Repeated games and reputations: long-run relationships
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford
Oxford Univ. Press
2006
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | Literaturverz. S. 619 - 628 |
| Beschreibung: | XVI, 645 S. graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 0195300793 9780195300796 |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Repeated games and reputations |b long-run relationships |c George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson |
| 264 | 1 | |a Oxford |b Oxford Univ. Press |c 2006 | |
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| 500 | |a Literaturverz. S. 619 - 628 | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Jeux, Théorie des | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Mathématiques économiques | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Speltheorie |2 gtt | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Game theory | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Economics, Mathematical | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text | REPEATED GAMES AND REPUTATIONS LONG-RUN RELATIONSHIPS GEORGE J. MAILATH
AND LARRY SAMUELSON OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 2006 CONTENTS FC PART 1 1
INTRODUCTION 1.1 INTERTEMPORAL INCENTIVES 1.2 THE PRISONERS DILEMMA 1.3
OLIGOPOLY 1.4 THE PRISONER S DILEMMA UNDER IMPERFECT MONITORING 1.5 THE
PRODUCT-CHOICE GAME 1.6 DISCUSSION 1.7 A READER S GUIDE 1.8 THE SCOPE OF
THE BOOK GAMES WITH PERFECT MONITORING 1 1 3 4 5 7 8 10 10 2 THE BASIC
STRUCTURE OF REPEATED GAMES WITH PERFECT MONITORING 15 2.1 THE CANONICAL
REPEATED GAME 15 2.1.1 THE STAGE GAME 15 2.1.2 PUBLIC CORRELATION 17
2.1.3 THE REPEATED GAME 19 2.1.4 SUBGAME-PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM OF THE
REPEATED GAME 22 2.2 THE ONE-SHOT DEVIATION PRINCIPLE 24 2.3 AUTOMATON
REPRESENTATIONS OF STRATEGY PROFILES 29 2.4 CREDIBLE CONTINUATION
PROMISES 32 2.5 GENERATING EQUILIBRIA 37 2.5.1 CONSTRUCTING EQUILIBRIA:
SELF-GENERATION 3 7 2.5.2 EXAMPLE: MUTUAL EFFORT 40 2.5.3 EXAMPLE: THE
FOLK THEOREM 41 2.5.4 EXAMPLE: CONSTRUCTING EQUILIBRIA FOR LOW S 44
2.5.5 EXAMPLE: FAILURE OF MONOTONICITY 46 2.5.6 EXAMPLE: PUBLIC
CORRELATION 49 2.6 CONSTRUCTING EQUILIBRIA: SIMPLE STRATEGIES AND PENAL
CODES 51 2.6.1 SIMPLE STRATEGIES AND PENAL CODES 51 2.6.2 EXAMPLE:
OLIGOPOLY 54 2.7 LONG-LIVED AND SHORT-LIVED PLAYERS 61 2.7.1 MINMAX
PAYOFFS 63 2.7.2 CONSTRAINTS ON PAYOFFS 66 CONTENTS 3 THE FOLK THEOREM
WITH PERFECT MONITORING 69 3.1 EXAMPLES 70 3.2 INTERPRETING THE FOLK
THEOREM 72 3.2.1 IMPLICATIONS 72 3.2.2 PATIENT PLAYERS 73 3.2.3 PATIENCE
AND INCENTIVES 75 3.2.4 OBSERVABLE MIXTURES 76 3.3 THE PURE-ACTION FOLK
THEOREM FOR TWO PLAYERS 76 3.4 THE FOLK THEOREM WITH MORE THAN TWO
PLAYERS 80 3.4.1 A COUNTEREXAMPLE 8 0 3.4.2 PLAYER-SPECIFIC PUNISHMENTS
82 3.5 NON-EQUIVALENT UTILITIES 87 3.6 LONG-LIVED AND SHORT-LIVED
PLAYERS 91 3.7 CONVEXIFYING THE EQUILIBRIUM PAYOFF SET WITHOUT PUBLIC
CORRELATION 96 3.8 MIXED-ACTION INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY 101 4 HOW LONG IS
FOREVER? 105 4.1 IS THE HORIZON EVER INFINITE? 105 4.2 UNCERTAIN
HORIZONS 106 4.3 DECLINING DISCOUNT FACTORS 107 4.4 FINITELY REPEATED
GAMES 112 4.5 APPROXIMATE EQUILIBRIA 118 4.6 RENEGOTIATION 120 4.6.1
FINITELY REPEATED GAMES 122 4.6.2 INFINITELY REPEATED GAMES 134 5
VARIATIONS ON THE GAME 145 5.1 RANDOM MATCHING 145 5.1.1 PUBLIC
HISTORIES 146 5.1.2 PERSONAL HISTORIES 147 5.2 RELATIONSHIPS IN CONTEXT
152 5.2.1 A FRICTIONLESS MARKET 153 5.2.2 FUTURE BENEFITS 154 5.2.3
ADVERSE SELECTION 155 5.2.4 STARTING SMALL 158 5.3 MULTIMARKET
INTERACTIONS 161 5.4 REPEATED EXTENSIVE FORMS 162 5.4.1 REPEATED
EXTENSIVE-FORM GAMES HAVE MORE SUBGAMES 1 63 5.4.2 PLAYER-SPECIFIC
PUNISHMENTS IN REPEATED EXTENSIVE-FORM GAMES 165 5.4.3 EXTENSIVE-FORM
GAMES AND IMPERFECT MONITORING 1 67 5.4.4 EXTENSIVE-FORM GAMES AND WEAK
INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY 168 5.4.5 ASYNCHRONOUS MOVES 169 5.4.6 SIMPLE
STRATEGIES 172 CONTENTS XI 5.5 DYNAMIC GAMES: INTRODUCTION 5.5.1 THE
GAME 5.5.2 MARKOV EQUILIBRIUM 5.5.3 EXAMPLES 5.6 DYNAMIC GAMES:
FOUNDATIONS 5.6.1 CONSISTENT PARTITIONS 5.6.2 COHERENT CONSISTENCY 5.6.3
MARKOV EQUILIBRIUM 5.7 DYNAMIC GAMES: EQUILIBRIUM 5.7.1 THE STRUCTURE OF
EQUILIBRIA 5.7.2 A FOLK THEOREM 6 APPLICATIONS 6.1 PRICE WARS 6.1.1
INDEPENDENT PRICE SHOCKS 6.1.2 CORRELATED PRICE SHOCKS 6.2 TIME
CONSISTENCY 6.2.1 THE STAGE GAME 6.2.2 EQUILIBRIUM, COMMITMENT, AND TIME
CONSISTENCY 6.2.3 THE INFINITELY REPEATED GAME 6.3 RISK SHARING 6.3.1
THE ECONOMY 6.3.2 FULL INSURANCE ALLOCATIONS 6.3.3 PARTIAL INSURANCE
6.3.4 CONSUMPTION DYNAMICS 6.3.5 INTERTEMPORAL CONSUMPTION SENSITIVITY
174 175 177 178 186 187 188 190 192 192 195 201 201 201 203 204 204 206
207 208 209 210 212 213 219 |_ GAMES WITH (IMPERFECT) PUBLIC MONITORING
7 THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF REPEATED GAMES WITH IMPERFECT PUBLIC MONITORING
225 7.1 THE CANONICAL REPEATED GAME 225 7.1.1 THE STAGE GAME 225 7.1.2
THE REPEATED GAME 226 7.1.3 RECOVERING A RECURSIVE STRUCTURE: PUBLIC
STRATEGIES AND PERFECT PUBLIC EQUILIBRIA 228 7.2 A REPEATED
PRISONERS DILEMMA EXAMPLE 232 7.2.1 PUNISHMENTS HAPPEN 233 7.2.2
FORGIVING STRATEGIES 235 7.2.3 STRONGLY SYMMETRIC BEHAVIOR IMPLIES
INEFFICIENCY 23 9 7.3 DECOMPOSABILITY AND SELF-GENERATION 241 7.4 THE
IMPACT OF INCREASED PRECISION 249 7.5 THE BANG-BANG RESULT 251 XII
CONTENTS 7.6 AN EXAMPLE WITH SHORT-LIVED PLAYERS 255 7.6.1 PERFECT
MONITORING 256 7.6.2 IMPERFECT PUBLIC MONITORING OF THE LONG-LIVED
PLAYER 260 7.7 THE REPEATED PRISONERS DILEMMA REDUX 264 7.7.1 SYMMETRIC
INEFFICIENCY REVISITED 264 7.7.2 ENFORCING A MIXED-ACTION PROFILE 267
7.8 ANONYMOUS PLAYERS 269 8 BOUNDING PERFECT PUBLIC EQUILIBRIUM PAYOFFS
273 8.1 DECOMPOSING ON HALF-SPACES 273 8.2 THE INEFFICIENCY OF STRONGLY
SYMMETRIC EQUILIBRIA 278 8.3 SHORT-LIVED PLAYERS 280 8.3.1 THE UPPER
BOUND ON PAYOFFS 280 8.3.2 BINDING MORAL HAZARD 281 8.4 THE PRISONERS
DILEMMA 282 8.4.1 BOUNDS ON EFFICIENCY: PURE ACTIONS 282 8.4.2 BOUNDS ON
EFFICIENCY: MIXED ACTIONS 284 8.4.3 A CHARACTERIZATION WITH TWO SIGNALS
287 8.4.4 EFFICIENCY WITH THREE SIGNALS 289 8.4.5 EFFICIENT ASYMMETRY
291 9 THE FOLK THEOREM WITH IMPERFECT PUBLIC MONITORING 293 9.1
CHARACTERIZING THE LIMIT SET OF PPE PAYOFFS 293 9.2 THE RANK CONDITIONS
AND A PUBLIC MONITORING FOLK THEOREM 298 9.3 PERFECT MONITORING
CHARACTERIZATIONS 303 9.3.1 THE FOLK THEOREM WITH LONG-LIVED PLAYERS 303
9.3.2 LONG-LIVED AND SHORT-LIVED PLAYERS 303 9.4 ENFORCEABILITY AND
IDENTIFIABILITY 305 9.5 GAMES WITH A PRODUCT STRUCTURE 309 9.6 REPEATED
EXTENSIVE-FORM GAMES 311 9.7 GAMES OF SYMMETRIC INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
316 9.7.1 EQUILIBRIUM 318 9.7.2 A FOLK THEOREM 320 9.8 SHORT PERIOD
LENGTH 326 10 PRIVATE STRATEGIES IN GAMES WITH IMPERFECT PUBLIC
MONITORING 329 10.1 SEQUENTIAL EQUILIBRIUM 329 10.2 A REDUCED-FORM
EXAMPLE 331 10.2.1 PURE STRATEGIES 331 10.2.2 PUBLIC CORRELATION 332
10.2.3 MIXED PUBLIC STRATEGIES 332 10.2.4 PRIVATE STRATEGIES 333 10.3
TWO-PERIOD EXAMPLES 334 10.3.1 EQUILIBRIUM PUNISHMENTS NEED NOT BE
EQUILIBRIA 334 10.3.2 PAYOFFS BY CORRELATION 337 10.3.3 INCONSISTENT
BELIEFS 338 CONTENTS XIII 10.4 AN INFINITELY REPEATED PRISONER S DILEMMA
340 10.4.1 PUBLIC TRANSITIONS 340 10.4.2 AN INFINITELY REPEATED
PRISONERS DILEMMA: INDIFFERENCE 343 11 APPLICATIONS 347 11.1 OLIGOPOLY
WITH IMPERFECT MONITORING 347 11.1.1 THE GAME 347 11.1.2 OPTIMAL
COLLUSION 348 11.1.3 WHICH NEWS IS BAD NEWS? 350 11.1.4 IMPERFECT
COLLUSION 352 11.2 REPEATED ADVERSE SELECTION 354 11.2.1 GENERAL
STRUCTURE 354 11.2.2 AN OLIGOPOLY WITH PRIVATE COSTS: THE GAME 355
11.2.3 A UNIFORM-PRICE EQUILIBRIUM 356 11.2.4 A STATIONARY-OUTCOME
SEPARATING EQUILIBRIUM 357 11.2.5 EFFICIENCY 359 11.2.6
NONSTATIONARY-OUTCOME EQUILIBRIA 360 11.3 RISK SHARING __ 365 11.4
PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEMS 370 11.4.1 HIDDEN ACTIONS 370 11.4.2 INCOMPLETE
CONTRACTS: THE STAGE GAME 371 11.4.3 INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS: THE REPEATED
GAME 372 11.4.4 -RISKAVERSION: THE STAGE GAME 37 4 11.4.5 RISK AVERSION:
REVIEW STRATEGIES IN THE REPEATED GAME 375 GAMES WITH PRIVATE MONITORING
12 PRIVATE MONITORING 385 12.1 A TWO-PERIOD EXAMPLE 385 12.1.1 ALMOST
PUBLIC MONITORING 387 12.1.2 CONDITIONALLY INDEPENDENT MONITORING 389
12.1.3 INTERTEMPORAL INCENTIVES FROM SECOND-PERIOD RANDOMIZATION 392
12.2 PRIVATE MONITORING GAMES: BASIC STRUCTURE 394 12.3 ALMOST PUBLIC
MONITORING: ROBUSTNESS IN THE INFINITELY REPEATED PRISONER S DILEMMA 397
12.3.1 THE FORGIVING PROFILE 398 12.3.2 GRIM TRIGGER 400 12.4
INDEPENDENT MONITORING: A BELIEF-BASED EQUILIBRIUM FOR THE INFINITELY
REPEATED PRISONER S DILEMMA 404 12.5 A BELIEF-FREE EXAMPLE 410 13 ALMOST
PUBLIC MONITORING GAMES 415 13.1 WHEN IS MONITORING ALMOST PUBLIC? 415
13.2 NEARBY GAMES WITH ALMOST PUBLIC MONITORING 418 XIV CONTENTS 13.2.1
PAYOFFS 418 13.2.2 CONTINUATION VALUES 419 13.2.3 BEST RESPONSES 421
13.2.4 EQUILIBRIUM 42 1 13.3 PUBLIC PROFILES WITH BOUNDED RECALL 423
13.4 FAILURE OF COORDINATION UNDER UNBOUNDED RECALL 425 13.4.1 EXAMPLES
425 13.4.2 INCENTIVES TO DEVIATE 427 13.4.3 SEPARATING PROFILES 428
13.4.4 RICH MONITORING 432 13.4.5 COORDINATION FAILURE 434 13.5 PATIENT
PLAYERS 434 13.5.1 PATIENT STRICTNESS 435 13.5.2 EQUILIBRIA IN NEARBY
GAMES 437 13.6 A FOLK THEOREM 441 14 BELIEF-FREE EQUILIBRIA IN PRIVATE
MONITORING GAMES 445 14.1 DEFINITION AND EXAMPLES 445 14.1.1 REPEATED
PRISONERS DILEMMA WITH PERFECT MONITORING 447 14.1.2 REPEATED PRISONERS
DILEMMA WITH PRIVATE MONITORING 451 14.2 STRONG SELF-GENERATION 453 PART
IV REPUTATIONS 15 REPUTATIONS WITH SHORT-LIVED PLAYERS 459 15.1 THE
ADVERSE SELECTION APPROACH TO REPUTATIONS N 459 15.2 COMMITMENT TYPES
463 15.3 PERFECT MONITORING GAMES 466 15.3.1 BUILDING A REPUTATION 470
15.3.2 THE REPUTATION BOUND 474 15.3.3 AN EXAMPLE: TIME CONSISTENCY 47 7
15.4 IMPERFECT MONITORING GAMES 478 15.4.1 STACKELBERG PAYOFFS 480
15.4.2 THE REPUTATION BOUND 484 15.4.3 SMALL PLAYERS WITH IDIOSYNCRATIC
SIGNALS 492 15.5 TEMPORARY REPUTATIONS 493 15.5.1 ASYMPTOTIC BELIEFS 494
15.5.2 UNIFORMLY DISAPPEARING REPUTATIONS * 496 15.5.3 ASYMPTOTIC
EQUILIBRIUM PLAY 497 15.6 TEMPORARY REPUTATIONS: THE PROOF OF
PROPOSITION 15.5.1 500 15.6.1 PLAYER 2 S POSTERIOR BELIEFS 500 15.6.2
PLAYER 2 S BELIEFS ABOUT HER FUTURE BEHAVIOR 502 CONTENTS XV 15.6.3
PLAYER 1 S BELIEFS ABOUT PLAYER 2 S FUTURE BEHAVIOR 503 15.6.4 PROOF
OF PROPOSITION 15.5.1 509 16 REPUTATIONS WITH LONG-LIVED PLAYERS 511
16.1 THE BASIC ISSUE 511 16.2 PERFECT MONITORING AND MINMAX-ACTION
REPUTATIONS 515 16.2.1 MINMAX-ACTION TYPES AND CONFLICTING INTERESTS 515
16.2.2 EXAMPLES 518 16.2.3 TWO-SIDED INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 520 16.3
WEAKER REPUTATIONS FOR ANY ACTION 521 16.4 IMPERFECT PUBLIC MONITORING
524 16.5 COMMITMENT TYPES WHO PUNISH 531 16.6 EQUAL DISCOUNT FACTORS 533
16.6.1 EXAMPLE 1: COMMON INTERESTS 534 16.6.2 EXAMPLE 2: CONFLICTING
INTERESTS 537 16.6.3 EXAMPLE 3 : STRICTLY DOMINANT ACTION GAMES 540
16.6.4 EXAMPLE 4: STRICTLY CONFLICTING INTERESTS 541 16.6.5 BOUNDED
RECALL 544 16.6.6 REPUTATIONS AND BARGAINING 546 16.7 TEMPORARY
REPUTATIONS 547 17 FINITELY REPEATED GAMES 549 17.1 THE CHAIN STORE GAME
550 17.2 THE PRISONERS DILEMMA 554 17.3 THE PRODUCT-CHOICE GAME 560
17.3.1 THE LAST PERIOD 562 17.3.2 THE FIRST PERIOD, PLAYER 1 562 17.3.3
THE FIRST PERIOD, PLAYER 2 565 18 MODELING REPUTATIONS 567 18.1 AN
ALTERNATIVE MODEL OF REPUTATIONS 568 18.1.1 MODELING REPUTATIONS 568
18.1.2 THE MARKET 570 18.1.3 REPUTATION WITH REPLACEMENTS 573 18.1.4 HOW
DIFFERENT IS IT? 576 18.2 THE ROLE OF REPLACEMENTS 576 18.3 GOOD TYPES
AND BAD TYPES 580 * 18.3.1 BAD TYPES 580 18.3.2 GOOD TYPES 581 18.4
REPUTATIONS WITH COMMON CONSUMERS 584 18.4.1 BELIEF-FREE EQUILIBRIA WITH
IDIOSYNCRATIC CONSUMERS 585 18.4.2 COMMON CONSUMERS 586 18.4.3
REPUTATIONS 587 18.4.4 REPLACEMENTS 588 18.4.5 CONTINUITY AT THE
BOUNDARY AND MARKOV EQUILIBRIA 590 18.4.6 COMPETITIVE MARKETS 594 XVI
CONTENTS 18.5 DISCRETE CHOICES 596 18.6 LOST CONSUMERS 599 18.6.1 THE
PURCHASE GAME 599 18.6.2 BAD REPUTATIONS: THE STAGE GAME 600 18.6.3 THE
REPEATED GAME 601 18.6.4 INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 603 18.6.5 GOOD FIRMS
607 18.6.6 CAPTIVE CONSUMERS 608 18.7 MARKETS FOR REPUTATIONS 610 18.7.1
REPUTATIONS HAVE VALUE 610 18.7.2 BUYING REPUTATIONS 61 3 BIBLIOGRAPHY
619 SYMBOLS 629 INDEX 631
|
| adam_txt |
REPEATED GAMES AND REPUTATIONS LONG-RUN RELATIONSHIPS GEORGE J. MAILATH
AND LARRY SAMUELSON OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 2006 CONTENTS FC PART 1 1
INTRODUCTION 1.1 INTERTEMPORAL INCENTIVES 1.2 THE PRISONERS' DILEMMA 1.3
OLIGOPOLY 1.4 THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA UNDER IMPERFECT MONITORING 1.5 THE
PRODUCT-CHOICE GAME 1.6 DISCUSSION 1.7 A READER'S GUIDE 1.8 THE SCOPE OF
THE BOOK GAMES WITH PERFECT MONITORING 1 1 3 4 5 7 8 10 10 2 THE BASIC
STRUCTURE OF REPEATED GAMES WITH PERFECT MONITORING 15 2.1 THE CANONICAL
REPEATED GAME 15 2.1.1 THE STAGE GAME 15 2.1.2 PUBLIC CORRELATION 17
2.1.3 THE REPEATED GAME 19 2.1.4 SUBGAME-PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM OF THE
REPEATED GAME 22 2.2 THE ONE-SHOT DEVIATION PRINCIPLE 24 2.3 AUTOMATON
REPRESENTATIONS OF STRATEGY PROFILES 29 2.4 CREDIBLE CONTINUATION
PROMISES 32 2.5 GENERATING EQUILIBRIA 37 2.5.1 CONSTRUCTING EQUILIBRIA:
SELF-GENERATION 3 7 2.5.2 EXAMPLE: MUTUAL EFFORT 40 2.5.3 EXAMPLE: THE
FOLK THEOREM 41 2.5.4 EXAMPLE: CONSTRUCTING EQUILIBRIA FOR LOW S 44
2.5.5 EXAMPLE: FAILURE OF MONOTONICITY 46 2.5.6 EXAMPLE: PUBLIC
CORRELATION 49 2.6 CONSTRUCTING EQUILIBRIA: SIMPLE STRATEGIES AND PENAL
CODES 51 2.6.1 SIMPLE STRATEGIES AND PENAL CODES 51 2.6.2 EXAMPLE:
OLIGOPOLY 54 2.7 LONG-LIVED AND SHORT-LIVED PLAYERS 61 2.7.1 MINMAX
PAYOFFS 63 2.7.2 CONSTRAINTS ON PAYOFFS 66 CONTENTS 3 THE FOLK THEOREM
WITH PERFECT MONITORING 69 3.1 EXAMPLES 70 3.2 INTERPRETING THE FOLK
THEOREM 72 3.2.1 IMPLICATIONS 72 3.2.2 PATIENT PLAYERS 73 3.2.3 PATIENCE
AND INCENTIVES 75 3.2.4 OBSERVABLE MIXTURES 76 3.3 THE PURE-ACTION FOLK
THEOREM FOR TWO PLAYERS 76 3.4 THE FOLK THEOREM WITH MORE THAN TWO
PLAYERS 80 3.4.1 A COUNTEREXAMPLE 8 0 3.4.2 PLAYER-SPECIFIC PUNISHMENTS
82 3.5 NON-EQUIVALENT UTILITIES 87 3.6 LONG-LIVED AND SHORT-LIVED
PLAYERS 91 3.7 CONVEXIFYING THE EQUILIBRIUM PAYOFF SET WITHOUT PUBLIC
CORRELATION 96 3.8 MIXED-ACTION INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY 101 4 HOW LONG IS
FOREVER? 105 4.1 IS THE HORIZON EVER INFINITE? 105 4.2 UNCERTAIN
HORIZONS 106 4.3 DECLINING DISCOUNT FACTORS 107 4.4 FINITELY REPEATED
GAMES 112 4.5 APPROXIMATE EQUILIBRIA 118 4.6 RENEGOTIATION 120 4.6.1
FINITELY REPEATED GAMES 122 4.6.2 INFINITELY REPEATED GAMES 134 5
VARIATIONS ON THE GAME 145 5.1 RANDOM MATCHING 145 5.1.1 PUBLIC
HISTORIES 146 5.1.2 PERSONAL HISTORIES 147 5.2 RELATIONSHIPS IN CONTEXT
152 5.2.1 A FRICTIONLESS MARKET 153 5.2.2 FUTURE BENEFITS 154 5.2.3
ADVERSE SELECTION 155 5.2.4 STARTING SMALL 158 5.3 MULTIMARKET
INTERACTIONS 161 5.4 REPEATED EXTENSIVE FORMS 162 5.4.1 REPEATED
EXTENSIVE-FORM GAMES HAVE MORE SUBGAMES 1 63 5.4.2 PLAYER-SPECIFIC
PUNISHMENTS IN REPEATED EXTENSIVE-FORM GAMES 165 5.4.3 EXTENSIVE-FORM
GAMES AND IMPERFECT MONITORING 1 67 5.4.4 EXTENSIVE-FORM GAMES AND WEAK
INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY 168 5.4.5 ASYNCHRONOUS MOVES 169 5.4.6 SIMPLE
STRATEGIES 172 CONTENTS XI 5.5 DYNAMIC GAMES: INTRODUCTION 5.5.1 THE
GAME 5.5.2 MARKOV EQUILIBRIUM 5.5.3 EXAMPLES 5.6 DYNAMIC GAMES:
FOUNDATIONS 5.6.1 CONSISTENT PARTITIONS 5.6.2 COHERENT CONSISTENCY 5.6.3
MARKOV EQUILIBRIUM 5.7 DYNAMIC GAMES: EQUILIBRIUM 5.7.1 THE STRUCTURE OF
EQUILIBRIA 5.7.2 A FOLK THEOREM 6 APPLICATIONS 6.1 PRICE WARS 6.1.1
INDEPENDENT PRICE SHOCKS 6.1.2 CORRELATED PRICE SHOCKS 6.2 TIME
CONSISTENCY 6.2.1 THE STAGE GAME 6.2.2 EQUILIBRIUM, COMMITMENT, AND TIME
CONSISTENCY 6.2.3 THE INFINITELY REPEATED GAME 6.3 RISK SHARING 6.3.1
THE ECONOMY 6.3.2 FULL INSURANCE ALLOCATIONS 6.3.3 PARTIAL INSURANCE
6.3.4 CONSUMPTION DYNAMICS 6.3.5 INTERTEMPORAL CONSUMPTION SENSITIVITY
174 175 177 178 186 187 188 190 192 192 195 201 201 201 203 204 204 206
207 208 209 210 212 213 219 |_ GAMES WITH (IMPERFECT) PUBLIC MONITORING
7 THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF REPEATED GAMES WITH IMPERFECT PUBLIC MONITORING
225 7.1 THE CANONICAL REPEATED GAME 225 7.1.1 THE STAGE GAME 225 7.1.2
THE REPEATED GAME 226 7.1.3 RECOVERING A RECURSIVE STRUCTURE: PUBLIC
STRATEGIES AND PERFECT PUBLIC EQUILIBRIA 228 7.2 A REPEATED
PRISONERS'DILEMMA EXAMPLE 232 7.2.1 PUNISHMENTS HAPPEN 233 7.2.2
FORGIVING STRATEGIES 235 7.2.3 STRONGLY SYMMETRIC BEHAVIOR IMPLIES
INEFFICIENCY 23 9 7.3 DECOMPOSABILITY AND SELF-GENERATION 241 7.4 THE
IMPACT OF INCREASED PRECISION 249 7.5 THE BANG-BANG RESULT 251 XII
CONTENTS 7.6 AN EXAMPLE WITH SHORT-LIVED PLAYERS 255 7.6.1 PERFECT
MONITORING 256 7.6.2 IMPERFECT PUBLIC MONITORING OF THE LONG-LIVED
PLAYER 260 7.7 THE REPEATED PRISONERS' DILEMMA REDUX 264 7.7.1 SYMMETRIC
INEFFICIENCY REVISITED 264 7.7.2 ENFORCING A MIXED-ACTION PROFILE 267
7.8 ANONYMOUS PLAYERS 269 8 BOUNDING PERFECT PUBLIC EQUILIBRIUM PAYOFFS
273 8.1 DECOMPOSING ON HALF-SPACES 273 8.2 THE INEFFICIENCY OF STRONGLY
SYMMETRIC EQUILIBRIA 278 8.3 SHORT-LIVED PLAYERS 280 8.3.1 THE UPPER
BOUND ON PAYOFFS 280 8.3.2 BINDING MORAL HAZARD 281 8.4 THE PRISONERS'
DILEMMA 282 8.4.1 BOUNDS ON EFFICIENCY: PURE ACTIONS 282 8.4.2 BOUNDS ON
EFFICIENCY: MIXED ACTIONS 284 8.4.3 A CHARACTERIZATION WITH TWO SIGNALS
287 8.4.4 EFFICIENCY WITH THREE SIGNALS 289 8.4.5 EFFICIENT ASYMMETRY
291 9 THE FOLK THEOREM WITH IMPERFECT PUBLIC MONITORING 293 9.1
CHARACTERIZING THE LIMIT SET OF PPE PAYOFFS 293 9.2 THE RANK CONDITIONS
AND A PUBLIC MONITORING FOLK THEOREM 298 9.3 PERFECT MONITORING
CHARACTERIZATIONS 303 9.3.1 THE FOLK THEOREM WITH LONG-LIVED PLAYERS 303
9.3.2 LONG-LIVED AND SHORT-LIVED PLAYERS 303 9.4 ENFORCEABILITY AND
IDENTIFIABILITY 305 9.5 GAMES WITH A PRODUCT STRUCTURE 309 9.6 REPEATED
EXTENSIVE-FORM GAMES 311 9.7 GAMES OF SYMMETRIC INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
316 9.7.1 EQUILIBRIUM 318 9.7.2 A FOLK THEOREM 320 9.8 SHORT PERIOD
LENGTH 326 10 PRIVATE STRATEGIES IN GAMES WITH IMPERFECT PUBLIC
MONITORING 329 10.1 SEQUENTIAL EQUILIBRIUM 329 10.2 A REDUCED-FORM
EXAMPLE 331 10.2.1 PURE STRATEGIES 331 10.2.2 PUBLIC CORRELATION 332
10.2.3 MIXED PUBLIC STRATEGIES 332 10.2.4 PRIVATE STRATEGIES 333 10.3
TWO-PERIOD EXAMPLES 334 10.3.1 EQUILIBRIUM PUNISHMENTS NEED NOT BE
EQUILIBRIA 334 10.3.2 PAYOFFS BY CORRELATION 337 10.3.3 INCONSISTENT
BELIEFS 338 CONTENTS XIII 10.4 AN INFINITELY REPEATED PRISONER'S DILEMMA
340 10.4.1 PUBLIC TRANSITIONS 340 10.4.2 AN INFINITELY REPEATED
PRISONERS'DILEMMA: INDIFFERENCE 343 11 APPLICATIONS 347 11.1 OLIGOPOLY
WITH IMPERFECT MONITORING 347 11.1.1 THE GAME 347 11.1.2 OPTIMAL
COLLUSION 348 11.1.3 WHICH NEWS IS BAD NEWS? 350 11.1.4 IMPERFECT
COLLUSION 352 11.2 REPEATED ADVERSE SELECTION 354 11.2.1 GENERAL
STRUCTURE 354 11.2.2 AN OLIGOPOLY WITH PRIVATE COSTS: THE GAME 355
11.2.3 A UNIFORM-PRICE EQUILIBRIUM 356 11.2.4 A STATIONARY-OUTCOME
SEPARATING EQUILIBRIUM 357 11.2.5 EFFICIENCY 359 11.2.6
NONSTATIONARY-OUTCOME EQUILIBRIA 360 11.3 RISK SHARING _ 365 11.4
PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEMS 370 11.4.1 HIDDEN ACTIONS 370 11.4.2 INCOMPLETE
CONTRACTS: THE STAGE GAME 371 11.4.3 INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS: THE REPEATED
GAME 372 11.4.4 -RISKAVERSION: THE STAGE GAME 37 4 11.4.5 RISK AVERSION:
REVIEW STRATEGIES IN THE REPEATED GAME 375 GAMES WITH PRIVATE MONITORING
12 PRIVATE MONITORING 385 12.1 A TWO-PERIOD EXAMPLE 385 12.1.1 ALMOST
PUBLIC MONITORING 387 12.1.2 CONDITIONALLY INDEPENDENT MONITORING 389
12.1.3 INTERTEMPORAL INCENTIVES FROM SECOND-PERIOD RANDOMIZATION 392
12.2 PRIVATE MONITORING GAMES: BASIC STRUCTURE 394 12.3 ALMOST PUBLIC
MONITORING: ROBUSTNESS IN THE INFINITELY REPEATED PRISONER'S DILEMMA 397
12.3.1 THE FORGIVING PROFILE 398 12.3.2 GRIM TRIGGER 400 12.4
INDEPENDENT MONITORING: A BELIEF-BASED EQUILIBRIUM FOR THE INFINITELY
REPEATED PRISONER'S DILEMMA 404 12.5 A BELIEF-FREE EXAMPLE 410 13 ALMOST
PUBLIC MONITORING GAMES 415 13.1 WHEN IS MONITORING ALMOST PUBLIC? 415
13.2 NEARBY GAMES WITH ALMOST PUBLIC MONITORING 418 XIV CONTENTS 13.2.1
PAYOFFS 418 13.2.2 CONTINUATION VALUES 419 13.2.3 BEST RESPONSES 421
13.2.4 EQUILIBRIUM 42 1 13.3 PUBLIC PROFILES WITH BOUNDED RECALL 423
13.4 FAILURE OF COORDINATION UNDER UNBOUNDED RECALL 425 13.4.1 EXAMPLES
425 13.4.2 INCENTIVES TO DEVIATE 427 13.4.3 SEPARATING PROFILES 428
13.4.4 RICH MONITORING 432 13.4.5 COORDINATION FAILURE 434 13.5 PATIENT
PLAYERS 434 13.5.1 PATIENT STRICTNESS 435 13.5.2 EQUILIBRIA IN NEARBY
GAMES 437 13.6 A FOLK THEOREM 441 14 BELIEF-FREE EQUILIBRIA IN PRIVATE
MONITORING GAMES 445 14.1 DEFINITION AND EXAMPLES 445 14.1.1 REPEATED
PRISONERS'DILEMMA WITH PERFECT MONITORING 447 14.1.2 REPEATED PRISONERS'
DILEMMA WITH PRIVATE MONITORING 451 14.2 STRONG SELF-GENERATION 453 PART
IV REPUTATIONS 15 REPUTATIONS WITH SHORT-LIVED PLAYERS 459 15.1 THE
ADVERSE SELECTION APPROACH TO REPUTATIONS N 459 15.2 COMMITMENT TYPES
463 15.3 PERFECT MONITORING GAMES 466 15.3.1 BUILDING A REPUTATION 470
15.3.2 THE REPUTATION BOUND 474 15.3.3 AN EXAMPLE: TIME CONSISTENCY 47 7
15.4 IMPERFECT MONITORING GAMES 478 15.4.1 STACKELBERG PAYOFFS 480
15.4.2 THE REPUTATION BOUND 484 15.4.3 SMALL PLAYERS WITH IDIOSYNCRATIC
SIGNALS 492 15.5 TEMPORARY REPUTATIONS 493 15.5.1 ASYMPTOTIC BELIEFS 494
15.5.2 UNIFORMLY DISAPPEARING REPUTATIONS * 496 15.5.3 ASYMPTOTIC
EQUILIBRIUM PLAY 497 15.6 TEMPORARY REPUTATIONS: THE PROOF OF
PROPOSITION 15.5.1 500 15.6.1 PLAYER 2'S POSTERIOR BELIEFS 500 15.6.2
PLAYER 2 'S BELIEFS ABOUT HER FUTURE BEHAVIOR 502 CONTENTS XV 15.6.3
PLAYER 1 'S BELIEFS ABOUT PLAYER 2 'S FUTURE BEHAVIOR 503 15.6.4 PROOF
OF PROPOSITION 15.5.1 509 16 REPUTATIONS WITH LONG-LIVED PLAYERS 511
16.1 THE BASIC ISSUE 511 16.2 PERFECT MONITORING AND MINMAX-ACTION
REPUTATIONS 515 16.2.1 MINMAX-ACTION TYPES AND CONFLICTING INTERESTS 515
16.2.2 EXAMPLES 518 16.2.3 TWO-SIDED INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 520 16.3
WEAKER REPUTATIONS FOR ANY ACTION 521 16.4 IMPERFECT PUBLIC MONITORING
524 16.5 COMMITMENT TYPES WHO PUNISH 531 16.6 EQUAL DISCOUNT FACTORS 533
16.6.1 EXAMPLE 1: COMMON INTERESTS 534 16.6.2 EXAMPLE 2: CONFLICTING
INTERESTS 537 16.6.3 EXAMPLE 3': STRICTLY DOMINANT ACTION GAMES 540
16.6.4 EXAMPLE 4: STRICTLY CONFLICTING INTERESTS 541 16.6.5 BOUNDED
RECALL 544 16.6.6 REPUTATIONS AND BARGAINING 546 16.7 TEMPORARY
REPUTATIONS 547 17 FINITELY REPEATED GAMES 549 17.1 THE CHAIN STORE GAME
550 17.2 THE PRISONERS'DILEMMA 554 17.3 THE PRODUCT-CHOICE GAME 560
17.3.1 THE LAST PERIOD 562 17.3.2 THE FIRST PERIOD, PLAYER 1 562 17.3.3
THE FIRST PERIOD, PLAYER 2 565 18 MODELING REPUTATIONS 567 18.1 AN
ALTERNATIVE MODEL OF REPUTATIONS 568 18.1.1 MODELING REPUTATIONS 568
18.1.2 THE MARKET 570 18.1.3 REPUTATION WITH REPLACEMENTS 573 18.1.4 HOW
DIFFERENT IS IT? 576 18.2 THE ROLE OF REPLACEMENTS 576 18.3 GOOD TYPES
AND BAD TYPES 580 * 18.3.1 BAD TYPES 580 18.3.2 GOOD TYPES 581 18.4
REPUTATIONS WITH COMMON CONSUMERS 584 18.4.1 BELIEF-FREE EQUILIBRIA WITH
IDIOSYNCRATIC CONSUMERS 585 18.4.2 COMMON CONSUMERS 586 18.4.3
REPUTATIONS 587 18.4.4 REPLACEMENTS 588 18.4.5 CONTINUITY AT THE
BOUNDARY AND MARKOV EQUILIBRIA 590 18.4.6 COMPETITIVE MARKETS 594 XVI
CONTENTS 18.5 DISCRETE CHOICES 596 18.6 LOST CONSUMERS 599 18.6.1 THE
PURCHASE GAME 599 18.6.2 BAD REPUTATIONS: THE STAGE GAME 600 18.6.3 THE
REPEATED GAME 601 18.6.4 INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 603 18.6.5 GOOD FIRMS
607 18.6.6 CAPTIVE CONSUMERS 608 18.7 MARKETS FOR REPUTATIONS 610 18.7.1
REPUTATIONS HAVE VALUE 610 18.7.2 BUYING REPUTATIONS 61 3 BIBLIOGRAPHY
619 SYMBOLS 629 INDEX 631 |
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| dewey-tens | 510 - Mathematics |
| discipline | Mathematik Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| discipline_str_mv | Mathematik Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
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| id | DE-604.BV022409969 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T17:21:47Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T20:56:59Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 0195300793 9780195300796 |
| language | English |
| lccn | 2005049518 |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-015618487 |
| oclc_num | 61821903 |
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| physical | XVI, 645 S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 2006 |
| publishDateSearch | 2006 |
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| publisher | Oxford Univ. Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Mailath, George J. Verfasser (DE-588)170342476 aut Repeated games and reputations long-run relationships George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson Oxford Oxford Univ. Press 2006 XVI, 645 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Literaturverz. S. 619 - 628 Jeux, Théorie des Mathématiques économiques Speltheorie gtt Game theory Economics, Mathematical Dynamisches Spiel (DE-588)4121154-6 gnd rswk-swf Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd rswk-swf Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 s Dynamisches Spiel (DE-588)4121154-6 s DE-604 Samuelson, Larry 1953- Verfasser (DE-588)113051050 aut GBV Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015618487&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Mailath, George J. Samuelson, Larry 1953- Repeated games and reputations long-run relationships Jeux, Théorie des Mathématiques économiques Speltheorie gtt Game theory Economics, Mathematical Dynamisches Spiel (DE-588)4121154-6 gnd Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4121154-6 (DE-588)4056243-8 |
| title | Repeated games and reputations long-run relationships |
| title_auth | Repeated games and reputations long-run relationships |
| title_exact_search | Repeated games and reputations long-run relationships |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Repeated games and reputations long-run relationships |
| title_full | Repeated games and reputations long-run relationships George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson |
| title_fullStr | Repeated games and reputations long-run relationships George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson |
| title_full_unstemmed | Repeated games and reputations long-run relationships George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson |
| title_short | Repeated games and reputations |
| title_sort | repeated games and reputations long run relationships |
| title_sub | long-run relationships |
| topic | Jeux, Théorie des Mathématiques économiques Speltheorie gtt Game theory Economics, Mathematical Dynamisches Spiel (DE-588)4121154-6 gnd Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd |
| topic_facet | Jeux, Théorie des Mathématiques économiques Speltheorie Game theory Economics, Mathematical Dynamisches Spiel Spieltheorie |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015618487&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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