Industrial organization: contemporary theory and empirical applications
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Malden, Mass.
Blackwell
2008
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| Ausgabe: | 4. ed. |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Beschreibung: | XXIV, 696 S. graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 9781405176323 |
Internformat
MARC
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| 100 | 1 | |a Pepall, Lynne |d 1952- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)132735970 |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Industrial organization |b contemporary theory and empirical applications |c Lynne Pepall ; Dan Richards ; George Norman |
| 250 | |a 4. ed. | ||
| 264 | 1 | |a Malden, Mass. |b Blackwell |c 2008 | |
| 300 | |a XXIV, 696 S. |b graph. Darst. | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 500 | |a Includes bibliographical references and index | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Industrie - Organisation, contrôle, etc | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Industriële organisatie |2 gtt | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Industrial organization | |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Industrieökonomie |0 (DE-588)4133311-1 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
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| 700 | 1 | |a Richards, Daniel Jay |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)132735946 |4 aut | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Norman, George |d 1946- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)13272510X |4 aut | |
| 856 | 4 | 2 | |m HBZ Datenaustausch |q application/pdf |u http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016096299&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |3 Inhaltsverzeichnis |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804137160007221248 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | Short Contents
List of Figures xiii
List of Tables xvi
About the Authors xviii
Preface to the Fourth Edition xx
Part I Foundations 1
1 Industrial Organization: What, How, and Why 3
2 Basic Microeconomics 20
3 Market Structure and Market Power 44
4 Technology and Cost 59
Part II Monopoly Power in Theory and Practice 85
5 Price Discrimination and Monopoly: Linear Pricing 87
6 Price Discrimination and Monopoly: Non-linear Pricing 111
7 Product Variety and Quality under Monopoly 130
8 Commodity Bundling and Tie-in Sales 163
Part III Oligopoly and Strategic Interaction 193
9 Static Games and Cournot Competition 195
10 Price Competition 223
11 Dynamic Games and First and Second Movers 245
Part IV Anticompetitive Strategies 263
12 Limit Pricing and Entry Deterrence 265
13 Predatory Conduct: More Recent Developments 291
14 Price Fixing and Repeated Games 323
15 Collusion: Detection and Public Policy 352
iv Short Contents
Part V Contractual Relations between Firms 385
16 Horizontal Mergers 387
17 Vertical and Conglomerate Mergers 430
18 Vertical Price Restraints 462
19 Nonprice Vertical Restraints 489
Part VI Nonprice Competition 513
20 Advertising, Market Power, and Information 515
21 Advertising, Competition, and Brand Names 538
22 Research and Development 572
23 Patents and Patent Policy 604
Part VII Networks and Auctions 635
24 Network Issues 637
25 Auctions and Auction Markets 660
Answers to Practice Problems 676
Index 689
Contents
List of Figures xiii
List of Tables xvi
About the Authors xviii
Preface to the Fourth Edition xx
Part I Foundations 1
1 Industrial Organization: What, How, and Why 3
1.1 What Is Industrial Organization? 3
1.2 How We Study Industrial Organization 5
1.3 Why? Antitrust and Industrial Organization Theory 7
1.3.1 The New Sherman Act and the Dominance of Structure-based
Analysis 10
1.3.2 The Tide Changes: The Chicago School and Beyond 12
Summary 15
Problems 15
References 16
Appendix: Excerpts from Key Antitrust Statutes 16
2 Basic Microeconomics 20
2.1 Competition versus Monopoly: The Poles of Market Performance 20
2.1.1 Perfect Competition 21
2.1.2 Monopoly 25
2.2 Profit Today versus Profit Tomorrow: Firm Decision-making over Time 30
2.3 Efficiency, Surplus, and Size Relative to the Market 35
2.3.1 The Monopolist and Producer Surplus 38
2.3.2 The Nonsurplus Approach to Economic Efficiency 39
Summary 42
Problems 42
References 43
vi Contents
3 Market Structure and Market Power 44
3.1 Measuring Market Structure 44
3.1.1 Measurement Problems: What Is a Market? 47
3.2 Measuring Market Power 51
3.3 Empirical Application: Monopoly Power—How Bad Is It? 54
Summary 57
Problems 57
References 58
4 Technology and Cost 59
4.1 Production Technology and Cost Functions for Single Product Firm 59
4.1.1 Key Cost Concepts 60
4.1.2 Cost Variables and Output Decisions 62
4.1.3 Costs and Market Structure 63
4.2 Sunk Cost and Market Structure 68
4.3 Costs and Multiproduct Firms 69
4.4 Noncost Determinants of Industry Structure 74
4.4.1 Market Size and Competitive Industry 75
4.4.2 Network Externalities and Market Structure 76
4.4.3 The Role of Government Policy 77
4.5 Empirical Application: Cost Function Estimation—Scale and Scope
Economies 78
Summary 81
Problems 82
References 83
Part II Monopoly Power in Theory and Practice 85
5 Price Discrimination and Monopoly: Linear Pricing 87
5.1 Feasibility of Price Discrimination 88
5.2 Third-degree Price Discrimination or Group Pricing 91
5.3 Implementing Third-degree Price Discrimination or Group Pricing 93
5.4 Product Variety and Third-degree Price Discrimination or
Group Pricing 100
5.5 Third-degree Price Discrimination or Group Pricing and Social Welfare 106
Summary 108
Problems 109
References 110
6 Price Discrimination and Monopoly: Non-linear Pricing 111
6.1 First-degree Price Discrimination or Personalized Pricing 111
6.1.1 Two-part Pricing 113
6.1.2 Block Pricing 119
6.2 Second-degree Price Discrimination or Menu Pricing 120
6.3 Social Welfare with First- and Second-degree Price Discrimination 126
Summary 128
Contents vii
Problems 128
References 129
7 Product Variety and Quality Under Monopoly 130
7.1 A Spatial Approach to Horizontal Product Differentiation 131
7.2 Monopoly and Horizontal Differentiation 132
7.3 Is There Too Much Product Variety? 139
7.4 Monopoly and Horizontal Differentiation with Price Discrimination 143
7.5 Vertical Product Differentiation 145
7.5.1 Price and Quality Choice with Just One Product 145
7.5.2 Offering More Than One Product in a Vertically Differentiated
Market 150
7.6 Empirical Application: Price Discrimination, Product Variety, and
Monopoly versus Competition 155
Summary 157
Problems 158
References 159
Appendix A: Location Choice with Two Shops 159
Appendix B: The Monopolist s Choice of Price When Her Shops
Have Different Costs 160
8 Commodity Bundling and Tie-in Sales 163
8.1 Commodity Bundling and Price Discrimination 164
8.2 Required Tie-in Sales 172
8.3 Complementary Goods, Network Externalities, and Monopoly Pricing 175
8.4 Antitrust, Bundling, and Tie-in Sales 181
8.4.1 Bundling and the Microsoft Case 181
8.4.2 Antitrust Policy, Bundling, and Tying: Additional Developments 184
Summary 188
Problems 189
References 190
Appendix: Formal Proof of the Inefficiency Induced by the Marketing of
Complementary Goods by Separate Monopolists 190
Part III Oligopoly and Strategic Interaction 193
9 Static Games and Cournot Competition 195
9.1 Strategic Interaction: Introduction to Game Theory 196
9.2 Dominant and Dominated Strategies 198
9.3 Nash Equilibrium as a Solution Concept 202
9.4 Static Models of Oligopoly: The Cournot Model 204
9.5 Variations on the Cournot Theme: Many Firms and Different Costs 211
9.6 Concentration and Profitability in the Cournot Model 217
Summary 219
Problems 220
References 222
viii Contents
10 Price Competition 223
10.1 The Bertrand Duopoly Model 224
10.2 Bertrand Reconsidered 229
10.3 Bertrand in a Spatial Setting 231
10.4 Strategic Complements and Substitutes 237
10.5 Empirical Application: Brand Competition and Consumer Preferences—
Evidence from the California Retail Gasoline Market 238
Summary 241
Problems 242
References 243
11 Dynamic Games and First and Second Movers 245
11.1 The Stackelberg Model of Quantity Competition 246
11.2 Sequential Price Competition 249
11.3 Credibility of Threats and Nash Equilibria for Dynamic Games 254
11.4 The Chain Store Paradox 258
Summary 259
Problems 260
References 261
Part IV Anticompetitive Strategies 263
12 Limit Pricing and Entry Deterrence 265
12.1 Monopoly Power and Market Structure Over Time: Some Basic Facts 266
12.2 Predatory Conduct and Limit Pricing 269
12.2.1 An Informal Model of Entry Deterrence 270
12.2.2 Capacity Expansion as a Credible Entry-deterring Commitment 272
12.3 Preemption and the Persistence of Monopoly 283
12.4 Evidence on Predatory Capacity Expansion 284
Summary 287
Problems 288
References 289
13 Predatory Conduct: More Recent Developments 291
13.1 Predatory Pricing: Myth or Reality? 293
13.2 Predation and Imperfect Information 298
13.2.1 Predatory Pricing and Financial Constraints 299
13.2.2 Asymmetric Information and Limit Pricing 302
13.3 Contracts as a Barrier to Entry 305
13.3.1 Long-term Exclusive Contracts as Predatory Instruments 306
13.3.2 Tying as a Predatory Contract 310
13.4 Predatory Conduct and Public Policy 312
13.5 Empirical Application: Entry Deterrence in the Pharmaceutical Industry 317
Summary 319
Problems 320
References 321
Contents ix
14 Price Fixing and Repeated Games 323
14.1 The Cartel s Dilemma 326
14.2 Repeated Games 330
14.2.1 Finitely Repeated Games 331
14.2.2 Infinitely or Indefinitely Repeated Games 334
14.2.3 Some Extensions 337
14.3 Collusion: The Role of the Antitrust Authorities 341
14.4 Empirical Application: Estimating the Effects of Price Fixing 345
Summary 349
Problems 349
References 351
15 Collusion: Detection and Public Policy 352
15.1 The Cartel Problem 353
15.2 Factors that Facilitate Collusion 355
15.2.1 High Industry Concentration 355
15.2.2 Significant Entry Barriers 356
15.2.3 Frequent and Regular Orders 356
15.2.4 Rapid Market Growth 358
15.2.5 Technological or Cost Symmetry 358
15.2.6 Multi-market Contact 359
15.2.7 Product Homogeneity 360
15.2.8 Other Factors 361
15.3 An Illustration: Collusion on the NASDAQ Exchange 364
15.4 Detecting Collusion among Firms 369
15.5 Cartel Leniency (Amnesty) Programs 372
15.6 Empirical Application: An Experimental Investigation of Leniency Programs 378
Summary 382
Problems 382
References 383
Part V Contractual Relations Between Firms 385
16 Horizontal Mergers 387
16.1 Horizontal Mergers and the Merger Paradox 389
16.2 Mergers and Cost Synergies 392
16.2.1 The Merger Reduces Fixed Costs 393
16.2.2 The Merger Reduces Variable Costs 393
16.3 The Merged Firm as a Stackelberg Leader 395
16.4 Horizontal Mergers and Product Differentiation 405
16.4.1 Bertrand Competition and Merger with Linear Demand Systems 406
16.4.2 Mergers in a Spatial Market 407
16.5 Public Policy toward Horizontal Mergers 414
16.6 Empirical Application: Evaluating the Impact of Mergers with Computer
Simulation 419
Summary 422
Problems 423
x Contents
References 424
Appendix A: Bertrand Competition in a Simple Linear Demand System 426
Appendix B: Equilibrium Prices in the Spatial Model without a Merger 428
Appendix C: Equilibrium Prices in the Spatial Model after Firms 2 and
3 Merge 429
17 Vertical and Conglomerate Mergers 430
17.1 Procompetitive Vertical Mergers 431
17.2 Possible Anticompetitive Effects of Vertical Mergers 436
17.2.1 Vertical Merger to Facilitate Price Discrimination 437
17.2.2 Vertical Merger, Oligopoly, and Market Foreclosure 438
17.3 Formal Oligopoly Models of Vertical Integration 439
17.3.1 Vertical Integration and Foreclosure in a Cournot Model 439
17.3.2 Vertical Integration and Foreclosure in a Model with
Differentiated Products 444
17.3.3 Reappraisal and Application: The GE-Honeywell Merger 448
17.4 Conglomerate Mergers 450
17.4.1 Possible Economies Associated with Conglomeration 450
17.4.2 Managerial Motives 451
17.5 A Brief Digression on Mergers and the Theory of the Firm 453
17.6 Empirical Application: Vertical Integration in the Ready-mixed Concrete
Industry 455
Summary 458
Problems 458
References 460
18 Vertical Price Restraints 462
18.1 Resale Price Maintenance: Some Historical Background 463
18.2 Vertical Price Restraints as a Response to Double-Marginalization 466
18.3 RPM Agreements and Retail Price Discrimination 469
18.4 RPM Agreements to Ensure the Provision of Retail Services 471
18.4.1 Optimal Provision of Retail Services 473
18.4.2 The Case of a Monopoly Retailer and a Monopoly Manufacturer 475
18.4.3 The Case of Competitive Retailing 477
18.4.4 Free-riding and the Provision of Retail Services 478
18.5 Retail Price Maintenance and Uncertain Demand 480
Summary 485
Problems 485
References 486
Appendix: Manufacturer s Optimal Wholesale Price When Retailer
Discriminates between Two Markets 487
19 Nonprice Vertical Restraints 489
19.1 Upstream Competition and Exclusive Dealing 489
19.2 Exclusive Selling and Territorial Arrangements 491
19.3 Aftermarkets 495
19.4 Public Policy toward Vertical Restraints 498
19.5 A Brief Discussion of Franchising and Divisionalization 500
Contents xi
19.6 Empirical Application: Exclusive Dealing in the U.S. Beer Industry 505
Summary 509
Problems 509
References 510
Part VI Nonprice Competition 513
20 Advertising, Market Power, and Information 515
20.1 The Extent of Advertising 517
20.2 Advertising, Product Differentiation, and Monopoly Power 518
20.3 The Monopoly Finn s Profit-maximizing Level of Advertising 519
20.4 Advertising as Consumer Information 523
20.5 Persuasive Advertising 525
20.6 Advertising and Signaling 526
20.7 Suppressed Advertising Content 530
20.8 Truth versus Fraud in Advertising 532
Summary 534
Problems 535
References 536
21 Advertising, Competition, and Brand Names 538
21.1 Advertising as Wasteful Competition 538
21.2 Advertising and Information in Product-differentiated Markets 540
21.3 What s in a Brand Name? 550
21.3.1 Advertising and Building Brand Value 552
21.3.2 Advertising and Extending the Reach 554
21.3.3 Brand Name Advertising and Prices 555
21.4 Too Much or Too Little Advertising: The Question Revisited 557
21.5 Cooperative Advertising 560
21.6 Empirical Application: Advertising, Information, and Prestige 564
Summary 569
Problems 569
References 571
22 Research and Development 572
22.1 A Taxonomy of Innovations 576
22.2 Market Structure and the Incentive to Innovate 577
22.2.1 Competition and the Value of Innovation 578
22.2.2 Preserving Monopoly Profit and the Efficiency Effect 581
22.3 A More Complete Model of Competition via Innovation 583
22.4 Evidence on the Schumpeterian Hypothesis 585
22.5 R D Cooperation between Firms 588
22.5.1 Noncooperative R D: Profit, Prices, and Social Welfare 589
22.5.2 Technology Cooperation 593
22.6 Empirical Application: R D Spillovers in Practice 597
Summary 600
Problems 601
References 602
xii Contents
23 Patents and Patent Policy 604
23.1 Optimal Patent Length 605
23.2 Optimal Patent Breadth 608
23.3 Patent Races 610
23.4 Monopoly Power and Sleeping Patents 616
23.5 Patent Licensing 619
23.5.1 The Incentive for an Oligopolist to License a Nondrastic Innovation 620
23.5.2 Licensing, Drastic Innovations, and Monopoly Power 621
23.5.3 Patent Licensing, Social Welfare, and Public Policy 622
23.6 Recent Patent Policy Developments 624
23.7 Empirical Application: Patent Law and Practice in the Semiconductor
Industry 627
Summary 631
Problems 632
References 633
Part VII Networks and Auctions 635
24 Network Issues 637
24.1 Monopoly Provision of a Network Service 638
24.2 Networks, Competition, and Complementary Services 642
24.3 Systems Competition and the Battle over Industry Standards 645
24.4 Network Goods and Public Policy 652
24.5 Empirical Application: Network Externalities in Computer
Software—Spreadsheets 654
Summary 657
Problems 658
References 659
25 Auctions and Auction Markets 660
25.1 A Brief Taxonomy of Auctions 661
25.2 The Revenue Equivalence Theorem 662
25.3 Common Value Auctions 666
25.3.1 The Winner s Curse 666
25.3.2 Almost Common Value Auctions 669
25.4 Auction Design: Lessons From Industrial Organization 669
Summary 673
Problems 674
References 674
Answers to Practice Problems 676
Index 689
Figures
2.1 Market demand curve 21
2.2 The long-run competitive equilibrium 24
2.3 The marginal revenue from increased production for a monopolist 26
2.4 The textbook monopoly case 27
2.5 Competition maximizes the total surplus 36
2.6 The deadweight loss of monopoly 38
3.1 Some possible concentration curves 45
4.1 Typical average and marginal cost curves 62
4.2 Location of cola products along the sugar content line 73
5.1 Non-disciminatory pricing: constant marginal cost 94
5.2 Third-degree price discrimination or group pricing: constant marginal cost 95
5.3 Non-discriminatory pricing with non-constant marginal cost 96
5.4 Third-degree price discrimination or group pricing with non-constant
marginal cost 97
5.5 Welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination or group pricing 107
6.1 No price discrimination 115
6.2 First-degree price discrimination with a two-part tariff 117
6.3 Diagram for the amusement park problem 119
6.4 Second-degree price discrimination 122
6.5 Total surplus 126
6.6 Impact of second-degree price discrimination on welfare 127
7.1 The full price at the shop on Main Street 133
7.2 Lowering the price at the shop on Main Street 134
7.3 Opening two shops on Main Street 135
7.4 Opening three shops on Main Street 136
7.5 Stand-alone retail shops on Main Street 138
7.6 Cost of serving customers when there are n shops 140
7.7 Impact of quality on demand 146
8.1 Consumers reservation prices for goods 1 and 2 and simple
monopoly pricing 166
8.2 Monopoly pricing of a pure bundle of goods 1 and 2 167
8.3 Monopoly pricing under mixed bundling of goods 1 and 2 167
xiv Figures
8.4 Pricing of complementary goods: the nuts and bolts case 178
9.1 Firm 2 s demand curve in the Cournot duopoly game depends on firm
l s output 207
9.2 Best-response (reaction) curves for the Cournot duopoly model 208
9.3 The Cournot duopoly model with different costs across firms 214
10.1 Firm 2 s demand curve in the Bertrand model 225
10.2 Firm 2 s profits as a function of p2 when firm 1 prices above cost but
below the pure monopoly price 226
10.3 Snow Richards residual demand curve 231
10.4 The Main Street spatial model once again 232
10.5 Best-reponse functions for price competition with imperfect substitutes 235
10.6 Best-response functions for the Cournot (quantity) case and the
Bertrand (price) case 237
10.7 Thrifty competition and gasoline prices in southern California 241
11.1 The Cournot and Stackelberg outcomes compared 248
11.2 Sequential price competition: firm 1 sets its price first anticipating
that firm 2 will price below firm 1 s price 252
11.3 The extensive form of the Microhard-Newvel game 256
12.1 The limit output model 270
12.2 The effect of previously acquired capacity on current marginal cost 273
12.3 The best-response function of the incumbent firm depends on its
first-stage choice of capacity 274
12.4 The rational bounds on the incumbent s initial choice of capacity, K) 276
12.5 Possible locations of the entrant s break-even point 278
12.6 An example of entry deterrence 280
12.7 Extensive form for Practice Problem 12.3 282
13.1 The bank and Newvel for just one period 299
13.2 The decision tree in the two-period loan contract 300
13.3 Extensive form of the Sequential Entry game with asymmetric
information on cost 303
14.1 Criminal antitrust fines for fiscal years 2002-6 324
14.2 Cartel maintenance with uncertain demand 338
14.3 The Folk theorem 339
15.1 A collusive agreement between firms with different costs 354
15.2 The distribution of inside spreads on NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ 365
15.3 Demand and supply for a stock 366
15.4 Equilibria with a leniency program 376
16.1 Product differentiation: no price discrimination 408
16.2 Price equilibrium without a merger 409
16.3 Price equilibrium after merger of firms 2 and 3 411
16.4 Price equilibrium with price discrimination 412
17.1 Independent retailer s optimum pricing as a function of manufacturer s
wholesale price, r 432
17.2 Upstream and downstream profit maximization without vertical
integration 434
17.3 Upstream and downstream profit maximization with vertical
integration 434
18.1 The effect of services on demand, costs, and the social surplus 472
Figures xv
18.2 The integrated firm s optimal price as a functon of the service level, s 474
18.3 Resale price maintenance and variable demand 481
21.1 Advertising in a Hotelling spatial model 543
21.2 Marginal and total advertising cost assumed for the spatial competition
model 545
21.3 Effect of advertising services a on firm s demand when advertising
raises brand value 553
21.4 Effect of advertising services a on firm s demand when advertising
extends reach 556
22.1 Drastic and nondrastic process innovations 577
22.2 Market structure and the incentive to innovate 579
22.3 Extensive form for the Innovation and Entry game 581
22.4 Best-response functions for research intensity in the noncooperative
R D game 592
23.1 Innovation gains during period of patent protection (T years) and
after patent protection 606
23.2 A patent race with a duopoly 613
23.3 Patterns of regression time coefficients in semiconductor patent behavior 631
24.1 Demand to a monopoly provider of a network service 639
Tables
3.1 Calculation of the HHI for industry C 47
3.2 Concentration measures for selected industries 48
3.3 Estimated Lerner Index for selected industries 53
4.1 Average and marginal cost 63
4.2 Christensen and Greene (1976) cost function estimates and scale
economies in electric power generation 80
5.1 Comparison of prescription drug prices (U.S. dollars) 88
5.2 Schedule of annual membership fees for the American Economic
Association 92
7.1 Ticket restrictions and air fares 157
8.1 Consumer reservation prices 169
8.2 Determination of simple monopoly prices 169
8.3 Pure bundling as the sustainable equilibrium 187
9.1 Strategy combinations and firm payoffs in the flight departure game 200
9.2 Strategy combinations and firm payoffs in the modified flight
departure game 201
9.3 Payoff matrix for the airfare game 203
10.1 Brand competition and gasoline prices 240
13.1 Detail advertising by category of entry probability, 64 pharmaceutical
markets 319
14.1 Violations yielding a corporate fine of $10 million or more since 2000 324
14.2a Payoffs (U.S. dollars, thousands) to cooperation (M) and defection (D)
in the Cournot duopoly game 329
14.2b Payoffs (U.S. dollars, thousands) to cooperaton (M) and defection (D)
in the Bertrand duopoly game 329
14.3 Summary statistics for the auction cartel 347
14.4 Regression results 348
15.1 Cartels and industry concentration 356
15.2 Payoff matrix for a 2 x 2 pricing game 363
15.3 Profits in the NASDAQ example 367
15.4 Payoff matrix for the NASDAQ cartel game (U.S. dollars, thousands) 367
15.5 The great salt duopoly 372
Tables xvii
15.6 Payoff matrix with a leniency program 375
15.7 Profits for the leniency program game 376
15.8 Cartel formation 379
15.9 Agreed-upon prices 380
15.10 Average market prices 380
15.11 Cartel breakdown 3 81
16.1 Necessary condition for profitable merger 391
16.2 Profit effect of two follower firms merging to become a leader, given
N followers and L leaders prior to the merger 400
17.1 Vertical integration, foreclosure, and strategic commitment 447
17.2 Vertical integration in cement/ready-mixed concrete market 456
17.3 Results for regressions explaining ready-mixed concrete prices in
the U.S. 457
19.1 What explains the use of exclusive dealing in U.S. beer distributor
contracts? 506
19.2 Effect of exclusive dealing on market outcomes 508
20.1 Estimated industry advertising-to-sales ratios, 2006 523
20.2 Advertising expenditures as a % of sales by different categories
of products 524
20.3 Price and quality in the upright vacuum cleaner market 529
21.1 Effect of advertising and price on demand for new Yoplait product:
preliminary results 565
21.2 Effect of advertising and price on demand for new Yoplait product:
final (logit) results 567
22.1 Top ten U.S. patent-receiving firms in 2006 and their rank in 2005
and 2004 574
22.2 Top ten patent-receiving industries in 2006 and cumulative
patents to that year 574
22.3a Payoff matrix with low R D spillovers, ji = 0.25 593
22.3b Payoff matrix with high R D spillovers, j8 = 0.75 593
22.4 Regression estimates of international R D spillovers 600
23.1 Payoff matrix for the Duopoly patent race 612
23.2 Patent use by inventor s employer 618
23.3 Parameter estimates for expected patent output by semiconductor firms 630
24.1 Excess inertia and excess momentum with network externalities
(in U.S. dollars, millions) 646
24.2 Tweedledum and Tweedledee (in U.S. dollars, millions) 648
24.3 The Battle of the Sexes (in U.S. dollars, millions) 650
24.4 The Pesky Little Brother (in U.S. dollars, millions) 651
24.5 Hedonic regression results for spreadsheet programs, 1986-91 656
24.6 Quality adjusted price indices for spreadsheet programs, 1986-91 657
|
| adam_txt |
Short Contents
List of Figures xiii
List of Tables xvi
About the Authors xviii
Preface to the Fourth Edition xx
Part I Foundations 1
1 Industrial Organization: What, How, and Why 3
2 Basic Microeconomics 20
3 Market Structure and Market Power 44
4 Technology and Cost 59
Part II Monopoly Power in Theory and Practice 85
5 Price Discrimination and Monopoly: Linear Pricing 87
6 Price Discrimination and Monopoly: Non-linear Pricing 111
7 Product Variety and Quality under Monopoly 130
8 Commodity Bundling and Tie-in Sales 163
Part III Oligopoly and Strategic Interaction 193
9 Static Games and Cournot Competition 195
10 Price Competition 223
11 Dynamic Games and First and Second Movers 245
Part IV Anticompetitive Strategies 263
12 Limit Pricing and Entry Deterrence 265
13 Predatory Conduct: More Recent Developments 291
14 Price Fixing and Repeated Games 323
15 Collusion: Detection and Public Policy 352
iv Short Contents
Part V Contractual Relations between Firms 385
16 Horizontal Mergers 387
17 Vertical and Conglomerate Mergers 430
18 Vertical Price Restraints 462
19 Nonprice Vertical Restraints 489
Part VI Nonprice Competition 513
20 Advertising, Market Power, and Information 515
21 Advertising, Competition, and Brand Names 538
22 Research and Development 572
23 Patents and Patent Policy 604
Part VII Networks and Auctions 635
24 Network Issues 637
25 Auctions and Auction Markets 660
Answers to Practice Problems 676
Index 689
Contents
List of Figures xiii
List of Tables xvi
About the Authors xviii
Preface to the Fourth Edition xx
Part I Foundations 1
1 Industrial Organization: What, How, and Why 3
1.1 What Is Industrial Organization? 3
1.2 How We Study Industrial Organization 5
1.3 Why? Antitrust and Industrial Organization Theory 7
1.3.1 The "New" Sherman Act and the Dominance of Structure-based
Analysis 10
1.3.2 The Tide Changes: The Chicago School and Beyond 12
Summary 15
Problems 15
References 16
Appendix: Excerpts from Key Antitrust Statutes 16
2 Basic Microeconomics 20
2.1 Competition versus Monopoly: The Poles of Market Performance 20
2.1.1 Perfect Competition 21
2.1.2 Monopoly 25
2.2 Profit Today versus Profit Tomorrow: Firm Decision-making over Time 30
2.3 Efficiency, Surplus, and Size Relative to the Market 35
2.3.1 The Monopolist and Producer Surplus 38
2.3.2 The Nonsurplus Approach to Economic Efficiency 39
Summary 42
Problems 42
References 43
vi Contents
3 Market Structure and Market Power 44
3.1 Measuring Market Structure 44
3.1.1 Measurement Problems: What Is a Market? 47
3.2 Measuring Market Power 51
3.3 Empirical Application: Monopoly Power—How Bad Is It? 54
Summary 57
Problems 57
References 58
4 Technology and Cost 59
4.1 Production Technology and Cost Functions for Single Product Firm 59
4.1.1 Key Cost Concepts 60
4.1.2 Cost Variables and Output Decisions 62
4.1.3 Costs and Market Structure 63
4.2 Sunk Cost and Market Structure 68
4.3 Costs and Multiproduct Firms 69
4.4 Noncost Determinants of Industry Structure 74
4.4.1 Market Size and Competitive Industry 75
4.4.2 Network Externalities and Market Structure 76
4.4.3 The Role of Government Policy 77
4.5 Empirical Application: Cost Function Estimation—Scale and Scope
Economies 78
Summary 81
Problems 82
References 83
Part II Monopoly Power in Theory and Practice 85
5 Price Discrimination and Monopoly: Linear Pricing 87
5.1 Feasibility of Price Discrimination 88
5.2 Third-degree Price Discrimination or Group Pricing 91
5.3 Implementing Third-degree Price Discrimination or Group Pricing 93
5.4 Product Variety and Third-degree Price Discrimination or
Group Pricing 100
5.5 Third-degree Price Discrimination or Group Pricing and Social Welfare 106
Summary 108
Problems 109
References 110
6 Price Discrimination and Monopoly: Non-linear Pricing 111
6.1 First-degree Price Discrimination or Personalized Pricing 111
6.1.1 Two-part Pricing 113
6.1.2 Block Pricing 119
6.2 Second-degree Price Discrimination or Menu Pricing 120
6.3 Social Welfare with First- and Second-degree Price Discrimination 126
Summary 128
Contents vii
Problems 128
References 129
7 Product Variety and Quality Under Monopoly 130
7.1 A Spatial Approach to Horizontal Product Differentiation 131
7.2 Monopoly and Horizontal Differentiation 132
7.3 Is There Too Much Product Variety? 139
7.4 Monopoly and Horizontal Differentiation with Price Discrimination 143
7.5 Vertical Product Differentiation 145
7.5.1 Price and Quality Choice with Just One Product 145
7.5.2 Offering More Than One Product in a Vertically Differentiated
Market 150
7.6 Empirical Application: Price Discrimination, Product Variety, and
Monopoly versus Competition 155
Summary 157
Problems 158
References 159
Appendix A: Location Choice with Two Shops 159
Appendix B: The Monopolist's Choice of Price When Her Shops
Have Different Costs 160
8 Commodity Bundling and Tie-in Sales 163
8.1 Commodity Bundling and Price Discrimination 164
8.2 Required Tie-in Sales 172
8.3 Complementary Goods, Network Externalities, and Monopoly Pricing 175
8.4 Antitrust, Bundling, and Tie-in Sales 181
8.4.1 Bundling and the Microsoft Case 181
8.4.2 Antitrust Policy, Bundling, and Tying: Additional Developments 184
Summary 188
Problems 189
References 190
Appendix: Formal Proof of the Inefficiency Induced by the Marketing of
Complementary Goods by Separate Monopolists 190
Part III Oligopoly and Strategic Interaction 193
9 Static Games and Cournot Competition 195
9.1 Strategic Interaction: Introduction to Game Theory 196
9.2 Dominant and Dominated Strategies 198
9.3 Nash Equilibrium as a Solution Concept 202
9.4 Static Models of Oligopoly: The Cournot Model 204
9.5 Variations on the Cournot Theme: Many Firms and Different Costs 211
9.6 Concentration and Profitability in the Cournot Model 217
Summary 219
Problems 220
References 222
viii Contents
10 Price Competition 223
10.1 The Bertrand Duopoly Model 224
10.2 Bertrand Reconsidered 229
10.3 Bertrand in a Spatial Setting 231
10.4 Strategic Complements and Substitutes 237
10.5 Empirical Application: Brand Competition and Consumer Preferences—
Evidence from the California Retail Gasoline Market 238
Summary 241
Problems 242
References 243
11 Dynamic Games and First and Second Movers 245
11.1 The Stackelberg Model of Quantity Competition 246
11.2 Sequential Price Competition 249
11.3 Credibility of Threats and Nash Equilibria for Dynamic Games 254
11.4 The Chain Store Paradox 258
Summary 259
Problems 260
References 261
Part IV Anticompetitive Strategies 263
12 Limit Pricing and Entry Deterrence 265
12.1 Monopoly Power and Market Structure Over Time: Some Basic Facts 266
12.2 Predatory Conduct and Limit Pricing 269
12.2.1 An Informal Model of Entry Deterrence 270
12.2.2 Capacity Expansion as a Credible Entry-deterring Commitment 272
12.3 Preemption and the Persistence of Monopoly 283
12.4 Evidence on Predatory Capacity Expansion 284
Summary 287
Problems 288
References 289
13 Predatory Conduct: More Recent Developments 291
13.1 Predatory Pricing: Myth or Reality? 293
13.2 Predation and Imperfect Information 298
13.2.1 Predatory Pricing and Financial Constraints 299
13.2.2 Asymmetric Information and Limit Pricing 302
13.3 Contracts as a Barrier to Entry 305
13.3.1 Long-term Exclusive Contracts as Predatory Instruments 306
13.3.2 Tying as a Predatory Contract 310
13.4 Predatory Conduct and Public Policy 312
13.5 Empirical Application: Entry Deterrence in the Pharmaceutical Industry 317
Summary 319
Problems 320
References 321
Contents ix
14 Price Fixing and Repeated Games 323
14.1 The Cartel's Dilemma 326
14.2 Repeated Games 330
14.2.1 Finitely Repeated Games 331
14.2.2 Infinitely or Indefinitely Repeated Games 334
14.2.3 Some Extensions 337
14.3 Collusion: The Role of the Antitrust Authorities 341
14.4 Empirical Application: Estimating the Effects of Price Fixing 345
Summary 349
Problems 349
References 351
15 Collusion: Detection and Public Policy 352
15.1 The Cartel Problem 353
15.2 Factors that Facilitate Collusion 355
15.2.1 High Industry Concentration 355
15.2.2 Significant Entry Barriers 356
15.2.3 Frequent and Regular Orders 356
15.2.4 Rapid Market Growth 358
15.2.5 Technological or Cost Symmetry 358
15.2.6 Multi-market Contact 359
15.2.7 Product Homogeneity 360
15.2.8 Other Factors 361
15.3 An Illustration: Collusion on the NASDAQ Exchange 364
15.4 Detecting Collusion among Firms 369
15.5 Cartel Leniency (Amnesty) Programs 372
15.6 Empirical Application: An Experimental Investigation of Leniency Programs 378
Summary 382
Problems 382
References 383
Part V Contractual Relations Between Firms 385
16 Horizontal Mergers 387
16.1 Horizontal Mergers and the Merger Paradox 389
16.2 Mergers and Cost Synergies 392
16.2.1 The Merger Reduces Fixed Costs 393
16.2.2 The Merger Reduces Variable Costs 393
16.3 The Merged Firm as a Stackelberg Leader 395
16.4 Horizontal Mergers and Product Differentiation 405
16.4.1 Bertrand Competition and Merger with Linear Demand Systems 406
16.4.2 Mergers in a Spatial Market 407
16.5 Public Policy toward Horizontal Mergers 414
16.6 Empirical Application: Evaluating the Impact of Mergers with Computer
Simulation 419
Summary 422
Problems 423
x Contents
References 424
Appendix A: Bertrand Competition in a Simple Linear Demand System 426
Appendix B: Equilibrium Prices in the Spatial Model without a Merger 428
Appendix C: Equilibrium Prices in the Spatial Model after Firms 2 and
3 Merge 429
17 Vertical and Conglomerate Mergers 430
17.1 Procompetitive Vertical Mergers 431
17.2 Possible Anticompetitive Effects of Vertical Mergers 436
17.2.1 Vertical Merger to Facilitate Price Discrimination 437
17.2.2 Vertical Merger, Oligopoly, and Market Foreclosure 438
17.3 Formal Oligopoly Models of Vertical Integration 439
17.3.1 Vertical Integration and Foreclosure in a Cournot Model 439
17.3.2 Vertical Integration and Foreclosure in a Model with
Differentiated Products 444
17.3.3 Reappraisal and Application: The GE-Honeywell Merger 448
17.4 Conglomerate Mergers 450
17.4.1 Possible Economies Associated with Conglomeration 450
17.4.2 Managerial Motives 451
17.5 A Brief Digression on Mergers and the Theory of the Firm 453
17.6 Empirical Application: Vertical Integration in the Ready-mixed Concrete
Industry 455
Summary 458
Problems 458
References 460
18 Vertical Price Restraints 462
18.1 Resale Price Maintenance: Some Historical Background 463
18.2 Vertical Price Restraints as a Response to Double-Marginalization 466
18.3 RPM Agreements and Retail Price Discrimination 469
18.4 RPM Agreements to Ensure the Provision of Retail Services 471
18.4.1 Optimal Provision of Retail Services 473
18.4.2 The Case of a Monopoly Retailer and a Monopoly Manufacturer 475
18.4.3 The Case of Competitive Retailing 477
18.4.4 Free-riding and the Provision of Retail Services 478
18.5 Retail Price Maintenance and Uncertain Demand 480
Summary 485
Problems 485
References 486
Appendix: Manufacturer's Optimal Wholesale Price When Retailer
Discriminates between Two Markets 487
19 Nonprice Vertical Restraints 489
19.1 Upstream Competition and Exclusive Dealing 489
19.2 Exclusive Selling and Territorial Arrangements 491
19.3 Aftermarkets 495
19.4 Public Policy toward Vertical Restraints 498
19.5 A Brief Discussion of Franchising and Divisionalization 500
Contents xi
19.6 Empirical Application: Exclusive Dealing in the U.S. Beer Industry 505
Summary 509
Problems 509
References 510
Part VI Nonprice Competition 513
20 Advertising, Market Power, and Information 515
20.1 The Extent of Advertising 517
20.2 Advertising, Product Differentiation, and Monopoly Power 518
20.3 The Monopoly Finn's Profit-maximizing Level of Advertising 519
20.4 Advertising as Consumer Information 523
20.5 Persuasive Advertising 525
20.6 Advertising and Signaling 526
20.7 Suppressed Advertising Content 530
20.8 Truth versus Fraud in Advertising 532
Summary 534
Problems 535
References 536
21 Advertising, Competition, and Brand Names 538
21.1 Advertising as Wasteful Competition 538
21.2 Advertising and Information in Product-differentiated Markets 540
21.3 What's in a Brand Name? 550
21.3.1 Advertising and Building Brand Value 552
21.3.2 Advertising and Extending the Reach 554
21.3.3 Brand Name Advertising and Prices 555
21.4 Too Much or Too Little Advertising: The Question Revisited 557
21.5 Cooperative Advertising 560
21.6 Empirical Application: Advertising, Information, and Prestige 564
Summary 569
Problems 569
References 571
22 Research and Development 572
22.1 A Taxonomy of Innovations 576
22.2 Market Structure and the Incentive to Innovate 577
22.2.1 Competition and the Value of Innovation 578
22.2.2 Preserving Monopoly Profit and the Efficiency Effect 581
22.3 A More Complete Model of Competition via Innovation 583
22.4 Evidence on the Schumpeterian Hypothesis 585
22.5 R D Cooperation between Firms 588
22.5.1 Noncooperative R D: Profit, Prices, and Social Welfare 589
22.5.2 Technology Cooperation 593
22.6 Empirical Application: R D Spillovers in Practice 597
Summary 600
Problems 601
References 602
xii Contents
23 Patents and Patent Policy 604
23.1 Optimal Patent Length 605
23.2 Optimal Patent Breadth 608
23.3 Patent Races 610
23.4 Monopoly Power and "Sleeping Patents" 616
23.5 Patent Licensing 619
23.5.1 The Incentive for an Oligopolist to License a Nondrastic Innovation 620
23.5.2 Licensing, Drastic Innovations, and Monopoly Power 621
23.5.3 Patent Licensing, Social Welfare, and Public Policy 622
23.6 Recent Patent Policy Developments 624
23.7 Empirical Application: Patent Law and Practice in the Semiconductor
Industry 627
Summary 631
Problems 632
References 633
Part VII Networks and Auctions 635
24 Network Issues 637
24.1 Monopoly Provision of a Network Service 638
24.2 Networks, Competition, and Complementary Services 642
24.3 Systems Competition and the Battle over Industry Standards 645
24.4 Network Goods and Public Policy 652
24.5 Empirical Application: Network Externalities in Computer
Software—Spreadsheets 654
Summary 657
Problems 658
References 659
25 Auctions and Auction Markets 660
25.1 A Brief Taxonomy of Auctions 661
25.2 The Revenue Equivalence Theorem 662
25.3 Common Value Auctions 666
25.3.1 The "Winner's Curse" 666
25.3.2 Almost Common Value Auctions 669
25.4 Auction Design: Lessons From Industrial Organization 669
Summary 673
Problems 674
References 674
Answers to Practice Problems 676
Index 689
Figures
2.1 Market demand curve 21
2.2 The long-run competitive equilibrium 24
2.3 The marginal revenue from increased production for a monopolist 26
2.4 The textbook monopoly case 27
2.5 Competition maximizes the total surplus 36
2.6 The deadweight loss of monopoly 38
3.1 Some possible concentration curves 45
4.1 Typical average and marginal cost curves 62
4.2 Location of cola products along the sugar content line 73
5.1 Non-disciminatory pricing: constant marginal cost 94
5.2 Third-degree price discrimination or group pricing: constant marginal cost 95
5.3 Non-discriminatory pricing with non-constant marginal cost 96
5.4 Third-degree price discrimination or group pricing with non-constant
marginal cost 97
5.5 Welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination or group pricing 107
6.1 No price discrimination 115
6.2 First-degree price discrimination with a two-part tariff 117
6.3 Diagram for the amusement park problem 119
6.4 Second-degree price discrimination 122
6.5 Total surplus 126
6.6 Impact of second-degree price discrimination on welfare 127
7.1 The full price at the shop on Main Street 133
7.2 Lowering the price at the shop on Main Street 134
7.3 Opening two shops on Main Street 135
7.4 Opening three shops on Main Street 136
7.5 Stand-alone retail shops on Main Street 138
7.6 Cost of serving customers when there are n shops 140
7.7 Impact of quality on demand 146
8.1 Consumers' reservation prices for goods 1 and 2 and simple
monopoly pricing 166
8.2 Monopoly pricing of a pure bundle of goods 1 and 2 167
8.3 Monopoly pricing under mixed bundling of goods 1 and 2 167
xiv Figures
8.4 Pricing of complementary goods: the nuts and bolts case 178
9.1 Firm 2's demand curve in the Cournot duopoly game depends on firm
l's output 207
9.2 Best-response (reaction) curves for the Cournot duopoly model 208
9.3 The Cournot duopoly model with different costs across firms 214
10.1 Firm 2's demand curve in the Bertrand model 225
10.2 Firm 2's profits as a function of p2 when firm 1 prices above cost but
below the pure monopoly price 226
10.3 Snow Richards residual demand curve 231
10.4 The Main Street spatial model once again 232
10.5 Best-reponse functions for price competition with imperfect substitutes 235
10.6 Best-response functions for the Cournot (quantity) case and the
Bertrand (price) case 237
10.7 "Thrifty" competition and gasoline prices in southern California 241
11.1 The Cournot and Stackelberg outcomes compared 248
11.2 Sequential price competition: firm 1 sets its price first anticipating
that firm 2 will price below firm 1 's price 252
11.3 The extensive form of the Microhard-Newvel game 256
12.1 The limit output model 270
12.2 The effect of previously acquired capacity on current marginal cost 273
12.3 The best-response function of the incumbent firm depends on its
first-stage choice of capacity 274
12.4 The rational bounds on the incumbent's initial choice of capacity, K) 276
12.5 Possible locations of the entrant's break-even point 278
12.6 An example of entry deterrence 280
12.7 Extensive form for Practice Problem 12.3 282
13.1 The bank and Newvel for just one period 299
13.2 The decision tree in the two-period loan contract 300
13.3 Extensive form of the Sequential Entry game with asymmetric
information on cost 303
14.1 Criminal antitrust fines for fiscal years 2002-6 324
14.2 Cartel maintenance with uncertain demand 338
14.3 The Folk theorem 339
15.1 A collusive agreement between firms with different costs 354
15.2 The distribution of inside spreads on NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ 365
15.3 Demand and supply for a stock 366
15.4 Equilibria with a leniency program 376
16.1 Product differentiation: no price discrimination 408
16.2 Price equilibrium without a merger 409
16.3 Price equilibrium after merger of firms 2 and 3 411
16.4 Price equilibrium with price discrimination 412
17.1 Independent retailer's optimum pricing as a function of manufacturer's
wholesale price, r 432
17.2 Upstream and downstream profit maximization without vertical
integration 434
17.3 Upstream and downstream profit maximization with vertical
integration 434
18.1 The effect of services on demand, costs, and the social surplus 472
Figures xv
18.2 The integrated firm's optimal price as a functon of the service level, s 474
18.3 Resale price maintenance and variable demand 481
21.1 Advertising in a Hotelling spatial model 543
21.2 Marginal and total advertising cost assumed for the spatial competition
model 545
21.3 Effect of advertising services a on firm's demand when advertising
raises brand value 553
21.4 Effect of advertising services a on firm's demand when advertising
extends reach 556
22.1 Drastic and nondrastic process innovations 577
22.2 Market structure and the incentive to innovate 579
22.3 Extensive form for the Innovation and Entry game 581
22.4 Best-response functions for research intensity in the noncooperative
R D game 592
23.1 Innovation gains during period of patent protection (T years) and
after patent protection 606
23.2 A patent race with a duopoly 613
23.3 Patterns of regression time coefficients in semiconductor patent behavior 631
24.1 Demand to a monopoly provider of a network service 639
Tables
3.1 Calculation of the HHI for industry C 47
3.2 Concentration measures for selected industries 48
3.3 Estimated Lerner Index for selected industries 53
4.1 Average and marginal cost 63
4.2 Christensen and Greene (1976) cost function estimates and scale
economies in electric power generation 80
5.1 Comparison of prescription drug prices (U.S. dollars) 88
5.2 Schedule of annual membership fees for the American Economic
Association 92
7.1 Ticket restrictions and air fares 157
8.1 Consumer reservation prices 169
8.2 Determination of simple monopoly prices 169
8.3 Pure bundling as the sustainable equilibrium 187
9.1 Strategy combinations and firm payoffs in the flight departure game 200
9.2 Strategy combinations and firm payoffs in the modified flight
departure game 201
9.3 Payoff matrix for the airfare game 203
10.1 Brand competition and gasoline prices 240
13.1 Detail advertising by category of entry probability, 64 pharmaceutical
markets 319
14.1 Violations yielding a corporate fine of $10 million or more since 2000 324
14.2a Payoffs (U.S. dollars, thousands) to cooperation (M) and defection (D)
in the Cournot duopoly game 329
14.2b Payoffs (U.S. dollars, thousands) to cooperaton (M) and defection (D)
in the Bertrand duopoly game 329
14.3 Summary statistics for the auction cartel 347
14.4 Regression results 348
15.1 Cartels and industry concentration 356
15.2 Payoff matrix for a 2 x 2 pricing game 363
15.3 Profits in the NASDAQ example 367
15.4 Payoff matrix for the NASDAQ cartel game (U.S. dollars, thousands) 367
15.5 The great salt duopoly 372
Tables xvii
15.6 Payoff matrix with a leniency program 375
15.7 Profits for the leniency program game 376
15.8 Cartel formation 379
15.9 Agreed-upon prices 380
15.10 Average market prices 380
15.11 Cartel breakdown 3 81
16.1 Necessary condition for profitable merger 391
16.2 Profit effect of two follower firms merging to become a leader, given
N followers and L leaders prior to the merger 400
17.1 Vertical integration, foreclosure, and strategic commitment 447
17.2 Vertical integration in cement/ready-mixed concrete market 456
17.3 Results for regressions explaining ready-mixed concrete prices in
the U.S. 457
19.1 What explains the use of exclusive dealing in U.S. beer distributor
contracts? 506
19.2 Effect of exclusive dealing on market outcomes 508
20.1 Estimated industry advertising-to-sales ratios, 2006 523
20.2 Advertising expenditures as a % of sales by different categories
of products 524
20.3 Price and quality in the upright vacuum cleaner market 529
21.1 Effect of advertising and price on demand for new Yoplait product:
preliminary results 565
21.2 Effect of advertising and price on demand for new Yoplait product:
final (logit) results 567
22.1 Top ten U.S. patent-receiving firms in 2006 and their rank in 2005
and 2004 574
22.2 Top ten patent-receiving industries in 2006 and cumulative
patents to that year 574
22.3a Payoff matrix with low R D spillovers, ji = 0.25 593
22.3b Payoff matrix with high R D spillovers, j8 = 0.75 593
22.4 Regression estimates of international R D spillovers 600
23.1 Payoff matrix for the Duopoly patent race 612
23.2 Patent use by inventor's employer 618
23.3 Parameter estimates for expected patent output by semiconductor firms 630
24.1 Excess inertia and excess momentum with network externalities
(in U.S. dollars, millions) 646
24.2 Tweedledum and Tweedledee (in U.S. dollars, millions) 648
24.3 The Battle of the Sexes (in U.S. dollars, millions) 650
24.4 The Pesky Little Brother (in U.S. dollars, millions) 651
24.5 Hedonic regression results for spreadsheet programs, 1986-91 656
24.6 Quality adjusted price indices for spreadsheet programs, 1986-91 657 |
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| author | Pepall, Lynne 1952- Richards, Daniel Jay Norman, George 1946- |
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| dewey-ones | 658 - General management |
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| dewey-search | 658.1 |
| dewey-sort | 3658.1 |
| dewey-tens | 650 - Management and auxiliary services |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| discipline_str_mv | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| edition | 4. ed. |
| format | Book |
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| genre | 1\p (DE-588)4123623-3 Lehrbuch gnd-content |
| genre_facet | Lehrbuch |
| id | DE-604.BV022891458 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T18:53:48Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:07:52Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9781405176323 |
| language | English |
| lccn | 2007039115 |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016096299 |
| oclc_num | 173248990 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-703 DE-N2 DE-20 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-83 DE-634 DE-M382 DE-11 DE-2070s |
| owner_facet | DE-703 DE-N2 DE-20 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-83 DE-634 DE-M382 DE-11 DE-2070s |
| physical | XXIV, 696 S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 2008 |
| publishDateSearch | 2008 |
| publishDateSort | 2008 |
| publisher | Blackwell |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Pepall, Lynne 1952- Verfasser (DE-588)132735970 aut Industrial organization contemporary theory and empirical applications Lynne Pepall ; Dan Richards ; George Norman 4. ed. Malden, Mass. Blackwell 2008 XXIV, 696 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Includes bibliographical references and index Industrie - Organisation, contrôle, etc Industriële organisatie gtt Industrial organization Industrieökonomie (DE-588)4133311-1 gnd rswk-swf 1\p (DE-588)4123623-3 Lehrbuch gnd-content Industrieökonomie (DE-588)4133311-1 s DE-604 Richards, Daniel Jay Verfasser (DE-588)132735946 aut Norman, George 1946- Verfasser (DE-588)13272510X aut HBZ Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016096299&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Pepall, Lynne 1952- Richards, Daniel Jay Norman, George 1946- Industrial organization contemporary theory and empirical applications Industrie - Organisation, contrôle, etc Industriële organisatie gtt Industrial organization Industrieökonomie (DE-588)4133311-1 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4133311-1 (DE-588)4123623-3 |
| title | Industrial organization contemporary theory and empirical applications |
| title_auth | Industrial organization contemporary theory and empirical applications |
| title_exact_search | Industrial organization contemporary theory and empirical applications |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Industrial organization contemporary theory and empirical applications |
| title_full | Industrial organization contemporary theory and empirical applications Lynne Pepall ; Dan Richards ; George Norman |
| title_fullStr | Industrial organization contemporary theory and empirical applications Lynne Pepall ; Dan Richards ; George Norman |
| title_full_unstemmed | Industrial organization contemporary theory and empirical applications Lynne Pepall ; Dan Richards ; George Norman |
| title_short | Industrial organization |
| title_sort | industrial organization contemporary theory and empirical applications |
| title_sub | contemporary theory and empirical applications |
| topic | Industrie - Organisation, contrôle, etc Industriële organisatie gtt Industrial organization Industrieökonomie (DE-588)4133311-1 gnd |
| topic_facet | Industrie - Organisation, contrôle, etc Industriële organisatie Industrial organization Industrieökonomie Lehrbuch |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016096299&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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