Osamosvojitev Slovenije: "ali naj Republika Slovenija postane samostojna in neodvisna država?"
Gespeichert in:
| Format: | Buch |
|---|---|
| Sprache: | Slovenian |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Ljubljana
Nova Revija
2007
|
| Ausgabe: | 1. izd. |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Abstract Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | Zsfassung in engl. Sprache |
| Beschreibung: | 605 S. Ill. |
| ISBN: | 9789616580267 |
Internformat
MARC
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| 500 | |a Zsfassung in engl. Sprache | ||
| 648 | 7 | |a Geschichte 1989-1992 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Geschichte | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Politik | |
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| 651 | 4 | |a Europe, Eastern |x Politics and government |y 1989- | |
| 651 | 4 | |a Slovenia |x History |x Autonomy and independence movements | |
| 651 | 4 | |a Slovenia |x Politics and government |y 1990- | |
| 651 | 7 | |a Slowenien |0 (DE-588)4055302-4 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
| 651 | 7 | |a Jugoslawien |0 (DE-588)4028966-7 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804137187035316224 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | KAZALO
BESEDA AVTORICE
........................................................................................11
I. poglavje: PREBOJ DEMOKRACIJE
...............................................................13
1.
SVET
VLETU
1989.................................................................................15
a) Madžarska
..............................................................................................15
b) Poljska
....................................................................................................16
c) Romunija
...............................................................................................16
č) Češkoslovaška
.........................................................................................17
d) Nemška demokratična republika
(NDR)
................................................17
e)
Sovjetska zveza
........................................................................................18
f)Kitajska
..................................................................................................19
2.
JUGOSLAVIJA
..........................................................................................20
a) Rojstvo »naroda«
v
Srbiji
.........................................................................20
b) Napovedaní,
prepovedani
in odpovedaní
miting
v
Ljubljani
...................29
II.
poglavje: PREDHODNICE
...........................................................................33
1.
KORENINE
..............................................................................................35
2.
MISELNI PREBOJ
80.
LET
......................................................................40
a) Slovenski narod
in
slovenska kultura
.......................................................41
b) Priprava
in posledice Príspevkov
za slovenski nacionalni program
..............42
3. 57.
ŠTEVILKA NOVE REVIJE
................................................................46
4.
OD ZVEZNIH
IN
REPUBLIŠKIH USTAVNIH DOPOLNIL DO
DEMOSOVE USTAVE
.............................................................................50
5.
ODBOR ZA VARSTVO ČLOVEKOVIH
PRAVIC
..................................59
6.
TEMELJNA LISTINA SLOVENIJE
IN
MAJNIŠKA DEKLARACIJA
1989.....72
7.
OKROGLA
MIZA
....................................................................................77
III. poglavje: BITKA ZA PRAVICO DO POLITIČNEGA ORGANIZIRANJA
V
SLOVENIJI
....................................................................................................79
l.RAZPRAVEVSZDL
.................................................................................81
2.
NASTANEK NOVIH POLITIČNIH ORGANIZACIJ
............................85
a) Slovenska kmečka zveza (SKZ)
...............................................................85
b) Slovenska demokratična zveza (SDZ)
.....................................................87
c) Socialdemokratska
zveza Slovenije (SDZS)
.............................................90
7
č) Zeleni
Slovenije
(ZS)
..............................................................................95
d)
Slovenski kršćanski
demokrati (SKD)
.....................................................97
e) Slovenska
obrtniška stranka (SOS)
in Slovenska obrtnopodjetniška
stranka
(SOPS)...........................................................................................
99
f)
Sivi panterji
..........................................................................................102
3.
PREOBRAZBA DRUŽBENOPOLITIČNIH ORGANIZACIJ
..............104
a) Zveza socialistične mladine Slovenije (ZSMS)
.......................................104
b) Socialistična zveza delovnega ljudstva (SZDL)
......................................107
c) Zveza
komunistov
Slovenije (ZKS)
-
Stranka demokratične
prenove
(ZKS-SDP)
..............................................................................................109
4.
DEMOS
...................................................................................................113
IV.
poglavje: VOLITVE
....................................................................................123
1.
VOLILNA ZAKONODAJA
....................................................................125
2.
POLITIČNE ORGANIZACIJE
V
SREDSTVIH DRUŽBENEGA
OBVEŠČANJA
........................................................................................129
3.
VOLILNA KAMPANJA
..........................................................................132
4.
VOLILNIIZIDI
......................................................................................138
a) Predsedstvo
...........................................................................................139
b) Družbenopolitični zbor
........................................................................140
c) Zbor občin
...........................................................................................142
č) Zbor združenega dela
............................................................................142
5.
DRUGI
KROG
........................................................................................144
6.
KDO
SO
POSTALI SKUPŠČINSKI DELEGATI
...................................149
a) Družbenopolitični zbor
.........................................................................151
b) Zbor občin
...........................................................................................153
c) Zbor združenega
dela
............................................................................156
7.
KONSTITUIRANJE SKUPŠČINE REPUBLIKE SLOVENIJE
.............160
8.
IZVOLITEV REPUBLIŠKEGAIZVRŠNEGA SVETA
SKUPŠČINE RS
......................................................................................168
V.
poglavje: DEKLARACIJA
О
SUVERENOSTI DRŽAVE REPUBLIKE
SLOVENIJE
.....................................................................................................179
1.
MEDNARODNE RAZMERE SPOMLADI
1990..................................181
2.
JUGOSLAVIJA SPOMLADI
1990.........................................................182
3.
О
DEKLARACIJI
V
SLOVENIJI SPOMLADI
1990.............................186
4.
PO SPREJETJU DEKLARACIJE
............................................................197
VI.
poglavje: PLEBISCIT
..................................................................................201
1.
MEDNARODNE RAZMERE
V
DRUGI POLOVICI
1990..................203
2.
RAZMERE
V
JUGOSLAVIJI
V
DRUGI POLOVICI
1990....................205
3.
MED DEKLARACIJO
IN
PLEBISCITOM
V
SLOVENIJI
....................210
4.
BITKA ZA
23.
DECEMBER
...................................................................222
8
~ ~~~~
5.
OSNUTEK ZAKONA
О
PLEBISCITU
(21.
NOVEMBER
1990)........231
6.
ZAKON
O
PLEBISCITU
О
SAMOSTOJNOSTI
IN
NEODVISNOSTI
REPUBLIKE SLOVENIJE
.......................................253
7.
BITKA ZA PLEBISCITNO ZMAGO
.....................................................262
8.
OCENE
...................................................................................................268
VII. poglavje:
PROJEKT BRDO
......................................................................275
1.
MEDNARODNE RAZMERE OD
JANUÁRJA
DO MAJA
1991..........277
2.
JUGOSLAVIJA OD
JANUÁRJA
DO MAJA
1991.................................279
3.
OD PLEBISCITA DO PROJEKTA BRDO
............................................287
4.
RESOLUCIJA
О
RAZDRUŽITVI
..........................................................295
5.
RAZPRAVA
О
OSAMOSVOJITVI
........................................................303
6.
RAČJIOTOK
..........................................................................................318
7.
OCENA
POMEMBNOSTIDOGODKOV NA BRDU
APRILA
1991..........................................................................................323
VIII.
poglavje: VELIKI DAN
............................................................................327
1.
TUJINA MAJA
IN JUNIJA
1991............................................................329
2.
JUGOSLAVIJA OD MAJA DO SLOVENSKE SAMOSTOJNOSTI
.....331
3.
SLOVENIJA OD PROJEKTNIH
SKUPIN
DO SAMOSTOJNOSTI...
337
4.
NOVI SIMBOLI
.....................................................................................361
5.
OBRAVNAVATEMELJNIH
AKTOV
(24.-25.
JUNIJ
1991)................372
6.
OCENA
NAJUSODNEJŠIH
DNI
..........................................................385
IX.
poglavje: SLOVENSKA VOJSKA
...............................................................393
1.
KRITIČNOST DO JLA
KONEC
80.
LET
.............................................395
2.
NOVA POLITIČNA OBLAST
IN JLA
...................................................397
3.
PRVE ZAKONODAJNE SPREMEMBE
................................................404
4.
ZASEDBA REPUBLIŠKEGA ŠTABA
TERITORIÁLNE OBRAMBE
... 413
5.
INFORMACIJA
О
NABORNIKIH
........................................................416
6.
SLOVENIJA BREZ VOJSKE
IN
DEKLARACIJA ZA MIR
...................418
7.
SLOVENSKO-HRVAŠKIVOJAŠKI SPORAZUM
.................................422
8.
SLOVENSKI NABORNIKI NE GREDO VEČ
VJUGOSLOVANSKO VOJSKO
............................................................424
9.
PRORAČUNSKE POSTAVKE ZA OBRAMBO
....................................435
10.
ZAKON
О
OBRAMBI
IN ZAŠČITI
....................................................441
11.
NASTAJANJE SLOVENSKE VOJSKE
.................................................444
12.
VOJNA
..................................................................................................453
13.
IZREDNATAJNA SEJA
.......................................................................458
14.
ZMAGA
.................................................................................................466
X.
poglavje: KRATKA ERA SAMOSTOJNOSTI
.............................................471
l.BRIONI
...................................................................................................473
2.
BRIONSKA DEKLARACIJA
..................................................................477
3.
DEKLARACIJA V
SKUPŠČINI
..............................................................482
4.
RAZDRUŽITVENAIZHODIŠČA
........................................................491
5.
DEKLARACIJA O
JUGOSLAVIJI
..........................................................493
6.
ISKANJE
POTI MED SCILO
IN KARIBDO
........................................501
XI.
poglavje: MEDNARODNI
ODNOSI
........................................................505
1.
KDAJ BOMO
PRIZNANÍ?
.....................................................................507
2.
NAŠE SRCE
JE Z VAMI.....................................................................
510
3.
SPRAVLjrVA SKUPŠČINSKA OBRAVNAVA
........................................513
4.
SVARILA TUJINE
...................................................................................516
5.
PRIZADEVANJA ZA
PRIZNANJE
PO
25.
JUNIJU
1991....................519
6.
SPREJEM
V OZN
...................................................................................528
XII.
poglavje:
SKLEPNE
MISLI.......................................................................
531
VIRI IN
LITERATURA
...................................................................................553
l.VIRI
.........................................................................................................555
a)
Televizijska dokumentacija
(TV DOK)
.................................................557
b)
Skupścinska
dokumentacija
(DKO DZ RS)
.........................................559
c)
Arhiv
Republike
Slovenije
(ARS)..........................................................560
č)
Arhiv
SDS
............................................................................................560
d)
Fotografski arhivi
in avtorji fotografij
...................................................560
2.
LITERATURA
.........................................................................................561
a)
Knjige
...................................................................................................561
b) Casopisni
članki
...................................................................................565
INDEPENDENCE OF SLOVENIA
................................................................571
IMENSKO KAZALO
.......................................................................................595
10
Д
few months after the collapse of the Demos coalition, when the Peterle
.xYgovernment left office, the Republic Secretary for Culture, Dr.
Andrej
Capuder, complained about a strange clouding of ideas. He believed that it was
no longer clear what had been risked and who had been courageous. Suddenly,
everyone earned it all and the real victors will remain empty handed. Was Ca-
puder s fear in
1992
justified? What is the mood today, almost
16
years after
the collapse of SFRY and
15
years after Slovenia s acceptance into the group
of UN member states? Does basic knowledge exist about when, how and with
what the new Slovene state was created? Who cut the umbilical cord which had
linked Slovenia to the southern Slav nations for
73
years
(1918-1991),
at first
only the Serbs and Croats, but from the Second World War onwards also the
Macedonians, Montenegrins, Bosnians and Albanians? How distinct or con¬
nected were the collapse of communism in East European countries and in
Slovenia with aspirations for greater independence of republics within a federal
state, either in the form of a loose federation, asymmetric federation, confede¬
ration or in completely sovereign and independent states? Was the
démocra¬
tisation
of political life a pre-condition for new relations within Yugoslavia or
could the old political elite have established them? How much did the latter
contribute or to what extent were these processes alien and they were reconciled
with them only with difficulty or not at all? What were the relations between
the successors of the old power structures and the new political organisations
which, united in Slovenia in the Demos coalition, took over parliamentary and
executive power after the first free and democratic elections? How did the new
government to a large extent find itself fighting for national sovereignty, how
much was it united within itself and what kind of tactics did it adopt? Who
pulled the first thread and operatively proposed and who realised the legislative
basis for the change? How much did »luck« contribute to this (if this exists at
all in history?) and how much considered moves and clearly formulated aims?
Did a clear vision of these aims exist, based on the agreement of all actors or
did the real ideas on the solution of the Slovene national question not have real
actors to the same extent?
The questions pose themselves, some answers are already known and fixed and
some, if they are not explicitly already included in the previous chapters, I will try
and indicate in these final thoughts.
- _
INDEPENDENCE OF SLOVENIA
Dr. Dimitrij Rupel, one of the more prominent opposition intellectuals in the
eighties, in relation to the dilemma of whether to stay in Yugoslavia or for Slove¬
nia to make its own way, said mat he understood the forebears who feared Slo¬
vene independence. The basic dilemma, namely, was whether national interests
were better protected by the Slovenes remaining in Yugoslavia or leaving it. »If
we remain in Yugoslavia, we could even become embroiled in fratricidal war, so that
Slovene young men will fall for some shitty ideal, if you ll excuse the expression^ he
said after the elections when he became Republican Secretary for Foreign Affairs.
The dilemma was thus clear to Rupel and his more prominent fellow thinkers,
and the answer to it, too, since as an opposition political structure Demos offered
it right from its creation in
1989,
when it took a stand for »a sovereign state for the
Slovene nation, independent or in a confederation with other states
...
«2
The Slovene »velvet revolution« lagged slightly in comparison with other co¬
untries of »people s democracy«, such as Poland and Czechoslovakia, and was not
among the first swallows of democratic changes, which is a unique paradox here
in view of the generally widespread thesis about Yugoslavia, which in comparison
with other eastern peoples democracies cultivated the least »hard« form of com¬
munist or a socialist regime to human measure. Attempts at cooperation between
the old authorities and the newly created opposition did not follow the pattern of
other countries, opposition political organisations and their representatives were
not admitted to participation in authority, such as for example in Poland already
in the spring of
1989.
Nevertheless, in the autumn of
1989,
amendments to the
Slovene constitution were adopted that allowed political changes and the collap¬
se of monopoly political power. Electoral legislation was adopted at the end of
1989,
elections were held in Slovenia at the same time as in Croatia, in April and
May
1990
and thus achieved primacy among Yugoslav republics within SFRY,
which were swept up in a wave of
démocratisation,
since other republics only
held them in November or December
1990.
In relation to the Slovene national question, shifts had already been made in
the intellectual sphere a year earlier. In the view of Dr.
Aleš Gabrič,
the victor of
the political transformation that the Slovenes experienced at the beginning of the
nineties of the last century was the »cultural opposition to the communist regi¬
me«.3 The expression is not entirely felicitous so it would be worth supplemen¬
ting
Gabrič,
since the term »cultural« is essentially too narrow to embrace some
of the intellectuals within it. That the first conceptual breakthrough occurred in
circles known as the cultural community, is beyond doubt, since this is already
demonstrated by the public appearance of Slovene writers in
1985
entitled The
Slovene Nation and Slovene Culture, and above all this critical group of individuals
was crystallised and affirmed by Contributions to the Slovene National Program-
1
Janko Lorenci,
Dimitrij Rupel, Sodobniki,
Partizanska knjiga,
Ljubljana,
1990,
p.
115.
Program
demokratične opozicije Slovenije, Dnevnik,
13.1. 1990.
3
Dr.
Aleš Gabrič, Demosov kulturnopolitični program, Demosov
zbornik,
volume
3-4,
Maribor,
2001,
p.
615.
574
~ ~~
________________________________________________
INDEPENDENCE OF SLOVENIA.
me, better known as Issue No.
57
of Nova
revija.
The conceptual core was also
soon formulated within the then circle around Nova
revija (Niko
Grafenauer,
Dr. Tine Hribar and Spomenka Hribar, Dr. Ivan
Urbančič,
Dr.
Jože Pučnik,
Dr. France
Bucar,
Dr. Peter Jambrek and Dr. Dimitrij Rupel) which provided
the tools for the political struggle and also later operative authority. The official
party authorities were alarmed by publication of Issue
57
of Nova
Revija,
that
the contributions had an
anti-
Yugoslav character and that they fractured the Yu¬
goslav community since they included words about the military occupation by a
national foreign army, about Slovene state sovereignty from which would appear
a confederation or independent Slovenia, about free nations that independently
decide about linkage, and even about ending links with other nations etc. To use
the words of Spomenka Hribar, Issue
57
of Nova
revija
in
1987
certainly signifi¬
ed spiritual freedom,4 it meant the end of hopelessness, especially when it became
clear that things could never be as they had been before.
In addition to those in the cultural field, a sociological and legal group also
made a breakthrough: Dr. Peter Jambrek, Dr. France
Bucar,
Dr.
Veljko Rus
and
Dr. Ivan Svetlik. In the spring of
1988
they thus already formulated the thesis
for constitutional development which the groups presented together as the fun¬
damental principles Theses for a Constitution for the Republic of Slovenia in which,
in addition to political pluralism, was also enshrined the principle that Slovenia
should regulate its own internal political, legislative, defence and cultural matters
independently.
»Ђе
Republic of Slovenia is the state of the Slovene nation,^ was
enshrined at the very beginning. In this case, too, the official powers responded
to it with accusations of isolationism, anti-ideological tendencies and making the
nation absolute.
The deepest gulf, involving the most people and having the greatest reverbera¬
tion within the triangle of the emerging Slovene political opposition, the Slovene
party authorities and the federal authorities, including the JLA (Yugoslav Peo¬
ple Army), opened during the Serbo-Croat led process against Janez
Janša, Ivan
Borštner,
David
Tasić
and
Franci Zavri,
known as the process against the four,
with the creation of the Committee for the Protection of Human Rights (Igor
Bavčar)
and in the mass demonstrations outside the court on
Roška
cesta.
The
spiritual freedom of the intellectual elite obtained a wider extent and, with the
»arrival of the nation on
Roška
cesta« in
Ljubljana actually became the property
of the masses, the property of all Slovenes. So Dr.
Janko
Prunks
view that the
process against the four is something that awakened in Slovenes deep offence and
disappointment at centralist Belgrade,6 must be supplemented by the fact that
it also profoundly strengthened Slovene national consciousness and a conviction
that the obligatory »brotherhood and unity« prescribed for decades were actually
only useless
clichés.
Rosvita
Pešek,
Dosje, Projekt osamosvojitev,
1996.
Dr. Tine
Hribar, Nova osamosvojitvena volja Slovencev, p.
281.
Dr.
Janko
Prunk,
Slovenski narodni vzpon, narodna politika
(1768-1992), 1992,
p.
416.
575
INDEPENDENCE OF SLOVENIA
The official party authorities were not prepared to enter the national trenches
and left out neither Yugoslavia nor socialist self-management with the Funda¬
mental Document of Slovenia in
1989.
At a widely reverberating public session of
the League of Socialist Youth of Slovenia (ZSMS) in May
1989
the opposition
had already announced that »we want to live in a sovereign state of the Slovene
nation«. The short, clear document entitled May Declaration
1989
was written
at a sitting and Dr. France
Bucar,
Dr. Dimitrij Rupel,
Veno
Taufer,
Dr. Hubert
Požarnik
in Dr.
Ivo Urbančič
cooperated in its elaboration. The two documents
became a guide to the political groups and a public obligation in relation to the
national question: the Fundamental Document ofthe socio-political group of the
then authorities and the May Dechration of the emerging opposition.
The strike at Litostroj at the end of
1987,
in addition to entirely union de¬
mands, also raised the demand for autonomous political organisations (France
Tomšič),
in opposition to the League of Communists. The social democratic
demands of labour, in particular the call for organisation, were followed after
half a year by farmers and young farmers. At first fairly modestly and extremely
cautiously, as if they had no intention of trying to gain power, and then with the
creation of other autonomous political organisations, and above all the coalition
Demos, with the self-confident call of Ivan Oman: »We re going into elections to
win!«7
The Slovene Democratic Alliance was established at the beginning of
1989,
in which a large part of the cultural, legal, sociological and philosophical intel¬
ligentsia were found. It was presided over by Dr. Dimitrij Rupel. Among all the
opposition organisations it had the most media-skilful and articulate core and it
was soon spoken of as the »intellectual core« of Demos, its »brains trust« etc.
Over the course of a year, therefore, slowly, as a kind of structural pillar of
Slovene society, new political organisations emerged. Nature conservationists fo¬
unded the
Zeleni
Slovenije
(Greens of Slovenia
-
ZS) lead by Dr.
Dušan Plut,
small business persons were found in two parties:
Slovenska obrtniška
stranka
(Slovene Trades Party), of which the president was Franc Golija, but its most re¬
cognised face soon became the Kranj businessman, Vitomir
Gros,
and
Slovenska
obrtno podjetniška stranka
(Slovene Trade and Commerce Party), lead by
Rado
Bergant. Pensioners formed their own party
Sivi panterji
(Grey Panthers) under
the presidency of mag.
Dragan Černetič,
and Christians could find their electoral
base and core in
Slovensko
kršćansko
sociálno
gibanje
(Slovene Christian Social
Movement), which tried to avoid party political identification, but a group soon
predominated in it which was committed to organisation of a political party and
entry to the political battlefield. The Slovene Christian Democrats (SKD) was
taken over by a man of simple and understandable language, Lojze Peterle who,
without fuss and fairly unnoticed by the media, to everyone s surprise in a bare
6
months made an »opposition« election victor out of this party.
7
TV
DOK,
vka
465,13.1. 1990.
576
~
____________________________________________
INDEPENDENCE OF SLOVENIA
At the April elections, three out of five socio-political organisations prepared
for the April elections. The League of Communists of Slovenia (ZKS) was most
successful. Despite the process against the four, which caused a significant loss
of membership, it managed to win as the largest single party. The 14th Congress
of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia contributed to this to a significant
extent, at which the Slovene Communists, with the support of the Croatians,
left the hall and
mus
decisively contributed to the end of one of the important
integrative
factors of Yugoslavia, the
avant
garde party. The president of the cen¬
tral committee of the Slovene League of Communists, Milan
Kučan,
succeeded
Dr. Ciril
Ribičič
some months before the elections, and the party was transfor¬
med immediately before the elections. The League of Socialist Youth of Slovenia
(ZSMS), which at the time of
démocratisation
supported the alternative and also
themselves successfully undermined the monopoly structures, did not enter the
victorious coalition after the elections, despite the logical continuation of this
cooperation, and did not participate in authority. Its leadership since the process
against the four had been in the hands of
Jožef Školč.
The Socialist Alliance of
Working People, transformed into the Socialist Alliance of Slovenia (SZS), despi¬
te its frontline role, which it stressed throughout and despite the likable features
of its president,
Jože Smole
(»Father Christmas«) and expectation of high electo¬
ral success, came last of the reformed socio-political organisations.
The decision to found Demos was crucial for obtaining the levers of power.
If the new political organisations had not combined the energy that had been
created within them, and had only struggled individually, the reformed Com¬
munist party, as the strongest individual group, would also have retained the
mechanisms of power after the elections. The decision in favour of a joint appe¬
arance at the elections, initially of a narrower core (SDZ, SDZS and SKD) and
later associated organisations (SKZ, SOS, ZS), was crucial for obtaining electoral
victory. The decision of the alliances or parties in favour of the Demos coalition,
namely, also meant unifying around common aims in these organisations, since
the establishment of a multi-party system and the sovereignty of a state of the
Slovene nation were the highest priorities.
»
There was never any serious doubftP
about that among the leaders of the Demos parties, Lojze Peterle (SKD), Ivan
Oman (SKZ), Dr. Dimitrij Rupel (SDZ), Dr.
Jože Pučnik (SDZS),
Dr.
Dušan
Plut
(ZS)
and Franc Golija
(SOS).
The decision that the coalition of opposition parties would be led by a pro¬
minent personality with a dissident past, Dr.
Jože Pučnik
showed itself to be
correct several times in the key independence year. He deserved the role more
on the grounds of an overall professional (sociological, psychological, anthropo¬
logical, philosophical etc) analysis than on a purely political one.
Pučnik
knew
from his own experience what the party apparatus could do. He had lived for
8
Dr.
Jože Pučnik,
statement for
Dosje, Projekt
osamosvojìtev,
personal archive
Rosvita Pesek,
unpublis¬
hed material,
1996.
- _____ __
INDEPENDENCE OF SLOVENIA
several decades in the democratic West (Federal Republic of Germany), which
gave him a sound understanding of the functioning of parliamentary democracy.
He was completely independent financially and in business, since he had retired
before coming to Slovenia. He was a sociologist by basic qualification, and he had
been engaged in deontic logic so with natural sociological processes in general.
He was an articulate speaker, with clear ideas, without demagogy and clearly a
man without fear. His decision not to take over leadership of executive authority
irrespective of whether it was taken for health or for any other reason had a good
side apart from a number of doubts, regrets and his personal »specific lack of
executive and business qualification«. As an external critic, he could afford to be
»unburdened« by the operational (incapacity of the bureaucratic state apparatus,
making use of the majority in the assembly he knew how to pressure and drive
it when it was a matter of implementing the more crucial independence tasks
connected with relations with the federal state. He also used the media to good
advantage to put pressure on the executive council or assembly delegates from his
own ranks. It immediately published his announcements, which also caused bad
blood within the coalition partners, above all SDZ, not only with the opposition.
His political fellow thinkers thus often today justifiably today speak of him as the
»motor of Slovene independence«.
The takeover of authority passed with some friction and tension with journa¬
lists of the most influential of the media,
Televizija
Ljubljana. Peterles executive
council, after the first test of strength between the proposed prime minister and
his nominator, the president of the Presidency of the Republic of Slovenia, Mi¬
lan
Kučan,
and with some doubts in connection with the appointment of Igor
Bavčar
and Janez
Janša
as republican secretaries of internal affairs and of people s
defence, was appointed without major hesitations, and the prime minister stres¬
sed in his programme speech above all the full sovereignty of the Republic of
Slovenia, including Slovenes doing military service in Slovenia and orders being
given in the Slovene language, which was spelt out decisively by the government.9
Sovereignty was to be established by constitutional and agreed pathways, and
a confederation was acceptable for the executive council on the basis of a clear
confederative
treaty »in which the
confederative
states would voluntarily determine
what to leave to the central level and how to finance common needs«.10
The smallest party in Demos, SOS, was the first to hasten with normative
acts towards Slovene independence, which already intended to achieve Slovenia s
secession with a Declaration of the Independence of the Slovene State which would
be finally confirmed by a second legal act and a referendum after a year. SDZ
soon took over the initiative and included it in its own, very much milder, modi¬
fied proposal, and SOS revoked their original declaration in exchange for being
joint proposers. At the beginning of July, therefore, to the great surprise of the
9
DKO
DZ Republike Slovenije,
2nd joint session of all chambers of the Assembly RS, minutes of the
session, Lojze Peterle, p.
7.
10
Ibid, p.
5.
578
~~~
_________
INDEPENDENCE OF SLOVENIA
opposition, even the most reformist, the agenda of the session of the Assembly
included a Declaration on the full sovereignty of the State of the Republic of Slovenia.
It proclaimed the sovereignty of Slovenia; the federal constitution, federal laws
and regulations would only apply in Slovenia if they were not in conflict with
the constitution and laws of the republic. The primacy of republican legislation
over federal was thus established and the Assembly was committed to specify by
constitutional law which federal regulations would no longer be applied in the
Republic of Slovenia. The unease of the opposition, above all
SDP,
which raised
procedural questions, demanded analyses, disputed the quality of the text, was
overcome after a joint session; and after a short break and coordination among all
the parties represented in the Assembly and a »joint« proposal of a Declaration on
the sovereignty of the State of the Republic of Slovenia was adopted with only three
votes against and two abstentions. Actually, adopting the declaration showed the
leading coalition several things. First, that the opposition was divided in opposing
the proposal on various levels: the Socialists, for instance, did not oppose the dec¬
laration and supported it without a lot of words, the youth party (ZSMS) were
more or less indifferent, and the reformists
(SDP)
threw up a heap of deficiencies,
immediately highlighting their distance from the proposal and shared decision-
making. Not least, there were a whole
55
votes against placing the proposal on
the agenda. The other experience showed that the Demos coalition could be
successful
ifit
was fully coordinated and if there were no fractures within it. The
third factor was motivational: not even two months had passed since it had taken
over power (far less the
100
days of peace allowed in established west European
democracies!) when the first step was taken towards realising electoral promises.
Demos took electoral promises seriously, to which testifies
Pučnik s
statement
that, because major movement towards Slovene sovereignty could not be shown,
voters needed to be told that Demos remained firmly committed to establishing
Slovene independence and sovereignty.11 The Declaration in question, therefore
was created from this decisiveness within Demos, together with a clear awareness
that it was anybody s guess what kind of legal effects it would have immediately.
The tiny, at first sight marginal booklet by the historian, Dr.
Janko
Prunk,
entitled New Slovene Self-confidence, is eloquent for a slightly fuller and clearer
image of the attitude of the most prominent Slovene politicians had at that time
to the national question. In it are published none other than interviews with
politicians that were made soon after the April elections.12 It is first and foremost
portraits of individuals, together with their assessments and prognoses of Slovene
political life. The image that the reader gets from
Prunks
book is the following.
A collective
(Gregor
Golobič, Miha Kovač,
Pavle
Gantar, Mile Šetinc and Janez
Kopač)
answered for ZSMS and briefly stressed that in relation to the national
question they were considering
a confederative
status for Slovenia, which would
Rosvita Pesek,
Dosje,
Projekt
osamosvojitev,
1996.
12
Dr.
Janko
Prunk,
Nova
slovenska
samozavest,
Pogovori
s
slovenskimi političnimi prvaki,
Lumi,
Panatal,
Ljubljana,
1990.
- — —
INDEPENDENCE OF SLOVENIA
be linked to other republics on the principle of a Yugoslav economic commu¬
nity. Dr. Lev
Kreft
answered for
SDP in
relation to the national question and
stressed that he would prefer to discuss the theme in more stable European and
Yugoslav conditions, in the direction of
a confederative
position of Slovenia wit¬
hin Yugoslavia, with openness to European
integrative
currents. Socialist Borut
Šuklje
viewed independence as a process, which he gave priority than formal
acts of proclaiming secession, which in itself brought nothing. A suitable form
of confederation (as an association of independent states within the framework
of the existing Yugoslav boundaries, combined in a trade, customs and perhaps
monetary union) would be an equally valuable solution as secession. The Liberal
(formerly SOS) Vitomir
Gros
saw the solution of the Slovene economy, and thus
also national existence, only in a completely independent Slovene state, which
would not be bound to any block, pact or confederation with anyone. In the
interview with Leo
Šešerko
(ZS),
he did not perceive anything from the aspect of
the national question. Among the more interesting answers are those of three key
holders of Demos authority, Lojze Peterle, Dr. France
Bucar
and Dr.
Jože Pučnik
and President of the Presidency Milan
Kučan.
Kučan
(the interview with him took place at the end of October
1990)
beli¬
eved that creating a Slovene national state cannot be the final aim.
»
This does not
in principle exclude a number of new Yugoslav integrations on the basis of complete
equality and voluntary association, based on real and not on presumed, and especially
not on ideological interests:«13
Dr. France
Bucar
(the interview with him took place at the beginning of
August
1990)
considered that it after Slovene sovereignty, an inevitable conse¬
quence is a very modest analysis of the Slovene national position. »In
iugoslavia,
as it was and as it is, we have no possibility of our own national development, nor
for preserving the national identity, nor for continuing our own cultural affiliation.
We are drawn into apolitical cultural circle which is in conflict with all our national
traditions, which denies us as a nation
andas
individuals.«1^
Lojze Peterle (the interview took place in September
1990)
more than a perso¬
nal point of view presented the proposal of the committee for legislation, which
had already prepared a draft
confederative
treaty in which the basic points related
to the economic system, foreign policy, defence and joint institutions and met¬
hods of reaching decisions.
Dr.
Jože Pučnik
(the interview took place at the beginning of June
1990)
was
the most extensive and decisive in relation to conditions in Yugoslavia. As a So¬
cial Democrat, he rejected any form of association with other nations that was
forced. The Yugoslav federation did not in his opinion have legitimacy, since the
Slovenes had not decided on it at free and democratic elections. »We therefore
demand an independent state, which can voluntarily and by its own equal decision
perhaps combine in joint projects with other nations within or outside Yugoshvia.
13
Ibid, p.
154.
14
Ibid, p.
117.
580
INDEPENDENCE OF SLOVENIA
This means that we are in favour of cooperation when and to the extent that this
is also in our interest.
Ће
current federation does not allow all this. It is therefore
dead for us and it is only a question of
tíme
before we shake off the forced bonds of
this obsolete project.«1 * He continued with the opinion that only an independent
Slovenia can sensibly decide on what, with whom, when and how to will be as¬
sociated. »The path to integration and linkage in Europe is
aho
necessarily the path
of independence of the Slovene state. The Slovene Social Democratic Party does not
retreat from this.«16
In the circumstances of approximately such a political understanding of the
Yugoslav reality, at the beginning of October
1990
the Socialists formulated an
initiative for a plebiscite, which was intended to be more of a consultative nature.
It was soon apparent that this would not occur very soon, since the president of
the Socialists, Viktor
Žakelj,
enumerated a series of things that had first to be
done: from the adoption of a modern Citizenship Act to the establishment of
communication with external political forces.17 The Socialists are often mentio¬
ned as the first initiators of a plebiscite, which is only partially true and only if
one has in mind merely the formal procedure in the Assembly. However, it was
already enshrined in the Demos programme published in newspaper
Demokra¬
cija
on
19
December
1989
mat the citizens of Slovenia would decide by referen¬
dum on the internal arrangement of Slovenia and its external links,18 or that a
plebiscite would »realise the nations right to self-determination«.19
A key move towards actual implementation of the plebiscite happened at the
beginning of November
1990,
only a few days before a closed meeting of the
Demos delegate club in
Poljče
at which delegates of the coalition supported the
plebiscite with great enthusiasm. Right from May
1 1990,
when Dr. Tine Hribar
and Spomenka Hribar, Dr.
Jože Pučnik
and Dr. Peter Jambrek met at the home
of Dr. France and Ivka
Bucar in
Bohinjska
Bistrica,
namely, it was intended that
a constitutional referendum bill would be adopted not later than
23
December.
This meant that the date of the formation of the new state would correspond to
the adoption of the Constitution, and this would be confirmed in a constitutio¬
nal referendum.
The shift from a constitutional referendum to the plebiscite question Should
the Republic of Slovenia become a sovereign and independent state? was of crucial
significance since it had become so complicated during the constitutional discus¬
sion and numerous supplements to it in the assembly that it was quite obvious
that there would be no agreement on the Constitution by the end of
1990.
Testi¬
monies somewhat differ as to how exactly in the last days before the meeting in
15
Ibid, p.
88.
16
Ibid.
17
Delo,
13.11.1990.
18
Dr.
Božo
Repe,
Viri
о
demokratizaciji
in osamosvojìtvi
Slovenije
(1.
del:
opozicija
in
oblast),
2002,
p.
216.
19
Delo,
18.1. 1990.
581
INDEPENDENCE OF SLOVENIA
Poljče
the spark was born within the circle of Dr. Peter Jambrek, Dr. Tine Hribar,
Mag. Tone
Jerovšek
and Dr.
Jože Pučnik.
Certainly, though, shifts occurred im¬
mediately before the president of the Demos club, Dr. Franc
Zagožen,
called the
meeting in
Poljče,
with a different agenda without mention of the plebiscite and
that Dr. Tine Hribar, in a break during the course of the meeting in
Poljče,
per¬
suaded Janez
Janša
and Dr. France
Bučar. Lojze
Peterle, president of the executive
council, was not acquainted at all with the initiative on the plebiscite and because
of leaving
Poljče
in haste only learned of it post
festům.
The time that remained for the Demos coalition between
9-Ю
November
and
23
December
1990
was short, only a month and a half: the president of the
coalition, Dr.
Jože Pučnik,
because of the many tasks that waited, was clearly
aware of this. On the same day, he informed some journalists in Ptuj that there
would be a plebiscite on
23
December. Great offence was taken, both within the
Presidency RS, which was angry at not being involved in the formulating of such
an important initiative (Ciril Zlobec) and among some members of the Demos
coalition, that
Pučnik
had again been too hasty (Dr. Rupel, Dr.
Plut).
The initi¬
ative, with such a short time scale also greatly reverberated within the opposition
and met with complete unreadiness; this is also demonstrated by the demands
-
when the draft: Plebiscite Act had reached the floor of the assembly
-
for the
debate to be withdrawn from the agenda.
The time from the middle of November right up to
6
December
1990,
when
the Plebiscite Act was passed, showed how different were views on the speed of
performing the independence steps. The polemics and divisions went in two di¬
rections. On the one hand, mainly the Reformers and Liberal Democrats tended
towards delaying the plebiscite to the early months of
1991,
so February or March,
since the time pressure for holding the plebiscite on
23
December
1990
was not
to their liking. The Socialists supported as early a plebiscite as possible.
SDP
and
LDS were reassured neither by analyses nor the information provided by members
of the executive council who, during adoption of the draft, extensively presented
the economic and political conditions in Yugoslavia. The Reformers warned aga¬
inst nationalism, political cleavage and of Slovenia easily becoming the poor man
of Europe because of an ill-considered decision. The Liberal Democrats trusted in
the Presidency RS, which was supposed to judge when was the most favourable
moment for holding the plebiscite and only then propose to the Assembly a date
for holding it. Not least, even President
Kučan
in a speech to the Assembly on the
plebiscite, reminded the Demos government that it could only gain the widest
democratic legitimacy
(!)
with a plebiscite, since its decision had not so far been
verified at the widest level. As if a mere half year had not passed since the Demos
government had been constituted and as if Demos had not gone into the elections
witb the demand for the independence of Slovenia.
The date for holding the plebiscite was seriously hard for the opposition to
take; mis is also shown by the initiative of the Reformers to call the referendum by
international treaty. Delegates of the Demos coalition answered the reproaches and
582
~~
INDEPENDENCE OF SLOVENIA
hesitations immediately and pressed the opposition into a position in which they
did not want to find themselves.
Marjan Podobnik
thus delicately reproached Mi¬
lan
Balažic
and Janez
Kocijančič
that they were not in favour of the plebiscite and
were thus seeking every possible objection.
Spomenica Hribar
stated that Slovenia
would really become the pauper of Europe
ifit
remained in Yugoslavia. The motto
of the Demos delegates was that all analyses showed that the least risky course of
action for Slovenia was to form its own state. The Plebiscite Bill was adopted with a
convincing majority, but a large part of the delegates sitting in the hall did not want
to take a position on the bill at all: not to abstain and not to vote against.
In addition to the date of holding the referendum, the other most important
point of division between the Demos majority and the opposition parties was
the question of what sort of majority should suffice for a successful outcome
of the referendum. Because of these disagreements, President Milan
Kučan
was
involved in overcoming the differences between the parties and he called a num¬
ber of dramatic meetings that lasted late into the night. The leading members
of Demos stuck to the view that an ordinary majority, i.e., a majority of those
voting, would be sufficient for a successful outcome of the plebiscite. The Liberal
Democrats in particular, when they had become reconciled to the date of the
plebiscite, unconditionally insisted that an absolute majority was required for
a successful outcome. Milan
Kučan,
who was presiding, also did an about turn,
saying at first that below a standard of
50%
of
50%
could not be accepted, but
when it was clear that LDS and
SDP
would not give in, joined their demand
for an absolute majority, which meant that the plebiscite would succeed only
if at least half of all registered voters voted for it, not just a majority of those
voting. The first standard means that it is sufficient for a successful outcome of
the referendum if half of registered voters cast their vote and at least half of these
must vote in favour. The second standard is essentially stricter, since it specifies
that more than half of all registered voters must vote for an independent state,
irrespective of how many people actually vote. The leading members of Demos
based the lower standard for the success of the plebiscite on possible bad weather
conditions, which would make it difficult for older people in particular to go to
the polling stations, fear of an intervention by the JLA, which could intimidate
voters, and the lack of a need to set such a high standard. They also feared other
reactions of the federal authorities. The smallest Demos party, LS, even expressed
its fear with a successful amendment to the Plebiscite Act, by which the right of
Slovenes to self-determination would not be exhausted irrespective of the result
of the plebiscite, which in those days meant above all a unique reserve that in the
event of a failure of the plebiscite the Slovenes could apply self-determination
again later. Fear at the possible non-adoption of the Plebiscite Act was genuinely
great, as is also shown by the proposal of the Christian Democrats that in voting
for the act, delegates should declare themselves individually.
The Plebiscite Act was finally adopted with no votes against and
203
votes in
favour, and the date of holding the plebiscite was also specified. An agreement
- _
INDEPENDENCE OF SLOVENIA
____________________________________________________
that the parties had signed the same morning certainly contributed to this (Spo-
menka Hribar had worked hard for this), and in it they bound themselves to a
common approach and coordinated activity in its implementation, and above all
that no party or coalition would impute a positive result of the plebiscite.
The adoption of the Plebiscite Act was followed by an extensive media campa¬
ign for a positive result. All segments of civil society were involved, from Group
57,
the Conference for Slovenia, Alliance of Associations of Combatants of the
National Liberation War, to the movement for a culture of peace and non-violence,
pensioners alliances and others. To a large extent, parties operating in Slovenia ex¬
pressed themselves in favour of a positive result in the plebiscite and they were joi¬
ned by members of other nations and nationalities from the territory of Yugoslavia.
Dr. Tine Hribar stated that a precondition for the successful result of the plebiscite
was above all the ceremony of piety held in July
1990
in
Kočevski Rog,
which on a
symbolic level signified the end of civil war and genuine national reconciliation.
The pre-plebiscite time is today valued as a time of great unity of Slovene poli¬
ticians, which ended soon after the plebiscite had been held. The Plebiscite Act,
namely, had specified a six-month deadline for taking over all the functions of the
federation and for final independence from Yugoslavia. And there was still great
tension in the period from December up to and including
25
June
1991.
Relati¬
ons between Slovenia and the federal authorities, primarily the army high com¬
mand, which enforced a state of emergency in the spring, pushed the domestic
political elite into the adoption of decisions on a speedy exit from Yugoslavia. The
first blow was already struck at the very beginning of the year, when Serbia raided
the monetary system. A planned arrest of individuals in the Croatian and Slovene
leadership soon became known. In March, a planned military coup was only avo¬
ided by a hairsbreadth because of the internal difficulties in the Soviet Union.
The government coalition was confronted at home with numerous company
bankruptcies and, consequently, ever worse economic conditions, which increased
the pressure on Peterles executive council. Internal criticism of Demos at the ex¬
pense of the government that they should hurry with more energetic moves, was
joined by the opposition, on the grounds that Slovenia was inadequately prepared
for conditions after the plebiscite and that, by ignoring the Belgrade authorities,
it had itself contributed to such chaotic conditions. Into the bargain disagree¬
ment between President of the Executive Council Peterle and Dr. Rupel increased,
which caused the first proposal for replacement. The leader of the coalition, Dr.
Pučnik,
clearly explained the pressure that he exerted on the executive council
with the words that he was aware that the Demos government was in a tragic
situation. »It has to do a great deal of work, it must carry out the structural transfor¬
mations on which the Slovenes had decided and during this must actually promise only
material sacrifices to
lefi
and right. What it can promise positively is, unfortunately,
only on a symbolic level: sovereignty, independence, serving at home, eventually our
own currency.«10
20
TV
DOK
vka
699,
Žarišče,
dr.
Jože Pučnik,
8. 2.1991.
584
~~~
INDEPENDENCE OF SLOVENIA
In February
1991,
a marked public shift in thinking about
a confederative
Yugoslavia with both Dr.
Jože Pučnik
and Milan
Kučan.
Such a form of associ¬
ation with other republics, primarily with Croatia, was considered no longer to
have any chance since a confederation had for some time only been mentioned
as a »pretence«. Nevertheless, the Slovene president of the Presidency took part in
talks with the presidents of other republics, which were held one after another in
the spring of
1991
and at which possibilities were sought of solving the crisis in
Yugoslavia.
Kučan
fairly quickly said publicly that nothing could be hoped from
these talks, that they were only buying time and flogging a dead horse. In Febru¬
ary, the delegate clubs, without LDS, prepared a resolution on
disassociation
and
thus continued the debate in the Assembly on the manner of disintegration of
the common state. It was clearly visible in the debate that there was an awareness
that the separation from Yugoslavia could also occur a painful manner, but that
Slovenia would secede, with or without an agreement.
The Liberal Democrats did not like the hyperproduction of resolutions and
during debate made the reproach that it was just as well that they did not also
get carnations
(J.
Školč).
A month later the Social Democrats demanded a debate
on immediate independence and met with resistance to debating this question
from both the Reformers and the Liberal Democrats, and the executive council
showed a clear reluctance, since they could not work to instructions published in
the daily papers.
The debate was interrupted because talks among the presidents of the republic
presidencies, who were meeting in various Yugoslav cities, had not yet ended.
Due to this kind of initiative and pressures within Demos, it was decided at the
end of March that, in view of the clear delay, work would be started in project
groups at an accelerated speed. Janez
Janša
and Igor
Bavčar
did a great deal of
operational work at
Brdo pri Kranju,
where meetings of groups took place. After
the completion of projects, there was actually a balance of conditions on the table
in all the activities which are crucial for independence.
In April, the smallest of the Demos parties, the Liberal Party, demanded im¬
mediate secession, and they were joined by the Social Democrats and the Far¬
mers Alliance. On a legislative level, the strenuous process also ended in spring
of adopting and amending legislation in the defence field, where the opposition
contested to the utmost the questions of budget funds for defence, demilitarisa¬
tion and conscientious objection. Publicly presented initiatives entitled Declara¬
tion for Peace were also joined by ZS, or rather ZS was among the co-proposers
and, with the exception of Ivan Oman, these initiatives were signed by all other
members of the Presidency RS, which was the commander-in-chief of the armed
forces under the existing legislation. In April, the functioning of executive autho¬
rity was crucial. A personnel crisis was overcome, when demands first appeared
for the replacement of the secretary for agriculture, Osterc (there was no repla¬
cement), the resignations of the holders of key ministries of the economy and
finance, Dr.
Jože Mencinger
and Dr.
Marko Kranjec
were announced and also
- - —
INDEPENDENCE OF SLOVENIA
realised,
lhe
replacement of the secretary for information,
Stane Stanic,
and his
replacement by
Jelko Kacin,
was much less painful.
The work of project groups already gave the first positive results at the end of
April, which were presented to the delegates of the Assembly, which quietened
both the opposition, which had already been talking about negligent government
and had lodged a no confidence motion, as well as those dissatisfied within the
Demos coalition. At the end of April, the leading members of the Demos parties
and holders of key government offices once again closed ranks and, on
Račji otok
at
Brdo,
all clearly committed themselves to take full personal responsibility for
the successful completion of the project of Slovenia s independence. There was a
high awareness among them of the responsibility of their behaviour, but also a
latent fear of failure; the brief, rare minutes of discussions testify to this; how in
the case of defeat the independence politicians would be impaled and hung in the
market square, or be pushed into a situation in which they would have to ask for
re-admittance to the federation.
That was the time when the violence in Croatia was greatly increasing and
when the Serbs began armed rebellion in areas in which they were the majority
population. President Peterle therefore turned to the assembly delegates with the
words that civil war had started in Yugoslavia and that it was essential to speed
up adoption of legislation connected with the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Discord
was only visible during adoption of the Citizenship Act, which the Liberal De¬
mocrats obstructed. Slovenia at that time sent its proposal for dissolution to all
the republics, but only the Republic of Croatia responded, which accepted the
dissolution of Yugoslavia into two or more states.
May, from the point of view of the readiness of Slovenia to defend itself, was
also a litmus test for evaluating events in the June-July defence war. In the mid¬
dle of May, it was decided at a wider operational meeting, and later also within
narrower political circles, that Slovenia would answer a possible attack by the JLA
with force. Only a few days later, a second serious incident occurred (the first
was at the start of October
1990,
when soldiers of the Yugoslav Army occupied
the premises of the Republican Territorial Defence Headquarters
-
RŠ
TO
-
on
Prežihova ulica
in Ljubljana) between the JLA and staff of the territorial defen¬
ce training centre, which trained the first generation of Slovene soldiers. When
members of the centre arrested two military personnel that had come too close to
the centre, and soon thereafter released them, the JLA responded by surrounding
the teaching centre. During evening negotiations in the urban municipal buil¬
ding, there was a spectacular kidnapping of the regional commandant of the TO,
Vladimir Milosevic. The first fatality also occurred at that time among demon¬
strators, which was caused by a retreating JLA tank. The parties in the Assembly
began an agreement that it would prepare mass gatherings in a weeks time and
show united will against this kind of ill-discipline and activity of the JLA, but ne¬
gotiations ended with hard words. The meeting in support of the
Maribor
events
ended in Ljubljana without the opposition, which rescinded its participation
586
INDEPENDENCE OF SLOVENIA
immediately before the start: LDS on the pretext that there had already been
too many of these demonstrations, and the Reformers began discussions on the
organisation of the meeting with bargaining, which was several times repeated
up to the »great day«; they conditioned their participation on the prior adoption
of a new constitution, and
Jožef Školč
demanded in writing from the president
of the Presidency that the training centres in Pekre and on
Ig
should be closed.
The lesson from the non-participation of the opposition at the Ljubljana meeting
was instructive for the Demos parties and led many to the conviction that it was
also necessary to prepare for the possibility of adopting key independence acts
without the votes of the opposition or even with tlieir opposition.
The last month of the existence of RS within SFRY began with a great As¬
sembly scandal. It was caused by the new secretary for finance,
Dušan Šešok,
who clearly told delegates that Slovenia would not get all the levers of effective
power into her hands with independence. There would not be passports, there
would not be a division of the balance and Slovene money and, similarly, the
state border with Croatia would not be arranged. His words shocked the Demos
coalition more than the opposition, and within it most of all the Liberal, Vitomir
Gros,
who began looking for traitors, but also the leaders of
SDS,
who blamed
the president of the Executive Council, Peterle. Among external circumstances,
federal premier
Marković
s
demands increased the pressure on Slovenia and Slo¬
vene representatives recognised during this that neighbouring Croatia, whose
representatives had throughout promised that they would become independent
together with Slovenia, were badly prepared for this step.
Strikes in hospitals and schools also did nothing to create a pleasant atmosp¬
here in the last week before independence, nor the public comments of the Li¬
beral Democrats about the script of the independence celebration, at which they
were disturbed mainly by the presence of the head of the army and Archbishop
Sustar,
nor the derisory demonstration of the power of the JLA, which removed
a squadron of Kragulj aircraft from the military part of the airport at Brnik, to
which the Slovene army could not respond at all, and could only watch the event
powerlessly. The political uncertainty and lack of coordination among the poli¬
tical parties in the Assembly forecast tension to the last day. It was heated in the
Assembly mainly because of arguments about the new state symbols, the coat-
of-arms and the flag. The removal of the star from the flag most disturbed some
of the older opposition delegates and the Liberal Democrats were unhappy that
discussions on the new state symbols had taken place without the cooperation of
the profession and in conflict with its rules. The Demos delegates complicated
it by thinking about two new flags, a state and a national flag, and the
Gordian
knot was cut at the very last moment by Dr. France
Bucar,
who was presiding, for
whom how the new state symbols actually looked was all one but he pointed out
that they had to be decided before the proclamation of Slovene independence.
The basic acts that the delegates adopted on the final day nullified the validity
of the SFRY constitution on Slovene territory and proclaimed Slovenia to be a
- - - —-
INDEPENDENCE OF SLOVENIA
sovereign and independent state from the day of adoption
(25
June
1991).
This
is enshrined in Article
1
of the Basic Constitutional Charter on the Sovereignty and
Independence of the Republic of Slovenia. The following two articles defined the
borders of RS and specified guarantees given to all persons on Slovene territory
on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, irrespective of na¬
tional affiliation and without discrimination.21 The speaker, Dr.
Bucar,
avoided
great discussions on the details of the fundamental acts (which were nevertheless
not small) by stressing that the vote only concerned who was for and who against
independence, rather than having an ear for detail.
Nevertheless, the gap between the Basic Constitutional Charter and the Decla¬
ration on Independence was noticed and highlighted. In the latter, namely, it was
enshrined that Slovenia was prepared immediately to continue talks on possible
forms of linkage with countries created on the territory of the former SFRY and
that, on the basis of mutual recognition, it was prepared to start negotiations on
concluding an agreement on establishing a community of sovereign states on the
territory of the former SFRY.22 Why two documents so different in content were
created on the same day at the same formal ceremonial session is a question that
springs immediately to mind. The answer is also to hand. In view of the events of
the last month, the government coalition had no assurance that it would be able
to proclaim Slovenia independent with the required two-thirds majority. There
were no new symbols until the penultimate day, crucial negotiations under Presi¬
dent
Kučan
similarly took place in the last five days and primarily the Reformers
placed their hope in new links with the Yugoslav republics. The Assembly strate¬
gists prepared two documents with different contents, whereby the Declaration
encouraged hope in the creation of new links (with which to satisfy primarily
LDS and
SDP)
and the Basic Charter they immediately proclaimed the priority
aim, an independent state. The opposition of course saw things differently and
demanded
harmonisation
of the documents, which did not happen. If there had
been legal dispute the answer was similarly clear: the power of the constitutional
document is above that of the Declaration, just as the Constitution is above the
law. In this case it also appeared that the cunning of the Demos strategy was abo¬
ve the cunning of the experienced political opposition.
The trading already mentioned, which was used mainly by
SDP, also
appeared
at this meeting. The Slovene Reformers, who met at the start of June with their
Croatian and Bosnia&Herzegovina colleagues and demanded a community of
sovereign republics, also understood the adoption of basic acts in this spirit. They
stressed the importance of Slovenia continuing to express willingness to negotiate
and discuss with others in Yugoslavia and its support for a gradual form of disas-
sociation. This meant for
SDP
that from 25th June
1991,
the process of Slovene
independence was only starting and certainly not that independence had already
actually occurred. Their support for the independence acts was also conditioned
21
Official Gazette RS, no.
1, 25. 6.1991.
22
Ibid.
588
~~
INDEPENDENCE OF SLOVENIA
on adoption of a constitution by the end of October
1991,
and if it was not it
would be necessary to call an early election. Such a demand, without the sancti¬
on of elections, was adopted by
92
votes for,
54
against and
38
abstentions. The
independence acts, including the decree on proclamation, were adopted almost
unanimously.
Irrespective of discussions within the LDS delegate club on the first day of
the aggression, in which
Janša
and Peterle were blamed, it has to be said that the
great majority of assembly delegates also showed agreement at the secret night
session on the third day of the war and with the adoption of the Brioni Declara¬
tion, which was a particularly bitter pill. First at a secret night session on
29
June
there came words of thanks and encouragement from the opposition ranks for
the Slovene Territorial Defence Force and internal affairs bodies who had resisted
the occupiers aggression. The Socialists, e.g., stated that the firmest independen¬
ce variant had been enforced, and asked how much provocation there had been
from the Slovene side. The Liberal Democrats, in addition to thanks, highlighted
that they also valued a ceasefire, and the president of the Reformers showed bit¬
ter disappointment when he found that the Reformers from B&H, with whom
they had agreed a fortnight before on a community of sovereign republics, now
supported the attack on die RS. The delegates unanimously condemned the JLA
aggression.
The three representatives of the strongest political institutions, the Assembly,
the Government and the Presidency of the Republic, Dr.
Bucar,
Peterle and Ku-
čan,
had entirely identical standpoints, which already showed in negotiations on
Brioni, and above all in the adoption of the Brioni Declaration. The profound
awareness of the negotiating group that if they lacked unity the Assembly would
also be completely divided, which in the end had to accept or reject the declara¬
tion, was of crucial importance. The defence and internal affairs ministers, Janez
Janša
and Igor
Bavčar,
accepted with particular difficulty the conditions of the
Brioni Declaration, which was actually an attempt to revoke Slovene independen¬
ce and return Slovenia to the Yugoslav framework. After explicit perseverance of
Dr. France
Bucar in
answer to the question of whether we could successfully resist
with our own forces a new stronger attack by the JLA, defence minister
Janša
for
some time asserted that he did not accept the Brioni Declaration, and at sessions
of the delegate club, together with clearly enumerating its deficiencies said in the
end that he supported adoption of the declaration. In the assembly debate, none
of the parties were explicitly against the declaration; only one or two individuals
from the ranks of LS and ZS publicly opposed it, while the Liberal Party was
completely divided: the president Golija supported it, Vitomir
Gros
and
Zvone
Žagar
sharply opposed it because they considered that Slovenia gained nothing
from it and it was actually (Slovenia s) capitulation. The Brioni Declaration was
adopted by
189
votes in support,
11
votes against and
7
abstentions. The Slovene
executive bodies adapted its implementation in their own way and some deci¬
sions were not realised, or only partially realised. Events on Brioni, in addition to
- - - 589
INDEPENDENCE OF SLOVENIA
securing peace, were also important because beneath the table appeared the first
hints of possible agreement on the JLA withdrawing from Slovenia. The Yugoslav
Presidency adopted the decision on withdrawal three months later, when it was
also proposed or supported by General
Veljko Kadijević
and when the Presidency
found that the requirements for regulating the position of the JLA in Slovenia
had not been realised. Only the Croatian member of the Federal Presidency op¬
posed the withdrawal.
However, the Republic of Croatia was the first to recognise Slovene indepen¬
dence, on the same day that it was proclaimed. In the summer and beginning of
autumn, the newly created countries on the territory of the former Soviet Union
did so and the decision adopted in the middle of December
1991
by the foreign
ministers of the European Community that on 15th January
1992
the twelve
members of the EC would recognise the subjectivity of the newly created state,
was crucial. Germany s decision also took effect at that time, which had strived
most among West European countries for Slovenia s recognition but, because of
the greater impact of a joint decision, did not want to implement it alone. Prior
to the decision of the twelve
EU
countries, Slovenia was recognised by diploma¬
tic note by Iceland and Sweden, and on
13
January
1992
by the Vatican. The
USA, which most decisively supported a common Yugoslavia and President of
the Federal Executive Council Ante
Markovié,
including an attempt at financial
compensation or assistance to Slovenia as the price for remaining in Yugoslavia,
only changed its policy by recognising Slovenia at the beginning of April; and on
22
May
1992,
only two years after new democratic authority had been constitu¬
ted in Slovenia, in which the legislative and executive majority was provided by
Demos, Slovenia was accepted into the UN as the 176th member.
In the assessments of the activity of coalition and opposition parties in the
Assembly, which forms the core of this book, there can already be detected a
finding of more or less acceptable party relations. Thus, for example, Dr.
Zdenko
Čepic
is sure that ZSMS or LDS was most acceptable for Demos, in which they
saw difficult children who should not have been burdened with the encumbrance
of the past and communism.23
Čepic
also goes on to write that the encumbrance
of the past and communism was »the greatest stumbling block to the cooperation
of Demos with the Reformers, as well as the Socialists. In addition to this ideological
obstacle they
ako
accused them qfiugo-nostalgia.«24
Neither one nor the other is entirely correct. An evaluation of youth party
was also given by Dr. Rupel, when he wrote that politicians from ZSMS were
most sentimental about Yugoslavia since they had invested too much feelings
and energy into it. »In its own way it was my generation and we new people in the
government who were lucky: in relation to Yugoslavia we were completely unburde¬
ned.^ It is clear from the chronology of events that the claim about the most
Dr.
Zdenko
Čepič, Opozicija »opozicije«, Demosov zbornik, p.
630.
23
24 Ibid.
25
Dr.
Dimitrij Rupel, Skrivnost države,
1992,
p.
62.
590
INDEPENDENCE OF SLOVENIA
acceptability of LDS could still be applied in the first half of
1990,
when some
Demos parties, mainly the young farmers and ZS, cultivated visible sympathy
for ZSMS, which helped them in the initial organisational steps. Similarly, the
role of ZSMS in supporting efforts of the opposition to establish a multi-party
system should not be overlooked, as well as in the Council for the Constitution,
the calling of the »public session« of the 8th May
1989,
at which there was a
demonstration in support of the four and a reading of the May Declaration, and
in other ways. Relations between Demos and ZSMS or LDS had already begun
to deteriorate at the beginning of
1990,
the plebiscite events were an especially
difficult experience, which were joined in
1992
with the initiative for demili¬
tarisation, constant disputes with the republican secretary
Janša
in relation to
conscripts and the Slovene army, the unconstructiveness of LDS in the adoption
of the new state symbols etc.
As concerns the note about the Yugo-nostalgia of the Reformers and Socialists,
a clear line must be drawn between the two political groups. Demos, namely,
soon found common language with the Socialists, first concerning the plebiscite,
which for the sake of their own credibility and initiative the Socialists could not
oppose out of hand. Recordings of assembly sessions show considerable support
from the Socialists for the great majority of the independence activities. The So¬
cialists were not the first to attack the executive council and also in delegate po¬
lemics and disputes in the Assembly, and even the war of words between Demos
delegates and the Socialists, in comparison with those with ZSMS and ZKS-SDP
were more of a placebo. Only
Jože Smole
was an exception in the concluding
phase of adopting the independence acts and new symbols, who could in no way
be reconciled with the removal of the star and with Slovenia without Yugoslavia.
It is similarly known that in the autumn of
1991,
after the departure of SDZ and
difficulties with the newly created Democrats, Dr.
Jože Pučnik
first turned to the
Socialists and began discussing entering into a coalition.
The following definition of relations between the Demos parties and the op¬
position that derived from socio-political organisations comes to the fore from
the records. Great distrust prevailed between the groups and numerous very mar¬
ked differences in political activity. While the opposition had many years of expe¬
rience in the functioning of the Assembly system, there were fewer such experts
in the way the Assembly functioned within the Demos majority. Also because
of this, the first constitutive session of the Assembly, which was chaired by the
oldest delegate and was marked by public mockery of the new authorities, was a
bitter experience for the majority coalition.
Recordings of assembly sessions show that the majority was of a more discreet
nature, and the opposition, mainly LDS and the Reformers were exaggeratedly
critical in their opposition and even at times insulting. With the Demos tactic,
which was based first on internal agreement, including with external supporters
of this coalition, then agreement within the Demos delegate club and finally the
elaboration of suitable legislation in the executive authority. The opposition was
INDEPENDENCE OF SLOVENIA
_______________________________________________
several times hard pressed publicly to oppose a proposal, and invested every effort
into having the debate rejected as procedurally inadequate, or at least drawing
out over an extending time period.
The most often used word in assessing the Slovene liberation project is lucky.
Dr. Tine Hribar says the same and adds that this luck was no more than intelli¬
gence, since we had already been preparing for independence for a century. His
assessment is that without Demos, there would not have been parliamentary
elections nor independence since it was Demos that introduced the idea of a
plebiscite as a form of national self-determination. »And without leading Demos
politicians, there would not have been the political will that gathered the strength to
proclaim the sovereign independence of the RS and then for the defence of the Slovene
state against invasion by theJLA.«26 He thus ascribes to Demos the major but not
exclusive credit for establishing national sovereignty, since it was mainly they
who decided on resistance against the aggressor and thus risked their heads.27
I am personally more inclined to the view that there is no luck in history.
More or less favourable external, international circumstances exist, which also
marked the transition of the eighties to nineties of the past century. Communist
regimes fell, together with the Berlin Wall as the most obvious example of the
Iron Curtain. However, even this external circumstance would not have been
enough if in Slovenia committed people had not existed in Demos who were
prepared courageously to risk, who were prepared publicly and clearly to express
their own political demands for
démocratisation
and an independent state, in
short who were prepared to be politically committed and personally exposed,
especially and in first place Dr.
Jože
Pučnik.
If there had not been within the coalition vision, even victory at the elections
and obtaining the levers of power would not have been much benefit.
If the project of independence had not been elaborated consciously, with per¬
sonal risk and consideration on the means for its realisation, it would have been
silenced by the first threat from Belgrade.
If it had not believed in the power and fidelity to the aims of its own delegate
base in the Assembly, it would have quit at the first criticism from the opposition.
If it had not trusted in the capacity of survival of the Slovene nation also
outside the Yugoslav framework, it would have resorted only to an attempt to
reform SFRY.
If they had not perceived and recognised the surge and desire of the Slovene
nation they would not have so instantaneously and decisively insisted on holding
a plebiscite and then realising the plebiscite decision.
If they had not been unified on
Račji otok
and prepared to risk even their
heads for the project of liberation, they would have surrendered to the threats of
Markovié
and the army.
Dr. Tine Hribar,
Slovenci kot
nacija,
p.
138.
27 Ibid.
592
INDEPENDENCE OF SLOVENIA
If they had not been so consciously and decisively committed to the forma¬
tion of a Slovene army, the desire for independence would have been left to ne¬
gotiating enthusiasts and deferred to the distant future.
If allies had not also been found in the international community for our aspi¬
rations to statehood, we would have been left to the (non)mercy of the great
powers, for whom the disintegration of multi-national communities was not in
their interests.
If they had not been unified at key moments of deciding on war and peace,
about the adoption of the Brioni Declaration, the fallen in the fighting for the RS
would perhaps have been in more than double figures.
What they did was done responsibly and thought through to the end.
Translated by Martin Cregeen
593
|
| adam_txt |
KAZALO
BESEDA AVTORICE
.11
I. poglavje: PREBOJ DEMOKRACIJE
.13
1.
SVET
VLETU
1989.15
a) Madžarska
.15
b) Poljska
.16
c) Romunija
.16
č) Češkoslovaška
.17
d) Nemška demokratična republika
(NDR)
.17
e)
Sovjetska zveza
.18
f)Kitajska
.19
2.
JUGOSLAVIJA
.20
a) Rojstvo »naroda«
v
Srbiji
.20
b) Napovedaní,
prepovedani
in odpovedaní
miting
v
Ljubljani
.29
II.
poglavje: PREDHODNICE
.33
1.
KORENINE
.35
2.
MISELNI PREBOJ
80.
LET
.40
a) Slovenski narod
in
slovenska kultura
.41
b) Priprava
in posledice Príspevkov
za slovenski nacionalni program
.42
3. 57.
ŠTEVILKA NOVE REVIJE
.46
4.
OD ZVEZNIH
IN
REPUBLIŠKIH USTAVNIH DOPOLNIL DO
DEMOSOVE USTAVE
.50
5.
ODBOR ZA VARSTVO ČLOVEKOVIH
PRAVIC
.59
6.
TEMELJNA LISTINA SLOVENIJE
IN
MAJNIŠKA DEKLARACIJA
1989.72
7.
OKROGLA
MIZA
.77
III. poglavje: BITKA ZA PRAVICO DO POLITIČNEGA ORGANIZIRANJA
V
SLOVENIJI
.79
l.RAZPRAVEVSZDL
.81
2.
NASTANEK NOVIH POLITIČNIH ORGANIZACIJ
.85
a) Slovenska kmečka zveza (SKZ)
.85
b) Slovenska demokratična zveza (SDZ)
.87
c) Socialdemokratska
zveza Slovenije (SDZS)
.90
7
č) Zeleni
Slovenije
(ZS)
.95
d)
Slovenski kršćanski
demokrati (SKD)
.97
e) Slovenska
obrtniška stranka (SOS)
in Slovenska obrtnopodjetniška
stranka
(SOPS).
99
f)
Sivi panterji
.102
3.
PREOBRAZBA DRUŽBENOPOLITIČNIH ORGANIZACIJ
.104
a) Zveza socialistične mladine Slovenije (ZSMS)
.104
b) Socialistična zveza delovnega ljudstva (SZDL)
.107
c) Zveza
komunistov
Slovenije (ZKS)
-
Stranka demokratične
prenove
(ZKS-SDP)
.109
4.
DEMOS
.113
IV.
poglavje: VOLITVE
.123
1.
VOLILNA ZAKONODAJA
.125
2.
POLITIČNE ORGANIZACIJE
V
SREDSTVIH DRUŽBENEGA
OBVEŠČANJA
.129
3.
VOLILNA KAMPANJA
.132
4.
VOLILNIIZIDI
.138
a) Predsedstvo
.139
b) Družbenopolitični zbor
.140
c) Zbor občin
.142
č) Zbor združenega dela
.142
5.
DRUGI
KROG
.144
6.
KDO
SO
POSTALI SKUPŠČINSKI DELEGATI
.149
a) Družbenopolitični zbor
.151
b) Zbor občin
.153
c) Zbor združenega
dela
.156
7.
KONSTITUIRANJE SKUPŠČINE REPUBLIKE SLOVENIJE
.160
8.
IZVOLITEV REPUBLIŠKEGAIZVRŠNEGA SVETA
SKUPŠČINE RS
.168
V.
poglavje: DEKLARACIJA
О
SUVERENOSTI DRŽAVE REPUBLIKE
SLOVENIJE
.179
1.
MEDNARODNE RAZMERE SPOMLADI
1990.181
2.
JUGOSLAVIJA SPOMLADI
1990.182
3.
О
DEKLARACIJI
V
SLOVENIJI SPOMLADI
1990.186
4.
PO SPREJETJU DEKLARACIJE
.197
VI.
poglavje: PLEBISCIT
.201
1.
MEDNARODNE RAZMERE
V
DRUGI POLOVICI
1990.203
2.
RAZMERE
V
JUGOSLAVIJI
V
DRUGI POLOVICI
1990.205
3.
MED DEKLARACIJO
IN
PLEBISCITOM
V
SLOVENIJI
.210
4.
BITKA ZA
23.
DECEMBER
.222
8 "
~ ~~~~
5.
OSNUTEK ZAKONA
О
PLEBISCITU
(21.
NOVEMBER
1990).231
6.
ZAKON
O
PLEBISCITU
О
SAMOSTOJNOSTI
IN
NEODVISNOSTI
REPUBLIKE SLOVENIJE
.253
7.
BITKA ZA PLEBISCITNO ZMAGO
.262
8.
OCENE
.268
VII. poglavje:
PROJEKT BRDO
.275
1.
MEDNARODNE RAZMERE OD
JANUÁRJA
DO MAJA
1991.277
2.
JUGOSLAVIJA OD
JANUÁRJA
DO MAJA
1991.279
3.
OD PLEBISCITA DO PROJEKTA BRDO
.287
4.
RESOLUCIJA
О
RAZDRUŽITVI
.295
5.
RAZPRAVA
О
OSAMOSVOJITVI
.303
6.
RAČJIOTOK
.318
7.
OCENA
POMEMBNOSTIDOGODKOV NA BRDU
APRILA
1991.323
VIII.
poglavje: VELIKI DAN
.327
1.
TUJINA MAJA
IN JUNIJA
1991.329
2.
JUGOSLAVIJA OD MAJA DO SLOVENSKE SAMOSTOJNOSTI
.331
3.
SLOVENIJA OD PROJEKTNIH
SKUPIN
DO SAMOSTOJNOSTI.
337
4.
NOVI SIMBOLI
.361
5.
OBRAVNAVATEMELJNIH
AKTOV
(24.-25.
JUNIJ
1991).372
6.
OCENA
NAJUSODNEJŠIH
DNI
.385
IX.
poglavje: SLOVENSKA VOJSKA
.393
1.
KRITIČNOST DO JLA
KONEC
80.
LET
.395
2.
NOVA POLITIČNA OBLAST
IN JLA
.397
3.
PRVE ZAKONODAJNE SPREMEMBE
.404
4.
ZASEDBA REPUBLIŠKEGA ŠTABA
TERITORIÁLNE OBRAMBE
. 413
5.
INFORMACIJA
О
NABORNIKIH
.416
6.
SLOVENIJA BREZ VOJSKE
IN
DEKLARACIJA ZA MIR
.418
7.
SLOVENSKO-HRVAŠKIVOJAŠKI SPORAZUM
.422
8.
SLOVENSKI NABORNIKI NE GREDO VEČ
VJUGOSLOVANSKO VOJSKO
.424
9.
PRORAČUNSKE POSTAVKE ZA OBRAMBO
.435
10.
ZAKON
О
OBRAMBI
IN ZAŠČITI
.441
11.
NASTAJANJE SLOVENSKE VOJSKE
.444
12.
VOJNA
.453
13.
IZREDNATAJNA SEJA
.458
14.
ZMAGA
.466
X.
poglavje: KRATKA ERA SAMOSTOJNOSTI
.471
l.BRIONI
.473
2.
BRIONSKA DEKLARACIJA
.477
3.
DEKLARACIJA V
SKUPŠČINI
.482
4.
RAZDRUŽITVENAIZHODIŠČA
.491
5.
DEKLARACIJA O
JUGOSLAVIJI
.493
6.
ISKANJE
POTI MED SCILO
IN KARIBDO
.501
XI.
poglavje: MEDNARODNI
ODNOSI
.505
1.
KDAJ BOMO
PRIZNANÍ?
.507
2.
NAŠE SRCE
JE Z VAMI.
510
3.
SPRAVLjrVA SKUPŠČINSKA OBRAVNAVA
.513
4.
SVARILA TUJINE
.516
5.
PRIZADEVANJA ZA
PRIZNANJE
PO
25.
JUNIJU
1991.519
6.
SPREJEM
V OZN
.528
XII.
poglavje:
SKLEPNE
MISLI.
531
VIRI IN
LITERATURA
.553
l.VIRI
.555
a)
Televizijska dokumentacija
(TV DOK)
.557
b)
Skupścinska
dokumentacija
(DKO DZ RS)
.559
c)
Arhiv
Republike
Slovenije
(ARS).560
č)
Arhiv
SDS
.560
d)
Fotografski arhivi
in avtorji fotografij
.560
2.
LITERATURA
.561
a)
Knjige
.561
b) Casopisni
članki
.565
INDEPENDENCE OF SLOVENIA
.571
IMENSKO KAZALO
.595
10
Д
few months after the collapse of the Demos coalition, when the Peterle
.xYgovernment left office, the Republic Secretary for Culture, Dr.
Andrej
Capuder, complained about a strange clouding of ideas. He believed that it was
no longer clear what had been risked and who had been courageous. Suddenly,
everyone earned it all and the real victors will remain empty handed. Was Ca-
puder's fear in
1992
justified? What is the mood today, almost
16
years after
the collapse of SFRY and
15
years after Slovenia's acceptance into the group
of UN member states? Does basic knowledge exist about when, how and with
what the new Slovene state was created? Who cut the umbilical cord which had
linked Slovenia to the southern Slav nations for
73
years
(1918-1991),
at first
only the Serbs and Croats, but from the Second World War onwards also the
Macedonians, Montenegrins, Bosnians and Albanians? How distinct or con¬
nected were the collapse of communism in East European countries and in
Slovenia with aspirations for greater independence of republics within a federal
state, either in the form of a loose federation, asymmetric federation, confede¬
ration or in completely sovereign and independent states? Was the
démocra¬
tisation
of political life a pre-condition for new relations within Yugoslavia or
could the old political elite have established them? How much did the latter
contribute or to what extent were these processes alien and they were reconciled
with them only with difficulty or not at all? What were the relations between
the successors of the old power structures and the new political organisations
which, united in Slovenia in the Demos coalition, took over parliamentary and
executive power after the first free and democratic elections? How did the new
government to a large extent find itself fighting for national sovereignty, how
much was it united within itself and what kind of tactics did it adopt? Who
pulled the first thread and operatively proposed and who realised the legislative
basis for the change? How much did »luck« contribute to this (if this exists at
all in history?) and how much considered moves and clearly formulated aims?
Did a clear vision of these aims exist, based on the agreement of all actors or
did the real ideas on the solution of the Slovene national question not have real
actors to the same extent?
The questions pose themselves, some answers are already known and fixed and
some, if they are not explicitly already included in the previous chapters, I will try
and indicate in these final thoughts.
- _
INDEPENDENCE OF SLOVENIA
Dr. Dimitrij Rupel, one of the more prominent opposition intellectuals in the
eighties, in relation to the dilemma of whether to stay in Yugoslavia or for Slove¬
nia to make its own way, said mat he understood the forebears who feared Slo¬
vene independence. The basic dilemma, namely, was whether national interests
were better protected by the Slovenes remaining in Yugoslavia or leaving it. »If
we remain in Yugoslavia, we could even become embroiled in fratricidal war, so that
Slovene young men will fall for some shitty ideal, if you'll excuse the expression^ he
said after the elections when he became Republican Secretary for Foreign Affairs.
The dilemma was thus clear to Rupel and his more prominent fellow thinkers,
and the answer to it, too, since as an opposition political structure Demos offered
it right from its creation in
1989,
when it took a stand for »a sovereign state for the
Slovene nation, independent or in a confederation with other states
.
«2
The Slovene »velvet revolution« lagged slightly in comparison with other co¬
untries of »people's democracy«, such as Poland and Czechoslovakia, and was not
among the first swallows of democratic changes, which is a unique paradox here
in view of the generally widespread thesis about Yugoslavia, which in comparison
with other eastern peoples democracies cultivated the least »hard« form of com¬
munist or a socialist regime to human measure. Attempts at cooperation between
the old authorities and the newly created opposition did not follow the pattern of
other countries, opposition political organisations and their representatives were
not admitted to participation in authority, such as for example in Poland already
in the spring of
1989.
Nevertheless, in the autumn of
1989,
amendments to the
Slovene constitution were adopted that allowed political changes and the collap¬
se of monopoly political power. Electoral legislation was adopted at the end of
1989,
elections were held in Slovenia at the same time as in Croatia, in April and
May
1990
and thus achieved primacy among Yugoslav republics within SFRY,
which were swept up in a wave of
démocratisation,
since other republics only
held them in November or December
1990.
In relation to the Slovene national question, shifts had already been made in
the intellectual sphere a year earlier. In the view of Dr.
Aleš Gabrič,
the victor of
the political transformation that the Slovenes experienced at the beginning of the
nineties of the last century was the »cultural opposition to the communist regi¬
me«.3 The expression is not entirely felicitous so it would be worth supplemen¬
ting
Gabrič,
since the term »cultural« is essentially too narrow to embrace some
of the intellectuals within it. That the first conceptual breakthrough occurred in
circles known as the cultural community, is beyond doubt, since this is already
demonstrated by the public appearance of Slovene writers in
1985
entitled The
Slovene Nation and Slovene Culture, and above all this critical group of individuals
was crystallised and affirmed by Contributions to the Slovene National Program-
1
Janko Lorenci,
Dimitrij Rupel, Sodobniki,
Partizanska knjiga,
Ljubljana,
1990,
p.
115.
Program
demokratične opozicije Slovenije, Dnevnik,
13.1. 1990.
3
Dr.
Aleš Gabrič, Demosov kulturnopolitični program, Demosov
zbornik,
volume
3-4,
Maribor,
2001,
p.
615.
574
~ ~~
_
INDEPENDENCE OF SLOVENIA.
me, better known as Issue No.
57
of Nova
revija.
The conceptual core was also
soon formulated within the then circle around Nova
revija (Niko
Grafenauer,
Dr. Tine Hribar and Spomenka Hribar, Dr. Ivan
Urbančič,
Dr.
Jože Pučnik,
Dr. France
Bucar,
Dr. Peter Jambrek and Dr. Dimitrij Rupel) which provided
the tools for the political struggle and also later operative authority. The official
party authorities were alarmed by publication of Issue
57
of Nova
Revija,
that
the contributions had an
anti-
Yugoslav character and that they fractured the Yu¬
goslav community since they included words about the military occupation by a
national foreign army, about Slovene state sovereignty from which would appear
a confederation or independent Slovenia, about free nations that independently
decide about linkage, and even about ending links with other nations etc. To use
the words of Spomenka Hribar, Issue
57
of Nova
revija
in
1987
certainly signifi¬
ed spiritual freedom,4 it meant the end of hopelessness, especially when it became
clear that things could never be as they had been before.
In addition to those in the cultural field, a sociological and legal group also
made a breakthrough: Dr. Peter Jambrek, Dr. France
Bucar,
Dr.
Veljko Rus
and
Dr. Ivan Svetlik. In the spring of
1988
they thus already formulated the thesis
for constitutional development which the groups presented together as the fun¬
damental principles Theses for a Constitution for the Republic of Slovenia in which,
in addition to political pluralism, was also enshrined the principle that Slovenia
should regulate its own internal political, legislative, defence and cultural matters
independently.
»Ђе
Republic of Slovenia is the state of the Slovene nation,^ was
enshrined at the very beginning. In this case, too, the official powers responded
to it with accusations of isolationism, anti-ideological tendencies and making the
nation absolute.
The deepest gulf, involving the most people and having the greatest reverbera¬
tion within the triangle of the emerging Slovene political opposition, the Slovene
party authorities and the federal authorities, including the JLA (Yugoslav Peo¬
ple Army), opened during the Serbo-Croat led process against Janez
Janša, Ivan
Borštner,
David
Tasić
and
Franci Zavri,
known as the process against the four,
with the creation of the Committee for the Protection of Human Rights (Igor
Bavčar)
and in the mass demonstrations outside the court on
Roška
cesta.
The
spiritual freedom of the intellectual elite obtained a wider extent and, with the
»arrival of the nation on
Roška
cesta« in
Ljubljana actually became the property
of the masses, the property of all Slovenes. So Dr.
Janko
Prunks
view that the
process against the four is something that awakened in Slovenes deep offence and
disappointment at centralist Belgrade,6 must be supplemented by the fact that
it also profoundly strengthened Slovene national consciousness and a conviction
that the obligatory »brotherhood and unity« prescribed for decades were actually
only useless
clichés.
Rosvita
Pešek,
Dosje, Projekt osamosvojitev,
1996.
Dr. Tine
Hribar, Nova osamosvojitvena volja Slovencev, p.
281.
Dr.
Janko
Prunk,
Slovenski narodni vzpon, narodna politika
(1768-1992), 1992,
p.
416.
575
INDEPENDENCE OF SLOVENIA
The official party authorities were not prepared to enter the national trenches
and left out neither Yugoslavia nor socialist self-management with the Funda¬
mental Document of Slovenia in
1989.
At a widely reverberating public session of
the League of Socialist Youth of Slovenia (ZSMS) in May
1989
the opposition
had already announced that »we want to live in a sovereign state of the Slovene
nation«. The short, clear document entitled May Declaration
1989
was written
at a sitting and Dr. France
Bucar,
Dr. Dimitrij Rupel,
Veno
Taufer,
Dr. Hubert
Požarnik
in Dr.
Ivo Urbančič
cooperated in its elaboration. The two documents
became a guide to the political groups and a public obligation in relation to the
national question: the Fundamental Document ofthe socio-political group of the
then authorities and the May Dechration of the emerging opposition.
The strike at Litostroj at the end of
1987,
in addition to entirely union de¬
mands, also raised the demand for autonomous political organisations (France
Tomšič),
in opposition to the League of Communists. The social democratic
demands of labour, in particular the call for organisation, were followed after
half a year by farmers and young farmers. At first fairly modestly and extremely
cautiously, as if they had no intention of trying to gain power, and then with the
creation of other autonomous political organisations, and above all the coalition
Demos, with the self-confident call of Ivan Oman: »We're going into elections to
win!«7
The Slovene Democratic Alliance was established at the beginning of
1989,
in which a large part of the cultural, legal, sociological and philosophical intel¬
ligentsia were found. It was presided over by Dr. Dimitrij Rupel. Among all the
opposition organisations it had the most media-skilful and articulate core and it
was soon spoken of as the »intellectual core« of Demos, its »brains trust« etc.
Over the course of a year, therefore, slowly, as a kind of structural pillar of
Slovene society, new political organisations emerged. Nature conservationists fo¬
unded the
Zeleni
Slovenije
(Greens of Slovenia
-
ZS) lead by Dr.
Dušan Plut,
small business persons were found in two parties:
Slovenska obrtniška
stranka
(Slovene Trades Party), of which the president was Franc Golija, but its most re¬
cognised face soon became the Kranj businessman, Vitomir
Gros,
and
Slovenska
obrtno podjetniška stranka
(Slovene Trade and Commerce Party), lead by
Rado
Bergant. Pensioners formed their own party
Sivi panterji
(Grey Panthers) under
the presidency of mag.
Dragan Černetič,
and Christians could find their electoral
base and core in
Slovensko
kršćansko
sociálno
gibanje
(Slovene Christian Social
Movement), which tried to avoid party political identification, but a group soon
predominated in it which was committed to organisation of a political party and
entry to the political battlefield. The Slovene Christian Democrats (SKD) was
taken over by a man of simple and understandable language, Lojze Peterle who,
without fuss and fairly unnoticed by the media, to everyone's surprise in a bare
6
months made an »opposition« election victor out of this party.
7
TV
DOK,
vka
465,13.1. 1990.
576
~
_
INDEPENDENCE OF SLOVENIA
At the April elections, three out of five socio-political organisations prepared
for the April elections. The League of Communists of Slovenia (ZKS) was most
successful. Despite the process against the four, which caused a significant loss
of membership, it managed to win as the largest single party. The 14th Congress
of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia contributed to this to a significant
extent, at which the Slovene Communists, with the support of the Croatians,
left the hall and
mus
decisively contributed to the end of one of the important
integrative
factors of Yugoslavia, the
'avant
garde' party. The president of the cen¬
tral committee of the Slovene League of Communists, Milan
Kučan,
succeeded
Dr. Ciril
Ribičič
some months before the elections, and the party was transfor¬
med immediately before the elections. The League of Socialist Youth of Slovenia
(ZSMS), which at the time of
démocratisation
supported the alternative and also
themselves successfully undermined the monopoly structures, did not enter the
victorious coalition after the elections, despite the logical continuation of this
cooperation, and did not participate in authority. Its leadership since the process
against the four had been in the hands of
Jožef Školč.
The Socialist Alliance of
Working People, transformed into the Socialist Alliance of Slovenia (SZS), despi¬
te its frontline role, which it stressed throughout and despite the likable features
of its president,
Jože Smole
(»Father Christmas«) and expectation of high electo¬
ral success, came last of the reformed socio-political organisations.
The decision to found Demos was crucial for obtaining the levers of power.
If the new political organisations had not combined the energy that had been
created within them, and had only struggled individually, the reformed Com¬
munist party, as the strongest individual group, would also have retained the
mechanisms of power after the elections. The decision in favour of a joint appe¬
arance at the elections, initially of a narrower core (SDZ, SDZS and SKD) and
later associated organisations (SKZ, SOS, ZS), was crucial for obtaining electoral
victory. The decision of the alliances or parties in favour of the Demos coalition,
namely, also meant unifying around common aims in these organisations, since
the establishment of a multi-party system and the sovereignty of a state of the
Slovene nation were the highest priorities.
»
There was never any serious doubftP
about that among the leaders of the Demos parties, Lojze Peterle (SKD), Ivan
Oman (SKZ), Dr. Dimitrij Rupel (SDZ), Dr.
Jože Pučnik (SDZS),
Dr.
Dušan
Plut
(ZS)
and Franc Golija
(SOS).
The decision that the coalition of opposition parties would be led by a pro¬
minent personality with a dissident past, Dr.
Jože Pučnik
showed itself to be
correct several times in the key independence year. He deserved the role more
on the grounds of an overall professional (sociological, psychological, anthropo¬
logical, philosophical etc) analysis than on a purely political one.
Pučnik
knew
from his own experience what the party apparatus could do. He had lived for
8
Dr.
Jože Pučnik,
statement for
Dosje, Projekt
osamosvojìtev,
personal archive
Rosvita Pesek,
unpublis¬
hed material,
1996.
- _ _
INDEPENDENCE OF SLOVENIA
several decades in the democratic West (Federal Republic of Germany), which
gave him a sound understanding of the functioning of parliamentary democracy.
He was completely independent financially and in business, since he had retired
before coming to Slovenia. He was a sociologist by basic qualification, and he had
been engaged in deontic logic so with natural sociological processes in general.
He was an articulate speaker, with clear ideas, without demagogy and clearly a
man without fear. His decision not to take over leadership of executive authority
irrespective of whether it was taken for health or for any other reason had a good
side apart from a number of doubts, regrets and his personal »specific lack of
executive and business qualification«. As an external critic, he could afford to be
»unburdened« by the operational (incapacity of the bureaucratic state apparatus,
making use of the majority in the assembly he knew how to pressure and drive
it when it was a matter of implementing the more crucial independence tasks
connected with relations with the federal state. He also used the media to good
advantage to put pressure on the executive council or assembly delegates from his
own ranks. It immediately published his announcements, which also caused bad
blood within the coalition partners, above all SDZ, not only with the opposition.
His political fellow thinkers thus often today justifiably today speak of him as the
»motor of Slovene independence«.
The takeover of authority passed with some friction and tension with journa¬
lists of the most influential of the media,
Televizija
Ljubljana. Peterles executive
council, after the first test of strength between the proposed prime minister and
his nominator, the president of the Presidency of the Republic of Slovenia, Mi¬
lan
Kučan,
and with some doubts in connection with the appointment of Igor
Bavčar
and Janez
Janša
as republican secretaries of internal affairs and of people's
defence, was appointed without major hesitations, and the prime minister stres¬
sed in his programme speech above all the full sovereignty of the Republic of
Slovenia, including Slovenes doing military service in Slovenia and orders being
given in the Slovene language, which was spelt out decisively by the government.9
Sovereignty was to be established by constitutional and agreed pathways, and
a confederation was acceptable for the executive council on the basis of a clear
confederative
treaty »in which the
confederative
states would voluntarily determine
what to leave to the central level and how to finance common needs«.10
The smallest party in Demos, SOS, was the first to hasten with normative
acts towards Slovene independence, which already intended to achieve Slovenia's
secession with a Declaration of the Independence of the Slovene State which would
be finally confirmed by a second legal act and a referendum after a year. SDZ
soon took over the initiative and included it in its own, very much milder, modi¬
fied proposal, and SOS revoked their original declaration in exchange for being
joint proposers. At the beginning of July, therefore, to the great surprise of the
9
DKO
DZ Republike Slovenije,
2nd joint session of all chambers of the Assembly RS, minutes of the
session, Lojze Peterle, p.
7.
10
Ibid, p.
5.
578
~~~
_
INDEPENDENCE OF SLOVENIA
opposition, even the most reformist, the agenda of the session of the Assembly
included a Declaration on the full sovereignty of the State of the Republic of Slovenia.
It proclaimed the sovereignty of Slovenia; the federal constitution, federal laws
and regulations would only apply in Slovenia if they were not in conflict with
the constitution and laws of the republic. The primacy of republican legislation
over federal was thus established and the Assembly was committed to specify by
constitutional law which federal regulations would no longer be applied in the
Republic of Slovenia. The unease of the opposition, above all
SDP,
which raised
procedural questions, demanded analyses, disputed the quality of the text, was
overcome after a joint session; and after a short break and coordination among all
the parties represented in the Assembly and a »joint« proposal of a Declaration on
the sovereignty of the State of the Republic of Slovenia was adopted with only three
votes against and two abstentions. Actually, adopting the declaration showed the
leading coalition several things. First, that the opposition was divided in opposing
the proposal on various levels: the Socialists, for instance, did not oppose the dec¬
laration and supported it without a lot of words, the youth party (ZSMS) were
more or less indifferent, and the reformists
(SDP)
threw up a heap of deficiencies,
immediately highlighting their distance from the proposal and shared decision-
making. Not least, there were a whole
55
votes against placing the proposal on
the agenda. The other experience showed that the Demos coalition could be
successful
ifit
was fully coordinated and if there were no fractures within it. The
third factor was motivational: not even two months had passed since it had taken
over power (far less the
100
days of peace allowed in established west European
democracies!) when the first step was taken towards realising electoral promises.
Demos took electoral promises seriously, to which testifies
Pučnik's
statement
that, because major movement towards Slovene sovereignty could not be shown,
voters needed to be told that Demos remained firmly committed to establishing
Slovene independence and sovereignty.11 The Declaration in question, therefore
was created from this decisiveness within Demos, together with a clear awareness
that it was anybody's guess what kind of legal effects it would have immediately.
The tiny, at first sight marginal booklet by the historian, Dr.
Janko
Prunk,
entitled New Slovene Self-confidence, is eloquent for a slightly fuller and clearer
image of the attitude of the most prominent Slovene politicians had at that time
to the national question. In it are published none other than interviews with
politicians that were made soon after the April elections.12 It is first and foremost
portraits of individuals, together with their assessments and prognoses of Slovene
political life. The image that the reader gets from
Prunks
book is the following.
A collective
(Gregor
Golobič, Miha Kovač,
Pavle
Gantar, Mile Šetinc and Janez
Kopač)
answered for ZSMS and briefly stressed that in relation to the national
question they were considering
a confederative
status for Slovenia, which would
Rosvita Pesek,
Dosje,
Projekt
osamosvojitev,
1996.
12
Dr.
Janko
Prunk,
Nova
slovenska
samozavest,
Pogovori
s
slovenskimi političnimi prvaki,
Lumi,
Panatal,
Ljubljana,
1990.
- — —
INDEPENDENCE OF SLOVENIA
be linked to other republics on the principle of a Yugoslav economic commu¬
nity. Dr. Lev
Kreft
answered for
SDP in
relation to the national question and
stressed that he would prefer to discuss the theme in more stable European and
Yugoslav conditions, in the direction of
a confederative
position of Slovenia wit¬
hin Yugoslavia, with openness to European
integrative
currents. Socialist Borut
Šuklje
viewed independence as a process, which he gave priority than formal
acts of proclaiming secession, which in itself brought nothing. A suitable form
of confederation (as an association of independent states within the framework
of the existing Yugoslav boundaries, combined in a trade, customs and perhaps
monetary union) would be an equally valuable solution as secession. The Liberal
(formerly SOS) Vitomir
Gros
saw the solution of the Slovene economy, and thus
also national existence, only in a completely independent Slovene state, which
would not be bound to any block, pact or confederation with anyone. In the
interview with Leo
Šešerko
(ZS),
he did not perceive anything from the aspect of
the national question. Among the more interesting answers are those of three key
holders of Demos authority, Lojze Peterle, Dr. France
Bucar
and Dr.
Jože Pučnik
and President of the Presidency Milan
Kučan.
Kučan
(the interview with him took place at the end of October
1990)
beli¬
eved that creating a Slovene national state cannot be the final aim.
»
This does not
in principle exclude a number of new Yugoslav integrations on the basis of complete
equality and voluntary association, based on real and not on presumed, and especially
not on ideological interests:«13
Dr. France
Bucar
(the interview with him took place at the beginning of
August
1990)
considered that it after Slovene sovereignty, an inevitable conse¬
quence is a very modest analysis of the Slovene national position. »In
iugoslavia,
as it was and as it is, we have no possibility of our own national development, nor
for preserving the national identity, nor for continuing our own cultural affiliation.
We are drawn into apolitical cultural circle which is in conflict with all our national
traditions, which denies us as a nation
andas
individuals.«1^
Lojze Peterle (the interview took place in September
1990)
more than a perso¬
nal point of view presented the proposal of the committee for legislation, which
had already prepared a draft
confederative
treaty in which the basic points related
to the economic system, foreign policy, defence and joint institutions and met¬
hods of reaching decisions.
Dr.
Jože Pučnik
(the interview took place at the beginning of June
1990)
was
the most extensive and decisive in relation to conditions in Yugoslavia. As a So¬
cial Democrat, he rejected any form of association with other nations that was
forced. The Yugoslav federation did not in his opinion have legitimacy, since the
Slovenes had not decided on it at free and democratic elections. »We therefore
demand an independent state, which can voluntarily and by its own equal decision
perhaps combine in joint projects with other nations within or outside Yugoshvia.
13
Ibid, p.
154.
14
Ibid, p.
117.
580
INDEPENDENCE OF SLOVENIA
This means that we are in favour of cooperation when and to the extent that this
is also in our interest.
Ће
current federation does not allow all this. It is therefore
dead for us and it is only a question of
tíme
before we shake off the forced bonds of
this obsolete project.«1"* He continued with the opinion that only an independent
Slovenia can sensibly decide on what, with whom, when and how to will be as¬
sociated. »The path to integration and linkage in Europe is
aho
necessarily the path
of independence of the Slovene state. The Slovene Social Democratic Party does not
retreat from this.«16
In the circumstances of approximately such a political understanding of the
Yugoslav reality, at the beginning of October
1990
the Socialists formulated an
initiative for a plebiscite, which was intended to be more of a consultative nature.
It was soon apparent that this would not occur very soon, since the president of
the Socialists, Viktor
Žakelj,
enumerated a series of things that had first to be
done: from the adoption of a modern Citizenship Act to the establishment of
communication with external political forces.17 The Socialists are often mentio¬
ned as the first initiators of a plebiscite, which is only partially true and only if
one has in mind merely the formal procedure in the Assembly. However, it was
already enshrined in the Demos programme published in newspaper
Demokra¬
cija
on
19
December
1989
mat the citizens of Slovenia would decide by referen¬
dum on the internal arrangement of Slovenia and its external links,18 or that a
plebiscite would »realise the nations right to self-determination«.19
A key move towards actual implementation of the plebiscite happened at the
beginning of November
1990,
only a few days before a closed meeting of the
Demos delegate club in
Poljče
at which delegates of the coalition supported the
plebiscite with great enthusiasm. Right from May
1 1990,
when Dr. Tine Hribar
and Spomenka Hribar, Dr.
Jože Pučnik
and Dr. Peter Jambrek met at the home
of Dr. France and Ivka
Bucar in
Bohinjska
Bistrica,
namely, it was intended that
a constitutional referendum bill would be adopted not later than
23
December.
This meant that the date of the formation of the new state would correspond to
the adoption of the Constitution, and this would be confirmed in a constitutio¬
nal referendum.
The shift from a constitutional referendum to the plebiscite question Should
the Republic of Slovenia become a sovereign and independent state? was of crucial
significance since it had become so complicated during the constitutional discus¬
sion and numerous supplements to it in the assembly that it was quite obvious
that there would be no agreement on the Constitution by the end of
1990.
Testi¬
monies somewhat differ as to how exactly in the last days before the meeting in
15
Ibid, p.
88.
16
Ibid.
17
Delo,
13.11.1990.
18
Dr.
Božo
Repe,
Viri
о
demokratizaciji
in osamosvojìtvi
Slovenije
(1.
del:
opozicija
in
oblast),
2002,
p.
216.
19
Delo,
18.1. 1990.
581
INDEPENDENCE OF SLOVENIA
Poljče
the spark was born within the circle of Dr. Peter Jambrek, Dr. Tine Hribar,
Mag. Tone
Jerovšek
and Dr.
Jože Pučnik.
Certainly, though, shifts occurred im¬
mediately before the president of the Demos club, Dr. Franc
Zagožen,
called the
meeting in
Poljče,
with a different agenda without mention of the plebiscite and
that Dr. Tine Hribar, in a break during the course of the meeting in
Poljče,
per¬
suaded Janez
Janša
and Dr. France
Bučar. Lojze
Peterle, president of the executive
council, was not acquainted at all with the initiative on the plebiscite and because
of leaving
Poljče
in haste only learned of it post
festům.
The time that remained for the Demos coalition between
9-Ю
November
and
23
December
1990
was short, only a month and a half: the president of the
coalition, Dr.
Jože Pučnik,
because of the many tasks that waited, was clearly
aware of this. On the same day, he informed some journalists in Ptuj that there
would be a plebiscite on
23
December. Great offence was taken, both within the
Presidency RS, which was angry at not being involved in the formulating of such
an important initiative (Ciril Zlobec) and among some members of the Demos
coalition, that
Pučnik
had again been too hasty (Dr. Rupel, Dr.
Plut).
The initi¬
ative, with such a short time scale also greatly reverberated within the opposition
and met with complete unreadiness; this is also demonstrated by the demands
-
when the draft: Plebiscite Act had reached the floor of the assembly
-
for the
debate to be withdrawn from the agenda.
The time from the middle of November right up to
6
December
1990,
when
the Plebiscite Act was passed, showed how different were views on the speed of
performing the independence steps. The polemics and divisions went in two di¬
rections. On the one hand, mainly the Reformers and Liberal Democrats tended
towards delaying the plebiscite to the early months of
1991,
so February or March,
since the time pressure for holding the plebiscite on
23
December
1990
was not
to their liking. The Socialists supported as early a plebiscite as possible.
SDP
and
LDS were reassured neither by analyses nor the information provided by members
of the executive council who, during adoption of the draft, extensively presented
the economic and political conditions in Yugoslavia. The Reformers warned aga¬
inst nationalism, political cleavage and of Slovenia easily becoming the poor man
of Europe because of an ill-considered decision. The Liberal Democrats trusted in
the Presidency RS, which was supposed to judge when was the most favourable
moment for holding the plebiscite and only then propose to the Assembly a date
for holding it. Not least, even President
Kučan
in a speech to the Assembly on the
plebiscite, reminded the Demos government that it could only gain the widest
democratic legitimacy
(!)
with a plebiscite, since its decision had not so far been
verified at the widest level. As if a mere half year had not passed since the Demos
government had been constituted and as if Demos had not gone into the elections
witb the demand for the independence of Slovenia.
The date for holding the plebiscite was seriously hard for the opposition to
take; mis is also shown by the initiative of the Reformers to call the referendum by
international treaty. Delegates of the Demos coalition answered the reproaches and
582
~~
INDEPENDENCE OF SLOVENIA
hesitations immediately and pressed the opposition into a position in which they
did not want to find themselves.
Marjan Podobnik
thus delicately reproached Mi¬
lan
Balažic
and Janez
Kocijančič
that they were not in favour of the plebiscite and
were thus seeking every possible objection.
Spomenica Hribar
stated that Slovenia
would really become the pauper of Europe
ifit
remained in Yugoslavia. The motto
of the Demos delegates was that all analyses showed that the least risky course of
action for Slovenia was to form its own state. The Plebiscite Bill was adopted with a
convincing majority, but a large part of the delegates sitting in the hall did not want
to take a position on the bill at all: not to abstain and not to vote against.
In addition to the date of holding the referendum, the other most important
point of division between the Demos majority and the opposition parties was
the question of what sort of majority should suffice for a successful outcome
of the referendum. Because of these disagreements, President Milan
Kučan
was
involved in overcoming the differences between the parties and he called a num¬
ber of dramatic meetings that lasted late into the night. The leading members
of Demos stuck to the view that an ordinary majority, i.e., a majority of those
voting, would be sufficient for a successful outcome of the plebiscite. The Liberal
Democrats in particular, when they had become reconciled to the date of the
plebiscite, unconditionally insisted that an absolute majority was required for
a successful outcome. Milan
Kučan,
who was presiding, also did an about turn,
saying at first that below a standard of
50%
of
50%
could not be accepted, but
when it was clear that LDS and
SDP
would not give in, joined their demand
for an absolute majority, which meant that the plebiscite would succeed only
if at least half of all registered voters voted for it, not just a majority of those
voting. The first standard means that it is sufficient for a successful outcome of
the referendum if half of registered voters cast their vote and at least half of these
must vote in favour. The second standard is essentially stricter, since it specifies
that more than half of all registered voters must vote for an independent state,
irrespective of how many people actually vote. The leading members of Demos
based the lower standard for the success of the plebiscite on possible bad weather
conditions, which would make it difficult for older people in particular to go to
the polling stations, fear of an intervention by the JLA, which could intimidate
voters, and the lack of a need to set such a high standard. They also feared other
reactions of the federal authorities. The smallest Demos party, LS, even expressed
its fear with a successful amendment to the Plebiscite Act, by which the right of
Slovenes to self-determination would not be exhausted irrespective of the result
of the plebiscite, which in those days meant above all a unique reserve that in the
event of a failure of the plebiscite the Slovenes could apply self-determination
again later. Fear at the possible non-adoption of the Plebiscite Act was genuinely
great, as is also shown by the proposal of the Christian Democrats that in voting
for the act, delegates should declare themselves individually.
The Plebiscite Act was finally adopted with no votes against and
203
votes in
favour, and the date of holding the plebiscite was also specified. An agreement
- _
INDEPENDENCE OF SLOVENIA
_
that the parties had signed the same morning certainly contributed to this (Spo-
menka Hribar had worked hard for this), and in it they bound themselves to a
common approach and coordinated activity in its implementation, and above all
that no party or coalition would impute a positive result of the plebiscite.
The adoption of the Plebiscite Act was followed by an extensive media campa¬
ign for a positive result. All segments of civil society were involved, from Group
57,
the Conference for Slovenia, Alliance of Associations of Combatants of the
National Liberation War, to the movement for a culture of peace and non-violence,
pensioners' alliances and others. To a large extent, parties operating in Slovenia ex¬
pressed themselves in favour of a positive result in the plebiscite and they were joi¬
ned by members of other nations and nationalities from the territory of Yugoslavia.
Dr. Tine Hribar stated that a precondition for the successful result of the plebiscite
was above all the ceremony of piety held in July
1990
in
Kočevski Rog,
which on a
symbolic level signified the end of civil war and genuine national reconciliation.
The pre-plebiscite time is today valued as a time of great unity of Slovene poli¬
ticians, which ended soon after the plebiscite had been held. The Plebiscite Act,
namely, had specified a six-month deadline for taking over all the functions of the
federation and for final independence from Yugoslavia. And there was still great
tension in the period from December up to and including
25
June
1991.
Relati¬
ons between Slovenia and the federal authorities, primarily the army high com¬
mand, which enforced a state of emergency in the spring, pushed the domestic
political elite into the adoption of decisions on a speedy exit from Yugoslavia. The
first blow was already struck at the very beginning of the year, when Serbia raided
the monetary system. A planned arrest of individuals in the Croatian and Slovene
leadership soon became known. In March, a planned military coup was only avo¬
ided by a hairsbreadth because of the internal difficulties in the Soviet Union.
The government coalition was confronted at home with numerous company
bankruptcies and, consequently, ever worse economic conditions, which increased
the pressure on Peterles executive council. Internal criticism of Demos at the ex¬
pense of the government that they should hurry with more energetic moves, was
joined by the opposition, on the grounds that Slovenia was inadequately prepared
for conditions after the plebiscite and that, by ignoring the Belgrade authorities,
it had itself contributed to such chaotic conditions. Into the bargain disagree¬
ment between President of the Executive Council Peterle and Dr. Rupel increased,
which caused the first proposal for replacement. The leader of the coalition, Dr.
Pučnik,
clearly explained the pressure that he exerted on the executive council
with the words that he was aware that the Demos government was in a tragic
situation. »It has to do a great deal of work, it must carry out the structural transfor¬
mations on which the Slovenes had decided and during this must actually promise only
material sacrifices to
lefi
and right. What it can promise positively is, unfortunately,
only on a symbolic level: sovereignty, independence, serving at home, eventually our
own currency.«10
20
TV
DOK
vka
699,
Žarišče,
dr.
Jože Pučnik,
8. 2.1991.
584 ' '
~~~
INDEPENDENCE OF SLOVENIA
In February
1991,
a marked public shift in thinking about
a confederative
Yugoslavia with both Dr.
Jože Pučnik
and Milan
Kučan.
Such a form of associ¬
ation with other republics, primarily with Croatia, was considered no longer to
have any chance since a confederation had for some time only been mentioned
as a »pretence«. Nevertheless, the Slovene president of the Presidency took part in
talks with the presidents of other republics, which were held one after another in
the spring of
1991
and at which possibilities were sought of solving the crisis in
Yugoslavia.
Kučan
fairly quickly said publicly that nothing could be hoped from
these talks, that they were only buying time and flogging a dead horse. In Febru¬
ary, the delegate clubs, without LDS, prepared a resolution on
disassociation
and
thus continued the debate in the Assembly on the manner of disintegration of
the common state. It was clearly visible in the debate that there was an awareness
that the separation from Yugoslavia could also occur a painful manner, but that
Slovenia would secede, with or without an agreement.
The Liberal Democrats did not like the hyperproduction of resolutions and
during debate made the reproach that it was just as well that they did not also
get carnations
(J.
Školč).
A month later the Social Democrats demanded a debate
on immediate independence and met with resistance to debating this question
from both the Reformers and the Liberal Democrats, and the executive council
showed a clear reluctance, since they could not work to instructions published in
the daily papers.
The debate was interrupted because talks among the presidents of the republic
presidencies, who were meeting in various Yugoslav cities, had not yet ended.
Due to this kind of initiative and pressures within Demos, it was decided at the
end of March that, in view of the clear delay, work would be started in project
groups at an accelerated speed. Janez
Janša
and Igor
Bavčar
did a great deal of
operational work at
Brdo pri Kranju,
where meetings of groups took place. After
the completion of projects, there was actually a balance of conditions on the table
in all the activities which are crucial for independence.
In April, the smallest of the Demos parties, the Liberal Party, demanded im¬
mediate secession, and they were joined by the Social Democrats and the Far¬
mers' Alliance. On a legislative level, the strenuous process also ended in spring
of adopting and amending legislation in the defence field, where the opposition
contested to the utmost the questions of budget funds for defence, demilitarisa¬
tion and conscientious objection. Publicly presented initiatives entitled Declara¬
tion for Peace were also joined by ZS, or rather ZS was among the co-proposers
and, with the exception of Ivan Oman, these initiatives were signed by all other
members of the Presidency RS, which was the commander-in-chief of the armed
forces under the existing legislation. In April, the functioning of executive autho¬
rity was crucial. A personnel crisis was overcome, when demands first appeared
for the replacement of the secretary for agriculture, Osterc (there was no repla¬
cement), the resignations of the holders of key ministries' of the economy and
finance, Dr.
Jože Mencinger
and Dr.
Marko Kranjec
were announced and also
- - —
INDEPENDENCE OF SLOVENIA
realised,
lhe
replacement of the secretary for information,
Stane Stanic,
and his
replacement by
Jelko Kacin,
was much less painful.
The work of project groups already gave the first positive results at the end of
April, which were presented to the delegates of the Assembly, which quietened
both the opposition, which had already been talking about negligent government
and had lodged a no confidence motion, as well as those dissatisfied within the
Demos coalition. At the end of April, the leading members of the Demos parties
and holders of key government offices once again closed ranks and, on
Račji otok
at
Brdo,
all clearly committed themselves to take full personal responsibility for
the successful completion of the project of Slovenia's independence. There was a
high awareness among them of the responsibility of their behaviour, but also a
latent fear of failure; the brief, rare minutes of discussions testify to this; how in
the case of defeat the independence politicians would be impaled and hung in the
market square, or be pushed into a situation in which they would have to ask for
re-admittance to the federation.
That was the time when the violence in Croatia was greatly increasing and
when the Serbs began armed rebellion in areas in which they were the majority
population. President Peterle therefore turned to the assembly delegates with the
words that civil war had started in Yugoslavia and that it was essential to speed
up adoption of legislation connected with the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Discord
was only visible during adoption of the Citizenship Act, which the Liberal De¬
mocrats obstructed. Slovenia at that time sent its proposal for dissolution to all
the republics, but only the Republic of Croatia responded, which accepted the
dissolution of Yugoslavia into two or more states.
May, from the point of view of the readiness of Slovenia to defend itself, was
also a litmus test for evaluating events in the June-July defence war. In the mid¬
dle of May, it was decided at a wider operational meeting, and later also within
narrower political circles, that Slovenia would answer a possible attack by the JLA
with force. Only a few days later, a second serious incident occurred (the first
was at the start of October
1990,
when soldiers of the Yugoslav Army occupied
the premises of the Republican Territorial Defence Headquarters
-
RŠ
TO
-
on
Prežihova ulica
in Ljubljana) between the JLA and staff of the territorial defen¬
ce training centre, which trained the first generation of Slovene soldiers. When
members of the centre arrested two military personnel that had come too close to
the centre, and soon thereafter released them, the JLA responded by surrounding
the teaching centre. During evening negotiations in the urban municipal buil¬
ding, there was a spectacular kidnapping of the regional commandant of the TO,
Vladimir Milosevic. The first fatality also occurred at that time among demon¬
strators, which was caused by a retreating JLA tank. The parties in the Assembly
began an agreement that it would prepare mass gatherings in a weeks time and
show united will against this kind of ill-discipline and activity of the JLA, but ne¬
gotiations ended with hard words. The meeting in support of the
Maribor
events
ended in Ljubljana without the opposition, which rescinded its participation
586
INDEPENDENCE OF SLOVENIA
immediately before the start: LDS on the pretext that there had already been
too many of these demonstrations, and the Reformers began discussions on the
organisation of the meeting with bargaining, which was several times repeated
up to the »great day«; they conditioned their participation on the prior adoption
of a new constitution, and
Jožef Školč
demanded in writing from the president
of the Presidency that the training centres in Pekre and on
Ig
should be closed.
The lesson from the non-participation of the opposition at the Ljubljana meeting
was instructive for the Demos parties and led many to the conviction that it was
also necessary to prepare for the possibility of adopting key independence acts
without the votes of the opposition or even with tlieir opposition.
The last month of the existence of RS within SFRY began with a great As¬
sembly scandal. It was caused by the new secretary for finance,
Dušan Šešok,
who clearly told delegates that Slovenia would not get all the levers of effective
power into her hands with independence. There would not be passports, there
would not be a division of the balance and Slovene money and, similarly, the
state border with Croatia would not be arranged. His words shocked the Demos
coalition more than the opposition, and within it most of all the Liberal, Vitomir
Gros,
who began looking for traitors, but also the leaders of
SDS,
who blamed
the president of the Executive Council, Peterle. Among external circumstances,
federal premier
Marković
s
demands increased the pressure on Slovenia and Slo¬
vene representatives recognised during this that neighbouring Croatia, whose
representatives had throughout promised that they would become independent
together with Slovenia, were badly prepared for this step.
Strikes in hospitals and schools also did nothing to create a pleasant atmosp¬
here in the last week before independence, nor the public comments of the Li¬
beral Democrats about the script of the independence celebration, at which they
were disturbed mainly by the presence of the head of the army and Archbishop
Sustar,
nor the derisory demonstration of the power of the JLA, which removed
a squadron of Kragulj aircraft from the military part of the airport at Brnik, to
which the Slovene army could not respond at all, and could only watch the event
powerlessly. The political uncertainty and lack of coordination among the poli¬
tical parties in the Assembly forecast tension to the last day. It was heated in the
Assembly mainly because of arguments about the new state symbols, the coat-
of-arms and the flag. The removal of the star from the flag most disturbed some
of the older opposition delegates and the Liberal Democrats were unhappy that
discussions on the new state symbols had taken place without the cooperation of
the profession and in conflict with its rules. The Demos delegates complicated
it by thinking about two new flags, a state and a national flag, and the
Gordian
knot was cut at the very last moment by Dr. France
Bucar,
who was presiding, for
whom how the new state symbols actually looked was all one but he pointed out
that they had to be decided before the proclamation of Slovene independence.
The basic acts that the delegates adopted on the final day nullified the validity
of the SFRY constitution on Slovene territory and proclaimed Slovenia to be a
- - - —-
INDEPENDENCE OF SLOVENIA
sovereign and independent state from the day of adoption
(25
June
1991).
This
is enshrined in Article
1
of the Basic Constitutional Charter on the Sovereignty and
Independence of the Republic of Slovenia. The following two articles defined the
borders of RS and specified guarantees given to all persons on Slovene territory
on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, irrespective of na¬
tional affiliation and without discrimination.21 The speaker, Dr.
Bucar,
avoided
great discussions on the details of the fundamental acts (which were nevertheless
not small) by stressing that the vote only concerned who was for and who against
independence, rather than having an ear for detail.
Nevertheless, the gap between the Basic Constitutional Charter and the Decla¬
ration on Independence was noticed and highlighted. In the latter, namely, it was
enshrined that Slovenia was prepared immediately to continue talks on possible
forms of linkage with countries created on the territory of the former SFRY and
that, on the basis of mutual recognition, it was prepared to start negotiations on
concluding an agreement on establishing a community of sovereign states on the
territory of the former SFRY.22 Why two documents so different in content were
created on the same day at the same formal ceremonial session is a question that
springs immediately to mind. The answer is also to hand. In view of the events of
the last month, the government coalition had no assurance that it would be able
to proclaim Slovenia independent with the required two-thirds majority. There
were no new symbols until the penultimate day, crucial negotiations under Presi¬
dent
Kučan
similarly took place in the last five days and primarily the Reformers
placed their hope in new links with the Yugoslav republics. The Assembly strate¬
gists prepared two documents with different contents, whereby the Declaration
encouraged hope in the creation of new links (with which to satisfy primarily
LDS and
SDP)
and the Basic Charter they immediately proclaimed the priority
aim, an independent state. The opposition of course saw things differently and
demanded
harmonisation
of the documents, which did not happen. If there had
been legal dispute the answer was similarly clear: the power of the constitutional
document is above that of the Declaration, just as the Constitution is above the
law. In this case it also appeared that the cunning of the Demos strategy was abo¬
ve the cunning of the experienced political opposition.
The trading already mentioned, which was used mainly by
SDP, also
appeared
at this meeting. The Slovene Reformers, who met at the start of June with their
Croatian and Bosnia&Herzegovina colleagues and demanded a community of
sovereign republics, also understood the adoption of basic acts in this spirit. They
stressed the importance of Slovenia continuing to express willingness to negotiate
and discuss with others in Yugoslavia and its support for a gradual form of disas-
sociation. This meant for
SDP
that from 25th June
1991,
the process of Slovene
independence was only starting and certainly not that independence had already
actually occurred. Their support for the independence acts was also conditioned
21
Official Gazette RS, no.
1, 25. 6.1991.
22
Ibid.
588
~~
INDEPENDENCE OF SLOVENIA
on adoption of a constitution by the end of October
1991,
and if it was not it
would be necessary to call an early election. Such a demand, without the sancti¬
on of elections, was adopted by
92
votes for,
54
against and
38
abstentions. The
independence acts, including the decree on proclamation, were adopted almost
unanimously.
Irrespective of discussions within the LDS delegate club on the first day of
the aggression, in which
Janša
and Peterle were blamed, it has to be said that the
great majority of assembly delegates also showed agreement at the secret night
session on the third day of the war and with the adoption of the Brioni Declara¬
tion, which was a particularly bitter pill. First at a secret night session on
29
June
there came words of thanks and encouragement from the opposition ranks for
the Slovene Territorial Defence Force and internal affairs bodies who had resisted
the occupiers aggression. The Socialists, e.g., stated that the firmest independen¬
ce variant had been enforced, and asked how much provocation there had been
from the Slovene side. The Liberal Democrats, in addition to thanks, highlighted
that they also valued a ceasefire, and the president of the Reformers showed bit¬
ter disappointment when he found that the Reformers from B&H, with whom
they had agreed a fortnight before on a community of sovereign republics, now
supported the attack on die RS. The delegates unanimously condemned the JLA
aggression.
The three representatives of the strongest political institutions, the Assembly,
the Government and the Presidency of the Republic, Dr.
Bucar,
Peterle and Ku-
čan,
had entirely identical standpoints, which already showed in negotiations on
Brioni, and above all in the adoption of the Brioni Declaration. The profound
awareness of the negotiating group that if they lacked unity the Assembly would
also be completely divided, which in the end had to accept or reject the declara¬
tion, was of crucial importance. The defence and internal affairs ministers, Janez
Janša
and Igor
Bavčar,
accepted with particular difficulty the conditions of the
Brioni Declaration, which was actually an attempt to revoke Slovene independen¬
ce and return Slovenia to the Yugoslav framework. After explicit perseverance of
Dr. France
Bucar in
answer to the question of whether we could successfully resist
with our own forces a new stronger attack by the JLA, defence minister
Janša
for
some time asserted that he did not accept the Brioni Declaration, and at sessions
of the delegate club, together with clearly enumerating its deficiencies said in the
end that he supported adoption of the declaration. In the assembly debate, none
of the parties were explicitly against the declaration; only one or two individuals
from the ranks of LS and ZS publicly opposed it, while the Liberal Party was
completely divided: the president Golija supported it, Vitomir
Gros
and
Zvone
Žagar
sharply opposed it because they considered that Slovenia gained nothing
from it and it was actually (Slovenia's) capitulation. The Brioni Declaration was
adopted by
189
votes in support,
11
votes against and
7
abstentions. The Slovene
executive bodies adapted its implementation in their own way and some deci¬
sions were not realised, or only partially realised. Events on Brioni, in addition to
- - - 589
INDEPENDENCE OF SLOVENIA
securing peace, were also important because beneath the table appeared the first
hints of possible agreement on the JLA withdrawing from Slovenia. The Yugoslav
Presidency adopted the decision on withdrawal three months later, when it was
also proposed or supported by General
Veljko Kadijević
and when the Presidency
found that the requirements for regulating the position of the JLA in Slovenia
had not been realised. Only the Croatian member of the Federal Presidency op¬
posed the withdrawal.
However, the Republic of Croatia was the first to recognise Slovene indepen¬
dence, on the same day that it was proclaimed. In the summer and beginning of
autumn, the newly created countries on the territory of the former Soviet Union
did so and the decision adopted in the middle of December
1991
by the foreign
ministers of the European Community that on 15th January
1992
the twelve
members of the EC would recognise the subjectivity of the newly created state,
was crucial. Germany's decision also took effect at that time, which had strived
most among West European countries for Slovenia's recognition but, because of
the greater impact of a joint decision, did not want to implement it alone. Prior
to the decision of the twelve
EU
countries, Slovenia was recognised by diploma¬
tic note by Iceland and Sweden, and on
13
January
1992
by the Vatican. The
USA, which most decisively supported a common Yugoslavia and President of
the Federal Executive Council Ante
Markovié,
including an attempt at financial
compensation or assistance to Slovenia as the price for remaining in Yugoslavia,
only changed its policy by recognising Slovenia at the beginning of April; and on
22
May
1992,
only two years after new democratic authority had been constitu¬
ted in Slovenia, in which the legislative and executive majority was provided by
Demos, Slovenia was accepted into the UN as the 176th member.
In the assessments of the activity of coalition and opposition parties in the
Assembly, which forms the core of this book, there can already be detected a
finding of more or less acceptable party relations. Thus, for example, Dr.
Zdenko
Čepic
is sure that ZSMS or LDS was most acceptable for Demos, in which they
saw difficult children who should not have been burdened with the encumbrance
of the past and communism.23
Čepic
also goes on to write that the encumbrance
of the past and communism was »the greatest stumbling block to the cooperation
of Demos with the Reformers, as well as the Socialists. In addition to this ideological
obstacle they
ako
accused them qfiugo-nostalgia.«24
Neither one nor the other is entirely correct. An evaluation of youth party
was also given by Dr. Rupel, when he wrote that politicians from ZSMS were
most sentimental about Yugoslavia since they had invested too much feelings
and energy into it. »In its own way it was my generation and we new people in the
government who were lucky: in relation to Yugoslavia we were completely unburde¬
ned.^ It is clear from the chronology of events that the claim about the most
Dr.
Zdenko
Čepič, Opozicija »opozicije«, Demosov zbornik, p.
630.
23
24 Ibid.
25
Dr.
Dimitrij Rupel, Skrivnost države,
1992,
p.
62.
590
INDEPENDENCE OF SLOVENIA
acceptability of LDS could still be applied in the first half of
1990,
when some
Demos parties, mainly the young farmers and ZS, cultivated visible sympathy
for ZSMS, which helped them in the initial organisational steps. Similarly, the
role of ZSMS in supporting efforts of the opposition to establish a multi-party
system should not be overlooked, as well as in the Council for the Constitution,
the calling of the »public session« of the 8th May
1989,
at which there was a
demonstration in support of the four and a reading of the May Declaration, and
in other ways. Relations between Demos and ZSMS or LDS had already begun
to deteriorate at the beginning of
1990,
the plebiscite events were an especially
difficult experience, which were joined in
1992
with the initiative for demili¬
tarisation, constant disputes with the republican secretary
Janša
in relation to
conscripts and the Slovene army, the unconstructiveness of LDS in the adoption
of the new state symbols etc.
As concerns the note about the Yugo-nostalgia of the Reformers and Socialists,
a clear line must be drawn between the two political groups. Demos, namely,
soon found common language with the Socialists, first concerning the plebiscite,
which for the sake of their own credibility and initiative the Socialists could not
oppose out of hand. Recordings of assembly sessions show considerable support
from the Socialists for the great majority of the independence activities. The So¬
cialists were not the first to attack the executive council and also in delegate po¬
lemics and disputes in the Assembly, and even the war of words between Demos
delegates and the Socialists, in comparison with those with ZSMS and ZKS-SDP
were more of a placebo. Only
Jože Smole
was an exception in the concluding
phase of adopting the independence acts and new symbols, who could in no way
be reconciled with the removal of the star and with Slovenia without Yugoslavia.
It is similarly known that in the autumn of
1991,
after the departure of SDZ and
difficulties with the newly created Democrats, Dr.
Jože Pučnik
first turned to the
Socialists and began discussing entering into a coalition.
The following definition of relations between the Demos parties and the op¬
position that derived from socio-political organisations comes to the fore from
the records. Great distrust prevailed between the groups and numerous very mar¬
ked differences in political activity. "While the opposition had many years of expe¬
rience in the functioning of the Assembly system, there were fewer such experts
in the way the Assembly functioned within the Demos majority. Also because
of this, the first constitutive session of the Assembly, which was chaired by the
oldest delegate and was marked by public mockery of the new authorities, was a
bitter experience for the majority coalition.
Recordings of assembly sessions show that the majority was of a more discreet
nature, and the opposition, mainly LDS and the Reformers were exaggeratedly
critical in their opposition and even at times insulting. With the Demos tactic,
which was based first on internal agreement, including with external supporters
of this coalition, then agreement within the Demos delegate club and finally the
elaboration of suitable legislation in the executive authority. The opposition was
INDEPENDENCE OF SLOVENIA
_
several times hard pressed publicly to oppose a proposal, and invested every effort
into having the debate rejected as procedurally inadequate, or at least drawing
out over an extending time period.
The most often used word in assessing the Slovene liberation project is lucky.
Dr. Tine Hribar says the same and adds that this luck was no more than intelli¬
gence, since we had already been preparing for independence for a century. His
assessment is that without Demos, there would not have been parliamentary
elections nor independence since it was Demos that introduced the idea of a
plebiscite as a form of national self-determination. »And without leading Demos
politicians, there would not have been the political will that gathered the strength to
proclaim the sovereign independence of the RS and then for the defence of the Slovene
state against invasion by theJLA.«26 He thus ascribes to Demos the major but not
exclusive credit for establishing national sovereignty, since it was mainly they
who decided on resistance against the aggressor and thus risked their heads.27
I am personally more inclined to the view that there is no luck in history.
More or less favourable external, international circumstances exist, which also
marked the transition of the eighties to nineties of the past century. Communist
regimes fell, together with the Berlin Wall as the most obvious example of the
Iron Curtain. However, even this external circumstance would not have been
enough if in Slovenia committed people had not existed in Demos who were
prepared courageously to risk, who were prepared publicly and clearly to express
their own political demands for
démocratisation
and an independent state, in
short who were prepared to be politically committed and personally exposed,
especially and in first place Dr.
Jože
Pučnik.
If there had not been within the coalition vision, even victory at the elections
and obtaining the levers of power would not have been much benefit.
If the project of independence had not been elaborated consciously, with per¬
sonal risk and consideration on the means for its realisation, it would have been
silenced by the first threat from Belgrade.
If it had not believed in the power and fidelity to the aims of its own delegate
base in the Assembly, it would have quit at the first criticism from the opposition.
If it had not trusted in the capacity of survival of the Slovene nation also
outside the Yugoslav framework, it would have resorted only to an attempt to
reform SFRY.
If they had not perceived and recognised the surge and desire of the Slovene
nation they would not have so instantaneously and decisively insisted on holding
a plebiscite and then realising the plebiscite decision.
If they had not been unified on
Račji otok
and prepared to risk even their
heads for the project of liberation, they would have surrendered to the threats of
Markovié
and the army.
Dr. Tine Hribar,
Slovenci kot
nacija,
p.
138.
27 Ibid.
592
INDEPENDENCE OF SLOVENIA
If they had not been so consciously and decisively committed to the forma¬
tion of a Slovene army, the desire for independence would have been left to ne¬
gotiating enthusiasts and deferred to the distant future.
If allies had not also been found in the international community for our aspi¬
rations to statehood, we would have been left to the (non)mercy of the great
powers, for whom the disintegration of multi-national communities was not in
their interests.
If they had not been unified at key moments of deciding on war and peace,
about the adoption of the Brioni Declaration, the fallen in the fighting for the RS
would perhaps have been in more than double figures.
What they did was done responsibly and thought through to the end.
Translated by Martin Cregeen
593 |
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| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV022946489 |
| callnumber-first | J - Political Science |
| callnumber-label | JN2201 |
| callnumber-raw | JN2201.A58 |
| callnumber-search | JN2201.A58 |
| callnumber-sort | JN 42201 A58 |
| classification_rvk | MG 91094 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)191878697 (DE-599)BVBBV022946489 |
| discipline | Politologie |
| discipline_str_mv | Politologie |
| edition | 1. izd. |
| era | Geschichte 1989-1992 gnd |
| era_facet | Geschichte 1989-1992 |
| format | Book |
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| geographic | Europe, Eastern Politics and government 1989- Slovenia History Autonomy and independence movements Slovenia Politics and government 1990- Slowenien (DE-588)4055302-4 gnd Jugoslawien (DE-588)4028966-7 gnd |
| geographic_facet | Europe, Eastern Politics and government 1989- Slovenia History Autonomy and independence movements Slovenia Politics and government 1990- Slowenien Jugoslawien |
| id | DE-604.BV022946489 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T18:59:57Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:08:18Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9789616580267 |
| language | Slovenian |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016151049 |
| oclc_num | 191878697 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR |
| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR |
| physical | 605 S. Ill. |
| publishDate | 2007 |
| publishDateSearch | 2007 |
| publishDateSort | 2007 |
| publisher | Nova Revija |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Osamosvojitev Slovenije "ali naj Republika Slovenija postane samostojna in neodvisna država?" Rosvita Pesek 1. izd. Ljubljana Nova Revija 2007 605 S. Ill. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Zsfassung in engl. Sprache Geschichte 1989-1992 gnd rswk-swf Geschichte Politik Gründung (DE-588)4020642-7 gnd rswk-swf Jugoslawienkriege (DE-588)4875209-5 gnd rswk-swf Unabhängigkeitsbewegung (DE-588)4121814-0 gnd rswk-swf Auflösung (DE-588)4193468-4 gnd rswk-swf Europe, Eastern Politics and government 1989- Slovenia History Autonomy and independence movements Slovenia Politics and government 1990- Slowenien (DE-588)4055302-4 gnd rswk-swf Jugoslawien (DE-588)4028966-7 gnd rswk-swf Jugoslawienkriege (DE-588)4875209-5 s Slowenien (DE-588)4055302-4 g Geschichte 1989-1992 z DE-604 Unabhängigkeitsbewegung (DE-588)4121814-0 s Jugoslawien (DE-588)4028966-7 g Auflösung (DE-588)4193468-4 s Gründung (DE-588)4020642-7 s Pesek, Rosvita Sonstige oth Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016151049&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Abstract Digitalisierung BSBMuenchen application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016151049&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Osamosvojitev Slovenije "ali naj Republika Slovenija postane samostojna in neodvisna država?" Geschichte Politik Gründung (DE-588)4020642-7 gnd Jugoslawienkriege (DE-588)4875209-5 gnd Unabhängigkeitsbewegung (DE-588)4121814-0 gnd Auflösung (DE-588)4193468-4 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4020642-7 (DE-588)4875209-5 (DE-588)4121814-0 (DE-588)4193468-4 (DE-588)4055302-4 (DE-588)4028966-7 |
| title | Osamosvojitev Slovenije "ali naj Republika Slovenija postane samostojna in neodvisna država?" |
| title_auth | Osamosvojitev Slovenije "ali naj Republika Slovenija postane samostojna in neodvisna država?" |
| title_exact_search | Osamosvojitev Slovenije "ali naj Republika Slovenija postane samostojna in neodvisna država?" |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Osamosvojitev Slovenije "ali naj Republika Slovenija postane samostojna in neodvisna država?" |
| title_full | Osamosvojitev Slovenije "ali naj Republika Slovenija postane samostojna in neodvisna država?" Rosvita Pesek |
| title_fullStr | Osamosvojitev Slovenije "ali naj Republika Slovenija postane samostojna in neodvisna država?" Rosvita Pesek |
| title_full_unstemmed | Osamosvojitev Slovenije "ali naj Republika Slovenija postane samostojna in neodvisna država?" Rosvita Pesek |
| title_short | Osamosvojitev Slovenije |
| title_sort | osamosvojitev slovenije ali naj republika slovenija postane samostojna in neodvisna drzava |
| title_sub | "ali naj Republika Slovenija postane samostojna in neodvisna država?" |
| topic | Geschichte Politik Gründung (DE-588)4020642-7 gnd Jugoslawienkriege (DE-588)4875209-5 gnd Unabhängigkeitsbewegung (DE-588)4121814-0 gnd Auflösung (DE-588)4193468-4 gnd |
| topic_facet | Geschichte Politik Gründung Jugoslawienkriege Unabhängigkeitsbewegung Auflösung Europe, Eastern Politics and government 1989- Slovenia History Autonomy and independence movements Slovenia Politics and government 1990- Slowenien Jugoslawien |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016151049&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016151049&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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