Projection and realism in Hume's philosophy:
'In Projection and Realism in Hume's Philsophy', Kail provides a fresh interpretation of this metaphor and uses it to shed new light on some of Hume's central ideas.
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford [u.a.]
Oxford Univ. Press
2007
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| Ausgabe: | 1. publ. |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Table of contents only Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Zusammenfassung: | 'In Projection and Realism in Hume's Philsophy', Kail provides a fresh interpretation of this metaphor and uses it to shed new light on some of Hume's central ideas. |
| Beschreibung: | XXXVI, 264 S. |
| ISBN: | 9780199229505 |
Internformat
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Projection and realism in Hume's philosophy |c P. J. E. Kail |
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| 264 | 1 | |a Oxford [u.a.] |b Oxford Univ. Press |c 2007 | |
| 300 | |a XXXVI, 264 S. | ||
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| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 520 | |a 'In Projection and Realism in Hume's Philsophy', Kail provides a fresh interpretation of this metaphor and uses it to shed new light on some of Hume's central ideas. | ||
| 600 | 1 | 4 | |a Hume, David |d 1711-1776 |
| 600 | 1 | 7 | |a Hume, David |d 1711-1776 |0 (DE-588)118554735 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 7 | |a Godsdienst |2 gtt | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Realisme (filosofie) |2 gtt | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Religion | |
| 689 | 0 | 0 | |a Hume, David |d 1711-1776 |0 (DE-588)118554735 |D p |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804136660332445696 |
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| adam_text | CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS REFERENCES TO HUMES WORK INTRODUCTION PART 1.
RELIGION AND THE EXTERNAL WORLD 1. PROJEETION, RELIGION, AND THE
EXTERNAL W ORID 2. THE SENSES, REASON AND THE IMAGINATION 3. REALISM,
MEANING AND ] USTIFICATION: THE EXTERNAL W ORID AND RELIGIOUS BELIEF
XYLLT XXI XXL11 3 26 56 PART 11. MODALITY, PRO]ECTION AND REALISM 4.
OUR PROFOUND IGNORANCE : CAUSAL REALISM AND THE FAILURE TO DETECT
NECESSITY 77 5. SPREADING THE MIND: PROJECTION, NECESSITY AND REALISM
103 6. INTO THE LABYRINTH: PERSONS, MODALITY AND HUME S UNDOING 125 PART
III. VALUE, PRO]ECTION AND REALISM 7. GILDING: PROJECTION, VALUE AND
SECONDARY QUALITIES 8. THE GOLD: GOOD, EVIL, BELIEF AND DESIRE 9. THE
GOLDEN: RELATIONAL VALUES, REALISM AND A MORAL SENSE BIBLIOGRAPHY INDEX
147 175 204 245 255 DETAILED TABLE 0/ CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
INTRODUCTION PART 1. RELIGION AND THE EXTERNAL WORLD XVLLL XXLLL 1.
PROJECTION, RELIGION, AND THE EXTERNAL W ORLD 3 1.1 PROJECTION: INITIAL
DISTINCTIONS 3 FEATURE AND EXPLANATORY PROJECTION; EXPLANATORY
PROJECTION AS NON-DETECTIVE EXPLANATION; QUESTIONS TO BE ASKED 0/
EXPLANATORY PROJECTIVE ACCOUNTS 1.2 PROJECTION AND THE ORIGINS OF
RELIGION 7 1NVISIBLE INTELLIGENT POWER: THE CORE CONTENT 0/ RELIGIOUS
BELIEF; ITS EMERGENCE IN POLYTHEISM; ANTHROPOMORPHISM; ANXIETY, PASSIONS
AND EXPLANATORY PROJECTION; MOTIVATED IRRATIONALITY; THE MANIFESTATION
0/ A PSYCHOLOGICAL DISPOSITION TO RELIEVE UNEASINESS 1.3 DIGRESSION:
ABRIEF COMPARISON WITH FREUD 12 PROJECTION AS EXPULSION AND MOTIVATED
IRRATIONALITY; THE OVERLAP WITH EXPLANATORY PROJECTION; THE ORIGIN 0/
MALIGN SPIRITS 1.4 PROJEETION AND THE ORIGINS OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD
BELIEF 14 THE VULGAR VIEW; CONTINUED AND DISTINCT EXISTENCE, THE CORE
CONTENT 0/ EXTERNAL WORLD BELIEF; DETECTION AND THE SENSES;CONSTANCY AND
COHERENCE; CONSTANCY; THE MANIFESTATION 0/ A PSYCHOLOGICAL DISPOSITION
TO RELIEVE UNEASINESS; COMPARED WITH THE EMERGENCE 0/ POLYTHEISM 1.5 THE
TRANSMUTATION OF THE CORE CONTENTS: FURTHER PARALLELS 17 PO(YTHEISM AND
THE VULGAR VIEW EASILY SHOWN TO BEFALSE; TRANSMUTATION INTO MONOTHEISM
AND THE PHILOSOPHICAL VIEW; NOT PRODUCED BY REASON BUT THE SAME
PROJECTIVE SOURCES AS THE EARLIER VIEWS; BOTH SOPHISTICATED VERSIONS
HAVE A TENUOUS GRIP ON THE IMAGINATION 1.6 DESTABILIZATION, REALISM AND
HUME S PROJECTIVE EXPLANATIONS 20 SUCH EXPLANATIONS DO NOT FORECLOSE ON
REALISM; RATIONAL DESTABILIZATION AND THE DEMAND FOR JUSTIFICATION 1.7
SUMMARY 24 X DETAILED TABLE OFCONTENTS 2. THE SENSES, REASON AND THE
IMAGINATION 2.1 INTRODUCTION THE SENSES AND REASON AS DETECTIVE SOURCES,
THE FORMER OF BASIC CONTENTS, THE LATTER OF NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS 26
26 36 2.2 THE SENSES 27 2.2.1 IMPRESSIONS,ACQUAINTANCEAND DETEETION 27
IMPRESSIONS, WHAT THEY ARE; IMPRESSIONS AS OBJECTS AND INPUT; DETECTION
AS ACQUAINTANCE; THE AEIFFERENCE BETWIXT FEELING AND THINKING: A
MITIGATION 2.2.2 DETECTION, MEANING AND MEANINGLESSNESS 31 THE COPY
PRINCIPLE AS A THEORY 0/ MEANING; SEMES IN WHICH HUME HAS NO THEORY 0/
MEANING; MEANINGLESSNESS AND REALISM; MEANING AND HUMES FORMULATION 0/
THE COPY PRINCIPLE; MEANING ASPOSSIBLE OBJECT 0/ ACQUAINTANCE; SIMPLE
AND COMPLEX PERCEPTIONS; HUMES APPROACH; TWO SENSES O/ MEANINGLESSNESS:
SUM- MARY 2.3 REASON 2.3.1 PRELIMINARIES 36 REASONP, REASONSN AND
REASONING] 2.3.2 RELATIONSAND DEMONSTRATIVE REASON 37 REASONING AS
COMPARISON 0/ RELATIONS; PHILOSOPHICAL RELATIONS, CONSTANT AND
INCONSTANT; INTUITION AND DEMONSTRATION; DEMONSTRATION AS AWARENESS 0/
NECESSITATION RELATIONS GROUNDED IN ANALYTIC RELATIONS; DEMONSTRATION
NOT DEDUCTION 2.3.3 PROBABLE REASONAND CAUSA!INFERENCE 40 DETECTION,
PROJECTION AND SCEPTICISM ABOUT PROBABLE REASON; PROBABLE REASON AND THE
PHILOSOPHICAL RELATION 0/ CAUSATION; REASONP NOT THE CAUSE 0/ PROBABLE
REASONING]; BECAUSE REASONP CANNOT GRASP REASONSN; THE UP; PROBABLE
REASON AS HAVINGPROJECTIVE (NON-DETECTIVE BASIS); THIS NOT EQUIVALENT TO
SHOWING THAT PROBABLE REASON IS NOT A DETECTIVE SOURCE 0/ BELIEF 2.4 THE
IMAGINATION 2.4.1 IDEAS AND THE IMAGINATION 48 IDEAS AS IMAGESFITLL
UNTIER THE IMAGINATION 2.4.2 ASSOCIATIONAND POWER 48 HUMES
BRIEFINTRODUCTION 0/ THE PRINCIPLES; CAUSE AND EFFECT AND THE
ASSOCIATION 0/ IDEAS; LEIBNIZ, SPINOZA AND HOBBES ON ASSOCIATION AND THE
FITILURE TO GRAS; THAT WHICH UNDERPINS MANIFEST REGULARITIES 2.4.3
RESEMBLANCE,ASSOCIATIONAND ERROR 52 RESEMBLANCE AND ITS BACKGROUND; THE
GROUNDS JIJR THE DISPOSITIONS BEHIND THE EXTERNAL WORLD AND RELIGIOUS
BELIEF; OUTNESS AND THE THREE-DIMEMIONAL TRICK 48 DETAILED TABLE 0/
CONTENTS XI 3. REA1ISM,MEANING AND ]USTIFICATION: THE EXTERNAL WORLD AND
RELIGIOUS BELIEF 56 3.1 REALISM AND THREATS TO REALISM 56 REALISM AS
JUSTIFIED BELIEF IN THE EXTERNAL WORLDLGOD; JUSTIFIEATORY AND SEMANTIE
THREATS TO REALISM 3.2 THE ABSURDITY OFMONOTHEISM AND THE DOCTRINE
OFDOUBLE EXISTENCE:A THREAT TO REALISM REMOVED 58 MONOTHEISM AND DOUBLE
EXISTENEE BOTH MONSTROUS AND ABSURD: THE ABSURDITY IN MONOTHEISM
EXTRINSIE TO ITS EONTENT; THE SEMANTIE THREAT AND THE DOETRINE 0/ DOUBLE
EXISTENEE; RELATIVE IDEAS; THE SUPPOSITION 0/ RESEMBLING EXTERNAL
OBJEETS EOHERENT; THE SEMANTIE THREAT MET; THE SUPPOSITION O/ SPEEIFIE
DIFFERENEE 3.3 A DIFFERENT SEMANTIC THREAT: REASON AND THE EVACUATION
OF CONTENT 62 CONSISTENT REASONING ON THE LIKE EFFEETS, LIKE EAUSES
PRINCIPLE LEAVES AN UNKNOWN SOMETHING AS THE EAUSE 0/ ORDER IN THE
UNIVERSE OR THE EAUSE 0/ PEREEPTIONS; THE RELEVANEE TO REALISM 3.4
REALISM AND JUSTIFICATION: RELIGION AND THE EXTERNAL WORLD CONTRASTED 66
3.4.1 THE LETTER CO ELLIOT 66 HUME S DIFFERING ATTITUDES TO THE
PROPENSITY TO OUR SENSES AND RELIGION 3.4.2 NATURAL BELIEF ,
]USTIFICATION AND THE EXTERNAL WORLD 67 PRINCIPLES O/THE IMAGINATION,
PERMANENT AND IRRESISTIBLE; PRACTICAL JUSTIJICATION; THE PROPENSITY TO
BELIEVE OUR SENSES AND EXPERIENCE; THE DOETRINE 0/ DOUBLE EXISTENCE AS
HAVING AUTHORITY 3.4.3 DOUBLE EXISTENCE AND THE EVACUATION OF CONTENT 69
HUMES LACK 0/ ENTHUSIASM FOR THE DOETRINE 0/ MODERN PHILOSOPHY; THE
TITLE PRINCIPLE AND THE WOMSOME ARGUMENT 3.4.4 RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT 71
&LIGIOUS BELIEF AND ITSPRACTICAL COMEQUENCES; ONLY THE VACUOUS FORM
SURVIVES 3.5 CONCLUSION TO PART I 71 PART II. MODALITY, PROJECTION AND
REALISM 4. OUR PROFOUND IGNORANCE : CAUSAL REALISM AND THE FAILURE TO
OETEET NECESSITY 77 4.1 INTRODUCTION 77 78 XLL DETAILED TABLE 0/
CONTENTS 4.2 CAUSALREALISMAND THREATS TO CAUSALREALISM 4.2.1 WHAT IS
CAUSAL REALISM? 78 THE JUSTIJICATORY THREAT AND THE SEMANTIC THREAT; THE
MEANING TEMION; D4FA- TIONARY APPROACHES 4.2.2 THREATS TO CAUSAL REALISM
80 4.3 MEETING THE SEMANTICTHREAT 82 4.3.1 THE SEMANTIC THREAT AND THE
REALIST STRATEGY 82 HUMES NEGATIVE ARGUMENTS AS MANIFESTING AN
UNDERSTANDING OF CAUSAL POWER SUFFICIENTLY RICH TO SPECI.FJ THAT OF
WHICH WE ARE IGNORANT; THE BARE THOUGHT MEETS THE SEMANTIC THREAT 4.3.2
THE BARE THOUGHT OFNECESSITY ARTICULATED; WHY WE CANNOT DETECT CAUSAL
POWER 83 THE COGNITIVE COMEQUENCES OF A GENUINE IMPRESSION OFPOWER;
APRIORI INFERENCE AND INCONCEIVABILITY; THIS YIELDS A WAY OF SPECI.FJING
THAT WHICH WE CANNOT UM/ERSTAND; HUMES GENERAL NEGATIVE STRATEGY 4.3.3
POWERS AND ABSOLUTE NECESSITY 85 POWERS AND ABSOLUTE NECESSITY;
NATURALISM AND OCCASIONALISM; HUME, MALE- BRANCHE AND WHY HUMES STRATEGY
IS NOT AD HOMINEM 4.3.4 THE BARE THOUGHT AND THE THREAT OF INCOHERENCE:
THE SHORT ARGUMENT 88 THE THREAT OF INCOHERENCE; THE SHORT ARGUMENT FOR
INCOHERENCE; AN ALTERNATIVE READING; IGNORANCE OF ESSENCE 4.3.5 POWERS
AS ESSENCES 90 REASON AND THE SUPPOSITION OFPOWER; THE SWITCHING
ARGUMENT; A CAUSA!NEXUS AND A CAUSAL STRAIGHTJACKET; POWERS AS
ESSENCESEXPLAIM THE SWITCHING ARGUMENT 4.3.6 THE SHORT ARGUMENT
DISMANTLED: CONCEIVABILITY, METAPHYSICAL POS- SIBILITY AND THE OBJECTS
OF CONCEIVABILITY 92 CONCEIVABILITY BRIEFTY INTRODUCED; CONCEIVABILITY
AND HUMES RESTRICTIOM; IMPRESSIOM CANNOT REVEA! MODAL PROPERTIES OF
OBJECTS;ESSENCES AND THE EPISTEMIC POSSIBILITY OF A CHANGE IN THE COURSE
OF NATURE 4.3.7 SUMMARY, ANOTHER OBJECTION AND MEANINGLESSNESS
RECONSID- ERED 98 SUMMARY OFTHIS CHAPTER; A JINAL OBJEETION; THE
CONSTITUTION OF OUR FACULTIES A CONTINGENT MATTER 5. SPREADING THE MIND:
PROJEETION, NECESSITYAND REALISM 103 5.1 INTRODUCTION 103 5.2 HUME S
PROJECTIVE ACCOUM OFNECESSITY 105 5.2.1 THE DETERMINATION OF THE MIND:
HUME S NON-DETEETIVE EXPLAN- ATION OF THE IDEA OF NECESSITY 105 DETAILED
TABLE 0/ CONTENTS X1LI THE CUSTOMARY TRANSITION; HUMES ACCOUNT 0/ THE
IDEA THOUGHT TO BE HOPELESS; THE IMMEDIACY 0/ THE TRANSITION AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL INSEPARABILITY AS MIMICKING APRIORI INFTRENCE AND
INCONCEIVABILITY 5.2.2 SPREADING THE DETERMINATION: FEATUTE PROJECTION
AND THE EXPERIENCE OF CAUSATION 108 THE FTATURE PROJECTIVE ELEMENT; ITS
PERCEPTUAL NATURE; HUME ON THE VULGAR EPISTEMOLOGY O/POWER; MALEBRANCHE
AND SPREADING THE MIND; SINGULARISTS AND THE PHENOMENOLOGY 0/ CAUSATION
5.3 THOUGHT OR QUASI THOUGHT? REALISM, THE IDEA OFNECESSITY AND THE BARE
THOUGHT 110 A THREAT TO REALISM; THE IDEA DOES NOT REPRESENT;
NON-COGNITIVISM; NON-COGNITIVISM AND THE BARE THOUGHT 5.4 REALISM
RECONSIDERED 116 5.4.1 WHY REALISM? 116 HUME 5 REFERENCES TO POWERS; THE
BARE THOUGHT AND REALISM 5.4.2 DEFLATIONARY STRATEGIES REJECTED 118
DEFLATIONARY READINGS 0/ HIDDEN CONNECTIONS AND IGNORANCE REJEETED;
MICRO- REGULARITIES; EXPRESSIVISM; THE ENQUIRY FOOTNOTE; AN ALLEGED
FALLACY 5.4.3 THE CHARACTER OF THE SUPPOSITION AND THE J USTIFICATORY
THREAT 121 THE GENERAL ASSUMPTION AND THE CUSTOMARY TRANSITION; A
MINIMAL PREFERENCE; AGNOSTICISM? 6. INTO THE LABYRINTH: PERSONS,
MODALITY AND HUME S UNDOING 125 6.1 INTRODUCTION 125 6.2 THE PROJECTIVE
EXPLANATION OF THE BELIEF IN A SUBSTANTIAL SELF 126 HUME S PRIMARY
CONCERN THE ORIGIN 0/ THE FALSE BELIEF IN A SUBSTANTIAL SETT NO
IMPRESSION THAT IS CONSTANT AND INVARIABLE: DISSONANCE AND THE BIAS 0/
THE IMAGINATION; OUR YIELDING TO THE BIAS AND FEIGNING A SELF, THE
RELATIONS THAT TRIGGER THIS PROJECTED BELIEF 6.3 SCEPTICAL REALISM ABOUT
SUBSTANTIAL SELVES, AND DENYING THE PROPER IDENTITY AND SIMPLICITY OF A
SELF 129 HUME CONJIDENT THE SELF IS A COLLECTION 0/ PERCEPTIONS;
SCEPTICAL REALISM ABOUT SELF REJECTED; HUME S REDUCTIO AGAINST THE SELF
AS SIMPLE INDIVIDUAL SUBSTANCE UPON WHICH PERCEPTIONS DEPEND;
PERCEPTIONS NEVERTHELESS DEPENDENT ENTITIES 6.4 THE LABYRINTH 131 6.4.1
A CAUSAL REALIST READING OF THE APPENDIX WORRY OUTLINED 131 HUMES MODAL
REASONING IMPLIES PERCEPTIONS CANNOT BE NECESSARILY CONNECTED, AND SO
NOT CAUSALLY CONNECTED; THIS IS INCONSISTENT WITH HIS ACCOUNT O/SELF XLV
DETAILED TABLE 0/ CONTENTS 6.4.2 DISTINCTNESS 133 HUME DOES NOT
ILSSUME A NOTION 0/ DISTINCT EXISTENCE THAT ANALYTICALLY IMPLIES
METAPHYSICAL INDEPENDENCE; DISTINET EXISTENCESLLSA PHENOMENAL NOTION;
AVOIDS CIRCULARITY AND EXPLAIM CONCEPTUAL INDEPENDENCE 6.4.3
DISTINETNESS, CONCEIVABILITY AND THE REIFICATION OF EXPERIENCE: WHY HUME
CANNOT RENOUNCE HIS PRINCIPLES AND ESCAPE THE LABYRINTH 136 PHENOMENAL
DISTINCTNESS LLSAN INTENTIONAL NOTION; REPRESENTATION AND PHENOM- ENAL
DISTINCTNESS; THE REIFICATION 0/ EXPERIENCES AND PERCEPTIOM QUA VEHICLES
0/ RESEMBLANCE AND REPRESENTATION; SEPARABILITY APPLIED TO THOSE OBJECTS
ENTAILS THAT THEY CANNOT BE NECESSARILY CONNECTED; WHY HUME CANNOT
RENOUNCE HIS PRINCIPLES 6.4.4 SUMMARY, OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES 138 6.5
SUMMARY OUTLINE OF THE ARGUMENT 142 6.6 CONCLUSION TO PART II 143 PART
III. VALUE, PROJECTION AND REALISM 7. GILDING: PROJEETION, VALUE AND
SECONDARY QUALITIES 147 7.1INTRODUCTION 147 7.2 HUME AND THE DOCTRINE
OFMODERN PHILOSOPHY: THE VIEW AND ITS BACKGROUND 151 7.2.1 MODERN
PHILOSOPHY AND THE VULGAR 151 HUME S ALLEGED CONFUSION OVER THE DOCTRINE
0/ MODERN PHILOSOPHY; MALEBRANCHE, BAYLE AND BERKELEY; THE COMEQUENCE 0/
MODERN PHILOSOPHY FOR THE VULGAR CONCEPT 0/ COLOUR LLS 0/ IRREDUCIBLE,
MANIFEST PHENOMENAL QUALITIES; HUMES RESPONSE TO REID; THE CONTENT 0/
THE VULGAR VIEW 7.2.2 PROJECTION, SENSATION AND EXPERIENCE 158 IN THE
MIND INTENTIONALAND NON-INTENTIONAL; THEFEATURE PROJECTION O/SEMATION
IN MALEBRANCHE; FEATURE AND EXPLANATORY PROJECTION; COLOURSLLS IDMTICAL
WITH SEMATIOM; MALEBRANCHE AGAIN 7.3 THE COMPARISON 162 7.3.1
INTRODUCTORY 162 7.3.2 THE EXPLANANDUM 163 ESSENTIAL VALUE; A MODERATE
INTERNALISM; DISPOSITIOM AND GROUNDS 7.3.3 THE MECHANISM OFPROJEETION
167 LOW PHENOMENAL INTEMITY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES; HUMES RELLSOM FOR
WHY WE CANNOT DETEET ESSENTIAL VALUE 7.3.4 SENTIMENT AND COLOUR
SENSATION 170 THE COMPARISON AND THE IRREDUCIBILITY 0/ THE RESPOME
DETAILED TABLE OFCONTENTS XV 7.4 PRELIMINARYCONCLUSION:QUESTIONS AND
ISSUES 171 SUMMARY: TOO MUCH ERROR? SENTIMENTS AS DESIRES OR
CONSTITUENTS? WHY PLEASURE? IS THE ACCOUNT REALLY EXPLANATORY? 8. THE
GOLD: GOOD, EVIL, BELIEFAND DESIRE 175 8.1 INTRODUCTION 175 8.2
PLEASUREAND PAIN, GOOD AND EVIL, DESIRE AND AVERSION 177 8.2.1 THE
IDENTITY THESIS 177 NATURAL GOOD AND EVIL PLEASURE AND PAIN; HUME AND
OTHERS; THE EFFICIENT CAUSES READING OF PLEASURE AND PAIN
UNSATISFAETORY; PLEASURES AND PAINS AS PROVIDING IDEAS OF GOOD AND EVIL
THAT FIGURE IN COMPLEX JUDGMENTS CONCERNING THE VALUE OF THE OBJECTS OF
THE PASSIONS; IDEAS OF GOOD AND EVIL AND BELIEF 8.2.2 WHY THE IDENTITY
THESIS?METAPHYSICALHEDONISM AND THE SOURCES OF CONTENT 182 THE LDENTITY
THESIS AND THE ACQUISITION OF IDEAS OF GOOD AND EVI/; METAPHYS- ICAL
HEDONISM; CONVERGENCE AND EXPLANATION; PLEASURE AND PAIN AS STATES OF
CONSCIOUMESS WITH ESSENTIAL VALUE 8.2.3 HUME AND METAPHYSICAL HEDONISM:
INITIAL SUPPORT AND STRAT- EGY 187 TWO INITIAL POINTS; THE PRESENCE OF
THE LDENTITY THESIS AND THE REGRESSOF REASONS IN APPENDIX I EPM; REASONS
CLEARLY NOT DECISIVE; STRATEGY; RE-READ OF THE INFLUENCING MOTIVES OF
THE WILL; OFFER AN ALTERNATIVE TARGET AND INTEGRATED SUCH A VIEW IN THE
ACCOUNT OF MORAL MOTIVATION 8.3 RE-READING OF THE INFLUENCINGMOTIVESOF
THE WILL 189 8.3.1 THE STANDARD READING 189 THE HUMEAN THEORY OF
MOTIVATION; ITS THREAT TO METAPHYSICAL HEDONISM; SMITH S GENERAL
STRATEGY REJECTED 8.3.2 REASONALONE 192 WHAT IS MEANT BE REASON
ALONE; THE FACULTY OF COMPARISON AND MOTIVATING CONTENTS 8.3.3
REASONCANNAT OPPOSE 193 REASON ALONE, MEANS, ENDS AND FALSE BELIEFI;
THREE NOTORIOUS PASSAGES 8.3.4 CALM PASSIONS 196 GENERAL APPETITE TO
GOOD AND EVIL NOT ORIGINAL BUT ACQUIRED 8.3.5 COGNITION, ACQUAINTANCEAND
BELIEF 197 BELIEFAND THE MANIFESTATION OF THE POWER TO ACTUATE THE WILL
8.4 MORAL RATIONALISMAND MORALITY NOT A MATTER OFFACT 199 RATIONALISM A
THESIS ABOUT WHAT MORAL FACTS CONSIST IN AND NOT MORAL COGNITIVE
INTERNALISM XVI DETAILED TABLE OF CONTENTS 9. THE GOLDEN: RELATIONAL
VALUES, REALISM AND A MORAL SENSE 204 9.1 INTRODUCTION 204 9.2
PERCEPTIONS OF OF GOOD OR EVIL, OF PLEASURE AND PAIN : THE INDICATOR
FUNCTION OFPLEASURE AND PAIN, AND THE BENEFICIALAND THE HARMFUL 206
PLEASURE AND PAIN AS DIRECTING US TOWARD THE HEALTHY AND AWAY /ROM THE
HARMJITL; DESCARTES, MALEBRANCHE, BERKE!EY AND HUTCHESON; ANIMAL NATURE,
AND THE INDICATION OF RELATIONAL GOODS; MALEBRANCHE AND THE JITNCTION
OFPROJECTINGPLEASURE AND PAIN; INDICATION, AWARENESS AND THE PROPER
JITNCTION OFPLEASURE AND PAIN 9.3 MODELLING A MORAL SENSE: HUME IN THE
LIGHT OFHUTCHESON 213 9.3.1 PRELIMINARIES 213 HUMES AWARENESS 0/ THE
FUNCTIONAL ROLE 0/ PLEASURE AND PAIN; THE LETTER TO HUTCHESON AND THE
PARALLEL BETWEEN BODILY PLEASURE AND MORAL SENTIMENTS; PROPOSAL; A WORD
ON HUME AND HUTCHESON 9.3.2 SENTIMENTS, PLEASURE AND MEANING 216
PECULIAR PLEASURES AND THE PHENOMENOLOGY 0/ MORALITY; HUTCHESON AND HUME
AGAIMT HOBBES AND MANDEVILLE 9.3.3 THE RELATIONAL VALUES AND PTOJECTION
219 HUTCHESON, UNIFORMITY AMIDST VARIETY AND BENEVOLENCE; HUME, THE
USEFUL AND THE AGREEABLE 9.3.4 REFLEX SENTIMENTS & SENSITIVITY 222
PROJECTION AND THE RENDERING RELATIONAL VALUES SALIENT;
REFLECTIVEPERCEPTIOM AND AN OBJECTION; THE EMPIRICAL DISCOVERY 0/ THE
FTUNDATION 0/ MERIT 9.4 THE CORRECTION OF SENTIMENT: SENSITIVITY,
SECONDATY QUALITIES AND REALISM 228 9.4.1 REALISM, IDENTITY AND
CORRECTION 228 THE IDENTITY 0/ MORAL FACTS WITH RELATIONAL VALUES;
STANDARDS 0/ CORRECTION 9.4.2 TWO VIEWS OFPOWER AND SECONDATY QUALITIES
REVISITED 229 CAUSALISM; CAUSALISM ABOUT VIRTUES REJECTED;POWERS
UNDERSTOOD DISPOSITIONAUY; NORMAL CONDITIOM AND OBSERVERS ASPARTLY
COMTITUTIVE 9.4.3 DISPOSITIONALISM REJECTED: HUTCHESON 233 WHAT MAKES
FTR NORMALITY? 9.4.4 DISPOSITIONALISM REJEETED: HUME 235 FOR WHAT ARE WE
CORRECTING? 9.4.5 SYMPATHY AND THE COMMON POINT OFVIEW 236 CORRECTINGFTR
SYMPATHY; AN APPARENT TENSION DISSOLVED DETAILED TABLE 0/ CONTENTS XVLL
9.4.6 PROVIDENCE VERSUS REFLECTION: A KEY DIFFERENCE BETWEEN HUTCHESON
ANDHUME 239 9.5 CONCLUSION TO CHAPTER 9: REALISM IN HUMEAN MORALS 241
9.6 CONCLUSION TO PART III 242 9.7 APPENDIX: A PUZZLE ABOUT OF THE
STANDARD OF TASTE 243 BIBLIOGRAPHY 245 INDEX 255
|
| adam_txt |
CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS REFERENCES TO HUMES WORK INTRODUCTION PART 1.
RELIGION AND THE EXTERNAL WORLD 1. PROJEETION, RELIGION, AND THE
EXTERNAL W ORID 2. THE SENSES, REASON AND THE IMAGINATION 3. REALISM,
MEANING AND ] USTIFICATION: THE EXTERNAL W ORID AND RELIGIOUS BELIEF
XYLLT XXI XXL11 3 26 56 PART 11. MODALITY, PRO]ECTION AND REALISM 4.
'OUR PROFOUND IGNORANCE': CAUSAL REALISM AND THE FAILURE TO DETECT
NECESSITY 77 5. SPREADING THE MIND: PROJECTION, NECESSITY AND REALISM
103 6. INTO THE LABYRINTH: PERSONS, MODALITY AND HUME'S UNDOING 125 PART
III. VALUE, PRO]ECTION AND REALISM 7. GILDING: PROJECTION, VALUE AND
SECONDARY QUALITIES 8. THE GOLD: GOOD, EVIL, BELIEF AND DESIRE 9. THE
GOLDEN: RELATIONAL VALUES, REALISM AND A MORAL SENSE BIBLIOGRAPHY INDEX
147 175 204 245 255 DETAILED TABLE 0/ CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
INTRODUCTION PART 1. RELIGION AND THE EXTERNAL WORLD XVLLL XXLLL 1.
PROJECTION, RELIGION, AND THE EXTERNAL W ORLD 3 1.1 PROJECTION: INITIAL
DISTINCTIONS 3 FEATURE AND EXPLANATORY PROJECTION; EXPLANATORY
PROJECTION AS NON-DETECTIVE EXPLANATION; QUESTIONS TO BE ASKED 0/
EXPLANATORY PROJECTIVE ACCOUNTS 1.2 PROJECTION AND THE ORIGINS OF
RELIGION 7 1NVISIBLE INTELLIGENT POWER: THE CORE CONTENT 0/ RELIGIOUS
BELIEF; ITS EMERGENCE IN POLYTHEISM; ANTHROPOMORPHISM; ANXIETY, PASSIONS
AND EXPLANATORY PROJECTION; MOTIVATED IRRATIONALITY; THE MANIFESTATION
0/ A PSYCHOLOGICAL DISPOSITION TO RELIEVE UNEASINESS 1.3 DIGRESSION:
ABRIEF COMPARISON WITH FREUD 12 PROJECTION AS 'EXPULSION' AND MOTIVATED
IRRATIONALITY; THE OVERLAP WITH EXPLANATORY PROJECTION; THE ORIGIN 0/
MALIGN SPIRITS 1.4 PROJEETION AND THE ORIGINS OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD
BELIEF 14 THE VULGAR VIEW; CONTINUED AND DISTINCT EXISTENCE, THE CORE
CONTENT 0/ EXTERNAL WORLD BELIEF; DETECTION AND THE SENSES;CONSTANCY AND
COHERENCE; CONSTANCY; THE MANIFESTATION 0/ A PSYCHOLOGICAL DISPOSITION
TO RELIEVE UNEASINESS; COMPARED WITH THE EMERGENCE 0/ POLYTHEISM 1.5 THE
TRANSMUTATION OF THE CORE CONTENTS: FURTHER PARALLELS 17 PO(YTHEISM AND
THE VULGAR VIEW EASILY SHOWN TO BEFALSE; TRANSMUTATION INTO MONOTHEISM
AND THE PHILOSOPHICAL VIEW; NOT PRODUCED BY REASON BUT THE SAME
PROJECTIVE SOURCES AS THE EARLIER VIEWS; BOTH SOPHISTICATED VERSIONS
HAVE A TENUOUS GRIP ON THE IMAGINATION 1.6 DESTABILIZATION, REALISM AND
HUME'S PROJECTIVE EXPLANATIONS 20 SUCH EXPLANATIONS DO NOT FORECLOSE ON
REALISM; RATIONAL DESTABILIZATION AND THE DEMAND FOR JUSTIFICATION 1.7
SUMMARY 24 X DETAILED TABLE OFCONTENTS 2. THE SENSES, REASON AND THE
IMAGINATION 2.1 INTRODUCTION THE SENSES AND REASON AS DETECTIVE SOURCES,
THE FORMER OF BASIC CONTENTS, THE LATTER OF NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS 26
26 36 2.2 THE SENSES 27 2.2.1 IMPRESSIONS,ACQUAINTANCEAND DETEETION 27
IMPRESSIONS, WHAT THEY ARE; IMPRESSIONS AS OBJECTS AND INPUT; DETECTION
AS ACQUAINTANCE; THE AEIFFERENCE BETWIXT FEELING AND THINKING: A
MITIGATION 2.2.2 DETECTION, MEANING AND MEANINGLESSNESS 31 THE COPY
PRINCIPLE AS A THEORY 0/ MEANING; SEMES IN WHICH HUME HAS NO THEORY 0/
MEANING; MEANINGLESSNESS AND REALISM; MEANING AND HUMES FORMULATION 0/
THE COPY PRINCIPLE; MEANING ASPOSSIBLE OBJECT 0/ ACQUAINTANCE; SIMPLE
AND COMPLEX PERCEPTIONS; HUMES APPROACH; TWO SENSES O/'MEANINGLESSNESS:'
SUM- MARY 2.3 REASON 2.3.1 PRELIMINARIES 36 REASONP, REASONSN AND
REASONING] 2.3.2 RELATIONSAND DEMONSTRATIVE REASON 37 REASONING AS
COMPARISON 0/ RELATIONS; PHILOSOPHICAL RELATIONS, CONSTANT AND
INCONSTANT; INTUITION AND DEMONSTRATION; DEMONSTRATION AS AWARENESS 0/
NECESSITATION RELATIONS GROUNDED IN ANALYTIC RELATIONS; DEMONSTRATION
NOT DEDUCTION 2.3.3 PROBABLE REASONAND CAUSA!INFERENCE 40 DETECTION,
PROJECTION AND SCEPTICISM ABOUT PROBABLE REASON; PROBABLE REASON AND THE
PHILOSOPHICAL RELATION 0/ CAUSATION; REASONP NOT THE CAUSE 0/ PROBABLE
REASONING]; BECAUSE REASONP CANNOT GRASP REASONSN; THE UP; PROBABLE
REASON AS HAVINGPROJECTIVE (NON-DETECTIVE BASIS); THIS NOT EQUIVALENT TO
SHOWING THAT PROBABLE REASON IS NOT A DETECTIVE SOURCE 0/ BELIEF 2.4 THE
IMAGINATION 2.4.1 IDEAS AND THE IMAGINATION 48 IDEAS AS IMAGESFITLL
UNTIER THE IMAGINATION 2.4.2 ASSOCIATIONAND POWER 48 HUMES
BRIEFINTRODUCTION 0/ THE PRINCIPLES; CAUSE AND EFFECT AND THE
ASSOCIATION 0/ IDEAS; LEIBNIZ, SPINOZA AND HOBBES ON ASSOCIATION AND THE
FITILURE TO GRAS; THAT WHICH UNDERPINS MANIFEST REGULARITIES 2.4.3
RESEMBLANCE,ASSOCIATIONAND ERROR 52 RESEMBLANCE AND ITS BACKGROUND; THE
GROUNDS JIJR THE DISPOSITIONS BEHIND THE EXTERNAL WORLD AND RELIGIOUS
BELIEF; 'OUTNESS'AND THE THREE-DIMEMIONAL TRICK 48 DETAILED TABLE 0/
CONTENTS XI 3. REA1ISM,MEANING AND ]USTIFICATION: THE EXTERNAL WORLD AND
RELIGIOUS BELIEF 56 3.1 REALISM AND THREATS TO REALISM 56 REALISM AS
JUSTIFIED BELIEF IN THE EXTERNAL WORLDLGOD; JUSTIFIEATORY AND SEMANTIE
THREATS TO REALISM 3.2 THE 'ABSURDITY' OFMONOTHEISM AND THE DOCTRINE
OFDOUBLE EXISTENCE:A THREAT TO REALISM REMOVED 58 MONOTHEISM AND DOUBLE
EXISTENEE BOTH 'MONSTROUS' AND 'ABSURD:' THE ABSURDITY IN MONOTHEISM
EXTRINSIE TO ITS EONTENT; THE SEMANTIE THREAT AND THE DOETRINE 0/ DOUBLE
EXISTENEE; RELATIVE IDEAS; THE SUPPOSITION 0/ RESEMBLING EXTERNAL
OBJEETS EOHERENT; THE SEMANTIE THREAT MET; THE SUPPOSITION O/'SPEEIFIE
DIFFERENEE' 3.3 A DIFFERENT SEMANTIC THREAT: REASON AND THE EVACUATION
OF CONTENT 62 CONSISTENT REASONING ON THE LIKE EFFEETS, LIKE EAUSES
PRINCIPLE LEAVES AN 'UNKNOWN ' SOMETHING AS THE EAUSE 0/ ORDER IN THE
UNIVERSE OR THE EAUSE 0/ PEREEPTIONS; THE RELEVANEE TO REALISM 3.4
REALISM AND JUSTIFICATION: RELIGION AND THE EXTERNAL WORLD CONTRASTED 66
3.4.1 THE LETTER CO ELLIOT 66 HUME S DIFFERING ATTITUDES TO THE
PROPENSITY TO OUR SENSES AND RELIGION 3.4.2 'NATURAL BELIEF',
]USTIFICATION AND THE EXTERNAL WORLD 67 PRINCIPLES O/THE IMAGINATION,
PERMANENT AND IRRESISTIBLE; PRACTICAL JUSTIJICATION; THE PROPENSITY TO
BELIEVE OUR SENSES AND EXPERIENCE; THE DOETRINE 0/ DOUBLE EXISTENCE AS
HAVING AUTHORITY 3.4.3 DOUBLE EXISTENCE AND THE EVACUATION OF CONTENT 69
HUMES LACK 0/ ENTHUSIASM FOR THE DOETRINE 0/ MODERN PHILOSOPHY; THE
TITLE PRINCIPLE AND THE WOMSOME ARGUMENT 3.4.4 RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT 71
&LIGIOUS BELIEF AND ITSPRACTICAL COMEQUENCES; ONLY THE VACUOUS FORM
SURVIVES 3.5 CONCLUSION TO PART I 71 PART II. MODALITY, PROJECTION AND
REALISM 4. 'OUR PROFOUND IGNORANCE': CAUSAL REALISM AND THE FAILURE TO
OETEET NECESSITY 77 4.1 INTRODUCTION 77 78 XLL DETAILED TABLE 0/
CONTENTS 4.2 CAUSALREALISMAND THREATS TO CAUSALREALISM 4.2.1 WHAT IS
CAUSAL REALISM? 78 THE JUSTIJICATORY THREAT AND THE SEMANTIC THREAT; THE
MEANING TEMION; D4FA- TIONARY APPROACHES 4.2.2 THREATS TO CAUSAL REALISM
80 4.3 MEETING THE SEMANTICTHREAT 82 4.3.1 THE SEMANTIC THREAT AND THE
REALIST STRATEGY 82 HUMES NEGATIVE ARGUMENTS AS MANIFESTING AN
UNDERSTANDING OF CAUSAL POWER SUFFICIENTLY RICH TO SPECI.FJ THAT OF
WHICH WE ARE IGNORANT; THE BARE THOUGHT MEETS THE SEMANTIC THREAT 4.3.2
THE BARE THOUGHT OFNECESSITY ARTICULATED; WHY WE CANNOT DETECT CAUSAL
POWER 83 THE COGNITIVE COMEQUENCES OF A GENUINE IMPRESSION OFPOWER;
APRIORI INFERENCE AND INCONCEIVABILITY; THIS YIELDS A WAY OF SPECI.FJING
THAT WHICH WE CANNOT UM/ERSTAND; HUMES GENERAL NEGATIVE STRATEGY 4.3.3
POWERS AND ABSOLUTE NECESSITY 85 POWERS AND ABSOLUTE NECESSITY;
NATURALISM AND OCCASIONALISM; HUME, MALE- BRANCHE AND WHY HUMES STRATEGY
IS NOT AD HOMINEM 4.3.4 THE BARE THOUGHT AND THE THREAT OF INCOHERENCE:
THE SHORT ARGUMENT 88 THE THREAT OF INCOHERENCE; THE SHORT ARGUMENT FOR
INCOHERENCE; AN ALTERNATIVE READING; IGNORANCE OF ESSENCE 4.3.5 POWERS
AS ESSENCES 90 REASON AND THE SUPPOSITION OFPOWER; THE SWITCHING
ARGUMENT; A CAUSA!NEXUS AND A CAUSAL STRAIGHTJACKET; POWERS AS
ESSENCESEXPLAIM THE SWITCHING ARGUMENT 4.3.6 THE SHORT ARGUMENT
DISMANTLED: CONCEIVABILITY, METAPHYSICAL POS- SIBILITY AND THE OBJECTS
OF CONCEIVABILITY 92 CONCEIVABILITY BRIEFTY INTRODUCED; CONCEIVABILITY
AND HUMES RESTRICTIOM; IMPRESSIOM CANNOT REVEA! MODAL PROPERTIES OF
OBJECTS;ESSENCES AND THE EPISTEMIC POSSIBILITY OF A CHANGE IN THE COURSE
OF NATURE 4.3.7 SUMMARY, ANOTHER OBJECTION AND 'MEANINGLESSNESS'
RECONSID- ERED 98 SUMMARY OFTHIS CHAPTER; A JINAL OBJEETION; THE
CONSTITUTION OF OUR FACULTIES A CONTINGENT MATTER 5. SPREADING THE MIND:
PROJEETION, NECESSITYAND REALISM 103 5.1 INTRODUCTION 103 5.2 HUME'S
PROJECTIVE ACCOUM OFNECESSITY 105 5.2.1 THE DETERMINATION OF THE MIND:
HUME'S NON-DETEETIVE EXPLAN- ATION OF THE IDEA OF NECESSITY 105 DETAILED
TABLE 0/ CONTENTS X1LI THE CUSTOMARY TRANSITION; HUMES ACCOUNT 0/ THE
IDEA THOUGHT TO BE HOPELESS; THE IMMEDIACY 0/ THE TRANSITION AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL INSEPARABILITY AS MIMICKING APRIORI INFTRENCE AND
INCONCEIVABILITY 5.2.2 SPREADING THE DETERMINATION: FEATUTE PROJECTION
AND THE EXPERIENCE OF CAUSATION 108 THE FTATURE PROJECTIVE ELEMENT; ITS
PERCEPTUAL NATURE; HUME ON THE VULGAR EPISTEMOLOGY O/POWER; MALEBRANCHE
AND SPREADING THE MIND; SINGULARISTS AND THE PHENOMENOLOGY 0/ CAUSATION
5.3 THOUGHT OR QUASI THOUGHT? REALISM, THE IDEA OFNECESSITY AND THE BARE
THOUGHT 110 A THREAT TO REALISM; THE IDEA DOES NOT REPRESENT;
NON-COGNITIVISM; NON-COGNITIVISM AND THE BARE THOUGHT 5.4 REALISM
RECONSIDERED 116 5.4.1 WHY REALISM? 116 HUME 5 REFERENCES TO POWERS; THE
BARE THOUGHT AND REALISM 5.4.2 DEFLATIONARY STRATEGIES REJECTED 118
DEFLATIONARY READINGS 0/ HIDDEN CONNECTIONS AND IGNORANCE REJEETED;
MICRO- REGULARITIES; EXPRESSIVISM; THE ENQUIRY FOOTNOTE; AN ALLEGED
FALLACY 5.4.3 THE CHARACTER OF THE SUPPOSITION AND THE J USTIFICATORY
THREAT 121 THE GENERAL ASSUMPTION AND THE CUSTOMARY TRANSITION; A
MINIMAL PREFERENCE; AGNOSTICISM? 6. INTO THE LABYRINTH: PERSONS,
MODALITY AND HUME'S UNDOING 125 6.1 INTRODUCTION 125 6.2 THE PROJECTIVE
EXPLANATION OF THE BELIEF IN A SUBSTANTIAL SELF 126 HUME S PRIMARY
CONCERN THE ORIGIN 0/ THE FALSE BELIEF IN A SUBSTANTIAL SETT NO
IMPRESSION THAT IS 'CONSTANT AND INVARIABLE:' DISSONANCE AND THE BIAS 0/
THE IMAGINATION; OUR YIELDING TO THE BIAS AND FEIGNING A SELF, THE
RELATIONS THAT TRIGGER THIS PROJECTED BELIEF 6.3 SCEPTICAL REALISM ABOUT
SUBSTANTIAL SELVES, AND DENYING THE 'PROPER IDENTITY AND SIMPLICITY OF A
SELF 129 HUME CONJIDENT THE SELF IS A COLLECTION 0/ PERCEPTIONS;
SCEPTICAL REALISM ABOUT SELF REJECTED; HUME S REDUCTIO AGAINST THE SELF
AS SIMPLE INDIVIDUAL SUBSTANCE UPON WHICH PERCEPTIONS DEPEND;
PERCEPTIONS NEVERTHELESS DEPENDENT ENTITIES 6.4 THE LABYRINTH 131 6.4.1
A CAUSAL REALIST READING OF THE APPENDIX WORRY OUTLINED 131 HUMES MODAL
REASONING IMPLIES PERCEPTIONS CANNOT BE NECESSARILY CONNECTED, AND SO
NOT CAUSALLY CONNECTED; THIS IS INCONSISTENT WITH HIS ACCOUNT O/SELF XLV
DETAILED TABLE 0/ CONTENTS 6.4.2 'DISTINCTNESS' 133 HUME DOES NOT
ILSSUME A NOTION 0/ 'DISTINCT EXISTENCE' THAT ANALYTICALLY IMPLIES
METAPHYSICAL INDEPENDENCE; DISTINET EXISTENCESLLSA PHENOMENAL NOTION;
AVOIDS CIRCULARITY AND EXPLAIM CONCEPTUAL INDEPENDENCE 6.4.3
DISTINETNESS, CONCEIVABILITY AND THE REIFICATION OF EXPERIENCE: WHY HUME
CANNOT RENOUNCE HIS PRINCIPLES AND ESCAPE THE LABYRINTH 136 PHENOMENAL
DISTINCTNESS LLSAN INTENTIONAL NOTION; REPRESENTATION AND PHENOM- ENAL
DISTINCTNESS; THE REIFICATION 0/ EXPERIENCES AND PERCEPTIOM QUA VEHICLES
0/ RESEMBLANCE AND REPRESENTATION; SEPARABILITY APPLIED TO THOSE OBJECTS
ENTAILS THAT THEY CANNOT BE NECESSARILY CONNECTED; WHY HUME CANNOT
RENOUNCE HIS PRINCIPLES 6.4.4 SUMMARY, OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES 138 6.5
SUMMARY OUTLINE OF THE ARGUMENT 142 6.6 CONCLUSION TO PART II 143 PART
III. VALUE, PROJECTION AND REALISM 7. GILDING: PROJEETION, VALUE AND
SECONDARY QUALITIES 147 7.1INTRODUCTION 147 7.2 HUME AND THE DOCTRINE
OFMODERN PHILOSOPHY: THE VIEW AND ITS BACKGROUND 151 7.2.1 MODERN
PHILOSOPHY AND THE VULGAR 151 HUME S ALLEGED CONFUSION OVER THE DOCTRINE
0/ MODERN PHILOSOPHY; MALEBRANCHE, BAYLE AND BERKELEY; THE COMEQUENCE 0/
MODERN PHILOSOPHY FOR THE VULGAR CONCEPT 0/ COLOUR LLS 0/ IRREDUCIBLE,
MANIFEST PHENOMENAL QUALITIES; HUMES RESPONSE TO REID; THE CONTENT 0/
THE VULGAR VIEW 7.2.2 PROJECTION, SENSATION AND EXPERIENCE 158 'IN THE
MIND' INTENTIONALAND NON-INTENTIONAL; THEFEATURE PROJECTION O/SEMATION
IN MALEBRANCHE; FEATURE AND EXPLANATORY PROJECTION; COLOURSLLS IDMTICAL
WITH SEMATIOM; MALEBRANCHE AGAIN 7.3 THE COMPARISON 162 7.3.1
INTRODUCTORY 162 7.3.2 THE EXPLANANDUM 163 ESSENTIAL VALUE; A MODERATE
INTERNALISM; DISPOSITIOM AND GROUNDS 7.3.3 THE MECHANISM OFPROJEETION
167 LOW PHENOMENAL INTEMITY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES; HUMES RELLSOM FOR
WHY WE CANNOT DETEET ESSENTIAL VALUE 7.3.4 SENTIMENT AND COLOUR
SENSATION 170 THE COMPARISON AND THE IRREDUCIBILITY 0/ THE RESPOME
DETAILED TABLE OFCONTENTS XV 7.4 PRELIMINARYCONCLUSION:QUESTIONS AND
ISSUES 171 SUMMARY: TOO MUCH ERROR? SENTIMENTS AS DESIRES OR
CONSTITUENTS? WHY PLEASURE? IS THE ACCOUNT REALLY EXPLANATORY? 8. THE
GOLD: GOOD, EVIL, BELIEFAND DESIRE 175 8.1 INTRODUCTION 175 8.2
PLEASUREAND PAIN, GOOD AND EVIL, DESIRE AND AVERSION 177 8.2.1 THE
IDENTITY THESIS 177 NATURAL GOOD AND EVIL PLEASURE AND PAIN; HUME AND
OTHERS; THE EFFICIENT CAUSES READING OF PLEASURE AND PAIN
UNSATISFAETORY; PLEASURES AND PAINS AS PROVIDING IDEAS OF GOOD AND EVIL
THAT FIGURE IN COMPLEX JUDGMENTS CONCERNING THE VALUE OF THE OBJECTS OF
THE PASSIONS; IDEAS OF GOOD AND EVIL AND BELIEF 8.2.2 WHY THE IDENTITY
THESIS?METAPHYSICALHEDONISM AND THE SOURCES OF CONTENT 182 THE LDENTITY
THESIS AND THE ACQUISITION OF IDEAS OF GOOD AND EVI/; METAPHYS- ICAL
HEDONISM; CONVERGENCE AND EXPLANATION; PLEASURE AND PAIN AS STATES OF
CONSCIOUMESS WITH ESSENTIAL VALUE 8.2.3 HUME AND METAPHYSICAL HEDONISM:
INITIAL SUPPORT AND STRAT- EGY 187 TWO INITIAL POINTS; THE PRESENCE OF
THE LDENTITY THESIS AND THE REGRESSOF REASONS IN APPENDIX I EPM; REASONS
CLEARLY NOT DECISIVE; STRATEGY; RE-READ 'OF THE INFLUENCING MOTIVES OF
THE WILL; OFFER AN ALTERNATIVE TARGET AND INTEGRATED SUCH A VIEW IN THE
ACCOUNT OF MORAL MOTIVATION 8.3 RE-READING'OF THE INFLUENCINGMOTIVESOF
THE WILL' 189 8.3.1 THE STANDARD READING 189 THE 'HUMEAN' THEORY OF
MOTIVATION; ITS THREAT TO METAPHYSICAL HEDONISM; SMITH'S GENERAL
STRATEGY REJECTED 8.3.2 'REASONALONE' 192 WHAT IS MEANT BE 'REASON
ALONE;' THE FACULTY OF COMPARISON AND MOTIVATING CONTENTS 8.3.3
'REASONCANNAT OPPOSE' 193 REASON ALONE, MEANS, ENDS AND FALSE BELIEFI;
THREE NOTORIOUS PASSAGES 8.3.4 CALM PASSIONS 196 GENERAL APPETITE TO
GOOD AND EVIL NOT ORIGINAL BUT ACQUIRED 8.3.5 COGNITION, ACQUAINTANCEAND
BELIEF 197 BELIEFAND THE MANIFESTATION OF THE POWER TO ACTUATE THE WILL
8.4 MORAL RATIONALISMAND MORALITY NOT A MATTER OFFACT 199 RATIONALISM A
THESIS ABOUT WHAT MORAL FACTS CONSIST IN AND NOT MORAL COGNITIVE
INTERNALISM XVI DETAILED TABLE OF CONTENTS 9. THE GOLDEN: RELATIONAL
VALUES, REALISM AND A MORAL SENSE 204 9.1 INTRODUCTION 204 9.2
PERCEPTIONS OF'OF GOOD OR EVIL, OF PLEASURE AND PAIN': THE INDICATOR
FUNCTION OFPLEASURE AND PAIN, AND THE BENEFICIALAND THE HARMFUL 206
PLEASURE AND PAIN AS DIRECTING US TOWARD THE HEALTHY AND AWAY /ROM THE
HARMJITL; DESCARTES, MALEBRANCHE, BERKE!EY AND HUTCHESON; ANIMAL NATURE,
AND THE INDICATION OF RELATIONAL GOODS; MALEBRANCHE AND THE JITNCTION
OFPROJECTINGPLEASURE AND PAIN; INDICATION, AWARENESS AND THE PROPER
JITNCTION OFPLEASURE AND PAIN 9.3 MODELLING A MORAL SENSE: HUME IN THE
LIGHT OFHUTCHESON 213 9.3.1 PRELIMINARIES 213 HUMES AWARENESS 0/ THE
FUNCTIONAL ROLE 0/ PLEASURE AND PAIN; THE LETTER TO HUTCHESON AND THE
PARALLEL BETWEEN BODILY PLEASURE AND MORAL SENTIMENTS; PROPOSAL; A WORD
ON HUME AND HUTCHESON 9.3.2 SENTIMENTS, PLEASURE AND MEANING 216
PECULIAR PLEASURES AND THE PHENOMENOLOGY 0/ MORALITY; HUTCHESON AND HUME
AGAIMT HOBBES AND MANDEVILLE 9.3.3 THE RELATIONAL VALUES AND PTOJECTION
219 HUTCHESON, UNIFORMITY AMIDST VARIETY AND BENEVOLENCE; HUME, THE
USEFUL AND THE AGREEABLE 9.3.4 REFLEX SENTIMENTS & SENSITIVITY 222
PROJECTION AND THE RENDERING RELATIONAL VALUES SALIENT;
REFLECTIVEPERCEPTIOM AND AN OBJECTION; THE EMPIRICAL DISCOVERY 0/ THE
FTUNDATION 0/ MERIT 9.4 THE CORRECTION OF SENTIMENT: SENSITIVITY,
SECONDATY QUALITIES AND REALISM 228 9.4.1 REALISM, IDENTITY AND
CORRECTION 228 THE IDENTITY 0/ MORAL FACTS WITH RELATIONAL VALUES;
STANDARDS 0/ CORRECTION 9.4.2 TWO VIEWS OFPOWER AND SECONDATY QUALITIES
REVISITED 229 CAUSALISM; CAUSALISM ABOUT VIRTUES REJECTED;POWERS
UNDERSTOOD DISPOSITIONAUY; NORMAL CONDITIOM AND OBSERVERS ASPARTLY
COMTITUTIVE 9.4.3 DISPOSITIONALISM REJECTED: HUTCHESON 233 WHAT MAKES
FTR NORMALITY? 9.4.4 DISPOSITIONALISM REJEETED: HUME 235 FOR WHAT ARE WE
CORRECTING? 9.4.5 SYMPATHY AND THE COMMON POINT OFVIEW 236 CORRECTINGFTR
SYMPATHY; AN APPARENT TENSION DISSOLVED DETAILED TABLE 0/ CONTENTS XVLL
9.4.6 PROVIDENCE VERSUS REFLECTION: A KEY DIFFERENCE BETWEEN HUTCHESON
ANDHUME 239 9.5 CONCLUSION TO CHAPTER 9: REALISM IN HUMEAN MORALS 241
9.6 CONCLUSION TO PART III 242 9.7 APPENDIX: A PUZZLE ABOUT 'OF THE
STANDARD OF TASTE' 243 BIBLIOGRAPHY 245 INDEX 255 |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| any_adam_object_boolean | 1 |
| author | Kail, P. J. E. |
| author_GND | (DE-588)142823104 |
| author_facet | Kail, P. J. E. |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Kail, P. J. E. |
| author_variant | p j e k pje pjek |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV022545123 |
| callnumber-first | B - Philosophy, Psychology, Religion |
| callnumber-label | B1498 |
| callnumber-raw | B1498 |
| callnumber-search | B1498 |
| callnumber-sort | B 41498 |
| callnumber-subject | B - Philosophy |
| classification_rvk | CF 4617 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)86166544 (DE-599)DNB 2007014607 |
| dewey-full | 192 |
| dewey-hundreds | 100 - Philosophy & psychology |
| dewey-ones | 192 - Philosophy of British Isles |
| dewey-raw | 192 |
| dewey-search | 192 |
| dewey-sort | 3192 |
| dewey-tens | 190 - Modern western philosophy |
| discipline | Philosophie |
| discipline_str_mv | Philosophie |
| edition | 1. publ. |
| format | Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV022545123 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T18:11:38Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T20:59:56Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780199229505 |
| language | English |
| lccn | 2007014607 |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-015751510 |
| oclc_num | 86166544 |
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| owner | DE-29 DE-12 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-11 DE-188 |
| owner_facet | DE-29 DE-12 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-11 DE-188 |
| physical | XXXVI, 264 S. |
| publishDate | 2007 |
| publishDateSearch | 2007 |
| publishDateSort | 2007 |
| publisher | Oxford Univ. Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Kail, P. J. E. Verfasser (DE-588)142823104 aut Projection and realism in Hume's philosophy P. J. E. Kail 1. publ. Oxford [u.a.] Oxford Univ. Press 2007 XXXVI, 264 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier 'In Projection and Realism in Hume's Philsophy', Kail provides a fresh interpretation of this metaphor and uses it to shed new light on some of Hume's central ideas. Hume, David 1711-1776 Hume, David 1711-1776 (DE-588)118554735 gnd rswk-swf Godsdienst gtt Realisme (filosofie) gtt Religion Hume, David 1711-1776 (DE-588)118554735 p DE-604 http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0715/2007014607.html Table of contents only V:DE-604 application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015751510&sequence=000005&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Kail, P. J. E. Projection and realism in Hume's philosophy Hume, David 1711-1776 Hume, David 1711-1776 (DE-588)118554735 gnd Godsdienst gtt Realisme (filosofie) gtt Religion |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)118554735 |
| title | Projection and realism in Hume's philosophy |
| title_auth | Projection and realism in Hume's philosophy |
| title_exact_search | Projection and realism in Hume's philosophy |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Projection and realism in Hume's philosophy |
| title_full | Projection and realism in Hume's philosophy P. J. E. Kail |
| title_fullStr | Projection and realism in Hume's philosophy P. J. E. Kail |
| title_full_unstemmed | Projection and realism in Hume's philosophy P. J. E. Kail |
| title_short | Projection and realism in Hume's philosophy |
| title_sort | projection and realism in hume s philosophy |
| topic | Hume, David 1711-1776 Hume, David 1711-1776 (DE-588)118554735 gnd Godsdienst gtt Realisme (filosofie) gtt Religion |
| topic_facet | Hume, David 1711-1776 Godsdienst Realisme (filosofie) Religion |
| url | http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0715/2007014607.html http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015751510&sequence=000005&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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