Competition, collusion and game theory:
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
New Brunswick [u.a.]
AldineTransaction
2007
|
| Ausgabe: | 1. paperback print. |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Klappentext |
| Beschreibung: | XIX, 380 S. graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 9780202309255 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804136515515711488 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | COMPETITION, COLLUSION,
AND GAME THEORY
Lester G. Telser
This original, quantitatively oriented analysis applies the theory of the core
to define competition in order to describe and deduce the consequences of
competitive and non-competitive behavior. Written by one of the world s leading
mathematical economists, the book is mathematically rigorous
.
No other book
is currently available giving a game theoretic analysis of competition with
basic mathematical tools.
Economic theorists have been working on a new and fundamental approach
to the theory of competition and market structure, an approach inspired by
appreciation of the earlier work of Edgeworth and Bohm-Bawerk and making
use of the new tools of the theory of games as developed by
von
Neumann and
Morgenstern.
This new approach bases itself on the analysis of competitive
behavior and its implications for the characteristics of market equilibrium
rather than on assumptions about the characteristics of competitive and
monopolistic markets. Its central concept is the theory of the core of the
market, and it is concerned, with the conditions under which markets
will or will not achieve the characteristics of uniform prices and welfare
optimality.
Telser provides a number of insights into the symptoms of competition,
when and how competition is bought into play, the mechanisms of competition
and collusion, the results of competition and collusion, and the results of
competition and collusion for the economy and for the general public. Many
misconceptions about the nature of a competitive equilibrium are dispelled. The
book is not only a mathematical analysis of core price theory but also contains
extensive empirical research in private industry. These empirical findings,
from research pursued over several years, enhance understanding of how
competition works and of the determinants of the returns to manufacturing
industries.
About the Author
Lester G. Telser is professor emeritus of economics at the University of Chicago.
He is one of the world s leading mathematical economists; he has been a
Visiting Research Fellow, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale
University; Ford Foundation Faculty Research Fellow; and assistant professor
of economics, Iowa State University. In
2005
he received the St.
Clair
Drake
award from Roosevelt University.
Contents
Foreword
та
Acknowledgments
xi
Introduction
xiii
I. Applications of Core Theory to Market Exchange
3
1.
Introduction
3
2.
Consumer Surplus and Transferable Utility
4
3.
Some Simple Trading Situations
11
4.
m
Owners and
я
Nonowners
19
5.
The Basic Core Constraints
28
6.
Market Efficiency and Honest Brokers
31
7.
Multiunit Trade
37
8.
Increasing Returns and Public Goods from the Viewpoint of the Core
48
9.
A Brief Historical Note
57
Appendix: Consumer Surplus
62
II. Further Applications of Core Theory to Market Exchange
68
1.
Introduction
68
2.
Balanced Collections of Coalitions
70
3.
Empty Cores
78
4.
The Feasibility of Trade
88
5.
Group Rationality with Multiunit Trade
94
6.
Competition and Numbers
104
7.
The Number of Traders and the Emptiness of the Core
108
8.
Conclusions
117
Ш.
Applications of the Core to Oligopoly
119
1.
Introduction
119
2.
Properties of the Core under Constant Returns
124
3.
The Cournot-Nash Theory of Duopoly for Finite Horizons
131
4.
The Cournot-Nash Theory of Duopoly for Infinite Horizons
142
xii
Contents
IV.
Тнкжшѕ
of Expectations for
N
Competing Firms
146
1.
Introduction
146
2.
Expectation Models with Quantity as the Policy Variable
149
3.
Expectation Models for Price as the Policy Variable
164
4.
Summary
172
V. Competition or Collusion?
175
1.
Introduction
175
2.
The Nature of Competition and Collusion
176
3.
Equilibrium with Product Variety Illustrated for Spatial Competition
184
4.
The Costs of Maintaining Collusion
192
5.
Sharing the Collusive Return
206
VI. The Monopoly and Cournot-Nash Equilibria under Dynamic
Conditions
218
1.
Introduction
218
2.
Dynamic
Donând
Relations
221
3.
Some Fundamentals on Optimal Policies
226
4.
The Solvability of Certain Linear Equations
242
5.
Properties of the Cooperative and
Noncooperative
Dynamic Equilibria
250
6.
Conclusions
272
VII.
Estimates of Demand, Price Policy, and the Ratio of Price to
Marginal Cost by Brand for Selected Consumer Goods
274
1.
Introduction
274
2.
Estimates of the Demand Relation between Market Share and Prices
283
3.
Estimates of the Relations among Competing Prices
294
4.
Competition in a New Product
299
5.
Conclusions
305
VIII.
Some Determinants of the Returns to Manufacturing Industries
312
1.
Introduction
312
2.
Description of the Data and Some Simple Summary Statistics
316
3.
Multiple Regression Analysis of the Census Data
324
4.
An Analysis of Employment Turnover in Selected Manufacturing
Industries
339
5.
A Brief Survey of Findings by Other Investigators
3 52
6.
Conclusions
356
Appendix
1 :
Estimation of Payrolls, Annual Earnings, and Employment of
Nonproduction Workers
357
Appendix
2 :
Description of the Samples
3 59
Appendix
3 :
The Two-Digit Industry Effects
361
Appendix
4:
The Relative Size Distribution of Firms
363
References
367
Name Index
371
Subject Index
372
|
| adam_txt |
COMPETITION, COLLUSION,
AND GAME THEORY
Lester G. Telser
This original, quantitatively oriented analysis applies the theory of the core
to define competition in order to describe and deduce the consequences of
competitive and non-competitive behavior. Written by one of the world's leading
mathematical economists, the book is mathematically rigorous
.
No other book
is currently available giving a game theoretic analysis of competition with
basic mathematical tools.
Economic theorists have been working on a new and fundamental approach
to the theory of competition and market structure, an approach inspired by
appreciation of the earlier work of Edgeworth and Bohm-Bawerk and making
use of the new tools of the theory of games as developed by
von
Neumann and
Morgenstern.
This new approach bases itself on the analysis of competitive
behavior and its implications for the characteristics of market equilibrium
rather than on assumptions about the characteristics of competitive and
monopolistic markets. Its central concept is "the theory of the core of the
market," and it is concerned, with the conditions under which markets
will or will not achieve the characteristics of uniform prices and welfare
optimality.
Telser provides a number of insights into the symptoms of competition,
when and how competition is bought into play, the mechanisms of competition
and collusion, the results of competition and collusion, and the results of
competition and collusion for the economy and for the general public. Many
misconceptions about the nature of a competitive equilibrium are dispelled. The
book is not only a mathematical analysis of core price theory but also contains
extensive empirical research in private industry. These empirical findings,
from research pursued over several years, enhance understanding of how
competition works and of the determinants of the returns to manufacturing
industries.
About the Author
Lester G. Telser is professor emeritus of economics at the University of Chicago.
He is one of the world's leading mathematical economists; he has been a
Visiting Research Fellow, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale
University; Ford Foundation Faculty Research Fellow; and assistant professor
of economics, Iowa State University. In
2005
he received the St.
Clair
Drake
award from Roosevelt University.
Contents
Foreword
та
Acknowledgments
xi
Introduction
xiii
I. Applications of Core Theory to Market Exchange
3
1.
Introduction
3
2.
Consumer Surplus and Transferable Utility
4
3.
Some Simple Trading Situations
11
4.
m
Owners and
я
Nonowners
19
5.
The Basic Core Constraints
28
6.
Market Efficiency and Honest Brokers
31
7.
Multiunit Trade
37
8.
Increasing Returns and Public Goods from the Viewpoint of the Core
48
9.
A Brief Historical Note
57
Appendix: Consumer Surplus
62
II. Further Applications of Core Theory to Market Exchange
68
1.
Introduction
68
2.
Balanced Collections of Coalitions
70
3.
Empty Cores
78
4.
The Feasibility of Trade
88
5.
Group Rationality with Multiunit Trade
94
6.
Competition and Numbers
104
7.
The Number of Traders and the Emptiness of the Core
108
8.
Conclusions
117
Ш.
Applications of the Core to Oligopoly
119
1.
Introduction
119
2.
Properties of the Core under Constant Returns
124
3.
The Cournot-Nash Theory of Duopoly for Finite Horizons
131
4.
The Cournot-Nash Theory of Duopoly for Infinite Horizons
142
xii
Contents
IV.
Тнкжшѕ
of Expectations for
N
Competing Firms
146
1.
Introduction
146
2.
Expectation Models with Quantity as the Policy Variable
149
3.
Expectation Models for Price as the Policy Variable
164
4.
Summary
172
V. Competition or Collusion?
175
1.
Introduction
175
2.
The Nature of Competition and Collusion
176
3.
Equilibrium with Product Variety Illustrated for Spatial Competition
184
4.
The Costs of Maintaining Collusion
192
5.
Sharing the Collusive Return
206
VI. The Monopoly and Cournot-Nash Equilibria under Dynamic
Conditions
218
1.
Introduction
218
2.
Dynamic
Donând
Relations
221
3.
Some Fundamentals on Optimal Policies
226
4.
The Solvability of Certain Linear Equations
242
5.
Properties of the Cooperative and
Noncooperative
Dynamic Equilibria
250
6.
Conclusions
272
VII.
Estimates of Demand, Price Policy, and the Ratio of Price to
Marginal Cost by Brand for Selected Consumer Goods
274
1.
Introduction
274
2.
Estimates of the Demand Relation between Market Share and Prices
283
3.
Estimates of the Relations among Competing Prices
294
4.
Competition in a New Product
299
5.
Conclusions
305
VIII.
Some Determinants of the Returns to Manufacturing Industries
312
1.
Introduction
312
2.
Description of the Data and Some Simple Summary Statistics
316
3.
Multiple Regression Analysis of the Census Data
324
4.
An Analysis of Employment Turnover in Selected Manufacturing
Industries
339
5.
A Brief Survey of Findings by Other Investigators
3 52
6.
Conclusions
356
Appendix
1 :
Estimation of Payrolls, Annual Earnings, and Employment of
Nonproduction Workers
357
Appendix
2 :
Description of the Samples
3 59
Appendix
3 :
The Two-Digit Industry Effects
361
Appendix
4:
The Relative Size Distribution of Firms
363
References
367
Name Index
371
Subject Index
372 |
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| language | English |
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| spelling | Telser, Lester G. Verfasser aut Competition, collusion and game theory Lester G. Telser 1. paperback print. New Brunswick [u.a.] AldineTransaction 2007 XIX, 380 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Mathematisches Modell Competition Mathematical models Game theory Price fixing Mathematical models Wettbewerbstheorie (DE-588)4117638-8 gnd rswk-swf Wettbewerb (DE-588)4065835-1 gnd rswk-swf Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd rswk-swf Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 s Wettbewerbstheorie (DE-588)4117638-8 s DE-604 Wettbewerb (DE-588)4065835-1 s 1\p DE-604 Digitalisierung UB Regensburg application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015647659&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung UB Regensburg application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015647659&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Klappentext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Telser, Lester G. Competition, collusion and game theory Mathematisches Modell Competition Mathematical models Game theory Price fixing Mathematical models Wettbewerbstheorie (DE-588)4117638-8 gnd Wettbewerb (DE-588)4065835-1 gnd Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4117638-8 (DE-588)4065835-1 (DE-588)4056243-8 |
| title | Competition, collusion and game theory |
| title_auth | Competition, collusion and game theory |
| title_exact_search | Competition, collusion and game theory |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Competition, collusion and game theory |
| title_full | Competition, collusion and game theory Lester G. Telser |
| title_fullStr | Competition, collusion and game theory Lester G. Telser |
| title_full_unstemmed | Competition, collusion and game theory Lester G. Telser |
| title_short | Competition, collusion and game theory |
| title_sort | competition collusion and game theory |
| topic | Mathematisches Modell Competition Mathematical models Game theory Price fixing Mathematical models Wettbewerbstheorie (DE-588)4117638-8 gnd Wettbewerb (DE-588)4065835-1 gnd Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd |
| topic_facet | Mathematisches Modell Competition Mathematical models Game theory Price fixing Mathematical models Wettbewerbstheorie Wettbewerb Spieltheorie |
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