Putting auction theory to work: [from the pioneer of spectrum auction design for economics, business, finance]
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge [u.a.]
Cambridge Univ. Press
2005
|
| Ausgabe: | 1. publ., reprinted |
| Schriftenreihe: | Churchill lectures in economics
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | Literaturverz. S. 339 - 346 |
| Beschreibung: | XXIV, 368 S. graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 9780521551847 9780521536721 0521536723 0521551846 |
Internformat
MARC
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Putting auction theory to work |b [from the pioneer of spectrum auction design for economics, business, finance] |c Paul Milgrom |
| 250 | |a 1. publ., reprinted | ||
| 264 | 1 | |a Cambridge [u.a.] |b Cambridge Univ. Press |c 2005 | |
| 300 | |a XXIV, 368 S. |b graph. Darst. | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
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| 500 | |a Literaturverz. S. 339 - 346 | ||
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804136492357910529 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | Contents
Preface
page
xiii
Foreword by Evan Kwerel
xvii
1
Getting to Work
1
1.1
Politics Sets the Stage
3
1.2
Designing for Multiple Goals
3
1.2.1
Substitutes and Complements
6
1.2.2
New Zealand s Rights Auction
9
1.2.3
Better Auction Designs
13
1.2.4
The FCC Design and Its Progeny
13
1.3
Comparing Seller Revenues
16
1.4
The Academic Critics
19
1.4.1
Resale and the
Coase
Theorem
19
1.4.2
Mechanism Design Theory
21
1.4.3
Theory and Experiment
25
1.4.4
Practical Concerns
26
1.5
Plan for This Book
31
PART
1
THE MECHANISM DESIGN APPROACH
35
2
Vickrey-Clarke-Croves Mechanisms
45
2.1
Formulation
45
2.2
Always Optimal and Weakly Dominant Strategies
49
2.3
Balancing the Budget
53
2.4
Uniqueness
55
2.5
Disadvantages of the Vickrey Auction
56
2.5.1
Practical Disadvantages
56
2.5.2
Monotonicity
Problems
57
2.5.3
The Merger-Investment Disadvantage
60
2.6
Conclusion
61
¡x
x
Contents
3
The Envelope Theorem and Payoff Equivalence
64
3.1
Ho telling s Lemma
65
3.2
The Envelope Theorem in Integral Form
66
3.3
Quasi-linear Payoffs
69
3.3.1
Holmstrom s Lemma
70
3.3.2
The Green-Laffont-Holmstrom Theorem
71
3.3.3
Myerson s Lemma
73
3.3.4
Revenue Equivalence Theorems
75
3.3.5
The Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem
77
3.3.6
The Jehiel-Moldovanu Impossibility Theorems
80
3.3.7
Myerson and Riley-Samuelson Revenue-Maximizing
Auctions
84
3.3.8
The McAfee-McMillan Weak-Cartels Theorem
87
3.3.9
Sequential Auctions and Weber s Martingale Theorem
90
3.3.10
Matthews Theorem: Risk Averse Payoff Equivalence
91
3.4
Conclusion
94
4
Bidding Equilibrium and Revenue Differences
98
4.1
The Single Crossing Conditions
99
4.1.1
The
Monotonie
Selection Theorem
101
4.1.2
The Sufficiency Theorem
102
4.1.3
The Constraint Simplification Theorem
105
4.1.4
The Mirrlees-Spence Representation Theorem
106
4.2
Deriving and Verifying Equilibrium Strategies
110
4.2.1
The Second-Price Auction with a Reserve Price 111
4.2.2
The Sealed Tender, or First-Price, Auction
112
4.2.3
The War of Attrition Auction
117
4.2.4
The All-Pay Auction
119
4.3
Revenue Comparisons in the Benchmark Model
119
4.3.1
Payoff Equivalence without Revenue
Equivalence
121
4.3.2
Budget Constraints
132
4.3.3
Endogenous Quantities
135
4.3.4
Correlated Types
137
4.4
Expected-Revenue-Maximizing Auctions
140
4.4.1
Myerson s Theorem
144
4.4.2
Bulow-Klemperer Theorem
148
4.4.3
The Irregular Case
148
4.5
Auctions with Weak and Strong Bidders
149
4.6
Conclusion
154
Contents
x¡
5
Interdependence of Types and Values
157
5.1
Which Models and Assumptions are Useful ?
158
5.1.1
Payoffs Depend Only on Bids and Types
158
5.1.2
Types Are One-Dimensional and Values Are Private
159
5.1.3
Types Are Statistically Independent
161
5.2
Statistical Dependence and Revenue-Maximizing Auctions
162
5.3
Wilson s Drainage Tract Model
166
5.3.1
Equilibrium
167
5.3.2
Profits and Revenues
173
5.3.3
Bidder Information Policy
175
5.3.4
Seller Information Policy
177
5.4
Correlated Types and Interdependent Values
181
5.4.1
Affiliation
182
5.4.2
The Milgrom-Weber Ascending Auction Models
187
5.4.2.1
The (Second-Price) Button Auction with Minimal
Information
188
5.4.2.2
The Button Auction with Maximal Information
195
5.4.2.3
Some Revenue Comparisons
198
5.4.3
First-Price Auctions
200
5.5
Conclusion
204
6
Auctions in Context
208
6.1
The Profit and Surplus Contribution of an Entrant
214
6.2
Symmetric Models with Costly Entry
216
6.2.1
Symmetric Bidders and Uncoordinated Entry
218
6.2.1.1
Equilibrium in Entry and Bidding Decisions
218
6.2.1.2
Setting the Reserve Price
222
6.2.2
Coordinating Entry among Symmetric Competitors
225
6.2.2.1
Pre-qualifying Bidders
227
6.2.2.2
Auctions, Negotiations, and Posted Prices
230
6.2.2.3
Buy Prices
232
6.3
Asymmetric Models: Devices to Promote Competition
234
6.3.1
Example of Set-asides
235
6.3.2
Example of Bidding Credits
237
6.3.3
Example of Lot Structure and Consolation Prizes
238
6.3.4
Premium Auctions
239
6.3.5
Dutch vs. English Auctions and the Anglo-Dutch Design
241
6.4
After the Bidding Ends
243
6.4.1
Bankruptcy and Non-performance
243
6.4.2
Scoring Rules vs. Price-Only Bids
245
6.5
Conclusion
247
x¡¡
Contents
PARTII
MULTI-UNIT AUCTIONS
251
7
Uniform Price Auctions
255
7.1
Uniform Price Sealed-Bid Auctions
257
7.1.1
Demand Reduction
258
7.1.2
Low-Price Equilibria
262
7.2
Simultaneous Ascending Auctions
265
7.2.1
The Simultaneous Ascending Auction and the Walrasian
Tâtonnement
268
7.2.2
Clock Auctions
279
7.2.3
Strategic Incentives in Uniform Price Auctions
284
7.2.3.1
The Basic Clock Auction Model
284
7.2.3.2
The Alternating-Move Clock Auction
287
7.2.3.3
Strategic Incentives with Elastic Supply
290
7.3
Conclusion
293
8
Package Auctions and Combinatorial Bidding
296
8.1
Vickrey Auctions and the
Monotonicity
Problems
302
8.1.1
Bidders Vickrey Payoffs Bound Their Core Payoffs
305
8.1.2
Vickrey Auctions and the Entry Puzzle
305
8.1.3
When Are Vickrey Outcomes in the Core?
307
8.1.4
Substitute Goods and Core Outcomes
308
8.1.5
Substitute Goods and Vickrey Outcomes
312
8.2
Bernheim-Whinston First-Price Package Auctions
315
8.2.1
Formulation
316
8.2.2
Profit-Target Strategies
318
8.2.3
Equilibrium and the Core
319
8.3
Ausubel-Milgrom Ascending Proxy Auctions
324
8.3.1
The Proxy Auction with Unlimited Budgets
325
8.3.1.1
Proxy Outcomes Are Core Outcomes
326
8.3.1.2
Profit-Target Strategies and Equilibrium
327
8.3.1.3
The Proxy Auction When Goods Are Substitutes
329
8.3.2
The Non-transferable-Utility Proxy Auction
330
8.4
Conclusion
333
Bibliography
339
Author Index
347
Subject Index
351
|
| adam_txt |
Contents
Preface
page
xiii
Foreword by Evan Kwerel
xvii
1
Getting to Work
1
1.1
Politics Sets the Stage
3
1.2
Designing for Multiple Goals
3
1.2.1
Substitutes and Complements
6
1.2.2
New Zealand's Rights Auction
9
1.2.3
Better Auction Designs
13
1.2.4
The FCC Design and Its Progeny
13
1.3
Comparing Seller Revenues
16
1.4
The Academic Critics
19
1.4.1
Resale and the
Coase
Theorem
19
1.4.2
Mechanism Design Theory
21
1.4.3
Theory and Experiment
25
1.4.4
Practical Concerns
26
1.5
Plan for This Book
31
PART
1
THE MECHANISM DESIGN APPROACH
35
2
Vickrey-Clarke-Croves Mechanisms
45
2.1
Formulation
45
2.2
Always Optimal and Weakly Dominant Strategies
49
2.3
Balancing the Budget
53
2.4
Uniqueness
55
2.5
Disadvantages of the Vickrey Auction
56
2.5.1
Practical Disadvantages
56
2.5.2
Monotonicity
Problems
57
2.5.3
The Merger-Investment Disadvantage
60
2.6
Conclusion
61
¡x
x
Contents
3
The Envelope Theorem and Payoff Equivalence
64
3.1
Ho telling's Lemma
65
3.2
The Envelope Theorem in Integral Form
66
3.3
Quasi-linear Payoffs
69
3.3.1
Holmstrom's Lemma
70
3.3.2
The Green-Laffont-Holmstrom Theorem
71
3.3.3
Myerson's Lemma
73
3.3.4
Revenue Equivalence Theorems
75
3.3.5
The Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem
77
3.3.6
The Jehiel-Moldovanu Impossibility Theorems
80
3.3.7
Myerson and Riley-Samuelson Revenue-Maximizing
Auctions
84
3.3.8
The McAfee-McMillan Weak-Cartels Theorem
87
3.3.9
Sequential Auctions and Weber's Martingale Theorem
90
3.3.10
Matthews Theorem: Risk Averse Payoff Equivalence
91
3.4
Conclusion
94
4
Bidding Equilibrium and Revenue Differences
98
4.1
The Single Crossing Conditions
99
4.1.1
The
Monotonie
Selection Theorem
101
4.1.2
The Sufficiency Theorem
102
4.1.3
The Constraint Simplification Theorem
105
4.1.4
The Mirrlees-Spence Representation Theorem
106
4.2
Deriving and Verifying Equilibrium Strategies
110
4.2.1
The Second-Price Auction with a Reserve Price 111
4.2.2
The Sealed Tender, or First-Price, Auction
112
4.2.3
The War of Attrition Auction
117
4.2.4
The All-Pay Auction
119
4.3
Revenue Comparisons in the Benchmark Model
119
4.3.1
Payoff Equivalence without Revenue
Equivalence
121
4.3.2
Budget Constraints
132
4.3.3
Endogenous Quantities
135
4.3.4
Correlated Types
137
4.4
Expected-Revenue-Maximizing Auctions
140
4.4.1
Myerson's Theorem
144
4.4.2
Bulow-Klemperer Theorem
148
4.4.3
The Irregular Case
148
4.5
Auctions with Weak and Strong Bidders
149
4.6
Conclusion
154
Contents
x¡
5
Interdependence of Types and Values
157
5.1
Which Models and Assumptions are "Useful"?
158
5.1.1
Payoffs Depend Only on Bids and Types
158
5.1.2
Types Are One-Dimensional and Values Are Private
159
5.1.3
Types Are Statistically Independent
161
5.2
Statistical Dependence and Revenue-Maximizing Auctions
162
5.3
Wilson's Drainage Tract Model
166
5.3.1
Equilibrium
167
5.3.2
Profits and Revenues
173
5.3.3
Bidder Information Policy
175
5.3.4
Seller Information Policy
177
5.4
Correlated Types and Interdependent Values
181
5.4.1
Affiliation
182
5.4.2
The Milgrom-Weber Ascending Auction Models
187
5.4.2.1
The (Second-Price) Button Auction with Minimal
Information
188
5.4.2.2
The Button Auction with Maximal Information
195
5.4.2.3
Some Revenue Comparisons
198
5.4.3
First-Price Auctions
200
5.5
Conclusion
204
6
Auctions in Context
208
6.1
The Profit and Surplus Contribution of an Entrant
214
6.2
Symmetric Models with Costly Entry
216
6.2.1
Symmetric Bidders and Uncoordinated Entry
218
6.2.1.1
Equilibrium in Entry and Bidding Decisions
218
6.2.1.2
Setting the Reserve Price
222
6.2.2
Coordinating Entry among Symmetric Competitors
225
6.2.2.1
Pre-qualifying Bidders
227
6.2.2.2
Auctions, Negotiations, and Posted Prices
230
6.2.2.3
Buy Prices
232
6.3
Asymmetric Models: Devices to Promote Competition
234
6.3.1
Example of Set-asides
235
6.3.2
Example of Bidding Credits
237
6.3.3
Example of Lot Structure and Consolation Prizes
238
6.3.4
Premium Auctions
239
6.3.5
Dutch vs. English Auctions and the Anglo-Dutch Design
241
6.4
After the Bidding Ends
243
6.4.1
Bankruptcy and Non-performance
243
6.4.2
Scoring Rules vs. Price-Only Bids
245
6.5
Conclusion
247
x¡¡
Contents
PARTII
MULTI-UNIT AUCTIONS
251
7
Uniform Price Auctions
255
7.1
Uniform Price Sealed-Bid Auctions
257
7.1.1
Demand Reduction
258
7.1.2
Low-Price Equilibria
262
7.2
Simultaneous Ascending Auctions
265
7.2.1
The Simultaneous Ascending Auction and the Walrasian
Tâtonnement
268
7.2.2
Clock Auctions
279
7.2.3
Strategic Incentives in Uniform Price Auctions
284
7.2.3.1
The Basic Clock Auction Model
284
7.2.3.2
The Alternating-Move Clock Auction
287
7.2.3.3
Strategic Incentives with Elastic Supply
290
7.3
Conclusion
293
8
Package Auctions and Combinatorial Bidding
296
8.1
Vickrey Auctions and the
Monotonicity
Problems
302
8.1.1
Bidders' Vickrey Payoffs Bound Their Core Payoffs
305
8.1.2
Vickrey Auctions and the Entry Puzzle
305
8.1.3
When Are Vickrey Outcomes in the Core?
307
8.1.4
Substitute Goods and Core Outcomes
308
8.1.5
Substitute Goods and Vickrey Outcomes
312
8.2
Bernheim-Whinston First-Price Package Auctions
315
8.2.1
Formulation
316
8.2.2
Profit-Target Strategies
318
8.2.3
Equilibrium and the Core
319
8.3
Ausubel-Milgrom Ascending Proxy Auctions
324
8.3.1
The Proxy Auction with Unlimited Budgets
325
8.3.1.1
Proxy Outcomes Are Core Outcomes
326
8.3.1.2
Profit-Target Strategies and Equilibrium
327
8.3.1.3
The Proxy Auction When Goods Are Substitutes
329
8.3.2
The Non-transferable-Utility Proxy Auction
330
8.4
Conclusion
333
Bibliography
339
Author Index
347
Subject Index
351 |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| any_adam_object_boolean | 1 |
| author | Milgrom, Paul 1948- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)128712139 |
| author_facet | Milgrom, Paul 1948- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Milgrom, Paul 1948- |
| author_variant | p m pm |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV022422634 |
| classification_rvk | QH 430 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)633736288 (DE-599)BVBBV022422634 |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| discipline_str_mv | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| edition | 1. publ., reprinted |
| format | Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV022422634 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T17:26:13Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T20:57:15Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780521551847 9780521536721 0521536723 0521551846 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-015630930 |
| oclc_num | 633736288 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-703 DE-N2 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG |
| owner_facet | DE-703 DE-N2 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG |
| physical | XXIV, 368 S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 2005 |
| publishDateSearch | 2005 |
| publishDateSort | 2005 |
| publisher | Cambridge Univ. Press |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Churchill lectures in economics |
| spelling | Milgrom, Paul 1948- Verfasser (DE-588)128712139 aut Putting auction theory to work [from the pioneer of spectrum auction design for economics, business, finance] Paul Milgrom 1. publ., reprinted Cambridge [u.a.] Cambridge Univ. Press 2005 XXIV, 368 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Churchill lectures in economics Literaturverz. S. 339 - 346 Mathematisches Modell (DE-588)4114528-8 gnd rswk-swf Auktionstheorie (DE-588)4732699-2 gnd rswk-swf Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd rswk-swf Auktionstheorie (DE-588)4732699-2 s Mathematisches Modell (DE-588)4114528-8 s DE-604 Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 s 1\p DE-604 Digitalisierung UB Bamberg application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015630930&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Milgrom, Paul 1948- Putting auction theory to work [from the pioneer of spectrum auction design for economics, business, finance] Mathematisches Modell (DE-588)4114528-8 gnd Auktionstheorie (DE-588)4732699-2 gnd Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4114528-8 (DE-588)4732699-2 (DE-588)4056243-8 |
| title | Putting auction theory to work [from the pioneer of spectrum auction design for economics, business, finance] |
| title_auth | Putting auction theory to work [from the pioneer of spectrum auction design for economics, business, finance] |
| title_exact_search | Putting auction theory to work [from the pioneer of spectrum auction design for economics, business, finance] |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Putting auction theory to work [from the pioneer of spectrum auction design for economics, business, finance] |
| title_full | Putting auction theory to work [from the pioneer of spectrum auction design for economics, business, finance] Paul Milgrom |
| title_fullStr | Putting auction theory to work [from the pioneer of spectrum auction design for economics, business, finance] Paul Milgrom |
| title_full_unstemmed | Putting auction theory to work [from the pioneer of spectrum auction design for economics, business, finance] Paul Milgrom |
| title_short | Putting auction theory to work |
| title_sort | putting auction theory to work from the pioneer of spectrum auction design for economics business finance |
| title_sub | [from the pioneer of spectrum auction design for economics, business, finance] |
| topic | Mathematisches Modell (DE-588)4114528-8 gnd Auktionstheorie (DE-588)4732699-2 gnd Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd |
| topic_facet | Mathematisches Modell Auktionstheorie Spieltheorie |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015630930&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT milgrompaul puttingauctiontheorytoworkfromthepioneerofspectrumauctiondesignforeconomicsbusinessfinance |