The taming of the true:
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
---|---|
Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford [u.a.]
Clarendon Press
2004
|
Ausgabe: | Reprinted |
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
Beschreibung: | XVII, 465 S. graph. Darst. |
ISBN: | 0199251606 |
Internformat
MARC
LEADER | 00000nam a2200000 c 4500 | ||
---|---|---|---|
001 | BV022881863 | ||
003 | DE-604 | ||
005 | 00000000000000.0 | ||
007 | t | ||
008 | 071015s2004 d||| |||| 00||| eng d | ||
020 | |a 0199251606 |9 0-19-925160-6 | ||
035 | |a (OCoLC)179734872 | ||
035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV022881863 | ||
040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rakddb | ||
041 | 0 | |a eng | |
049 | |a DE-355 | ||
084 | |a CC 4400 |0 (DE-625)17626: |2 rvk | ||
100 | 1 | |a Tennant, Neil |d 1950- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)138937672 |4 aut | |
245 | 1 | 0 | |a The taming of the true |c Neil Tennant |
250 | |a Reprinted | ||
264 | 1 | |a Oxford [u.a.] |b Clarendon Press |c 2004 | |
300 | |a XVII, 465 S. |b graph. Darst. | ||
336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
650 | 0 | 7 | |a Realismus |g Philosophie |0 (DE-588)4139710-1 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
650 | 0 | 7 | |a Wahrheit |0 (DE-588)4064314-1 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
689 | 0 | 0 | |a Wahrheit |0 (DE-588)4064314-1 |D s |
689 | 0 | 1 | |a Realismus |g Philosophie |0 (DE-588)4139710-1 |D s |
689 | 0 | |5 DE-604 | |
856 | 4 | 2 | |m Digitalisierung UB Regensburg |q application/pdf |u http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016086825&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |3 Inhaltsverzeichnis |
999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016086825 |
Datensatz im Suchindex
_version_ | 1804137145905971200 |
---|---|
adam_text | Contents
Introduction
1
1.1
The problem defined
....................... 1
1.2
The current state of the debate
................. 3
1.3
The structure of this work
.................... 6
1.4
Historical reflections
....................... 10
1.5
Relationship to AR&L
...................... 13
1.6
A note on style and substance
.................. 14
The Realism Debate
15
2.1
The central role of truth
..................... 15
2.2
Five important contentions
................... 19
2.3
Key theses
............................. 27
2.4
Superassertibility
......................... 42
2.5
Semantic anti-realism
...................... 45
2.6
A crescendo of concerns
..................... 50
2.7
Remarks on natural deduction
................. 55
2.7.1
Arguments and natural deductions
........... 56
2.7.2
Accumulating arguments
................ 56
2.7.3
Rules of inference
..................... 58
2.7.4
Reductio
ad absurdum
.................. 59
2.7.5
Regimenting philosophical arguments
......... 60
2.7.6
A plea for tolerance in matters logical
......... 61
Irrealism
63
3.1
A survey of various kinds of irrealism
.............. 63
3.2
Non-factualist irrealism v. error-theory
............. 67
3.3
Notational preliminaries
..................... 75
3.4
A reductio of semantic irrealism?
................ 77
Contents
3.5
Isolating the basic steps
..................... 77
3.5.1
The first basic step
.................... 77
3.5.2
The second basic step
.................. 79
3.5.3
The third basic step
................... 79
3.6
Some simple arguments using the basic steps
......... 80
3.7
Evaluating the steps
....................... 82
3.7.1
A stratificationist objection to Boghossian will not work
83
3.7.2
Objection to step (I)
................... 86
3.7.3
Objection to step (II) from a projectivist s point of view
86
3.8
Conclusion
............................ 89
Against Meaning Scepticism
91
4.1
The impact of scepticism about meaning. The stress between
materialist metaphysics and analytic intuition
......... 91
4.2
Theses about content, and some orthogonal issues
...... 93
4.3
What semantic determination thesis does the Kripkean scep¬
tic try to undermine?
....................... 97
4.4
On past and future applications of rules
............100
4.5
The sceptic is a non-factualist
..................102
4.6
Kripke s dialectic of reinterpretation
..............104
4.7
Uniformity of reinterpretation requires globality
........108
4.8
Kripkean scepticism compared with Quinean indeterminacy:
the new dogma of post-empiricism
...............115
4.9
Anti-sceptical responses emphasizing the first-person case
. . 120
4.10
On Goodman s Paradox
.....................122
4.11
The proper way to meet the sceptical challenge
........125
4.12
A parable
.............................127
4.13
Prom dispositional facts to normativity of meaning
......130
4.13.1
On going wrong: competence v. performance
.....133
4.13.2
Alleged problems for a dispositional account: the ar¬
gument from finitude
...................137
4.13.3
Alleged problems for a dispositional account: the ar¬
gument from error
....................139
Avoiding Strict Finitism
143
5.1
Knowability in principle
.....................143
5.2
The strict
fmitisťs
worry
....................148
5.3
Recognitional capacities and compositionality
.........150
5.4
Feasible verffiability
.......................151
Contents
xv
5.5
Aspectual recognition: competence as factorizable
......152
5.6
Finding the right dispositional conditionals
..........155
6
The Manifestation Argument is Dead
159
6.1
A summary by way of introduction
............... 159
6.2
Decidability, knowability and truth: picturing the positions
. 161
6.3
Dummett s construal of realist truth, and his blindness to
Gödelian
Optimism
........................ 168
6.4
Understanding the dialectic of debate
............. 170
6.5
Bivalence and Decidability
.................... 173
6.6
Manifest ationism
......................... 176
6.6.1
The original manifestation challenge
......... 176
6.6.2
Does Bivalence entau the possibility of recognition-
transcendent truth?
................... 180
6.6.3
Dummett s quantifier-switch fallacies
.......... 185
6.6.4
Independence results are no help to Dummett
..... 190
7
Long Live the Manifestation Argument
195
7.1
A summary by way of introduction
............... 195
7.2
A more convincing manifestation argument
.......... 196
7.2.1
The problem of undecidable sentences
......... 196
7.2.2
The manifestation requirement made more precise
. . 198
7.2.3
The principle of knowability made more precise
.... 203
7.2.4
The principle of bivalence made more precise
..... 205
7.3
Logical relationships among theses; the central inference
. . . 206
7.4
Decidability: demurral v. denial
................ 214
7.5
The undecidability of arithmetic
................ 216
7.6
Responses to undecidability
................... 219
7.6.1
The anti-realist s response
................ 219
7.6.2
The realist s response
.................. 221
7.7
Realist
reconstruais
of manifestation?
............. 224
7.8
The central inference revisited;
reconstruais
rejected
..... 232
7.9
Rubbing out the wrong pictures
................. 235
7.9.1
Arguing against
M-Realism
............... 236
7.9.2
Arguing against the
Gödelian
Optimist
........ 239
8
Truth as Knowable
245
8.1
Introduction
............................245
8.2
Rational thinkers
.........................247
xvi Contents
8.3
On wondering whether
......................252
8.4
On knowing every truth
.....................259
8.5
Diagnosis of the underlying problem
..............266
8.6
Cartesian contents, and our proposed solution
.........272
8.7
The failure of the
reconstrua!
strategy
.............276
8.8
Taking stock
...........................278
9
Analyticity and Syntheticity
281
9.1
Logic and analyticity
....................... 281
9.2
A brief history of the two distinctions
............. 282
9.3
The impact of
Gödel s
first incompleteness theorem
...... 290
9.4
An alternative view
........................ 295
9.5
The wider logic of number
.................... 297
9.6
Necessary
existente
........................ 299
9.7
The dogma of existence
.....................303
10
Finding the right
logie
305
10.1
On rational advocacy of reform
................. 305
10.2
Systematicity, immediacy, separability and harmony
..... 308
10.3
Epistemic
gain in logic
...................... 322
10.4
The maxim of narrow analysis
.................. 325
10.5
Non-forfeiture of
epistemic
gain
................. 328
10.5.1
The Sub-sequent Constraint
............... 329
10.5.2
Truth-preservation is not enough
............ 330
10.6
The Principle of Harmony
.................... 332
10.7
The Principle of Extraction for natural deduction systems
. . 334
10.8
The Anti-Dilution Principle for sequent systems
........ 335
10.9
Relevance
............................. 337
10.9.1
Uniquely determining rules for the logical operators
. 338
10.9.2
Intuitionistic Relevant Logic
............... 343
10.9.3
Classical Relevant Logic
................. 344
10.9.4
Benefits for computational logic
............. 346
10.9.5
On choosing the right relevant logic: the method sum¬
marized
.......................... 346
10.9.6
Prosecuting our principles further: a precondition on
rule applications
..................... 350
Contents
xvii
11
Cognitive Significance Regained
355
11.1
Re-evaluating the problem of cognitive significance
......355
11.2
Conditions of adequacy on a criterion of cognitive significance
360
11.2.1
Sentences are cognitively significant only within the
context of a theory that makes them so
........360
11.2.2
Basic sentences
......................361
11.2.3
Metalogical neutrality
..................362
11.2.4
Inductive levels, new vocabulary and extension
.... 363
11.2.5
Verifiability and falsifiability
..............365
11.2.6
The principle of composition, or molecularity
.....366
11.2.7
Constrained extension: higher-level hypotheses
.... 366
11.2.8
A remark on significance via compounding
......369
11.2.9
Hempel s compositionality condition
..........370
11.2.10The
first-order case
....................372
11.2.11
The
invariance
of non-significance under reformulation
373
11.3
The formal theory
........................374
11.3.1
Extension
.........................374
11.3.2
How sentences depend on the atomic facts within a
model for their truth or falsity
.............382
11.3.3
Some inductive definitions
................388
11.3.4
Main results
........................390
11.4
Comparison with Carnap s account
...............393
11.5
Blocking Church-Ullian collapses
................399
12
Defeasibility and Constructive Falsifiability
403
12.1
Rationalism and relativism
................... 403
12.2
On defeasible empirical claims
.................. 406
12.3
Refutation of empirical theories
................. 414
12.4
Normal forms for disproofs
................... 422
12.5
Validity of arguments
...................... 425
12.6
Validity of reductio
........................ 429
12.7
The anti-realist construal of empirical claims that cannot be
proved
............................... 432
13
Summary and Conclusion
435
Bibliography
439
Index
449
|
adam_txt |
Contents
Introduction
1
1.1
The problem defined
. 1
1.2
The current state of the debate
. 3
1.3
The structure of this work
. 6
1.4
Historical reflections
. 10
1.5
Relationship to AR&L
. 13
1.6
A note on style and substance
. 14
The Realism Debate
15
2.1
The central role of truth
. 15
2.2
Five important contentions
. 19
2.3
Key theses
. 27
2.4
Superassertibility
. 42
2.5
Semantic anti-realism
. 45
2.6
A crescendo of concerns
. 50
2.7
Remarks on natural deduction
. 55
2.7.1
Arguments and natural deductions
. 56
2.7.2
Accumulating arguments
. 56
2.7.3
Rules of inference
. 58
2.7.4
Reductio
ad absurdum
. 59
2.7.5
Regimenting philosophical arguments
. 60
2.7.6
A plea for tolerance in matters logical
. 61
Irrealism
63
3.1
A survey of various kinds of irrealism
. 63
3.2
Non-factualist irrealism v. error-theory
. 67
3.3
Notational preliminaries
. 75
3.4
A reductio of semantic irrealism?
. 77
Contents
3.5
Isolating the basic steps
. 77
3.5.1
The first basic step
. 77
3.5.2
The second basic step
. 79
3.5.3
The third basic step
. 79
3.6
Some simple arguments using the basic steps
. 80
3.7
Evaluating the steps
. 82
3.7.1
A stratificationist objection to Boghossian will not work
83
3.7.2
Objection to step (I)
. 86
3.7.3
Objection to step (II) from a projectivist's point of view
86
3.8
Conclusion
. 89
Against Meaning Scepticism
91
4.1
The impact of scepticism about meaning. The stress between
materialist metaphysics and analytic intuition
. 91
4.2
Theses about content, and some orthogonal issues
. 93
4.3
What semantic determination thesis does the Kripkean scep¬
tic try to undermine?
. 97
4.4
On past and future applications of rules
.100
4.5
The sceptic is a non-factualist
.102
4.6
Kripke's dialectic of reinterpretation
.104
4.7
Uniformity of reinterpretation requires globality
.108
4.8
Kripkean scepticism compared with Quinean indeterminacy:
the new dogma of post-empiricism
.115
4.9
Anti-sceptical responses emphasizing the first-person case
. . 120
4.10
On Goodman's Paradox
.122
4.11
The proper way to meet the sceptical challenge
.125
4.12
A parable
.127
4.13
Prom dispositional facts to normativity of meaning
.130
4.13.1
On going wrong: competence v. performance
.133
4.13.2
Alleged problems for a dispositional account: the ar¬
gument from finitude
.137
4.13.3
Alleged problems for a dispositional account: the ar¬
gument from error
.139
Avoiding Strict Finitism
143
5.1
Knowability in principle
.143
5.2
The strict
fmitisťs
worry
.148
5.3
Recognitional capacities and compositionality
.150
5.4
Feasible verffiability
.151
Contents
xv
5.5
Aspectual recognition: competence as factorizable
.152
5.6
Finding the right dispositional conditionals
.155
6
The Manifestation Argument is Dead
159
6.1
A summary by way of introduction
. 159
6.2
Decidability, knowability and truth: picturing the positions
. 161
6.3
Dummett's construal of realist truth, and his blindness to
Gödelian
Optimism
. 168
6.4
Understanding the dialectic of debate
. 170
6.5
Bivalence and Decidability
. 173
6.6
Manifest ationism
. 176
6.6.1
The original 'manifestation challenge'
. 176
6.6.2
Does Bivalence entau the possibility of recognition-
transcendent truth?
. 180
6.6.3
Dummett's quantifier-switch fallacies
. 185
6.6.4
Independence results are no help to Dummett
. 190
7
Long Live the Manifestation Argument
195
7.1
A summary by way of introduction
. 195
7.2
A more convincing manifestation argument
. 196
7.2.1
The problem of undecidable sentences
. 196
7.2.2
The manifestation requirement made more precise
. . 198
7.2.3
The principle of knowability made more precise
. 203
7.2.4
The principle of bivalence made more precise
. 205
7.3
Logical relationships among theses; the central inference
. . . 206
7.4
Decidability: demurral v. denial
. 214
7.5
The undecidability of arithmetic
. 216
7.6
Responses to undecidability
. 219
7.6.1
The anti-realist's response
. 219
7.6.2
The realist's response
. 221
7.7
Realist
reconstruais
of manifestation?
. 224
7.8
The central inference revisited;
reconstruais
rejected
. 232
7.9
Rubbing out the wrong pictures
. 235
7.9.1
Arguing against
M-Realism
. 236
7.9.2
Arguing against the
Gödelian
Optimist
. 239
8
Truth as Knowable
245
8.1
Introduction
.245
8.2
Rational thinkers
.247
xvi Contents
8.3
On wondering whether
.252
8.4
On knowing every truth
.259
8.5
Diagnosis of the underlying problem
.266
8.6
Cartesian contents, and our proposed solution
.272
8.7
The failure of the
reconstrua!
strategy
.276
8.8
Taking stock
.278
9
Analyticity and Syntheticity
281
9.1
Logic and analyticity
. 281
9.2
A brief history of the two distinctions
. 282
9.3
The impact of
Gödel's
first incompleteness theorem
. 290
9.4
An alternative view
. 295
9.5
The wider logic of number
. 297
9.6
Necessary
existente
. 299
9.7
The dogma of existence
.303
10
Finding the right
logie
305
10.1
On rational advocacy of reform
. 305
10.2
Systematicity, immediacy, separability and harmony
. 308
10.3
Epistemic
gain in logic
. 322
10.4
The maxim of narrow analysis
. 325
10.5
Non-forfeiture of
epistemic
gain
. 328
10.5.1
The Sub-sequent Constraint
. 329
10.5.2
Truth-preservation is not enough
. 330
10.6
The Principle of Harmony
. 332
10.7
The Principle of Extraction for natural deduction systems
. . 334
10.8
The Anti-Dilution Principle for sequent systems
. 335
10.9
Relevance
. 337
10.9.1
Uniquely determining rules for the logical operators
. 338
10.9.2
Intuitionistic Relevant Logic
. 343
10.9.3
Classical Relevant Logic
. 344
10.9.4
Benefits for computational logic
. 346
10.9.5
On choosing the right relevant logic: the method sum¬
marized
. 346
10.9.6
Prosecuting our principles further: a precondition on
rule applications
. 350
Contents
xvii
11
Cognitive Significance Regained
355
11.1
Re-evaluating the problem of cognitive significance
.355
11.2
Conditions of adequacy on a criterion of cognitive significance
360
11.2.1
Sentences are cognitively significant only within the
context of a theory that makes them so
.360
11.2.2
Basic sentences
.361
11.2.3
Metalogical neutrality
.362
11.2.4
Inductive levels, new vocabulary and extension
. 363
11.2.5
Verifiability and falsifiability
.365
11.2.6
The principle of composition, or molecularity
.366
11.2.7
Constrained extension: higher-level hypotheses
. 366
11.2.8
A remark on significance via compounding
.369
11.2.9
Hempel's compositionality condition
.370
11.2.10The
first-order case
.372
11.2.11
The
invariance
of non-significance under reformulation
373
11.3
The formal theory
.374
11.3.1
Extension
.374
11.3.2
How sentences depend on the atomic facts within a
model for their truth or falsity
.382
11.3.3
Some inductive definitions
.388
11.3.4
Main results
.390
11.4
Comparison with Carnap's account
.393
11.5
Blocking Church-Ullian collapses
.399
12
Defeasibility and Constructive Falsifiability
403
12.1
Rationalism and relativism
. 403
12.2
On defeasible empirical claims
. 406
12.3
Refutation of empirical theories
. 414
12.4
Normal forms for disproofs
. 422
12.5
Validity of arguments
. 425
12.6
Validity of reductio
. 429
12.7
The anti-realist construal of empirical claims that cannot be
proved
. 432
13
Summary and Conclusion
435
Bibliography
439
Index
449 |
any_adam_object | 1 |
any_adam_object_boolean | 1 |
author | Tennant, Neil 1950- |
author_GND | (DE-588)138937672 |
author_facet | Tennant, Neil 1950- |
author_role | aut |
author_sort | Tennant, Neil 1950- |
author_variant | n t nt |
building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | BV022881863 |
classification_rvk | CC 4400 |
ctrlnum | (OCoLC)179734872 (DE-599)BVBBV022881863 |
discipline | Philosophie |
discipline_str_mv | Philosophie |
edition | Reprinted |
format | Book |
fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01318nam a2200349 c 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV022881863</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">00000000000000.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">071015s2004 d||| |||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">0199251606</subfield><subfield code="9">0-19-925160-6</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)179734872</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV022881863</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rakddb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-355</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">CC 4400</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)17626:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Tennant, Neil</subfield><subfield code="d">1950-</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)138937672</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">The taming of the true</subfield><subfield code="c">Neil Tennant</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="250" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Reprinted</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Oxford [u.a.]</subfield><subfield code="b">Clarendon Press</subfield><subfield code="c">2004</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">XVII, 465 S.</subfield><subfield code="b">graph. Darst.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Realismus</subfield><subfield code="g">Philosophie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4139710-1</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Wahrheit</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4064314-1</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Wahrheit</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4064314-1</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Realismus</subfield><subfield code="g">Philosophie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4139710-1</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="m">Digitalisierung UB Regensburg</subfield><subfield code="q">application/pdf</subfield><subfield code="u">http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016086825&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA</subfield><subfield code="3">Inhaltsverzeichnis</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016086825</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
id | DE-604.BV022881863 |
illustrated | Illustrated |
index_date | 2024-07-02T18:50:45Z |
indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:07:39Z |
institution | BVB |
isbn | 0199251606 |
language | English |
oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016086825 |
oclc_num | 179734872 |
open_access_boolean | |
owner | DE-355 DE-BY-UBR |
owner_facet | DE-355 DE-BY-UBR |
physical | XVII, 465 S. graph. Darst. |
publishDate | 2004 |
publishDateSearch | 2004 |
publishDateSort | 2004 |
publisher | Clarendon Press |
record_format | marc |
spelling | Tennant, Neil 1950- Verfasser (DE-588)138937672 aut The taming of the true Neil Tennant Reprinted Oxford [u.a.] Clarendon Press 2004 XVII, 465 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Realismus Philosophie (DE-588)4139710-1 gnd rswk-swf Wahrheit (DE-588)4064314-1 gnd rswk-swf Wahrheit (DE-588)4064314-1 s Realismus Philosophie (DE-588)4139710-1 s DE-604 Digitalisierung UB Regensburg application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016086825&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
spellingShingle | Tennant, Neil 1950- The taming of the true Realismus Philosophie (DE-588)4139710-1 gnd Wahrheit (DE-588)4064314-1 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4139710-1 (DE-588)4064314-1 |
title | The taming of the true |
title_auth | The taming of the true |
title_exact_search | The taming of the true |
title_exact_search_txtP | The taming of the true |
title_full | The taming of the true Neil Tennant |
title_fullStr | The taming of the true Neil Tennant |
title_full_unstemmed | The taming of the true Neil Tennant |
title_short | The taming of the true |
title_sort | the taming of the true |
topic | Realismus Philosophie (DE-588)4139710-1 gnd Wahrheit (DE-588)4064314-1 gnd |
topic_facet | Realismus Philosophie Wahrheit |
url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016086825&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
work_keys_str_mv | AT tennantneil thetamingofthetrue |