A game-theoretic perspective on coalition formation:
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford
Oxford University Press
2007
|
| Schriftenreihe: | The Lipsey lectures
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | XIV, 321 Seiten |
| ISBN: | 019920795X 9780199207954 |
| DOI: | 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199207954.001.0001 |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a A game-theoretic perspective on coalition formation |c Debraj Ray |
| 264 | 1 | |a Oxford |b Oxford University Press |c 2007 | |
| 300 | |a XIV, 321 Seiten | ||
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| 490 | 0 | |a The Lipsey lectures | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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Contents
Preface
vii
Chapter
1.
Introduction
1
Part
1
The Setting
7
Chapter
2.
Ingredients for a Theory of Agreements
9
2.1
Introduction
9
2.2
Characteristic Functions and Cooperative Games
10
2.3
Two Approaches to Coalition Formation
14
2.4
Farsightedness
15
2.5
Two Examples
16
2.6
Negotiations: One-Time or Continuing?
20
Chapter
3.
Coalitions, Cooperation and Noncooperation
23
3.1
Definitions and Notation
23
3.2
Coalitional Equilibrium
24
3.3
Partition Functions
27
3.4
Extensions
32
3.5
Summary
33
Part
2
A Bargaining Approach To Coalition Formation
35
Chapter
4.
Irreversible Agreements
37
4.1
Introduction
37
4.2
A Model
38
4.3
Equilibrium
41
4.4
Rubinstein-Ståhl
Bargaining
41
4.5
Baron-Ferejohn Bargaining
46
4.6
Summary
47
xii
Contents
Chapter
5.
Irreversible Agreements: Symmetric Games
53
5.1
Symmetric Partition Functions
54
5.2
An Algorithm
55
5.3
Connecting the Algorithm to Equilibria
56
5.4
A Remark on
Nontransferable
Payoffs
67
5.5
Proofs
68
5.6
Summary
80
Chapter
6.
Applications
83
6.1
Cournot Oligopoly
83
6.2
Public Goods
87
6.3
Proofs
93
6.4
Summary
102
Chapter
7.
Irreversible Agreements: The General Case
105
7.1
Characteristic Functions and the Core
106
7.2
Equilibrium Response Vectors
108
7.3
No-Delay Equilibrium 111
7.4
Condition M, Payoffs and Coalition Structure
113
7.5
More on Efficiency
125
7.6
Externalities Revisited
130
7.7
Alternative Protocols
140
7.8
Proofs
145
7.9
Summary
152
Chapter
8.
A Framework for Reversible Agreements
155
8.1
An Example
156
8.2
A Proposal-Based Model of Coalition Formation
158
8.3
Binding Agreements
161
8.4
Strategies and Equilibrium
164
8.5
Absorption and Efficiency
166
8.6
Summary
167
Chapter
9.
Reversible Agreements Without Externalities
169
9.1
Two Examples
170
9.2
Benignness
172
9.3
Absorption and Efficiency
173
9.4
Proofs
178
9.5
Summary
181
Chapter
10.
Reversible Agreements With Externalities
183
10.1
The Baseline Model for Three-Player Games
184
Contents_xiii
10.2
The Baseline
Model
for Four or More
Players 187
10.3 Superadditive
Games
192
10.4
Upfront Transfers and the Failure of Efficiency
194
10.5
Summary
198
Part
3
A Blocking Approach to Coalition Formation
211
Chapter
11.
Blocking
213
11.1
The Core Revisited
213
11.2
Farsightedness in Blocking
215
11.3
A First Pass at Farsightedness
215
11.4
Externalities and Farsightedness
219
11.5
Summary
220
Chapter
12.
Irreversible Commitments
221
12.1
Equilibrium Binding Agreements
222
12.2
Farsightedness and Prediction
224
12.3
Inefficiency
227
12.4
An Application to Political Party Formation
230
12.5
Beyond Nested Deviations
236
12.6
Summary
241
Chapter
13.
The Blocking Approach in Real Time
243
13.1
Introduction
243
13.2
An Informal Description
244
13.3
A Process of Coalition Formation
246
13.4
Deterministic Equilibrium Processes
250
13.5
Stochastic Equilibrium Processes
261
13.6
Proofs
271
13.7
Summary
276
Chapter
14.
Directions
287
14.1
Coalition Formation Without Unanimity
288
14.2
Equity Within Coalitions
289
14.3
Coalition Formation With Deliberate Exit
292
14.4
Overlapping Coalitions
294
14.5
Networks
296
14.6
Coalition Formation With
Nonbinding
Agreements
299
14.7
Incomplete Information
301
14.8 Nontransferable
Utility
303
14.9
Axiomatic Approaches
304
xiv Contents
References
307
Subject Index
315
Author Index
319 |
| adam_txt |
Contents
Preface
vii
Chapter
1.
Introduction
1
Part
1
The Setting
7
Chapter
2.
Ingredients for a Theory of Agreements
9
2.1
Introduction
9
2.2
Characteristic Functions and Cooperative Games
10
2.3
Two Approaches to Coalition Formation
14
2.4
Farsightedness
15
2.5
Two Examples
16
2.6
Negotiations: One-Time or Continuing?
20
Chapter
3.
Coalitions, Cooperation and Noncooperation
23
3.1
Definitions and Notation
23
3.2
Coalitional Equilibrium
24
3.3
Partition Functions
27
3.4
Extensions
32
3.5
Summary
33
Part
2
A Bargaining Approach To Coalition Formation
35
Chapter
4.
Irreversible Agreements
37
4.1
Introduction
37
4.2
A Model
38
4.3
Equilibrium
41
4.4
Rubinstein-Ståhl
Bargaining
41
4.5
Baron-Ferejohn Bargaining
46
4.6
Summary
47
xii
Contents
Chapter
5.
Irreversible Agreements: Symmetric Games
53
5.1
Symmetric Partition Functions
54
5.2
An Algorithm
55
5.3
Connecting the Algorithm to Equilibria
56
5.4
A Remark on
Nontransferable
Payoffs
67
5.5
Proofs
68
5.6
Summary
80
Chapter
6.
Applications
83
6.1
Cournot Oligopoly
83
6.2
Public Goods
87
6.3
Proofs
93
6.4
Summary
102
Chapter
7.
Irreversible Agreements: The General Case
105
7.1
Characteristic Functions and the Core
106
7.2
Equilibrium Response Vectors
108
7.3
No-Delay Equilibrium 111
7.4
Condition M, Payoffs and Coalition Structure
113
7.5
More on Efficiency
125
7.6
Externalities Revisited
130
7.7
Alternative Protocols
140
7.8
Proofs
145
7.9
Summary
152
Chapter
8.
A Framework for Reversible Agreements
155
8.1
An Example
156
8.2
A Proposal-Based Model of Coalition Formation
158
8.3
Binding Agreements
161
8.4
Strategies and Equilibrium
164
8.5
Absorption and Efficiency
166
8.6
Summary
167
Chapter
9.
Reversible Agreements Without Externalities
169
9.1
Two Examples
170
9.2
Benignness
172
9.3
Absorption and Efficiency
173
9.4
Proofs
178
9.5
Summary
181
Chapter
10.
Reversible Agreements With Externalities
183
10.1
The Baseline Model for Three-Player Games
184
Contents_xiii
10.2
The Baseline
Model
for Four or More
Players 187
10.3 Superadditive
Games
192
10.4
Upfront Transfers and the Failure of Efficiency
194
10.5
Summary
198
Part
3
A Blocking Approach to Coalition Formation
211
Chapter
11.
Blocking
213
11.1
The Core Revisited
213
11.2
Farsightedness in Blocking
215
11.3
A First Pass at Farsightedness
215
11.4
Externalities and Farsightedness
219
11.5
Summary
220
Chapter
12.
Irreversible Commitments
221
12.1
Equilibrium Binding Agreements
222
12.2
Farsightedness and Prediction
224
12.3
Inefficiency
227
12.4
An Application to Political Party Formation
230
12.5
Beyond Nested Deviations
236
12.6
Summary
241
Chapter
13.
The Blocking Approach in Real Time
243
13.1
Introduction
243
13.2
An Informal Description
244
13.3
A Process of Coalition Formation
246
13.4
Deterministic Equilibrium Processes
250
13.5
Stochastic Equilibrium Processes
261
13.6
Proofs
271
13.7
Summary
276
Chapter
14.
Directions
287
14.1
Coalition Formation Without Unanimity
288
14.2
Equity Within Coalitions
289
14.3
Coalition Formation With Deliberate Exit
292
14.4
Overlapping Coalitions
294
14.5
Networks
296
14.6
Coalition Formation With
Nonbinding
Agreements
299
14.7
Incomplete Information
301
14.8 Nontransferable
Utility
303
14.9
Axiomatic Approaches
304
xiv Contents
References
307
Subject Index
315
Author Index
319 |
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| id | DE-604.BV022779333 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T18:35:44Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-20T05:30:51Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 019920795X 9780199207954 |
| language | English |
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| spelling | Ray, Debraj 1957- Verfasser (DE-588)128473835 aut A game-theoretic perspective on coalition formation Debraj Ray Oxford Oxford University Press 2007 XIV, 321 Seiten txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier The Lipsey lectures Coalities gtt Samenwerkingsvormen (bedrijfseconomie) gtt Speltheorie gtt Coalitions Game theory Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd rswk-swf Koalitionsbildung (DE-588)4481612-1 gnd rswk-swf Koalitionsbildung (DE-588)4481612-1 s Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 s b DE-604 Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe 978-0-19-170910-4 https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199207954.001.0001 Verlag kostenfrei Volltext Digitalisierung UB Regensburg application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015984859&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Ray, Debraj 1957- A game-theoretic perspective on coalition formation Coalities gtt Samenwerkingsvormen (bedrijfseconomie) gtt Speltheorie gtt Coalitions Game theory Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd Koalitionsbildung (DE-588)4481612-1 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4056243-8 (DE-588)4481612-1 |
| title | A game-theoretic perspective on coalition formation |
| title_auth | A game-theoretic perspective on coalition formation |
| title_exact_search | A game-theoretic perspective on coalition formation |
| title_exact_search_txtP | A game-theoretic perspective on coalition formation |
| title_full | A game-theoretic perspective on coalition formation Debraj Ray |
| title_fullStr | A game-theoretic perspective on coalition formation Debraj Ray |
| title_full_unstemmed | A game-theoretic perspective on coalition formation Debraj Ray |
| title_short | A game-theoretic perspective on coalition formation |
| title_sort | a game theoretic perspective on coalition formation |
| topic | Coalities gtt Samenwerkingsvormen (bedrijfseconomie) gtt Speltheorie gtt Coalitions Game theory Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd Koalitionsbildung (DE-588)4481612-1 gnd |
| topic_facet | Coalities Samenwerkingsvormen (bedrijfseconomie) Speltheorie Coalitions Game theory Spieltheorie Koalitionsbildung |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199207954.001.0001 http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015984859&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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