN FORMULA IF ITS FORMULA CANNOT BE DIVIDED INTO ANOTHER FORMULA THAT
EXPRESSES WHAT THE THING ISOFORMULAE OF COMPOSITES CAN BE DIVIDED INTO
CONSTITUENT FORMULAE, ONE OF WHICH EXPRESS THE OUSIA. HENCE, ONLY
UNDIVIDED ENTITIES CAN HAVE INDIVISIBLE FORMULAE. ALTHOUGH GENUS, A
SPECIES, AND AN INDIVIDUAL COULD EACH BE ONE IN FORMULA, THE INDIVIDUAL
OR, IN GENERAL, WHAT IS UNDIVIDED IN TIME AND PLACE AS WELL AS FORMULA
IS MOST ONE IN FORMULA. ARISTOTLE HAS AN ORDERED SCHEMA OF ONES THAT ARE
INDIVISIBLE IN FORMULA. ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS 2.2.6 ARISTOTLE S
SUMMARY [1016B6-11) THE SUMMARY STATEMENT CONSIDERED IN THIS SECTION
LOOKS LIKE IT ASSERTS THAT OTHER THINGS ARE CALLED ONE BY THEIR
RELATION TO A PRIMARY ONE; THIS WOULD BE THE PROS HEN DOCTRINE OF ONE.
ARGUING AGAINST THIS AND OTHER INTERPRETATIONS, THIS SECTION PROPOSES
THAT THE PRIMARY ONES ARE THE PRIMARY INSTANCES OF THE THREE PER SE ONES
AND THAT THE SECONDARY ONES ARE THE OTHER INSTANCES OF THE SCHEMATA OF
THESE PER SE ONES. 2.2.7 THE WHOLE [1016B11-17) THINGS ARE CALLED ONE
BY BEING A WHOLE IF THEY ARE BOTH ONE IN SUBSTRATE AND ONE BY
CONTINUITY. THESE TWO TYPES OF ONE BOTH DEPEND ON MATTER. OTHER
COMBINATIONS OF PER SE ONES THAT WOULD REQUIRE UNITY IN MATTER AND UNITY
IN FORM ARE EXCLUDED. 2.2.8 OTHER TREATMENTS OF ONE: METAPHYSICS I 1 AND
PHYSICS A 2 ARISTOTLE S TWO OTHER TREATMENTS OF THE WAYS ONE IS SAID
DO NOT ADD ANYTHING TO WHAT APPEARS IN I 6. PHYSICS A 2 IDENTIFIES
THREE PRIMARY ONES THAT APPEAR TO BE THE THREE DISCUSSED IN I 6. I 1
PROVIDES A MORE SYSTEMATIC TREATMENT THAN I 6 THAT, PROBABLY DRAWING ON
THE RESULTS OF THE CENTRAL BOOKS, OMITS BOTH SUBSTRATES. 2.3 THE ESSENCE
OF ONE AND ITS FUNCTIONS ARISTOTLE DEFINES THE ESSENCE OF ONE ( TO &VL
DVCX~) BY MENTIONING THREE OF ITS FUNC- TIONS, TO BE INDIVISIBLE, TO BE
THE PRINCIPLE OF KNOWLEDGE, AND TO BE THE PRINCIPLE OF NUMBER.
EISEWHERE, HE ALSO SPEAKS OF ONE AS THE PRINCIPLE OF CONTRARIETY. EACH
OF THESE FUNCTIONS BELONGS NOT TO SOME ONE ITSELF, BUT TO SOME THING
THAT IS ONE. 2.4 THE SERIES OF ONES (1016B23-1017A3J INDIVISIBILITY CAN
BE QUALITATIVE OR QUANTITATIVE, AND EACH OF THESE INCLUDES ASERIES NOT
OF THINGS THAT ARE ONE BUT OF TYPES OF UNITY. THIS SECTION EXPLORES THE
CHARAC- TERIZATION OF THESE SERIES AND THEIR RELATION TO THE THINGS SAID
TO BE ONE. IT REJECTS A STRICT IDENTIFICATION OF THE SERIES WITH THE
PER SE WAYS OF BEING ONE AND PROPOSES INSTEAD THAT THE SERIES BE
UNDERSTOOD AS EXPLICATING THE ESSENCE OF ONE. 2.5 SAME ARISTOTLE S
DISCUSSION OF SAME PROVIDES FURTHER SUPPORT FOR TAKING ONE TO APPLY
PRIMARILY TO INDIVIDUAL THINGS AND FOR THE THREE-COMPONENT ANALYSIS.
THIS SECTION CONSIDERS WHAT ARISTOTLE MEANS BY THE TERM ONENESS
(&V6 R1)~), AND IT ARGUES AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY OF THERE BEING A
PRINCIPLE OF THE IDENTITY OF INDIS- CERNIBLES IN ARISTOTLE. 2.6 SUMMARY
THE CHAPTER CONCLUDES WITH A BRIEF SUMMARY THAT EMPHASIZES THE RICH
COMPLEX- ITY OF ARISTOTLE S ACCOUNT OF THE WAYS ONE IS SAID,
PARTICULARLY HIS DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN MATERIAL AND FORMAL ONES AND
BETWEEN THINGS THAT ARE ONE AND THE UNITY THAT THEY HAVE. THE CONTRAST
BETWEEN HIS ACCOUNTS OF ONE AND BEING UNDER- MINES THE ASSUMPTION
THAT ARISTOTLE TREATS THEM AS VIRTUALLY THE SAME. APART FROM HELPING
APPRECIATE THE DIFFERENT ONES THAT ARISTOTLE USES IN THE METAPHYSICS,
OFTEN WITHOUT SPECIFYING THEM, THIS CHAPTER S TREATMENT OF THE WAYS
ONE IS SAID UNDERMINES SEVERAL COMMON NOTIONS THAT ARE INCOMPATIBLE
WITH THE ANALYSIS OF ARISTOTLE S TEXT IN THE REST OF MYSTUDY.
ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS XV 3 CHAPTER 3 THE PRINCIPLES OF
METAPHYSICS: BOOKS A AND CLT THE METAPHYSICS IS UNUSUAL IN THAT IT HAS
TWO INTRODUCTORY BOOKS, BUT BOTH ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF THE NUMBER OF
CAUSES. SINCE THEY ASSUME THAT EACH CAUSE IS ONE, THEY BOTH ADDRESS AN
ISSUE THAT FALLS UNDER THE BROAD RUBRIC OF ONE/MANY PROBLEMS. THE
UNIVERSAL SCOPE OF THESE INQUIRIES INTO CAUSES ILLUSTRATES THE
POSSIBILITY OF AN INQUIRY WITH THE SCOPE METAPHYSICS MUST HAVE. 3.1
WISDOM AND THE WISE: A 1-2 3.1.1 A 1: NATURALDESIRE FOR KNOWLEDGE
ARISTOTLE PROPOSES THREE SIGNS TO SUPPORT THE CLAIM THAT ALL MEN BY
NATURE DESIRE TO KNOW. SINCE THE DESIRE TO KNOW IS NATURAL, WE SEEK TO
EXERCISE IT UNTIL WE HAVE WHAT IS MOST KNOWABLE, THE OBJECT OF FIRST
SCIENCE. THE SCIENCE THAT KNOWS THIS OBJECT SHOULD ALSO KNOW ALL ELSE.
3.1.2 A 2: THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE WISE ARISTOTLE S CHARACTERIZATION
OF THE SCIENCE OF WISDOM IMPLICITLY RAISES A UNITY QUESTION: HOW CAN ALL
OF THE CHARACTERISTICS THAT ARE SUPPOSED TO BELONG TO THE OBJECTS OF
METAPHYSICS, NAMELY, UNIVERSALITY, UNITY, AND BEING THE HIGHEST CAUSES,
BELONG TO OBJECTS TREATED BY A SINGLE SCIENCE? 3.2 THE NUMBER OF CAUSES:
A 3-7 ARISTOTLE INQUIRES INTO THE NUMBER OF CAUSES AS A WAY OF INQUIRING
INTO THEIR NATURE. IN GENERAL, HIS PREDECESSORS ASSUME THAT A CAUSE MUST
BE ONE. THEY ENDORSE DIF- FERENT TYPES OF CAUSES BECAUSE THEY RECOGNIZE
DIFFERENT TYPES OF UNITY. THOSE WHO ENDORSE MATERIAL AND FORMAL CAUSES
DO SO BECAUSE THEY IDENTIFY THINGS AS ONE IN SUBSTRATE OR ONE IN
FORMULA. ALTHOUGH THOSE WHO ADVANCE EFFICIENT CAUSES DO NOT MAKE THEM
ONE, ARISTOTLE S CRITICISM OF THEM SUGGESTS THAT THAT IS A DEFICIENCY IN
THEIR ACCOUNTS. FOR SOME, SUCH AS PLATO, A CAUSE THAT IS ONE REQUIRES
ANOTHER CAUSE, SUCH AS THE DYAD, THAT IS DEFINED BY ITS LACK OF UNITY.
THAT OTHER PHILOSOPHERS DID NOT RECOGNIZE ALL FOUR CAUSES COUNTS AGAINST
THEIR ACCOUNTS OF THE CAUSES. 3.3 CRITIQUE OF THE CAUSES: A 8-10 THE
FINAL CHAPTERS OF BOOK A CRITICIZE THE CAUSES THAT A 3-7 SPELL OUT.
ARISTOTLE ORGANIZES HIS DISCUSSIONS BY CONSIDERING TOGETHER THOSE WHO
POSIT ONE CAUSE AND THOSE WHO POSIT MANY. 3.3.1 A 8 ARISTOTLE CRITICIZES
OTHER TREATMENTS OF THE CAUSES ON THE GROUND THAT THEY CAN- NOT ACCOUNT
FOR EVERYTHING. IN PARTICULAR, CAUSES OF SENSIBLES DO NOT ACCOUNT FOR
SUPERSENSIBLES, AND VICE VERSA. 3.3.2 A 9: ARISTOTLE S ARGUMENTS AGAINST
THE FORMS ARISTOTLE IS OFTEN THOUGHT TO OBJECT MOST VIGOROUSLY TO
PLATO S SEPARATION OF THE FORMS, BUT HE TAKES SEPARATION TO BE A MARK OF
FORM S UNITY, AND UNITY TO BE REQUISITE FOR ANY CAUSE. HENCE, THE BRUNT
OF HIS ARGUMENTS IN A 9 ARE DIRECTED TOWARD SHOWING THAT PLATO S FORMS
CANNOT BE ONE IN THE WAY HE TAKES THEM TO BE AND STILL BE CAUSES.
3.3.2.1 DOUBLING ARISTOTLE ARGUES THAT PLATO S FORMS DOUBLE PARTICULARS
WITHOUT EXPLAINING THEM. AS HE STATES IT, HIS ARGUMENT DEPENDS ON THE
DUBIOUS ASSUMPTION THAT XVI ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS PLATO TAKES
FORM AND SENSIBLE EACH TO BE INDIVIDUALS. HOWEVER, THE BASIC DIF-
FICULTY ARISTOTLE POINTS TO IS HOW ONE INDIVIDUAL COULD FUNCTION AS THE
CAUSE OF A SENSIBLE OF THE SAME CHARACTER. THIS SECTION PROPOSES AN
EXPLANATION FOR ARISTOTLE S DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE MORE AND THE LESS
ACCURATE ARGUMENTS FOR FORMS, AND IT SHOWS HOW THIS DISTINCTION HELPS TO
ORGANIZE A 9. 3.3.2.2 THE MORE AND LESS ACCURATE ARGUMENTS FOR THE FORMS
THIS SECTION ARGUES THAT IN 990B8-991A8 ARISTOTLE DISCUSSES TWO PARALLEL
SETS OF ARGUMENTS FOR FORMS, ONE FOR THE STANDARD DOCTRINE, THE OTHER
MORE ACCURATE ARGUMENTS FOR FORM NUMBERS. IN EACH CASE, ARISTOTLE
MENTIONS SOME ABSURD CONSEQUENCES OF THE ARGUMENTS BEFORE DISABLING
THEM. THE ARGUMENTS FOR THE FORMS DEPEND ON SHOWING THE NECESSITY FOR
SOME ONE, AND ARISTOTLE DISABLES THEM BY SHOWING THAT THESE ARGUMENTS
WOULD EITHER MAKE WHAT IS NOT ONE BE ONE, OR WHAT IS ONE BE MANY.
3.3.2.3 FORMS AS CAUSES ARISTOTLE ARGUES THAT THE FORMS, IN EITHER THE
LESS OR MORE ACCURATE VERSION, CANNOT SERVE AS CAUSES FOR SENSIBLES BY
SHOWING THAT WHAT IS ONE IN THE WAYS THEY ARE ONE CANNOT FUNCTION AS ANY
OF THE FOUR KINDS OF CAUSE. MOST STRIKINGLY, THE FORMS CANNOT ACCOUNT
FOR MOTION AND OTHER FEATURES OF SENSIBLES. 3.4 BOOK CLT: INFINI1:E
CAUSES, FIRST CAUSES, AND THE EXISTENCE OF METAPHYSICS BOOK CX ARGUES
THAT THERE CANNOT BE AN INFINITE NUMBER OF CAUSES BECAUSE ALL CAUSAL
SEQUENCES TERMINATE. THE FIRST CAUSES ARE ETERNAL BEINGS THAT ARE ALSO
MOST TRUE, AND KNOWLEDGE OF THEM IS THE HIGHEST KNOWLEDGE OF ALL THINGS.
THE SCIENCE OF THESE ETERNAL, FIRST CAUSES IS METAPHYSICS. HENCE, IN
ARGUING AGAINST INFINITE SEQUENCES OF CAUSES, ARISTOTLE IS ARGUING FOR
THE EXISTENCE OF A DISTINCT SCIENCE OF METAPHYSICS. HOWEVER, BOOK CX
DOES NOT SHOW WHAT THESE CAUSES ARE OR EXPLAIN HOW METAPHYSICS CAN KNOW
THEM. 4 CHAPTER 4 BOOK B: THE APOR;A; ARISTOTLE S APORIAI ARE
ANTINOMIES, AND SETTING THEM OUT IS A STANDARD PART OF HIS PHILOSOPHICAL
METHOD. THUS, THERE IS NO REASON THAT THESE APORIAI NEED BE PROBLEMS
THAT ARISTOTLE WAS PERSONALLY STRUGGLING WITH WHEN HE WROTE THE
METAPHYSICS. THOUGH IT IS WIDELY RECOGNIZED THAT THE APORIAI CONCERN
PLATONISM, THERE IS DISAGREEMENT ABOUT WHETHER IT IS A PLATONISM THAT
ARISTOTLE ENDORSES OR REJECTS. THE APORIAI THAT HE PRESENTS IN BOOK B
FALL INTO THREE GROUPS, THE FIRST OF WHICH CONCERNS THE SUBJECT MATTER
OF THE SCIENCE, AND THE SECOND AND THIRD OF WHICH CONCERN THE
PRINCIPLES. 4.1 UNITY LANGUAGE: A PARADIGM THIS SECTION PROPOSES THAT
ARISTOTLE S REFUTATION IN PHYSICS A 1-2 OF THE ELEATIC CLAIM THAT ALL IS
ONE SERVES AS A PARADIGM FOR THE PRESENTATION OF THE APORIAI IN
METAPHYSICS B. IN THE PHYSICS HE FIRST TRANSLATES A CLAIM INVOLVING ONE
INTO HIS MORE REFINED UNITY LANGUAGE AND THEN SHOWS THAT, HOWEVER
INTERPRETED, IT CANNOT BE TRUE. THE APORIAI OF THE METAPHYSICS SEEM TO
ARISE FROM A SIMILAR TRANSLATION, BUT HERE INCONSISTENT INTERPRETATIONS
OF THE INITIAL CLAIM ALL SEEM TRUE. ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS XVI 4.2
THE UNITY OT THE SUBJECT MATTER THE FIRST FOUR APORIAI HAVE THE SAME
FORM: EACH ASKS WHETHER A PARTICULAR TOPIC IS TREATED BY ONE OR MANY
SCIENCES. 4.2.1 MANY SEIENCES THE EXISTENCE OF MANY SCIENCES TREATING
THE VARIOUS TOPICS THAT OUGHT TO FALL UNDER METAPHYSICS IS INCOMPATIBLE
WITH THE EXISTENCE OF A SCIENCE OF METAPHYS- ICS. IF THERE IS A
METAPHYSICS, IT MUST BE ONE SCIENCE. 4.2.2 ONE SEIENCE THE VARIOUS
TOPICS THAT ARISTOTLE CONSIDERS IN THE FIRST FOUR APORIAI OUGHT TO FALL
UNDER ONE SCIENCE, METAPHYSICS, BUT THEIR INCLUSION IN ONE SCIENCE SEEMS
INCONSISTENT WITH TENETS OF ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE, PARTICULARLY THE
ASSUMPTION THAT ONE SCIENCE TREATS ONE GENUS. 4.2.3 APORIA FIVE ALTHOUGH
THE FIFTH APORIA IS CONCERNED WITH THE EXISTENCE OF MATHEMATICAL
INTERMEDIATES, ARISTOTLE PRESENTS IT AS A PROBLEM ABOUT WHETHER THERE
ARE ONE OR MANY GENERA OF OUSIAI AND WHETHER, IN THE LATTER CASE, ALL
CAN FALL UNDER ONE SCIENCE. HENCE, IT BELONGS IN THE FIRST GROUP OF
APORIAI. 4.2.4 THE POSSIBILITY OF METAPHYSICS THE FIRST SET OF APORIAI
CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF METAPHYSICS BY ASKING WHETHER THE TOPICS
THAT THIS SCIENCE OUGHT TO TREAT CAN FALL UNDER ONE SCIENCE. THERE SEEM
TO BE LEGITIMATE ARGUMENTS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ISSUE. 4.3 THE UNITY OT
A PRINCIPLE THIS SECTION ARGUES IN SOME DETAIL THAT APORIAI 6-10 TURN ON
THE KIND OF UNITY POS- SESSED BY A PRINCIPLE. ONLY ONE OF THESE APORIAI
IS CLEARLY FORMULATED AS QUESTION ABOUT UNITY, BUT WHEN WE EXAMINE
CLOSELY THE ARGUMENTS CREATING THESE OTHER APORIAI, WE SEE ARISTOTLE
SUPPORTING OR REFUTING CLAIMS THAT THE PRINCIPLES POSSESS PARTICULAR
CHARACTERS BY CONSIDERING THE UNITY OF THE PRINCIPLES. 4.4 CANDIDATH TOR
THE FIRST PRINCIPLE THE FINAL GROUP OF APORIAI CONSIDER PARTICULAR
CANDIDATES FOR THE FIRST PRINCIPLES. THREE OF THE FIVE CANDIDATES UNDER
CONSIDERATION ARE PLATONIC OR PYTHAGOREAN. AN ANALYSIS OF ARISTOTLE S
ARGUMENTS SHOWS THAT EACH SEEMS TO BE THE FIRST PRINCIPLE BECAUSE IT IS
ONE, BUT THAT NONE POSSESSES THE APPROPRIATE UNITY. THE TWO FINAL
CANDIDATES ARE ARISTOTELIAN; YET, ONLY ONE OF THEM IS PRESENTED WITHOUT
UNITY ARGUMENTS, AND EVEN IT MAY BE CONNECTED WITH A UNITY ISSUE. 4.5
METEPHY.ICAL METHOD 4.5.1 THE PLATONIC ORIGIN OF THE APORIAI THIS
SUBSECTION SHOWS HOW THE ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT UNITY THAT GENERATE APORIAI
ABOUT THE UNITY OF METAPHYSICS SUBJECT MATTER AND ITS PRINCIPLES COULD
ARISE FROM THE PLATONIE CLAIM THAT FORM IS ONE. PLATO S FORMS ARE BOTH
THE SUBJECT MAT- TER AND PRINCIPLES OF KNOWLEDGE; ARISTOTLE
DISTINGUISHES THESE TWO ROLES BY THE TYPE OF UNITY NEEDED FOR EACH.
XVIII ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS 4.5.2 THE ASSUMPTION ABOUT UNITY
SINCE MOST OF THE APORIAI ARE PROBLEMS ABOUT UNITY, WE MUST ASK WHY
ARISTOTLE DOES NOT CHOOSE TO AVOID THEM BY SIMPLY REJECTING THE UNITY
ASSUMPTIONS THAT GENERATE THEM. ALTHOUGH HE SHOWS IN BOOKS A AND RX THAT
THESE ASSUMPTIONS ARE COMMON OPINIONS, THERE IS NO REASON TO THINK
THAT IS WHY HE ENDORSES THEM. THIS SECTION ARGUES THAT HE ACCEPTS THESE
ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT UNITY BECAUSE THEY ARE INHERENT IN METAPHYSICS. 4.5.3
THE LOGIC OF THE APORIAI ALTHOUGH ARISTOTLE S METHOD IS USUALLY
DESCRIBED AS A METHOD OF SAVING THE PHENOMENA OR PRESERVING COMMON
OPINION, THIS SECTION ARGUES THAT IT IS BET- TER DESCRIBED AS A METHOD
OF ARGUING FOR NEW DOCTRINES BY SHOWING THAT THEY RESOLVE OTHERWISE
INSOLUBLE CONTRADICTIONS. ARISTOTLE S INJUNCTION TO PRESERVE COMMON
OPINIONS ACTS AS A SIDE CONSTRAINT ON THE NEW DOCTRINES. 5 CHAPTER 5
BOOK R: THE UNITY OF BEING THE FIRST SENTENCE OF BOOK R IS GENERALLY
TAKEN AS A STATEMENT OF FACT, BUT THIS CHAPTER ARGUES THAT IT IS A
CONCLUSION SUPPORTED BY SEVEN SEPARATE ARGUMENTS IN R 1-3. THESE
ARGUMENTS RESOLVE THE FIRST FOUR APORIAI. THIS CHAPTER ALSO ARGUES THAT
THE TREATMENT OF LOGICAL PRINCIPLES IN THE SECOND HALF OF BOOK R
CONTRIBUTES TO THE INQUIRY INTO BEING BY SHOWING THAT EACH BEING HAS ITS
OWN ESSENCE. HENCE, SENSIBLES DO NOT REQUIRE INTERMEDIATES TO BE KNOWN-A
POINT THAT UNDERMINES APORIA 5. FINALLY, THE CHAPTER ADDRESSES THREE
WELL-KNOWN SCHOLARLY ISSUES. 5.1 THE SUBJECT MATTER OF METAPHYSICS THIS
SECTION COMPARES THE STATED CONCLUSIONS OF THE SEVEN ARGUMENTS IN ORDER
TO ARGUE THAT ALL ASSERT THE UNITY OF A SCIENCE THAT TREATS VARIOUS
TOPICS. CONSIDERING THAT THE OBSTACLE TO THE EXISTENCE OF METAPHYSICS IS
ITS SUBJECT MATTER S APPARENT LACK OF UNITY, WE CAN SEE THAT TO ARGUE
FOR THE UNITY OF THIS SUBJECT MATTER IS TO ARGUE FOR THE EXISTENCE OF
METAPHYSICS. 5.1.1 R 1: A SCIENCE OF BEING R 1 DRAWS CONSEQUENCES ABOUT
METAPHYSICS BY ASSIMILATING THE SCIENCE OF BEING TO OTHER SCIENCES.
ARISTOTLE ASSURNES THAT METAPHYSICS TREATS THE NATURE OF BEING AND AIMS
TO FIND ITS PRINCIPLES AND CAUSES, BUT HE DOES NOT SPEIL OUT WHAT THAT
NATURE COULD BE, NOR DOES HE SHOW THAT THIS SCIENCE EXISTS. 5.1.2
ARGUMENT ONE [R 2, 1003A33-B19): THE CAUSES FROM THE STRUCTURE OF THE
ARGUMENT, ARISTOTLE ASSURNES THAT BEING IS PROS HEN AND ARGUES THAT IT
CAN BE TREATED BY ONE SCIENCE AND THAT ALL THE CAUSES CAN BE TREATED BY
ONE SCIENCE BECAUSE THEY ARE RELATED TO OUSIA. HUT, AS SCHOLARS HAVE
RECOGNIZED, THE INTERESTING AND SIGNIFICANT CLAIM IS WHAT FUNCTIONS HERE
AS APREMISE, THE PROS HEN CHARACTER OF BEING. I ARGUE HERE THAT THIS
OSTENSIBLE PREMISE IS THE REAL CONCLU- SION, AND THAT ARISTOTLE SUPPORTS
IT BY SHOWING THAT IT ALONE EXPLAINS HOW ALL THE CAUSES CAN FALL UNDER
ONE SCIENCE AND, THEREBY, RESOLVES THE FIRST APORIA. IMPORTANT TO HIS
ARGUMENT IS THAT INSOFAR AS BEING IS PROS HEN, IT IS A KIND OF GENUS.
5.2 BEING QUA BEING IT IS GENERALLY SUPPOSED THAT BEING QUA BEING HAS
SOME FIXED SENSE IN BOOK R. IN THIS SECTION, I ARGUE THAT ARISTOTLE USES
THE PHRASE AS A PLACEHOLDER: IT STANDS FOR THE ESSENCE OF BEING. OUSIA,
TOO, IS A PLACEHOLDER FOR THE PRIMARY NATURE OF BEING. IT IS ONLY LATER
THAT ARISTOTLE DETERMINES WHAT THIS ESSENCE AND NATURE ISO THE
ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS XIX CLAIMS HE MAKES ABOUT BEING QUA BEING
IN THE OPENING CHAPTERS PARALLEL CLAIMS HE MAKES ABOUT THE GENERIC
NATURES TREATED BY HISOTHER SCIENCES. 5.3 ARGUMENTS LWO AND THREE:
OUSIAI 5.3.1 ARGUMENT TWO [1003B19-22) OSTENSIBLY, THE AIM OF THIS
ARGUMENT IS TO INCLUDE IN THE SUBJECT MATTER OF METAPHYSICS THE SPECIES
OF BEING AND THE SPECIES OF THOSE SPECIES. IN EFFECT, THE ARGUMENT SHOWS
THAT BEING CAN BE TREATED AS IF IT HAD SPECIES. 5.3.2 ARGUMENT THREE
[1003B22-1004A2) SINCE WHATEVER IS IS ALSO ONE, ARISTOTLE INCLUDES ONE
IN THE SCIENCE THAT TREATS BEING. BECAUSE THE SPECIES OF BEING ARE
ASSOCIATED WITH SPECIES OF ONE, ARISTOTLE ALSO INCLUDES THE LATTER IN
THIS SCIENCE. THE ASSOCIATION-BETWEEN ONES AND BEINGS IS MORE THAN
MERELY EXTENSIONAL; ARISTOTLE INSISTS THAT THERE IS SOME SORT OF PER SE
CONNECTION. THE TWO BELONG TO EACH NATURE IN RESPECT OF THAT NATURE.
5.3.3 1004A2-9 IN THIS TEXT ARISTOTLE EXPLAINS HOW TO USE THE RESULTS OF
THE SECOND AND THIRD ARGUMENTS TO RESOLVE THE THIRD APORIA. 5.4
ARGUMENTS FOUR, FIVE, AND SIX: PER SE ATTRIBUTES 5.4.1 ARGUMENT FOUR
[1004A9-31) THE APPARENT CONCLUSION OF THIS SECTION IS THAT ALL THE
OPPOSITES COME UNDER META- PHYSICS. THE MEANS BY WHICH ARISTOTLE REACHES
THIS CONCLUSION IS TO SHOW THAT EACH OPPOSITE IN DEFINED THROUGH SOME
RELATION WITH A NATURE THAT IS ONE. 5.4.2 ARGUMENT FIVE [1004A31-B25) IN
THIS ARGUMENT ARISTOTLE INCLUDES THE PER SE ATTRIBUTES OF BEING QUA
BEING IN THE SCIENCE THAT TREATS THE LATTER BY DRAWING AN ANALOGY
BETWEEN IT AND NUMBER QUA NUMBER. HIS EXAMPLES OF ATTRIBUTES OF BEING
QUA BEING MAKE CLEAR THAT HE HAS IN MIND AT LEAST SOME OF THE OPPOSITES
THAT THE PRECEDING ARGL,LFFIENT INCLUDED IN THE SCIENCE. 5.4.3 ARGUMENT
SIX [1004B27-1005A18) THOUGH THIS ARGUMENT IS WIDELY SUPPOSED TO BE AD
HOMINEM, ARISTOTLE ACCEPTS THE CONCLUSION AND HE EVEN ENDORSES THE
PREMISES, AT LEAST IN SOME CONTEXTS. THIS SECTION ARGUES THAT THE
ARGUMENT IS ARISTOTLE:S OWN AND THAT IT WORKS WITH THE TWO PRECEDING
ARGUMENTS TO RESOLVE THE FOURTH DPORIA. 5.5 ARGUMENT SEVEN (1005A19-B8):
PRINCIPLES OF DEMONSTRATION HERE, ARISTOTLE ARGUES FOR INCLUDING THE
PRINCIPLES OF DEMONSTRATION IN THE SCI- ENCE THAT ALSO TREATS OUSIAI ON
THE GROUND THAT THE PRINCIPLES BELONG UNIVERSALLY. HIS ARGUMENT TREATS
THESE PRINCIPLES AS PER SE ATTRIBUTES OF BEING QUA BEING. 5.6 BEING AS
THE SUBJECT OF METAPHYSICS THIS SECTION SHOWS HOW BEING IS TO BE
UNDERSTOOD DYNAMICALLY. THE SEVEN ARGU- MENTS OF THE OPENING OF BOOK R
NOT ONLY RESOLVE THE APORIAI, BUT ALSO DETERMINE THE CHARACTER OF THE
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE SCIENCE, BEING. THIS DETERMINATION IS REFLEXIVE
BECAUSE ARISTOTLE EXAMINES ONE AND BEING IN ORDER,TO SHOW THE UNITY OF
BEING AND THE UNITY AND BEING (EXISTENCE) OF THE SCIENCE. THIS
SEH-DETERMINATION GOES SOME WAY TOWARD DELINEATING THE STRUCTURE AND
NATURE OF BEING, BUT WE ARE STILL AT THE OPENING STAGE OF THE PROCESS OF
DETERMINING THIS NATURE. XX ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS 5.7 BEING BND
ONE ALTHOUGH ARISTOTLE OFTEN SPEAKS OF ONE AND BEING TOGETHER, THE TWO
SEEM TO HAVE DIFFERENT NATURES, AND HE USES ONE INSTRUMENTALLY TO
DISCUSS BEING. THE ONE THAT HE SPEAKS ABOUT IN R 1-3 SEEMS TO BE THE ONE
THAT BELONGS TO EACH BEING BY VIRTUE OF ITS BEING AN INSTANCE OF THE
GENUS OF BEING. 5.8 THE PRINCIPLES OF REHSONING ALL FOUR FORMULATIONS OF
THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-CONTRADICTION MENTION SAME, A TYPE OF UNITY.
THUS, THE PRINCIPLE CAN ONLY APPLY TO THINGS THAT ARE ONE. IT IS FOR
THIS REASON THAT PLATO TAKES THE PRINCIPLE TO APPLY PROPERLY ONLY TO
FORMS. ALTHOUGH ARISTOTLE MAINTAINS THAT EACH BEING IS ONE, IT CANNOT BE
THE UNITY ASSOCIATED WITH BEING THAT ALLOWS THE PRINCIPLE TO APPLY; SOME
STRONGER UNITY POSSESSED BY EACH BEING IS NECESSARY. THIS UNITY MUST
ALSO BELONG TO EVERY BEING IF THE PRINCIPLE IS TO EXTEND UNIVERSALLY.
5.9 ARGUMENTS FOR NON-CONTRHDICTION ARISTOTLE S ARGUMENTS FOR THE
PRINCIPLE OF NON-CONTRADICTION BEGIN FROM THE ASSUMPTION THAT A WORD
SIGNIFIES SOMETHING ONE. THIS SECTICIN EXPLORES WHAT IS ENTAILED IN THIS
ASSUMPTION. IT ARGUES THAT THE ONE SIGNIFIED IS AN ESSENCE OR OUSIA AND
THAT THE UNITY OF THIS ESSENCE IS STRONGER THAN THE UNITY THAT CONVERTS
WITH BEING. BECAUSE THE EXISTENCE OF ESSENCES IS MORE PROBLEMATIC THAN
THE PNC, ARISTOTLE S OSTENSIBLE PREMISE IS HIS REAL CONCLUSION, AS IN
EARLIER ARGUMENTS IN BOOK R. HENCE, ARISTOTLE S ARGUMENTS SHOW THAT
THERE MUST BE ESSENCES FOR THE PNC TO HOLD, AND THEY MAKE A CASE FOR THE
EXISTENCE OF ESSENCES. 5.9.1 ARGUMENTS 1-2: 1006B11-34 ARISTOTLE S FIRST
TWO ARGUMENTS FOR THE PNC ARE RELATIVELY SIMPLE. THE FIRST FOL- LOWS
ALMOST IMMEDIATELY FROM THE ASSUMPTION THAT A TERM SIGNIFIES SOMETHING
ONE. HOWEVER, THIS ASSUMPTION AND THE PNC SEEM TO BE UNDERMINED IF THE
ONE THING HAS PROPERTIES, AND ARISTOTLE MUST ANSWER THIS AND ANOTHER
OBJECTION. THE SECOND ARGUMENT SHOWS THE ABSURD CONSEQUENCE OF
IDENTIFYING PROPERTY AND SUBJECT. BY UNDERSTANDING THE REASONS THAT THE
PNC MIGHT NOT HOLD, THESE ARGUMENTS SHOW US WHAT THINGS MUST BE LIKE IN
ORDER THAT THE PRINCIPLE WOULD HOLD AND THAT KNOWLEDGE BE POSSIBLE. IN
PARTICULAR, ARISTOTLE ARGUES IMPLICITLY FOR THE EXISTENCE OF A UNITY
THAT IS MORE REFINED THAN THE UNITY ASSOCIATED WITH BEING, NAMELY, THE
UNITY OF AN ESSENCE, AND THAT SERVES AS THE SUBJECT OF THE PNC. THUS,
THE PNC IS AN ONTOLOGICAL PRINCIPLE, AND EXPLORING IT CONTRIBUTES TO
ARISTOTLE S INVESTIGATION OF BEING. 5.9.2 ARGUMENTS 3-5: 1006B34-100BA2
PREDICATION POSES ANOTHER, ALBEIT SIMILAR, GROUND TO REJECT THE PNC.
WHEREAS THE SECOND ARGUMENT SHOWS THAT THE NATURE THAT RECEIVES A
PROPERTY MUST BE WHAT IT IS AND NOT ITS CONTRADICTORY, THE THIRD
ARGUMENT SHOWS THAT THE SAME HOLDS FOR THE DENIAL OF A NATURE EVEN
THOUGH, DEFINED BY NEGATION, IT MAY SEEM NOT TO HAVE A SINGLE ESSENCE.
ARISTOTLE S FOURTH ARGUMENT SHOWS THAT TO DENY THE PNC IS TO DESTROY
OUSIA, AND HIS FIFTH ARGUMENT AIMS TO SHOW THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF EVERY
CHARACTER S BEING AN ATTRIBUTE. AGAIN, THESE ARGUMENTS SUPPORT THE
NOTIONS THAT: ANY CHARACTER AND ITS DENIAL DIVIDE ALL BEINGS INTO TWO
DISCRETE CLASSES, INSTANCES OF ONLY ONE OF THESE CLASSES CAN BE
PREDICATED ESSENTIALLY OF ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS XXI ANY
INDIVIDUAL SUBJECT, AND NOT ALL PREDICATES CAN BE ACCIDENTAL. ALL THIS
DELIMITS THE CHARACTER OF THE OUSIA OR ESSENCE THAT IS SUBJECT TO THE
PNC 5.9.3 ARGUMENTS 6-8: CONTRADICTION IN SPEECH ANYONE WHO ASSERTED
THAT THE PNC DOES NOT HOLD WOULD ALSO DENY THE PRIN- CIPLE OF THE
EXCLUDED MIDDLE. FURTHER, THE ATTEMPT AT ONLY A PARTIAL DENIAL OF THE
PRINCIPLE BY ALLOWING THAT EVEN THOUGH EVERYTHING THAT CAN BE AFFIRMED
CAN BE DENIED, SOME OF WHAT IS DENIED CANNOT ALSO BE AFFIRMED IS SHOWN
TO AMOUNT TO A COMPLETE DENIAL OF THE PRINCIPLE. FINALLY, ANYONE WHO
ASSERTS THAT THE PNC DOES NOT HOLD MAKES A POSITIVE CLAIM ABOUT THE
CHARACTER OF BEING THAT HIS OWN ASSERTION REQUIRES HIRN TO DENY. THIS
LAST ARGUMENT PRESUPPOSES THAT THE PNC IS A CLAIM ABOUT BEING OR SOME
BEINGS, AN ASSUMPTION SUPPORTED BY PREVIOUS ARGUMENTS. 5.9.4 ARGUMENTS
9-10: CONTRADICTION IN ACTION WHATEVER PEOPLE MIGHT SAY ABOUT THE PNC,
THEY DO NOT ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS DENIAL; FOR WERE IT FALSE, IT
WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO CLAIM THAT ONE COURSE OF ACTION IS BETTER THAN
ANOTHER, AND PURPOSIVE ACTION WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE. MOREOVER, NO ANSWER
WOULD BE MORE RIGHT THAN ANOTHER BY BEING CLOSER TO THE TRUTH. 5.9.5 R
5: UNIVERSAL EXTENSION FOR ARISTOTLE THE PNC HOLDS PROVIDED THAT THERE
IS SOME ONE BEING OF WHICH IT IS TRUE. IN CONTRAST, CONTEMPORARY
PHILOSOPHERS DO NOT SANCTION A LOGICAL PRINCIPLE UNLESS IT HOLDS
UNIVERSALLY. ARLSTOTLE THINKS THAT THE PNC DOES HAVE UNIVERSAL EXTEN-
SION, AND THIS CHAPTER MAKES HIS CASE BY DISABLING ARGUMENTS TO THE
CONTRARY. 5.9.5.1THE ARGUMENT FROM CHANGE BECAUSE NOTHING COMES TO BE
FROM NOTHING, ANY CHANGE THAT OCCURS SEEMS TO REQUIRE THAT THE SUBJECT
ALREADY POSSESS THE CHARACTER IT BECOMES AND, HENCE, VIOLATE THE PNC.
ARISTOTLE DISABLES THIS ARGUMENT BY INTRODUCING HIS DOCTRINE OF MOTION
AS THE ACTUALIZATION OF A POTENTIAL, BUT ACTUALITY AND POTENCY HERE ARE
DEFINED IN RESPECT OF AN ESSENCE. 5.9.5.2THE ARGUMENT FROM SENSATION
BECAUSE AN OBJECT IS SENSED IN CONTRARY WAYS BY DIFFERENT PEOPLE, THE
OBJECT SEEMS TO BE CONTRARY TO ITSELF. ARISTOTLE DISABLES THIS ARGUMENT
BY RECOG- NIZING THAT THE SENSATION HAS ITS OWN ESSENCE. THE FORMULATION
OF THE PNC THAT APPLIES TO SENSATIONS AND NON-OUSIAI AND IS, THEREBY,
THE MOST UNIVERSAL FORMULATION IS THE FOURTH (5.8). 5.9.5.3 HERACLITUS
ARGUMENT ACCORDING TO THE ARGUMENT GENERALLY ASCRIBED TO HERACLITUS,
EVERY NATURE IS CONSTANTLY CHANGING. AS SUCH, IT IS NEVER ONE AND THE
SAME AND, THUS, NEVER SUBJECT TO THE PNC ARISTOTLE UNDERMINES THIS
ARGUMENT BY ARGUING THAT CHANGE IS NOT INDEFINITE BUT REGULAR AND
ORDERLY. AS SUCH, PARTICULAR CHANGES ARE ONE AND, THUS, THEMSELVES
SUBJECT TO THE PNC 5.9.6 R 6: RELATIVES IN THIS DIFFICULT DISCUSSION
ARISTOTLE ADDRESSES THE PERSON WHO INSISTS THAT THE PNC IS RELATIVE TO
THE KNOWER. HE SHOWS THAT SOMEONE WHO AFFIRMS THIS CLAIM DESTROYS THE
UNITY OF THE KNOWER AND, THEREBY, THE POSSIBILITY OF KNOWLEDGE. XXII
ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS 5.9.7 R 7: PRINCIPLE OF THE EXCLUDED MIDDLE
ARISTOTLE ALSO ARGUES AGAINST DENIALS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EXCLUDED
MIDDLE BY ASSUMING THAT THERE ARE ESSENCES. 5.9.8 NON-CONTRADICTION AS A
PRINCIPLE OF KNOWLEDGE ARISTOTLE CALLS THE PNC A PRINCIPLE OF KNOWLEDGE,
BUT HE ALSO CLAIMS THAT ONE IS THE PRINCIPLE OF KNOWLEDGE. THIS SECTION
ARGUES THAT THE PNC IS THE NEGATIVE FORMULATION OF THE LATTER POSITIVE
CLAIM. AS SUCH, IT IS A KIND OF ESSENTIAL PROPERTY OF BEINGS, LIKE ONE.
ARISTOTLE S NOTION THAT LOGIC DEPENDS ON ONTOLOGY, IMPLICIT IN THE PNC S
DEPENDENCE ON ESSENCES, IS QUITE DIFFERENT FROM CONTEMPORARY VIEWS OF
LOGIC. 5.10 CONCLUSION OF BOOK R THE ANALYSIS THAT I ADVANCE IN THIS
CHAPTER REQUIRES CONVOLUTING THE APPARENT STRUCTURE OF THE TEXT, BUT IT
ALLOWS US TO UNDERSTAND THE TEXT AS AN ARGUMENT. 6 CHAPTER 6 BOOK A
AGAIN BOOK SS TREATS THE ESSENTIAL ATTRIBUTES THAT R ARGUES FALL TO
METAPHYSICS. WHEREAS A STANDARD ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE WOULD HAVE
DEMONSTRATED THESE ATTRIBUTES FROM THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF ITS SUBJECT
GENUS, METAPHYSICS SS AIMS INSTEAD TO TRACE THE DIFFERENT WAYS IN WHICH
THINGS ARE CALLED BY THE NAME OF AN ATTRIBUTE TO A PRIMARY INSTANCE OF
THE ATTRIBUTE. IT IS OFTEN UNABLE TO FIND A SINGLE PRIMARY INSTANCE AND
SHOWS INSTEAD THEIR IRREDUCIBLE PLURALITY AND, THEREBY, THEIR LIMITED
KNOWABILITY. 7 CHAPTER 7 METAPHYSICS: UNIVERSAL OR SPECIAL THE CENTRAL
QUESTION OF METAPHYSICS IS WHETHER IT EXISTS AS A SCIENCE, AND IN ORDER
TO ARGUE FOR IT ARISTOTLE NEEDS TO SHOW THAT IT HAS A SUBJECT MATTER. TO
SHOW THAT METAPHYSICS HAS A SUBJECT MATTER, ARISTOTLE NEEDS TO SHOW THAT
ALL BEINGS HAVE SUFFICIENT UNITY TO FALL UNDER ONE SCIENCE. HENCE,
QUESTIONS OF BEING AND UNITY ARE INTRINSIC TO METAPHYSICS, AS IS ITS
DETERMINING ITS OWN SUBJECT MATTER AND EXISTENCE. THE CHIEF SCHOLARLY
PROBLEMS ABOUT THE OPENING BOOKS OF THE METAPHYSICS-WHETHER METAPHYSICS
IS (1) A SCIENCE OF ALL BEINGS OR A SCIENCE OF THE HIGHEST CAUSES, (2)
AN ONTOLOGY OR A THEOLOGY, (3) UNIVERSAL OR SPECIAL METAPHYSICS-ALL
SPRING FROM THE PROBLEM OF WHETHER THERE IS A METAPHYSICS AT ALL.
SCHOLARS DO NOT COME TO GRIPS WITH THIS ISSUE BECAUSE THEY THINK IT IS A
PROBLEM WITH ARISTOTLE S ACCOUNT OF METAPHYSICS RATHER THAN A PROBLEM
WITHIN METAPHYSICS; INDEED, IT IS A CENTRAL TASK OF METAPHYSICS TO
ADDRESS IT. 7.1 METAPHYSICAL METHOD ARISTOTLE S METHOD IS OFTEN CALLED
SAVING THE PHENOMENA AND UNDERSTOOD AS PRESERVING AND REFINING COMMON
OPINIONS WHEN THEY DASH WITH EACH OTHER. RECAPPING EARLIER CONDUSIONS,
THIS SECTION ARGUES THAT THE METHOD IS RATHER DIRECTED TO RESOLVING
CONTRADICTIONS THAT ARE GENERATED FROM VARIOUS INTERPRETATIONS OF A
SINGLE COMMON OPINION. ARISTOTLE SAVES THE PHENOMENA BY IDENTIFYING THE
ASSUMPTION THAT HAS A HAND IN GENERATING BOTH SIDES OF AN APORIA AND
MODIFYING . IT SO AS TO SKIRT THE ANTINOMY WHILE NOT ALTERING OTHER
COMMON OPINIONS. ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS XXIII 7.2 THE SUBIECT
MATTER OF METAPHYSICS THIS SEETION RECOUNTS THE FIRST FOUR APORIAI AND
EXPLAINS, BRIEFLY, HOW ARISTOTLE RESOLVES THEM AND HOW HIS DOING SO
DEMARCATES THE SUBJECT MATTER OF METAPHYS- ICS. IT CONSIDERS ALTERNATIVE
ACCOUNTS OF HOW ARISTOTLE ARRIVES AT NECESSARY TRUTHS AND EXPLAINS HOW
ARISTOTLE ORGANIZES THE APORIAI SO AS TO EXC1UDE ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS.
7.3 THE NATURE OF METAPHYSICS ALTHOUGH ARISTOTLE CONCEIVES OF
METAPHYSICS AS AN INVESTIGATION OF BEING ALONG LINES THAT PARALLEL HIS
OTHER SCIENCES, BECAUSE BEING IS A PROS HEN, STUDYING IT LEADS
INEVITABLY TO THE STUDY OF OUSIA. UNDERSTANDING WHY THIS IS SO AT ONCE
EXPLAINS WHY BOOK RADDRESSES ONLY THE IS IT QUESTION (THE WHAT IS IT
QUESTION IS LEFT FOR THE CENTRAL BOOKS), HOW A SCIENCE OF BEING IS
POSSIBLE, WHY METAPHYSICS IS BOTH UNIVERSAL AND SPECIAL, AND, MOST
IMPORTANTLY, WHY AN ONTOLOGY MUST, IF IT IS PURSUED TO COMPLETION,
BECOME A SCIENCE OF OUSIA AND, ULTIMATELY, A THEOLOGY.
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CONTENTS ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS ABBREVIATIONS GLOSSARY
INTRODUCTION CHAPTER 1 THE PROBLEM AND THE METHOD 1.1 AN OVERVIEW
1.1.1METAPHYSICS AND THE ONE 1.1.2ARISTOTLE'S SOLUTION 1.1.3THE SOLUTION
IN THE TEXT 1.2 THE PROBLEM 1.3 THE METHOD 1.4 THE LITERATURE 1.4.1
TREATMENTS OF THE ONE/MANY PROBLEM 1.4.2 PROBLEMS IN A-8 CHAPTER 2 THE
WAYS OF BEING ONE 2.1 POLLACHOS LEGOMENA 2.1.1 AN ALTERNATIVE ARGUMENT
FOR THE THREE-COMPONENT ANALYSIS 2.1.2 APPLYING THE THREE-COMPONENT
ANALYSIS TO METAPHYSICS 8: REAL AND NON-CATEGORIAL ESSENCES 2.1.3 THE
WAYS "BEING" IS SAID 2.2 86: THE WAYS "ONE" IS SAID 2.2.1 ACCIDENTAL
ONES (1015B16-36) 2.2.2 CONTINUITY (1015B36-1016A17) 2.2.3 SENSIBLE
SUBSTRATE (1016A17-24) 2.2.4 GENERIC SUBSTRATE (1016A24-32) 2.2.5
INDIVISIBLE IN FORMULA (1016A32-B6) 2.2.6 ARISTOTLE'S SUMMARY
(1016B6-11) 2.2.7 THE WHOLE (1016B11-17) 2.2.8 OTHER TREATMENTS OF ONE:
METAPHYSICS I 1 AND PHYSICS A 2 2.3 THE ESSENCE OF ONE AND ITS FUNCTIONS
2.4 THE SERIES OF ONES (1016B23-1017A3) 2.5 SAME 2.6 SUMMARY CHAPTER 3
THE PRINCIPLES OF METAPHYSICS: BOOKS A AND OC 3.1 WISDOM AND THE WISE: A
1-2 3.1.1 A 1: NATURAL DESIRE FOR KNOWLEDGE 3.1.2 A 2: THE
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE WISE XI XXV XXVII XXXV 1 1 1 7 14 20 31 43 43 48
53 53 60 66 72 83 86 92 99 105 110 118 125 129 131 135 145 149 153 154
154 164 VIII CONTENTS 3.2 THE NUMBER OF CAUSES: A 3-7 169 3.3 CRITIQUE
OF THE CAUSES: A 8-10 179 3.3.1 A 8 179 3.3.2 A 9: ARISTOTLE'S ARGUMENTS
AGAINST THE FORMS 180 3.3.2.1 DOUBLING 181 3.3.2.2 THE MORE AND LESS
ACCURATE ARGUMENTS FOR THE FORMS 186 3.3.2.3 FORMS AS CAUSES 192 3.4
BOOK IX: INFINITE CAUSES, FIRST CAUSES, AND THE EXISTENCE OF METAPHYSICS
196 CHAPTER 4 BOOK B:THE APORIAI 205 4.1 UNITY LANGUAGE: A PARADIGM 216
4.2 THE UNITY OF THE SUBJECT MATTER 220 4.2.1 MANY SCIENCES 220 4.2.2
ONE SCIENCE 226 4.2.3 APORIA FIVE 235 4.2.4 THE POSSIBILITY OF
METAPHYSICS 238 4.3 THE UNITY OF A PRINCIPLE 241 4.4 CANDIDATES FOR THE
FIRST PRINCIPLE 261 4.5 METAPHYSICAL METHOD 270 4.5.1 THE PLATONIC
ORIGIN OF THE APORIAI 270 4.5.2 THE ASSUMPTION ABOUT UNITY 274 4.5.3 THE
LOGIC OF THE APORIAI 280 CHAPTER 5 BOOK R: THE UNITY OF BEING 289 5.1
THE SUBJECT MATTER OF METAPHYSICS 291 5.1.1 R I: A SCIENCEOF BEING 293
5.1.2 ARGUMENT ONE (F 2, 1003A33-B19): THE CAUSES 297 5.2 BEING QUA
BEING 307 5.3 ARGUMENTS TWO AND THREE: OUSIAI 326 5.3.1 ARGUMENT TWO
(1003B19-22) 326 5.3.2 ARGUMENT THREE (1003B22-1004A2) 333 5.3.3
1004A2-9 341 5.4 ARGUMENTS FOUR, FIVE,AND SIX: PER SE ATTRIBUTES 353
5.4.1 ARGUMENT FOUR (1004A9-31) 354 5.4.2 ARGUMENT FIVE (1004A31-B25)
371 5.4.3 ARGUMENT SIX (1004B27-1005A18) 379 5.5 ARGUMENT SEVEN
(1005A19-B8): PRINCIPLES OF DEMONSTRATION 390 5.6 BEING AS THE SUBJECT
OF METAPHYSICS 395 5.7 BEING AND ONE 401 5.8 THE PRINCIPLES OF REASONING
405 5.9 ARGUMENTS FOR NON-CONTRADICTION 420 5.9.1 ARGUMENTS 1-2:
1006BLL-34 425 5.9.2 ARGUMENTS 3-5: 1006B34-1008A2 432 CONTENTS 5.9.3
ARGUMENTS 6-8: CONTRADICTION IN SPEECH 5.9.4 ARGUMENTS 9-10:
CONTRADICTION IN ACTION 5.9.5 R 5: UNIVERSAL EXTENSION 5.9.5.1 THE
ARGUMENT FROM CHANGE 5.9.5.2 THE ARGUMENT FROM SENSATION 5.9.5.3
HERACLITUS' ARGUMENT 5.9.6 R 6: RELATIVES 5.9.7 R 7: THE PRINCIPLE OF
THE EXCLUDED MIDDLE 5.9.8 NON-CONTRADICTION AS A PRINCIPLE OF KNOWLEDGE
5.10 CONCLUSION OF BOOK R CHAPTER 6 BOOK LL AGAIN CHAPTER 7 METAPHYSICS:
UNIVERSAL OR SPECIAL 7.1 METAPHYSICAL METHOD 7.2 THE SUBJECT MATTER OF
METAPHYSICS 7.3 THE NATURE OF METAPHYSICS BIBLIOGRAPHY INDEX IX 440 443
445 447 449 451 454 455 457 459 463 471 473 478 490 507 515 ANALYTICAL
TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 CHEPTER 1 THE PROBLEM END THE METHOD 1.1 AN OVERVIEW
1.1.1 METAPHYSICS AND THE ONE THIS SECTION EXPLAINS WHY THE PROBLEM OF
THE ONE AND THE MANY-ARE ALL THINGS ONE OR MANY?-IS INTRINSIC TO
METAPHYSICS AS ARISTOTLE CONCEIVES OF IT. THE ARGU- MENT TURNS ON HIS
REMARKS ON ARCHITECTONIC SCIENCES IN THE ETHICS AND POLITICS, ON PLATO'S
SIMILAR FORMULATIONS OF THE PROBLEM OF THE HIGHEST SCIENCE, AND ON
ARISTOTLE'S FREQUENT REFERENCES TO THE PROBLEM OF THE ONE AND THE MANY
IN ITS VARIOUS GUISES. 1.1.2 ARISTOTLE'S SOLUTION THIS SECTION SKETCHES
ARISTOTLE'S SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF THE ONE AND MANY, THAT IS, THE
PROBLEM OF HOW THERE CAN BE A METAPHYSICS AND WHAT IT IS THAT THIS
SCIENCE KNOWS. IT SETS OUT THE PRINCIPAL THESIS AND RESULTS OF THIS
STUDY FOR THE PRESENT VOLUME AND ALSO, MORE BRIEFLY, FOR THE TWO
SUCCEEDING ONES. 1.1.3 THE SOLUTION IN THE TEXT ONE OF THE CLAIMS IN
THIS BOOK IS THAT ARISTOTLE'S TEXT IS, FOR THE MOST PART, A CARE- FULLY
CONSTRUCTED AND COGENT SET OF ARGUMENTS THAT WORK TOGETHER TO SUPPORT
HIS CONCLUSIONS. THIS SECTION SHOWS HOW THE TEXT OF THE METAPHYSICS
MAKES A CASE FOR THE SOLUTION PRESENTED IN 1.1.2. 1.2 THE PROBLEM THE
PROBLEM OF THE ONE AND THE MANY IS CENTRAL FOR ARISTOTLE'S PHILOSOPHICAL
PRE- DECESSORS. ALTHOUGH HE HIMSELF DOES NOT REGARD IT AS A SINGLE
PROBLEM, HE USES IT IN MANY OF HIS WORKS AS A METHOD OF DETERMINING THE
NATURE THAT THE WORK EXPLORES. ONCE THE NATURE IS DEFINED, THE ONE/MANY
ISSUE RECEDES. IN THE METAPHYSICS, THE PROBLEM TAKES ITS MOST GENERAL
FORM: ARE ALL THINGS ONE OR MANY? ARISTOTLE USES THIS QUESTION TO
EXPLORE WHETHER THERE ARE CAUSES OR NATURES COMMON TO ALL BEINGS, BUT
ULTIMATELY IT TAKES A BACK SEAT TO HIS DOCTRINE OF BEING. HOWEVER, THE
PROBLEM IS IMPORTANT BECAUSE ARISTOTLE USES IT TO ARGUE FOR HIS
METAPHYSICAL DOCTRINES. IT HOLDS A SPECIAL PLACE IN METAPHYSICAL
INQUIRY. 1.3 THE METHOD THE TWO PREVAILING METHODS USED TO INTERPRET THE
METAPHYSICS HAVE BEEN DEVEL- OPMENTALISM AND WHAT I CALL THE "ARISTOTLE
AT WORK" APPROACH. BOTH EMPHASIZE THE DYNAMIC CHARACTER OF ARISTOTLE'S
ENGAGEMENT WITH PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS, BUT NEITHER HAS THE RESOURCES TO
CHOOSE BETWEEN COMPETING INTERPRETATIONS OF PARTICULAR TEXTS. MY
INNOVATION IS TO INTRODUCE THE PROBLEM OF THE ONE AND THE MANY AS A
GUIDING THREAD THROUGH WHICH TO UNDERSTAND AND EVALUATE THE DYNAMIC OF
ARISTOTLE'S THOUGHT. XI XII ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.4 THE
LITERATURE 1.4.1 TREATMENTS OF THE ONE/MANY PROBLEM SO LITTLE HAS
APPEARED IN THE LITERATURE ABOUT THE PROBLEM OF THE ONE AND THE MANY IN
THE METAPHYSICS THAT, INSTEAD OF THE USUALLITERATURE SURVEY, THIS
SECTION CONSIDERS WHY SCHOLARS HAVE NEGLECTED IT. IT SUGGESTS THAT THEY
HAVE BEEN DETERRED BY TWO ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE ONE: (1) THAT IT IS
CHARACTERISTIC OF PLATONIC FORM AND THEREFORE NOT PROPERLY ARISTOTELIAN,
AND (2) THAT ONE IS NEARLY IDENTICAL WITH BEING SO THAT ANY TREATMENT OF
THE LATTER IS ALSO A TREAT- MENT OF THE FORMER. 1.4.2 PROBLEMS IN A-!!
THE TWO MOST IMPORTANT SCHOLARLY ISSUES IN METAPHYSICS A-!! ARE: (1)WHAT
METHOD DOES ARISTOTLE USE TO ARRIVE AT AND JUSTIFY HIS CONCLUSIONS? AND
(2) WHAT ARE THE RELATIONS BETWEEN METAPHYSICS AND THE PARTICULAR
SCIENCES AND BETWEEN ITS SUB- JECT MATTER AND THEIRS? A THIRD IMPORTANT
ISSUE IS HOW ARISTOTLE CAN ARGUE FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-CONTRADICTION
(PNC). THIS VOLUME WILL ADDRESS ALL THREE. 2 CHAPTER 2 THE WAYS OF BEING
ONE "ONE" IS SAID IN MANY WAYS. IT IS NECESSARY TO EXPLORE THESE WAYS
BECAUSE ARISTOTLE OFTEN DOES NOT INDICATE WHICH ONE HE IS USING. THIS
CHAPTER FOLLOWS ARISTOTLE'S MOST DETAILED DISCUSSION IN LL 6. 2.1
POLLSCHOS LEGOMENS THIS SECTION ARGUES THAT WHEN ARISTOTLE CLAIMS A TERM
IS "SAID IN MANY WAYS" HE MEANS TO SAY THAT MANY THINGS ARE CALLED BY
THE SAME TERM IN RESPECT OF DIFFERENT DEFINITIONS OF THOSE THINGS. MY
CASE DEPENDS ON ARGUING AGAINST INTERPRETING THE PHRASE AS EITHER A
DESCRIPTION OF LINGUISTIC USAGE OR A DESIGNATION OF THINGS AND IN FAVOR
OF A THREE-COMPONENT ANALYSIS: THINGS, TERM, AND DEFINITIONS. 2.1.1 AN
ALTERNATIVE ARGUMENT FOR THE THREE-COMPONENT ANALYSIS JOSEPH OWENS ALSO
ARGUES FOR A THREE-COMPONENT ANALYSIS BASED ON THE OPENING CHAPTER OF
THE CATEGORIES, BUT HIS ARGUMENT HAS BEEN DISPUTED FROM PASSAGES IN THE
TOPICS AND THE METAPHYSICS THAT DISCUSS CASES WHERE THINGS ARE NAMED
NON-EQUIVOCALLY BY A TERM SAID IN MANY WAYS. THIS SECTION DEFENDS THE
THREE- COMPONENT ANALYSIS BY SHOWING HOW IT MAKES POSSIBLE THE MIDDLE
GROUND BETWEEN WHAT IS EQUIVOCALLY AND UNIVOCALLY NAMED. 2.1.2 APPLYING
THE THREE-COMPONENT ANALYSIS TO METAPHYSICS LL: REAL AND NON-CATEGORIAL
ESSENCES THE THREE-COMPONENT ANALYSIS SEEMS TO BE AT ODDS WITH
METAPHYSICS LL BECAUSE WHAT IS DISCUSSED THERE DOES NOT FALL UNDER A
SINGLE CATEGORIAL GENUS AND THEREFORE CANNOT HAVE AREAL ESSENCE OR
DEFINITION. MORE THAN A PROBLEM FOR THE THREE-COMPONENT ANALYSIS, THIS
IS A SERIOUS METAPHYSICAL PROBLEM. HOWEVER, ARISTOTLE CLEARLY RECOGNIZES
THAT, AT LEAST, SOME OF THE TERMS DISCUSSED IN LL DO SIGNIFY THINGS WITH
NON-CATEGORIAL ESSENCES. HENCE, THE THREE-COMPONENT ANALYSIS DOES APPLY
TO BOOK LL. 2.1.3 THE WAYS "BEING" IS SAID ALTHOUGH THE CATEGORIES ARE
MENTIONED MOST OFTEN IN DESCRIPTIONS OF THE WAYS "BEING" IS SAID, THEY
CONSTITUTE BUT ONE OF THREE SCHEMATA OF PER SE BEINGS. THE OTHERS ARE
TRUE/FALSE AND ACTUALITY /POTENTIALITY. 5INCE THE SAME THINGS ARE CALLED
ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS XIII "BEINGS" IN RESPECT OF MORE THAN ONE
SCHEMA, THE SCHEMATA CANNOT BE GENERA OF BEINGS. THIS SECTION ARGUES
THAT ARISTOTLE'S CHARACTERIZATION OF THESE SCHEMATA AMOUNTS TO
DEFINITIONS AND THAT, CONSEQUENTLY, THE THREE-COMPONENT ANALYSIS APPLIES
TO THE WAYS "BEING" IS SAID. A THING IS CALLED A "BEING" BECAUSE IT HAS
SOME CHARACTER, BECAUSE THAT CHARACTER IS FULLY OR LESS THAN FULLY
REALIZED, OR BECAUSE IT EXISTS. 2.2 A 6: THE WEY. "ONE"I. SEID
COMMENTATORS HAVE DISTINGUISHED BETWEEN ONE-PLACE AND TWO-PLACE WAYS
THAT ONE IS SAID. THIS SECTION ARGUES THAT THIS DISTINCTION IS
SUBSIDIARY TO THE QUESTION OF HOW SOME PARTICULAR THING IS ONE, FOR WE
COULD NOT HAVE TWO THINGS THAT WERE ONE UNLESS EACH OF THEM WERE ITSELF
ONE, NOR COULD WE CONSIDER WHETHER TWO COM- PONENTS CONSTITUTE ONE THING
UNLESS IT IS CLEAR WHAT IT IS TO BE ONE THING. ARISTOTLE RESERVES "SAME"
FOR "TWO-PLACE" USES OF "ONE"; HENCE, THE SCHEMATA OF L\ 6 SHOULD BE
UNDERSTOOD AS "ONE-PLACE" USES. 2.2.1 ACCIDENTAL ONES (1015B16-36) A
COMPOSITE OF ACCIDENTAL ATTRIBUTES AND AN OUSIA IS ACCIDENTALLY ONE. IT
IS CLEAR THAT THE COMPOSITE IS SOME SORT OF CONJUNCTION AND THAT IT IS
ONE BECAUSE THE SUBSTRATE OUSIA IS ONE. A MORE PRECISE ACCOUNT OF THE
UNITY OF OUSIA AND ATTRIBUTES DOES NOT SEEM POSSIBLE. 2.2.2 CONTINUITY
(1015B36-1016A17) SOMETHING IS CONTINUOUS IF ITS MOTION IS INDIVISIBLE
IN TIME. ARISTOTLE GIVES TWO CRITERIA THAT DISTINGUISH THE MORE FROM THE
LESS CONTINUOUS, BUT HE DOES NOT SHOW HOW THEY WORK TOGETHER. THIS
SECTION CONSIDERS HOW TO UNDERSTAND THESE CRITERIA AND SHOWS HOW THEY
SUGGEST A SCHEMA OF TYPES OF CONTINUITY. 2.2.3 SENSIBLE SUBSTRATE
(1016A17-24) SAME SINGLE THING IS ONE IN SENSIBLE SUBSTRATE IF ITS
SUBSTRATE IS INDIVISIBLE IN RESPECT OF SENSATION. THE CLAIM HERE IS THAT
THE CHARACTER OF A THING'S MATTER MAKES IT BE ONE BECAUSE MATTER GIVES
IT ITS NATURE AND IDENTITY. THE CHARACTER OF THE MATTER SEEMS TO BE
FUNDAMENTAL BECAUSE IT IS A BEDROCK CHARACTER THAT THE THING COULD NOT
LOSE. ARISTOTLE DISTINGUISHES PROXIMATE AND ULTIMATE SENSIBLE SUBSTRATES
AS A SCHEMA OF THIS TYPE OF UNITY. MAKING SENSE OF THIS DISTINCTION
REQUIRES DEVELOPING A NOTION OF RELATIVE DIVISIBILITY AT WHICH THE TEXT
ONLY HINTS. 2.2.4 GENERIC SUBSTRATE (1016A24-32) A GENUS MAKES A THING
ONE INSOFAR AS THE THING IS A SINGLE INSTANCE OF IT. A CAREFUL
EXAMINATION OF THE TEXT SHOWS THAT ARISTOTLE INTENDS ONE BY GENERIC
SUBSTRATE TO BE PRIMARILY A UNITY OF INDIVIDUAL THINGS OR SPECIES.
ARISTOTLE SUGGESTS A SCHEMA OF PROXIMATE AND ULTIMATE GENERIC
SUBSTRATES, BUT HE DOES NOT EXPLAIN IT NOR DOES HE DECIDE WHICH IS MORE
ONE. 2.2.5 INDIVISIBLE IN FORMULA (1016A32-B6) SOMETHING IS INDIVISIBLE
IN FORMULA IF ITS FORMULA CANNOT BE DIVIDED INTO ANOTHER FORMULA THAT
EXPRESSES WHAT THE THING ISOFORMULAE OF COMPOSITES CAN BE DIVIDED INTO
CONSTITUENT FORMULAE, ONE OF WHICH EXPRESS THE OUSIA. HENCE, ONLY
UNDIVIDED ENTITIES CAN HAVE INDIVISIBLE FORMULAE. ALTHOUGH GENUS, A
SPECIES, AND AN INDIVIDUAL COULD EACH BE ONE IN FORMULA, THE INDIVIDUAL
OR, IN GENERAL, WHAT IS UNDIVIDED IN TIME AND PLACE AS WELL AS FORMULA
IS MOST ONE IN FORMULA. ARISTOTLE HAS AN ORDERED SCHEMA OF ONES THAT ARE
INDIVISIBLE IN FORMULA. ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS 2.2.6 ARISTOTLE'S
SUMMARY [1016B6-11) THE SUMMARY STATEMENT CONSIDERED IN THIS SECTION
LOOKS LIKE IT ASSERTS THAT OTHER THINGS ARE CALLED "ONE" BY THEIR
RELATION TO A PRIMARY ONE; THIS WOULD BE THE PROS HEN DOCTRINE OF ONE.
ARGUING AGAINST THIS AND OTHER INTERPRETATIONS, THIS SECTION PROPOSES
THAT THE PRIMARY ONES ARE THE PRIMARY INSTANCES OF THE THREE PER SE ONES
AND THAT THE SECONDARY ONES ARE THE OTHER INSTANCES OF THE SCHEMATA OF
THESE PER SE ONES. 2.2.7 THE WHOLE [1016B11-17) THINGS ARE CALLED "ONE"
BY BEING A WHOLE IF THEY ARE BOTH ONE IN SUBSTRATE AND ONE BY
CONTINUITY. THESE TWO TYPES OF ONE BOTH DEPEND ON MATTER. OTHER
COMBINATIONS OF PER SE ONES THAT WOULD REQUIRE UNITY IN MATTER AND UNITY
IN FORM ARE EXCLUDED. 2.2.8 OTHER TREATMENTS OF ONE: METAPHYSICS I 1 AND
PHYSICS A 2 ARISTOTLE'S TWO OTHER TREATMENTS OF THE WAYS "ONE" IS SAID
DO NOT ADD ANYTHING TO WHAT APPEARS IN I\ 6. PHYSICS A 2 IDENTIFIES
THREE PRIMARY ONES THAT APPEAR TO BE THE THREE DISCUSSED IN I\ 6. I 1
PROVIDES A MORE SYSTEMATIC TREATMENT THAN I\ 6 THAT, PROBABLY DRAWING ON
THE RESULTS OF THE CENTRAL BOOKS, OMITS BOTH SUBSTRATES. 2.3 THE ESSENCE
OF ONE AND ITS FUNCTIONS ARISTOTLE DEFINES THE ESSENCE OF ONE ('TO &VL
DVCX~) BY MENTIONING THREE OF ITS FUNC- TIONS, TO BE INDIVISIBLE, TO BE
THE PRINCIPLE OF KNOWLEDGE, AND TO BE THE PRINCIPLE OF NUMBER.
EISEWHERE, HE ALSO SPEAKS OF ONE AS THE PRINCIPLE OF CONTRARIETY. EACH
OF THESE FUNCTIONS BELONGS NOT TO SOME ONE ITSELF, BUT TO SOME THING
THAT IS ONE. 2.4 THE SERIES OF ONES (1016B23-1017A3J INDIVISIBILITY CAN
BE QUALITATIVE OR QUANTITATIVE, AND EACH OF THESE INCLUDES ASERIES NOT
OF THINGS THAT ARE ONE BUT OF TYPES OF UNITY. THIS SECTION EXPLORES THE
CHARAC- TERIZATION OF THESE SERIES AND THEIR RELATION TO THE THINGS SAID
TO BE "ONE." IT REJECTS A STRICT IDENTIFICATION OF THE SERIES WITH THE
PER SE WAYS OF BEING ONE AND PROPOSES INSTEAD THAT THE SERIES BE
UNDERSTOOD AS EXPLICATING THE ESSENCE OF ONE. 2.5 SAME ARISTOTLE'S
DISCUSSION OF "SAME" PROVIDES FURTHER SUPPORT FOR TAKING "ONE" TO APPLY
PRIMARILY TO INDIVIDUAL THINGS AND FOR THE THREE-COMPONENT ANALYSIS.
THIS SECTION CONSIDERS WHAT ARISTOTLE MEANS BY THE TERM "ONENESS"
(&V6"R1)~), AND IT ARGUES AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY OF THERE BEING A
PRINCIPLE OF THE IDENTITY OF INDIS- CERNIBLES IN ARISTOTLE. 2.6 SUMMARY
THE CHAPTER CONCLUDES WITH A BRIEF SUMMARY THAT EMPHASIZES THE RICH
COMPLEX- ITY OF ARISTOTLE'S ACCOUNT OF THE WAYS "ONE" IS SAID,
PARTICULARLY HIS DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN MATERIAL AND FORMAL ONES AND
BETWEEN THINGS THAT ARE ONE AND THE UNITY THAT THEY HAVE. THE CONTRAST
BETWEEN HIS ACCOUNTS OF "ONE" AND "BEING" UNDER- MINES THE ASSUMPTION
THAT ARISTOTLE TREATS THEM AS VIRTUALLY THE SAME. APART FROM HELPING
APPRECIATE THE DIFFERENT ONES THAT ARISTOTLE USES IN THE METAPHYSICS,
OFTEN WITHOUT SPECIFYING THEM, THIS CHAPTER'S TREATMENT OF THE WAYS
"ONE" IS SAID UNDERMINES SEVERAL COMMON NOTIONS THAT ARE INCOMPATIBLE
WITH THE ANALYSIS OF ARISTOTLE'S TEXT IN THE REST OF MYSTUDY.
ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS XV 3 CHAPTER 3 THE PRINCIPLES OF
METAPHYSICS: BOOKS A AND CLT THE METAPHYSICS IS UNUSUAL IN THAT IT HAS
TWO INTRODUCTORY BOOKS, BUT BOTH ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF THE NUMBER OF
CAUSES. SINCE THEY ASSUME THAT EACH CAUSE IS ONE, THEY BOTH ADDRESS AN
ISSUE THAT FALLS UNDER THE BROAD RUBRIC OF ONE/MANY PROBLEMS. THE
UNIVERSAL SCOPE OF THESE INQUIRIES INTO CAUSES ILLUSTRATES THE
POSSIBILITY OF AN INQUIRY WITH THE SCOPE METAPHYSICS MUST HAVE. 3.1
WISDOM AND THE WISE: A 1-2 3.1.1 A 1: NATURALDESIRE FOR KNOWLEDGE
ARISTOTLE PROPOSES THREE SIGNS TO SUPPORT THE CLAIM THAT ALL MEN BY
NATURE DESIRE TO KNOW. SINCE THE DESIRE TO KNOW IS NATURAL, WE SEEK TO
EXERCISE IT UNTIL WE HAVE WHAT IS MOST KNOWABLE, THE OBJECT OF FIRST
SCIENCE. THE SCIENCE THAT KNOWS THIS OBJECT SHOULD ALSO KNOW ALL ELSE.
3.1.2 A 2: THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE WISE ARISTOTLE'S CHARACTERIZATION
OF THE SCIENCE OF WISDOM IMPLICITLY RAISES A UNITY QUESTION: HOW CAN ALL
OF THE CHARACTERISTICS THAT ARE SUPPOSED TO BELONG TO THE OBJECTS OF
METAPHYSICS, NAMELY, UNIVERSALITY, UNITY, AND BEING THE HIGHEST CAUSES,
BELONG TO OBJECTS TREATED BY A SINGLE SCIENCE? 3.2 THE NUMBER OF CAUSES:
A 3-7 ARISTOTLE INQUIRES INTO THE NUMBER OF CAUSES AS A WAY OF INQUIRING
INTO THEIR NATURE. IN GENERAL, HIS PREDECESSORS ASSUME THAT A CAUSE MUST
BE ONE. THEY ENDORSE DIF- FERENT TYPES OF CAUSES BECAUSE THEY RECOGNIZE
DIFFERENT TYPES OF UNITY. THOSE WHO ENDORSE MATERIAL AND FORMAL CAUSES
DO SO BECAUSE THEY IDENTIFY THINGS AS ONE IN SUBSTRATE OR ONE IN
FORMULA. ALTHOUGH THOSE WHO ADVANCE EFFICIENT CAUSES DO NOT MAKE THEM
ONE, ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF THEM SUGGESTS THAT THAT IS A DEFICIENCY IN
THEIR ACCOUNTS. FOR SOME, SUCH AS PLATO, A CAUSE THAT IS ONE REQUIRES
ANOTHER CAUSE, SUCH AS THE DYAD, THAT IS DEFINED BY ITS LACK OF UNITY.
THAT OTHER PHILOSOPHERS DID NOT RECOGNIZE ALL FOUR CAUSES COUNTS AGAINST
THEIR ACCOUNTS OF THE CAUSES. 3.3 CRITIQUE OF THE CAUSES: A 8-10 THE
FINAL CHAPTERS OF BOOK A CRITICIZE THE CAUSES THAT A 3-7 SPELL OUT.
ARISTOTLE ORGANIZES HIS DISCUSSIONS BY CONSIDERING TOGETHER THOSE WHO
POSIT ONE CAUSE AND THOSE WHO POSIT MANY. 3.3.1 A 8 ARISTOTLE CRITICIZES
OTHER TREATMENTS OF THE CAUSES ON THE GROUND THAT THEY CAN- NOT ACCOUNT
FOR EVERYTHING. IN PARTICULAR, CAUSES OF SENSIBLES DO NOT ACCOUNT FOR
SUPERSENSIBLES, AND VICE VERSA. 3.3.2 A 9: ARISTOTLE'S ARGUMENTS AGAINST
THE FORMS ARISTOTLE IS OFTEN THOUGHT TO OBJECT MOST VIGOROUSLY TO
PLATO'S SEPARATION OF THE FORMS, BUT HE TAKES SEPARATION TO BE A MARK OF
FORM'S UNITY, AND UNITY TO BE REQUISITE FOR ANY CAUSE. HENCE, THE BRUNT
OF HIS ARGUMENTS IN A 9 ARE DIRECTED TOWARD SHOWING THAT PLATO'S FORMS
CANNOT BE ONE IN THE WAY HE TAKES THEM TO BE AND STILL BE CAUSES.
3.3.2.1 DOUBLING ARISTOTLE ARGUES THAT PLATO'S FORMS DOUBLE PARTICULARS
WITHOUT EXPLAINING THEM. AS HE STATES IT, HIS ARGUMENT DEPENDS ON THE
DUBIOUS ASSUMPTION THAT XVI ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS PLATO TAKES
FORM AND SENSIBLE EACH TO BE INDIVIDUALS. HOWEVER, THE BASIC DIF-
FICULTY ARISTOTLE POINTS TO IS HOW ONE INDIVIDUAL COULD FUNCTION AS THE
CAUSE OF A SENSIBLE OF THE SAME CHARACTER. THIS SECTION PROPOSES AN
EXPLANATION FOR ARISTOTLE'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE MORE AND THE LESS
ACCURATE ARGUMENTS FOR FORMS, AND IT SHOWS HOW THIS DISTINCTION HELPS TO
ORGANIZE A 9. 3.3.2.2 THE MORE AND LESS ACCURATE ARGUMENTS FOR THE FORMS
THIS SECTION ARGUES THAT IN 990B8-991A8 ARISTOTLE DISCUSSES TWO PARALLEL
SETS OF ARGUMENTS FOR FORMS, ONE FOR THE STANDARD DOCTRINE, THE OTHER
"MORE ACCURATE ARGUMENTS" FOR FORM NUMBERS. IN EACH CASE, ARISTOTLE
MENTIONS SOME ABSURD CONSEQUENCES OF THE ARGUMENTS BEFORE DISABLING
THEM. THE ARGUMENTS FOR THE FORMS DEPEND ON SHOWING THE NECESSITY FOR
SOME ONE, AND ARISTOTLE DISABLES THEM BY SHOWING THAT THESE ARGUMENTS
WOULD EITHER MAKE WHAT IS NOT ONE BE ONE, OR WHAT IS ONE BE MANY.
3.3.2.3 FORMS AS CAUSES ARISTOTLE ARGUES THAT THE FORMS, IN EITHER THE
LESS OR MORE ACCURATE VERSION, CANNOT SERVE AS CAUSES FOR SENSIBLES BY
SHOWING THAT WHAT IS ONE IN THE WAYS THEY ARE ONE CANNOT FUNCTION AS ANY
OF THE FOUR KINDS OF CAUSE. MOST STRIKINGLY, THE FORMS CANNOT ACCOUNT
FOR MOTION AND OTHER FEATURES OF SENSIBLES. 3.4 BOOK CLT: INFINI1:E
CAUSES, FIRST CAUSES, AND THE EXISTENCE OF METAPHYSICS BOOK CX ARGUES
THAT THERE CANNOT BE AN INFINITE NUMBER OF CAUSES BECAUSE ALL CAUSAL
SEQUENCES TERMINATE. THE FIRST CAUSES ARE ETERNAL BEINGS THAT ARE ALSO
MOST TRUE, AND KNOWLEDGE OF THEM IS THE HIGHEST KNOWLEDGE OF ALL THINGS.
THE SCIENCE OF THESE ETERNAL, FIRST CAUSES IS METAPHYSICS. HENCE, IN
ARGUING AGAINST INFINITE SEQUENCES OF CAUSES, ARISTOTLE IS ARGUING FOR
THE EXISTENCE OF A DISTINCT SCIENCE OF METAPHYSICS. HOWEVER, BOOK CX
DOES NOT SHOW WHAT THESE CAUSES ARE OR EXPLAIN HOW METAPHYSICS CAN KNOW
THEM. 4 CHAPTER 4 BOOK B: THE APOR;A; ARISTOTLE'S APORIAI ARE
ANTINOMIES, AND SETTING THEM OUT IS A STANDARD PART OF HIS PHILOSOPHICAL
METHOD. THUS, THERE IS NO REASON THAT THESE APORIAI NEED BE PROBLEMS
THAT ARISTOTLE WAS PERSONALLY STRUGGLING WITH WHEN HE WROTE THE
METAPHYSICS. THOUGH IT IS WIDELY RECOGNIZED THAT THE APORIAI CONCERN
PLATONISM, THERE IS DISAGREEMENT ABOUT WHETHER IT IS A PLATONISM THAT
ARISTOTLE ENDORSES OR REJECTS. THE APORIAI THAT HE PRESENTS IN BOOK B
FALL INTO THREE GROUPS, THE FIRST OF WHICH CONCERNS THE SUBJECT MATTER
OF THE SCIENCE, AND THE SECOND AND THIRD OF WHICH CONCERN THE
PRINCIPLES. 4.1 UNITY LANGUAGE: A PARADIGM THIS SECTION PROPOSES THAT
ARISTOTLE'S REFUTATION IN PHYSICS A 1-2 OF THE ELEATIC CLAIM THAT ALL IS
ONE SERVES AS A PARADIGM FOR THE PRESENTATION OF THE APORIAI IN
METAPHYSICS B. IN THE PHYSICS HE FIRST TRANSLATES A CLAIM INVOLVING ONE
INTO HIS MORE REFINED UNITY LANGUAGE AND THEN SHOWS THAT, HOWEVER
INTERPRETED, IT CANNOT BE TRUE. THE APORIAI OF THE METAPHYSICS SEEM TO
ARISE FROM A SIMILAR TRANSLATION, BUT HERE INCONSISTENT INTERPRETATIONS
OF THE INITIAL CLAIM ALL SEEM TRUE. ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS XVI 4.2
THE UNITY OT THE SUBJECT MATTER THE FIRST FOUR APORIAI HAVE THE SAME
FORM: EACH ASKS WHETHER A PARTICULAR TOPIC IS TREATED BY ONE OR MANY
SCIENCES. 4.2.1 MANY SEIENCES THE EXISTENCE OF MANY SCIENCES TREATING
THE VARIOUS TOPICS THAT OUGHT TO FALL UNDER METAPHYSICS IS INCOMPATIBLE
WITH THE EXISTENCE OF A SCIENCE OF METAPHYS- ICS. IF THERE IS A
METAPHYSICS, IT MUST BE ONE SCIENCE. 4.2.2 ONE SEIENCE THE VARIOUS
TOPICS THAT ARISTOTLE CONSIDERS IN THE FIRST FOUR APORIAI OUGHT TO FALL
UNDER ONE SCIENCE, METAPHYSICS, BUT THEIR INCLUSION IN ONE SCIENCE SEEMS
INCONSISTENT WITH TENETS OF ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE, PARTICULARLY THE
ASSUMPTION THAT ONE SCIENCE TREATS ONE GENUS. 4.2.3 APORIA FIVE ALTHOUGH
THE FIFTH APORIA IS CONCERNED WITH THE EXISTENCE OF MATHEMATICAL
INTERMEDIATES, ARISTOTLE PRESENTS IT AS A PROBLEM ABOUT WHETHER THERE
ARE ONE OR MANY GENERA OF OUSIAI AND WHETHER, IN THE LATTER CASE, ALL
CAN FALL UNDER ONE SCIENCE. HENCE, IT BELONGS IN THE FIRST GROUP OF
APORIAI. 4.2.4 THE POSSIBILITY OF METAPHYSICS THE FIRST SET OF APORIAI
CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF METAPHYSICS BY ASKING WHETHER THE TOPICS
THAT THIS SCIENCE OUGHT TO TREAT CAN FALL UNDER ONE SCIENCE. THERE SEEM
TO BE LEGITIMATE ARGUMENTS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ISSUE. 4.3 THE UNITY OT
A PRINCIPLE THIS SECTION ARGUES IN SOME DETAIL THAT APORIAI 6-10 TURN ON
THE KIND OF UNITY POS- SESSED BY A PRINCIPLE. ONLY ONE OF THESE APORIAI
IS CLEARLY FORMULATED AS QUESTION ABOUT UNITY, BUT WHEN WE EXAMINE
CLOSELY THE ARGUMENTS CREATING THESE OTHER APORIAI, WE SEE ARISTOTLE
SUPPORTING OR REFUTING CLAIMS THAT THE PRINCIPLES POSSESS PARTICULAR
CHARACTERS BY CONSIDERING THE UNITY OF THE PRINCIPLES. 4.4 CANDIDATH TOR
THE FIRST PRINCIPLE THE FINAL GROUP OF APORIAI CONSIDER PARTICULAR
CANDIDATES FOR THE FIRST PRINCIPLES. THREE OF THE FIVE CANDIDATES UNDER
CONSIDERATION ARE PLATONIC OR PYTHAGOREAN. AN ANALYSIS OF ARISTOTLE'S
ARGUMENTS SHOWS THAT EACH SEEMS TO BE THE FIRST PRINCIPLE BECAUSE IT IS
ONE, BUT THAT NONE POSSESSES THE APPROPRIATE UNITY. THE TWO FINAL
CANDIDATES ARE ARISTOTELIAN; YET, ONLY ONE OF THEM IS PRESENTED WITHOUT
UNITY ARGUMENTS, AND EVEN IT MAY BE CONNECTED WITH A UNITY ISSUE. 4.5
METEPHY.ICAL METHOD 4.5.1 THE PLATONIC ORIGIN OF THE APORIAI THIS
SUBSECTION SHOWS HOW THE ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT UNITY THAT GENERATE APORIAI
ABOUT THE UNITY OF METAPHYSICS' SUBJECT MATTER AND ITS PRINCIPLES COULD
ARISE FROM THE PLATONIE CLAIM THAT FORM IS ONE. PLATO'S FORMS ARE BOTH
THE SUBJECT MAT- TER AND PRINCIPLES OF KNOWLEDGE; ARISTOTLE
DISTINGUISHES THESE TWO ROLES BY THE TYPE OF UNITY NEEDED FOR EACH.
XVIII ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS 4.5.2 THE ASSUMPTION ABOUT UNITY
SINCE MOST OF THE APORIAI ARE PROBLEMS ABOUT UNITY, WE MUST ASK WHY
ARISTOTLE DOES NOT CHOOSE TO AVOID THEM BY SIMPLY REJECTING THE UNITY
ASSUMPTIONS THAT GENERATE THEM. ALTHOUGH HE SHOWS IN BOOKS A AND RX THAT
THESE ASSUMPTIONS ARE "COMMON OPINIONS," THERE IS NO REASON TO THINK
THAT IS WHY HE ENDORSES THEM. THIS SECTION ARGUES THAT HE ACCEPTS THESE
ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT UNITY BECAUSE THEY ARE INHERENT IN METAPHYSICS. 4.5.3
THE LOGIC OF THE APORIAI ALTHOUGH ARISTOTLE'S METHOD IS USUALLY
DESCRIBED AS A METHOD OF "SAVING THE PHENOMENA" OR PRESERVING COMMON
OPINION, THIS SECTION ARGUES THAT IT IS BET- TER DESCRIBED AS A METHOD
OF ARGUING FOR NEW DOCTRINES BY SHOWING THAT THEY RESOLVE OTHERWISE
INSOLUBLE CONTRADICTIONS. ARISTOTLE'S INJUNCTION TO PRESERVE COMMON
OPINIONS ACTS AS A SIDE CONSTRAINT ON THE NEW DOCTRINES. 5 CHAPTER 5
BOOK R: THE UNITY OF BEING THE FIRST SENTENCE OF BOOK R IS GENERALLY
TAKEN AS A STATEMENT OF FACT, BUT THIS CHAPTER ARGUES THAT IT IS A
CONCLUSION SUPPORTED BY SEVEN SEPARATE ARGUMENTS IN R 1-3. THESE
ARGUMENTS RESOLVE THE FIRST FOUR APORIAI. THIS CHAPTER ALSO ARGUES THAT
THE TREATMENT OF LOGICAL PRINCIPLES IN THE SECOND HALF OF BOOK R
CONTRIBUTES TO THE INQUIRY INTO BEING BY SHOWING THAT EACH BEING HAS ITS
OWN ESSENCE. HENCE, SENSIBLES DO NOT REQUIRE INTERMEDIATES TO BE KNOWN-A
POINT THAT UNDERMINES APORIA 5. FINALLY, THE CHAPTER ADDRESSES THREE
WELL-KNOWN SCHOLARLY ISSUES. 5.1 THE SUBJECT MATTER OF METAPHYSICS THIS
SECTION COMPARES THE STATED CONCLUSIONS OF THE SEVEN ARGUMENTS IN ORDER
TO ARGUE THAT ALL ASSERT THE UNITY OF A SCIENCE THAT TREATS VARIOUS
TOPICS. CONSIDERING THAT THE OBSTACLE TO THE EXISTENCE OF METAPHYSICS IS
ITS SUBJECT MATTER'S APPARENT LACK OF UNITY, WE CAN SEE THAT TO ARGUE
FOR THE UNITY OF THIS SUBJECT MATTER IS TO ARGUE FOR THE EXISTENCE OF
METAPHYSICS. 5.1.1 R 1: A SCIENCE OF BEING R 1 DRAWS CONSEQUENCES ABOUT
METAPHYSICS BY ASSIMILATING THE SCIENCE OF BEING TO OTHER SCIENCES.
ARISTOTLE ASSURNES THAT METAPHYSICS TREATS THE NATURE OF BEING AND AIMS
TO FIND ITS PRINCIPLES AND CAUSES, BUT HE DOES NOT SPEIL OUT WHAT THAT
NATURE COULD BE, NOR DOES HE SHOW THAT THIS SCIENCE EXISTS. 5.1.2
ARGUMENT ONE [R 2, 1003A33-B19): THE CAUSES FROM THE STRUCTURE OF THE
ARGUMENT, ARISTOTLE ASSURNES THAT BEING IS PROS HEN AND ARGUES THAT IT
CAN BE TREATED BY ONE SCIENCE AND THAT ALL THE CAUSES CAN BE TREATED BY
ONE SCIENCE BECAUSE THEY ARE RELATED TO OUSIA. HUT, AS SCHOLARS HAVE
RECOGNIZED, THE INTERESTING AND SIGNIFICANT CLAIM IS WHAT FUNCTIONS HERE
AS APREMISE, THE PROS HEN CHARACTER OF BEING. I ARGUE HERE THAT THIS
OSTENSIBLE PREMISE IS THE REAL CONCLU- SION, AND THAT ARISTOTLE SUPPORTS
IT BY SHOWING THAT IT ALONE EXPLAINS HOW ALL THE CAUSES CAN FALL UNDER
ONE SCIENCE AND, THEREBY, RESOLVES THE FIRST APORIA. IMPORTANT TO HIS
ARGUMENT IS THAT INSOFAR AS BEING IS PROS HEN, IT IS A KIND OF GENUS.
5.2 BEING QUA BEING IT IS GENERALLY SUPPOSED THAT BEING QUA BEING HAS
SOME FIXED SENSE IN BOOK R. IN THIS SECTION, I ARGUE THAT ARISTOTLE USES
THE PHRASE AS A PLACEHOLDER: IT STANDS FOR THE ESSENCE OF BEING. OUSIA,
TOO, IS A PLACEHOLDER FOR THE PRIMARY NATURE OF BEING. IT IS ONLY LATER
THAT ARISTOTLE DETERMINES WHAT THIS ESSENCE AND NATURE ISO THE
ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS XIX CLAIMS HE MAKES ABOUT BEING QUA BEING
IN THE OPENING CHAPTERS PARALLEL CLAIMS HE MAKES ABOUT THE GENERIC
NATURES TREATED BY HISOTHER SCIENCES. 5.3 ARGUMENTS LWO AND THREE:
OUSIAI 5.3.1 ARGUMENT TWO [1003B19-22) OSTENSIBLY, THE AIM OF THIS
ARGUMENT IS TO INCLUDE IN THE SUBJECT MATTER OF METAPHYSICS THE SPECIES
OF BEING AND THE SPECIES OF THOSE SPECIES. IN EFFECT, THE ARGUMENT SHOWS
THAT BEING CAN BE TREATED AS IF IT HAD SPECIES. 5.3.2 ARGUMENT THREE
[1003B22-1004A2) SINCE WHATEVER IS IS ALSO ONE, ARISTOTLE INCLUDES ONE
IN THE SCIENCE THAT TREATS BEING. BECAUSE THE SPECIES OF BEING ARE
ASSOCIATED WITH SPECIES OF ONE, ARISTOTLE ALSO INCLUDES THE LATTER IN
THIS SCIENCE. THE ASSOCIATION-BETWEEN ONES AND BEINGS IS MORE THAN
MERELY EXTENSIONAL; ARISTOTLE INSISTS THAT THERE IS SOME SORT OF PER SE
CONNECTION. THE TWO BELONG TO EACH NATURE IN RESPECT OF THAT NATURE.
5.3.3 1004A2-9 IN THIS TEXT ARISTOTLE EXPLAINS HOW TO USE THE RESULTS OF
THE SECOND AND THIRD ARGUMENTS TO RESOLVE THE THIRD APORIA. 5.4
ARGUMENTS FOUR, FIVE, AND SIX: PER SE ATTRIBUTES 5.4.1 ARGUMENT FOUR
[1004A9-31) THE APPARENT CONCLUSION OF THIS SECTION IS THAT ALL THE
OPPOSITES COME UNDER META- PHYSICS. THE MEANS BY WHICH ARISTOTLE REACHES
THIS CONCLUSION IS TO SHOW THAT EACH OPPOSITE IN DEFINED THROUGH SOME
RELATION WITH A NATURE THAT IS ONE. 5.4.2 ARGUMENT FIVE [1004A31-B25) IN
THIS ARGUMENT ARISTOTLE INCLUDES THE PER SE ATTRIBUTES OF BEING QUA
BEING IN THE SCIENCE THAT TREATS THE LATTER BY DRAWING AN ANALOGY
BETWEEN IT AND NUMBER QUA NUMBER. HIS EXAMPLES OF ATTRIBUTES OF BEING
QUA BEING MAKE CLEAR THAT HE HAS IN MIND AT LEAST SOME OF THE OPPOSITES
THAT THE PRECEDING ARGL,LFFIENT INCLUDED IN THE SCIENCE. 5.4.3 ARGUMENT
SIX [1004B27-1005A18) THOUGH THIS ARGUMENT IS WIDELY SUPPOSED TO BE AD
HOMINEM, ARISTOTLE ACCEPTS THE CONCLUSION AND HE EVEN ENDORSES THE
PREMISES, AT LEAST IN SOME CONTEXTS. THIS SECTION ARGUES THAT THE
ARGUMENT IS ARISTOTLE:S OWN AND THAT IT WORKS WITH THE TWO PRECEDING
ARGUMENTS TO RESOLVE THE FOURTH DPORIA. 5.5 ARGUMENT SEVEN (1005A19-B8):
PRINCIPLES OF DEMONSTRATION HERE, ARISTOTLE ARGUES FOR INCLUDING THE
PRINCIPLES OF DEMONSTRATION IN THE SCI- ENCE THAT ALSO TREATS OUSIAI ON
THE GROUND THAT THE PRINCIPLES BELONG UNIVERSALLY. HIS ARGUMENT TREATS
THESE PRINCIPLES AS PER SE ATTRIBUTES OF BEING QUA BEING. 5.6 BEING AS
THE SUBJECT OF METAPHYSICS THIS SECTION SHOWS HOW BEING IS TO BE
UNDERSTOOD DYNAMICALLY. THE SEVEN ARGU- MENTS OF THE OPENING OF BOOK R
NOT ONLY RESOLVE THE APORIAI, BUT ALSO DETERMINE THE CHARACTER OF THE
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE SCIENCE, BEING. THIS DETERMINATION IS REFLEXIVE
BECAUSE ARISTOTLE EXAMINES ONE AND BEING IN ORDER,TO SHOW THE UNITY OF
BEING AND THE UNITY AND BEING (EXISTENCE) OF THE SCIENCE. THIS
SEH-DETERMINATION GOES SOME WAY TOWARD DELINEATING THE STRUCTURE AND
NATURE OF BEING, BUT WE ARE STILL AT THE OPENING STAGE OF THE PROCESS OF
DETERMINING THIS NATURE. XX ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS 5.7 BEING BND
ONE ALTHOUGH ARISTOTLE OFTEN SPEAKS OF ONE AND BEING TOGETHER, THE TWO
SEEM TO HAVE DIFFERENT NATURES, AND HE USES ONE INSTRUMENTALLY TO
DISCUSS BEING. THE ONE THAT HE SPEAKS ABOUT IN R 1-3 SEEMS TO BE THE ONE
THAT BELONGS TO EACH BEING BY VIRTUE OF ITS BEING AN INSTANCE OF THE
GENUS OF BEING. 5.8 THE PRINCIPLES OF REHSONING ALL FOUR FORMULATIONS OF
THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-CONTRADICTION MENTION "SAME," A TYPE OF UNITY.
THUS, THE PRINCIPLE CAN ONLY APPLY TO THINGS THAT ARE ONE. IT IS FOR
THIS REASON THAT PLATO TAKES THE PRINCIPLE TO APPLY PROPERLY ONLY TO
FORMS. ALTHOUGH ARISTOTLE MAINTAINS THAT EACH BEING IS ONE, IT CANNOT BE
THE UNITY ASSOCIATED WITH BEING THAT ALLOWS THE PRINCIPLE TO APPLY; SOME
STRONGER UNITY POSSESSED BY EACH BEING IS NECESSARY. THIS UNITY MUST
ALSO BELONG TO EVERY BEING IF THE PRINCIPLE IS TO EXTEND UNIVERSALLY.
5.9 ARGUMENTS FOR NON-CONTRHDICTION ARISTOTLE'S ARGUMENTS FOR THE
PRINCIPLE OF NON-CONTRADICTION BEGIN FROM THE ASSUMPTION THAT A WORD
SIGNIFIES SOMETHING ONE. THIS SECTICIN EXPLORES WHAT IS ENTAILED IN THIS
ASSUMPTION. IT ARGUES THAT THE ONE SIGNIFIED IS AN ESSENCE OR OUSIA AND
THAT THE UNITY OF THIS ESSENCE IS STRONGER THAN THE UNITY THAT CONVERTS
WITH BEING. BECAUSE THE EXISTENCE OF ESSENCES IS MORE PROBLEMATIC THAN
THE PNC, ARISTOTLE'S OSTENSIBLE PREMISE IS HIS REAL CONCLUSION, AS IN
EARLIER ARGUMENTS IN BOOK R. HENCE, ARISTOTLE'S ARGUMENTS SHOW THAT
THERE MUST BE ESSENCES FOR THE PNC TO HOLD, AND THEY MAKE A CASE FOR THE
EXISTENCE OF ESSENCES. 5.9.1 ARGUMENTS 1-2: 1006B11-34 ARISTOTLE'S FIRST
TWO ARGUMENTS FOR THE PNC ARE RELATIVELY SIMPLE. THE FIRST FOL- LOWS
ALMOST IMMEDIATELY FROM THE ASSUMPTION THAT A TERM SIGNIFIES SOMETHING
ONE. HOWEVER, THIS ASSUMPTION AND THE PNC SEEM TO BE UNDERMINED IF THE
ONE THING HAS PROPERTIES, AND ARISTOTLE MUST ANSWER THIS AND ANOTHER
OBJECTION. THE SECOND ARGUMENT SHOWS THE ABSURD CONSEQUENCE OF
IDENTIFYING PROPERTY AND SUBJECT. BY UNDERSTANDING THE REASONS THAT THE
PNC MIGHT NOT HOLD, THESE ARGUMENTS SHOW US WHAT THINGS MUST BE LIKE IN
ORDER THAT THE PRINCIPLE WOULD HOLD AND THAT KNOWLEDGE BE POSSIBLE. IN
PARTICULAR, ARISTOTLE ARGUES IMPLICITLY FOR THE EXISTENCE OF A UNITY
THAT IS MORE REFINED THAN THE UNITY ASSOCIATED WITH BEING, NAMELY, THE
UNITY OF AN ESSENCE, AND THAT SERVES AS THE SUBJECT OF THE PNC. THUS,
THE PNC IS AN ONTOLOGICAL PRINCIPLE, AND EXPLORING IT CONTRIBUTES TO
ARISTOTLE'S INVESTIGATION OF BEING. 5.9.2 ARGUMENTS 3-5: 1006B34-100BA2
PREDICATION POSES ANOTHER, ALBEIT SIMILAR, GROUND TO REJECT THE PNC.
WHEREAS THE SECOND ARGUMENT SHOWS THAT THE NATURE THAT RECEIVES A
PROPERTY MUST BE WHAT IT IS AND NOT ITS CONTRADICTORY, THE THIRD
ARGUMENT SHOWS THAT THE SAME HOLDS FOR THE DENIAL OF A NATURE EVEN
THOUGH, DEFINED BY NEGATION, IT MAY SEEM NOT TO HAVE A SINGLE ESSENCE.
ARISTOTLE'S FOURTH ARGUMENT SHOWS THAT TO DENY THE PNC IS TO DESTROY
OUSIA, AND HIS FIFTH ARGUMENT AIMS TO SHOW THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF EVERY
CHARACTER'S BEING AN ATTRIBUTE. AGAIN, THESE ARGUMENTS SUPPORT THE
NOTIONS THAT: ANY CHARACTER AND ITS DENIAL DIVIDE ALL BEINGS INTO TWO
DISCRETE CLASSES, INSTANCES OF ONLY ONE OF THESE CLASSES CAN BE
PREDICATED ESSENTIALLY OF ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS XXI ANY
INDIVIDUAL SUBJECT, AND NOT ALL PREDICATES CAN BE ACCIDENTAL. ALL THIS
DELIMITS THE CHARACTER OF THE OUSIA OR ESSENCE THAT IS SUBJECT TO THE
PNC 5.9.3 ARGUMENTS 6-8: CONTRADICTION IN SPEECH ANYONE WHO ASSERTED
THAT THE PNC DOES NOT HOLD WOULD ALSO DENY THE PRIN- CIPLE OF THE
EXCLUDED MIDDLE. FURTHER, THE ATTEMPT AT ONLY A PARTIAL DENIAL OF THE
PRINCIPLE BY ALLOWING THAT EVEN THOUGH EVERYTHING THAT CAN BE AFFIRMED
CAN BE DENIED, SOME OF WHAT IS DENIED CANNOT ALSO BE AFFIRMED IS SHOWN
TO AMOUNT TO A COMPLETE DENIAL OF THE PRINCIPLE. FINALLY, ANYONE WHO
ASSERTS THAT THE PNC DOES NOT HOLD MAKES A POSITIVE CLAIM ABOUT THE
CHARACTER OF BEING THAT HIS OWN ASSERTION REQUIRES HIRN TO DENY. THIS
LAST ARGUMENT PRESUPPOSES THAT THE PNC IS A CLAIM ABOUT BEING OR SOME
BEINGS, AN ASSUMPTION SUPPORTED BY PREVIOUS ARGUMENTS. 5.9.4 ARGUMENTS
9-10: CONTRADICTION IN ACTION WHATEVER PEOPLE MIGHT SAY ABOUT THE PNC,
THEY DO NOT ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS DENIAL; FOR WERE IT FALSE, IT
WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO CLAIM THAT ONE COURSE OF ACTION IS BETTER THAN
ANOTHER, AND PURPOSIVE ACTION WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE. MOREOVER, NO ANSWER
WOULD BE MORE RIGHT THAN ANOTHER BY BEING CLOSER TO THE TRUTH. 5.9.5 R
5: UNIVERSAL EXTENSION FOR ARISTOTLE THE PNC HOLDS PROVIDED THAT THERE
IS SOME ONE BEING OF WHICH IT IS TRUE. IN CONTRAST, CONTEMPORARY
PHILOSOPHERS DO NOT SANCTION A LOGICAL PRINCIPLE UNLESS IT HOLDS
UNIVERSALLY. ARLSTOTLE THINKS THAT THE PNC DOES HAVE UNIVERSAL EXTEN-
SION, AND THIS CHAPTER MAKES HIS CASE BY DISABLING ARGUMENTS TO THE
CONTRARY. 5.9.5.1THE ARGUMENT FROM CHANGE BECAUSE NOTHING COMES TO BE
FROM NOTHING, ANY CHANGE THAT OCCURS SEEMS TO REQUIRE THAT THE SUBJECT
ALREADY POSSESS THE CHARACTER IT BECOMES AND, HENCE, VIOLATE THE PNC.
ARISTOTLE DISABLES THIS ARGUMENT BY INTRODUCING HIS DOCTRINE OF MOTION
AS THE ACTUALIZATION OF A POTENTIAL, BUT ACTUALITY AND POTENCY HERE ARE
DEFINED IN RESPECT OF AN ESSENCE. 5.9.5.2THE ARGUMENT FROM SENSATION
BECAUSE AN OBJECT IS SENSED IN CONTRARY WAYS BY DIFFERENT PEOPLE, THE
OBJECT SEEMS TO BE CONTRARY TO ITSELF. ARISTOTLE DISABLES THIS ARGUMENT
BY RECOG- NIZING THAT THE SENSATION HAS ITS OWN ESSENCE. THE FORMULATION
OF THE PNC THAT APPLIES TO SENSATIONS AND NON-OUSIAI AND IS, THEREBY,
THE MOST UNIVERSAL FORMULATION IS THE FOURTH (5.8). 5.9.5.3 HERACLITUS'
ARGUMENT ACCORDING TO THE ARGUMENT GENERALLY ASCRIBED TO HERACLITUS,
EVERY NATURE IS CONSTANTLY CHANGING. AS SUCH, IT IS NEVER ONE AND THE
SAME AND, THUS, NEVER SUBJECT TO THE PNC ARISTOTLE UNDERMINES THIS
ARGUMENT BY ARGUING THAT CHANGE IS NOT INDEFINITE BUT REGULAR AND
ORDERLY. AS SUCH, PARTICULAR CHANGES ARE ONE AND, THUS, THEMSELVES
SUBJECT TO THE PNC 5.9.6 R 6: RELATIVES IN THIS DIFFICULT DISCUSSION
ARISTOTLE ADDRESSES THE PERSON WHO INSISTS THAT THE PNC IS RELATIVE TO
THE KNOWER. HE SHOWS THAT SOMEONE WHO AFFIRMS THIS CLAIM DESTROYS THE
UNITY OF THE KNOWER AND, THEREBY, THE POSSIBILITY OF KNOWLEDGE. XXII
ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS 5.9.7 R 7: PRINCIPLE OF THE EXCLUDED MIDDLE
ARISTOTLE ALSO ARGUES AGAINST DENIALS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EXCLUDED
MIDDLE BY ASSUMING THAT THERE ARE ESSENCES. 5.9.8 NON-CONTRADICTION AS A
PRINCIPLE OF KNOWLEDGE ARISTOTLE CALLS THE PNC A PRINCIPLE OF KNOWLEDGE,
BUT HE ALSO CLAIMS THAT ONE IS THE PRINCIPLE OF KNOWLEDGE. THIS SECTION
ARGUES THAT THE PNC IS THE NEGATIVE FORMULATION OF THE LATTER POSITIVE
CLAIM. AS SUCH, IT IS A KIND OF ESSENTIAL PROPERTY OF BEINGS, LIKE ONE.
ARISTOTLE'S NOTION THAT LOGIC DEPENDS ON ONTOLOGY, IMPLICIT IN THE PNC'S
DEPENDENCE ON ESSENCES, IS QUITE DIFFERENT FROM CONTEMPORARY VIEWS OF
LOGIC. 5.10 CONCLUSION OF BOOK R THE ANALYSIS THAT I ADVANCE IN THIS
CHAPTER REQUIRES CONVOLUTING THE APPARENT STRUCTURE OF THE TEXT, BUT IT
ALLOWS US TO UNDERSTAND THE TEXT AS AN ARGUMENT. 6 CHAPTER 6 BOOK A
AGAIN BOOK SS TREATS THE ESSENTIAL ATTRIBUTES THAT R ARGUES FALL TO
METAPHYSICS. WHEREAS A STANDARD ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE WOULD HAVE
DEMONSTRATED THESE ATTRIBUTES FROM THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF ITS SUBJECT
GENUS, METAPHYSICS SS AIMS INSTEAD TO TRACE THE DIFFERENT WAYS IN WHICH
THINGS ARE CALLED BY THE NAME OF AN ATTRIBUTE TO A PRIMARY INSTANCE OF
THE ATTRIBUTE. IT IS OFTEN UNABLE TO FIND A SINGLE PRIMARY INSTANCE AND
SHOWS INSTEAD THEIR IRREDUCIBLE PLURALITY AND, THEREBY, THEIR LIMITED
KNOWABILITY. 7 CHAPTER 7 METAPHYSICS: UNIVERSAL OR SPECIAL THE CENTRAL
QUESTION OF METAPHYSICS IS WHETHER IT EXISTS AS A SCIENCE, AND IN ORDER
TO ARGUE FOR IT ARISTOTLE NEEDS TO SHOW THAT IT HAS A SUBJECT MATTER. TO
SHOW THAT METAPHYSICS HAS A SUBJECT MATTER, ARISTOTLE NEEDS TO SHOW THAT
ALL BEINGS HAVE SUFFICIENT UNITY TO FALL UNDER ONE SCIENCE. HENCE,
QUESTIONS OF BEING AND UNITY ARE INTRINSIC TO METAPHYSICS, AS IS ITS
DETERMINING ITS OWN SUBJECT MATTER AND EXISTENCE. THE CHIEF SCHOLARLY
PROBLEMS ABOUT THE OPENING BOOKS OF THE METAPHYSICS-WHETHER METAPHYSICS
IS (1) A SCIENCE OF ALL BEINGS OR A SCIENCE OF THE HIGHEST CAUSES, (2)
AN ONTOLOGY OR A THEOLOGY, (3) UNIVERSAL OR SPECIAL METAPHYSICS-ALL
SPRING FROM THE PROBLEM OF WHETHER THERE IS A METAPHYSICS AT ALL.
SCHOLARS DO NOT COME TO GRIPS WITH THIS ISSUE BECAUSE THEY THINK IT IS A
PROBLEM WITH ARISTOTLE'S ACCOUNT OF METAPHYSICS RATHER THAN A PROBLEM
WITHIN METAPHYSICS; INDEED, IT IS A CENTRAL TASK OF METAPHYSICS TO
ADDRESS IT. 7.1 METAPHYSICAL METHOD ARISTOTLE'S METHOD IS OFTEN CALLED
"SAVING THE PHENOMENA" AND UNDERSTOOD AS PRESERVING AND REFINING COMMON
OPINIONS WHEN THEY DASH WITH EACH OTHER. RECAPPING EARLIER CONDUSIONS,
THIS SECTION ARGUES THAT THE METHOD IS RATHER DIRECTED TO RESOLVING
CONTRADICTIONS THAT ARE GENERATED FROM VARIOUS INTERPRETATIONS OF A
SINGLE COMMON OPINION. ARISTOTLE SAVES THE PHENOMENA BY IDENTIFYING THE
ASSUMPTION THAT HAS A HAND IN GENERATING BOTH SIDES OF AN APORIA AND
MODIFYING . IT SO AS TO SKIRT THE ANTINOMY WHILE NOT ALTERING OTHER
COMMON OPINIONS. ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS XXIII 7.2 THE SUBIECT
MATTER OF METAPHYSICS THIS SEETION RECOUNTS THE FIRST FOUR APORIAI AND
EXPLAINS, BRIEFLY, HOW ARISTOTLE RESOLVES THEM AND HOW HIS DOING SO
DEMARCATES THE SUBJECT MATTER OF METAPHYS- ICS. IT CONSIDERS ALTERNATIVE
ACCOUNTS OF HOW ARISTOTLE ARRIVES AT NECESSARY TRUTHS AND EXPLAINS HOW
ARISTOTLE ORGANIZES THE APORIAI SO AS TO EXC1UDE ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS.
7.3 THE NATURE OF METAPHYSICS ALTHOUGH ARISTOTLE CONCEIVES OF
METAPHYSICS AS AN INVESTIGATION OF BEING ALONG LINES THAT PARALLEL HIS
OTHER SCIENCES, BECAUSE BEING IS A PROS HEN, STUDYING IT LEADS
INEVITABLY TO THE STUDY OF OUSIA. UNDERSTANDING WHY THIS IS SO AT ONCE
EXPLAINS WHY BOOK RADDRESSES ONLY THE "IS IT" QUESTION (THE "WHAT IS IT"
QUESTION IS LEFT FOR THE CENTRAL BOOKS), HOW A SCIENCE OF BEING IS
POSSIBLE, WHY METAPHYSICS IS BOTH UNIVERSAL AND SPECIAL, AND, MOST
IMPORTANTLY, WHY AN ONTOLOGY MUST, IF IT IS PURSUED TO COMPLETION,
BECOME A SCIENCE OF OUSIA AND, ULTIMATELY, A THEOLOGY. |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| any_adam_object_boolean | 1 |
| author | Halper, Edward C. |
| author_facet | Halper, Edward C. |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Halper, Edward C. |
| author_variant | e c h ec ech |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV022959044 |
| callnumber-first | B - Philosophy, Psychology, Religion |
| callnumber-label | B434 |
| callnumber-raw | B434 |
| callnumber-search | B434 |
| callnumber-sort | B 3434 |
| callnumber-subject | B - Philosophy |
| classification_rvk | CD 2065 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)231745555 (DE-599)BVBBV022959044 |
| dewey-full | 110 |
| dewey-hundreds | 100 - Philosophy & psychology |
| dewey-ones | 110 - Metaphysics |
| dewey-raw | 110 |
| dewey-search | 110 |
| dewey-sort | 3110 |
| dewey-tens | 110 - Metaphysics |
| discipline | Philosophie |
| discipline_str_mv | Philosophie |
| format | Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV022959044 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T19:03:58Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:08:35Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9781930972216 1930972210 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016163434 |
| oclc_num | 231745555 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-29 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-11 |
| owner_facet | DE-29 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-11 |
| physical | XLI, 524 S. |
| publishDate | 2009 |
| publishDateSearch | 2009 |
| publishDateSort | 2009 |
| publisher | Parmenides Publ. |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Halper, Edward C. Verfasser aut One and many in Aristotle's Metaphysics books alpha - delta Edward C. Halper Las Vegas [u.a.] Parmenides Publ. 2009 XLI, 524 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Aristotle / Metaphysics Aristotle Metaphysics Book 1-4 Aristoteles v384-v322 Metaphysica (DE-588)4209121-4 gnd rswk-swf Metaphysics Many (Philosophy) One (The One in philosophy) Das Eine (DE-588)4250586-0 gnd rswk-swf Vielheit (DE-588)4188256-8 gnd rswk-swf Aristoteles v384-v322 Metaphysica (DE-588)4209121-4 u Vielheit (DE-588)4188256-8 s Das Eine (DE-588)4250586-0 s DE-604 Digitalisierung UB Erlangen application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016163434&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Halper, Edward C. One and many in Aristotle's Metaphysics books alpha - delta Aristotle / Metaphysics Aristotle Metaphysics Book 1-4 Aristoteles v384-v322 Metaphysica (DE-588)4209121-4 gnd Metaphysics Many (Philosophy) One (The One in philosophy) Das Eine (DE-588)4250586-0 gnd Vielheit (DE-588)4188256-8 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4209121-4 (DE-588)4250586-0 (DE-588)4188256-8 |
| title | One and many in Aristotle's Metaphysics books alpha - delta |
| title_auth | One and many in Aristotle's Metaphysics books alpha - delta |
| title_exact_search | One and many in Aristotle's Metaphysics books alpha - delta |
| title_exact_search_txtP | One and many in Aristotle's Metaphysics books alpha - delta |
| title_full | One and many in Aristotle's Metaphysics books alpha - delta Edward C. Halper |
| title_fullStr | One and many in Aristotle's Metaphysics books alpha - delta Edward C. Halper |
| title_full_unstemmed | One and many in Aristotle's Metaphysics books alpha - delta Edward C. Halper |
| title_short | One and many in Aristotle's Metaphysics |
| title_sort | one and many in aristotle s metaphysics books alpha delta |
| title_sub | books alpha - delta |
| topic | Aristotle / Metaphysics Aristotle Metaphysics Book 1-4 Aristoteles v384-v322 Metaphysica (DE-588)4209121-4 gnd Metaphysics Many (Philosophy) One (The One in philosophy) Das Eine (DE-588)4250586-0 gnd Vielheit (DE-588)4188256-8 gnd |
| topic_facet | Aristotle / Metaphysics Aristotle Metaphysics Book 1-4 Aristoteles v384-v322 Metaphysica Metaphysics Many (Philosophy) One (The One in philosophy) Das Eine Vielheit |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016163434&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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