Stvaranje hrvatske države i Domovinski rat:
Gespeichert in:
| Format: | Buch |
|---|---|
| Sprache: | Croatian |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Zagreb
Hrvatski Inst. za Povijest
2006
Školska knjiga |
| Schriftenreihe: | Biblioteka XX. stoljeće
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Abstract |
| Beschreibung: | Zsfassung in engl. Sprache |
| Beschreibung: | 575 S. Kt. |
| ISBN: | 9530608330 |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nam a2200000 c 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV022400340 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 20080530 | ||
| 007 | t | ||
| 008 | 070424s2006 b||| |||| 00||| hrv d | ||
| 020 | |a 9530608330 |9 953-0-60833-0 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)238830459 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV022400340 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rakwb | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a hrv | |
| 049 | |a DE-12 |a DE-473 |a DE-Re13 | ||
| 084 | |a KW 1017 |0 (DE-625)86483: |2 rvk | ||
| 084 | |a 7,41 |2 ssgn | ||
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Stvaranje hrvatske države i Domovinski rat |c Zdenko Radelić ... |
| 264 | 1 | |a Zagreb |b Hrvatski Inst. za Povijest |c 2006 | |
| 264 | 1 | |b Školska knjiga | |
| 300 | |a 575 S. |b Kt. | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 0 | |a Biblioteka XX. stoljeće | |
| 500 | |a Zsfassung in engl. Sprache | ||
| 648 | 7 | |a Geschichte 1990-1999 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
| 648 | 7 | |a Geschichte 1945-1991 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
| 648 | 7 | |a Geschichte 1990-1995 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Politik |0 (DE-588)4046514-7 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Außenpolitik |0 (DE-588)4003846-4 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Bürgerkrieg |0 (DE-588)4008784-0 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Auflösung |0 (DE-588)4193468-4 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Gründung |0 (DE-588)4020642-7 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 651 | 7 | |a Kroatien |0 (DE-588)4073841-3 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
| 651 | 7 | |a Jugoslawien |0 (DE-588)4028966-7 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
| 689 | 0 | 0 | |a Jugoslawien |0 (DE-588)4028966-7 |D g |
| 689 | 0 | 1 | |a Auflösung |0 (DE-588)4193468-4 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 2 | |a Gründung |0 (DE-588)4020642-7 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 3 | |a Kroatien |0 (DE-588)4073841-3 |D g |
| 689 | 0 | 4 | |a Geschichte 1990-1999 |A z |
| 689 | 0 | |5 DE-604 | |
| 689 | 1 | 0 | |a Kroatien |0 (DE-588)4073841-3 |D g |
| 689 | 1 | 1 | |a Außenpolitik |0 (DE-588)4003846-4 |D s |
| 689 | 1 | 2 | |a Geschichte 1990-1999 |A z |
| 689 | 1 | |5 DE-604 | |
| 689 | 2 | 0 | |a Kroatien |0 (DE-588)4073841-3 |D g |
| 689 | 2 | 1 | |a Politik |0 (DE-588)4046514-7 |D s |
| 689 | 2 | 2 | |a Geschichte 1945-1991 |A z |
| 689 | 2 | |5 DE-604 | |
| 689 | 3 | 0 | |a Jugoslawien |0 (DE-588)4028966-7 |D g |
| 689 | 3 | 1 | |a Auflösung |0 (DE-588)4193468-4 |D s |
| 689 | 3 | 2 | |a Bürgerkrieg |0 (DE-588)4008784-0 |D s |
| 689 | 3 | 3 | |a Kroatien |0 (DE-588)4073841-3 |D g |
| 689 | 3 | 4 | |a Geschichte 1990-1995 |A z |
| 689 | 3 | |5 DE-604 | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Radelić, Zdenko |e Sonstige |4 oth | |
| 856 | 4 | 2 | |m Digitalisierung BSBMuenchen |q application/pdf |u http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015609012&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |3 Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| 856 | 4 | 2 | |m Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen |q application/pdf |u http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015609012&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |3 Abstract |
| 940 | 1 | |n oe | |
| 942 | 1 | 1 | |c 909 |e 22/bsb |f 09049 |g 4972 |
| 942 | 1 | 1 | |c 355.009 |e 22/bsb |f 09049 |g 496 |
| 942 | 1 | 1 | |c 909 |e 22/bsb |f 09049 |g 496 |
| 943 | 1 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-015609012 | |
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1806961748520992768 |
|---|---|
| adam_text |
Uvodna napomena
zdenko
Komunistička vlast
Partizanski pokret
Komunistička diktatura
Komunisti i religija
Komunisti i tradicija
Socijalna revolucija
Federalizam i centralizam
Međunacionalni odnosi
Samoupravljanje
Granice
Razilaženja
Gospodarske reforme 1960-ih
Nacije i jugoslavenstvo
Nacionalna struktura državnih i partijskih tijela
Pad Aleksandra Ranko vica
„Stara" i „nova" ljevica
Hrvatsko proljeće
Hrvatska otvara pitanje ravnopravnosti u Jugoslaviji
Ústavnoprávna
Nacionalna ravnopravnost
Jezik i identitet
Gospodarsko pitanje
Migracije u inozemstvo.
Kraj hrvatskog proljeća
Posljedice hrvatskog proljeća
Konfederalizacija,.,.,,.,,.,.,.
Ustav
Zakon
Gospodarska i politička kriza
Jugoslavenski socijalizam: rezultati i usporedbe,.
Gospodarski pokazatelji odnosa među republikama.
Demografsko-kulturološki pokazatelji odnosa među republikama
Raspad
Centralisti i ustavorušitelji
Znakovi promjena i ustavobranitelji u Hrvatskoj.
Nacionalni sastav partijsko-državnih struktura
„Politički kriminal" i progoni.
Raspad Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije
Suverena i samostalna Hrvatska
Г
Staatsbibliothek
I
DAVOR
Zemljopisno okružje.
Sudionici.
Hrvatske snage
Jugoslavenska narodna armija
Vojna sila pobunjenih Srba
Ratni planovi.
Jugoslavenska narodna armija.
Hrvatska vojska.
Srpska vojska Krajine
Od demokratskih izbora do Sarajevskog primirja
Istočnoslavonsko bojište
Zapadnoslavonsko bojište
Banovinsko-pokupsko bojište
Pokupski pravac
Karlovačko-kordunsko bojište
Ličko bojište
Sjevernodalmatinsko bojište
Pomorsko bojište.
Južno bojište
Od Sarajevskog primirja do operacije Zima
Južno bojište
Posavsko bojište
Operacija Gusar {Zima
Medačka operacija
Hrvatska i Bosna i Hercegovina.
Hrvatska i rat u Bosni i Hercegovini
Angažman Hrvatske vojske u bošnjačko-hrvatskom ratu
Od operacije Zima
Operacija
Operacija. Oluja
Sektor Banovina.
Sektor Kordun
Sektor Lika
Sektor Dalmacija
Djelovanje zrakoplovstva
Obavještajni rad
Odlazak Srba i rad Vojne policije protiv nedoličnog ponašanja.
Završne operacije.».,···.··.··.,,,.,.,.,.,.,,,,.,.,.,.,,
NIKICA BARIĆ
Srpska manjina u Hrvatskoj i njezino pristajanje us politiku Slobodana Miloševića.,,,.,.,
Temeljni podatci
Instrumentalizacija dijela hrvatskih Srba za Miloševićevu politiku tijekom
Višestranački izbori u Hrvatskoj
Povećanje napetosti nakon prvih višestranačkih izbora u Hrvatskoj
Osnivanje Zajednice općina sjeverne Dalmacije i Like.
Amandmani na hrvatski Ustav kao novi povod srpskog nezadovoljstava
Pobuna u kninskoj policiji
Srpski sabor u Srbu i Deklaracija
Balvan-revolucija
Izjašnjavanje
Srpsko protivljenje novom Ustavu Republike Hrvatske.
Osnivanje i ustroj srpskih autonomnih oblasti na teritoriju Republike Hrvatske
Djelovanje vodstva
Srpska oblast Slavonija, Baranja i zapadni Srijem.
О
1991. -
Proglašenje Republike Srpske Krajine i Vanceov mirovni plan.
Vanceov mirovni plan
Sukob M. Babica i S. Miloševića oko prihvaćanja Vanceova plana
Još neka razmatranja
Glavni politički i vojni događaji
Raspoređivanje UNPROFOR-a i stanje do kraja
Novi sukobi tijekom
RSK i rat u Bosni i Hercegovini.
Planovi ujedinjenja RSK i Republike Srpske
Slučaj Veljka Džakule
Kraj
Obilježja političkog života u RSK
Skupštinski, predsjednički i općinski izbori
Prekid oružanih sukoba
Obilježja unutarnjeg ustroja RSK
Srpska vojska Krajine
Stanje javne sigurnosti u RSK
Gospodarski i društveni problemi u RSK
Slom Republike Srpske Krajine
Sukobi u vodstvu RSK tijekom
PlanZ-4
Sukobi u vodstvu RSK tijekom
Hrvatske vojne akcije Bljesak
Još neka razmatranja
Odlazak pobunjenih Srba tijekom Oluje i
Kretanje broja Srba u Hrvatskoj
ALBERT
Uvodne napomene
Međunarodne prilike uoči raspada Jugoslavije
Jugoslavija početkom devedesetih godina
i jačanje republika
Pregovori jugoslavenskih čelnika
Prijetnje vojnim pučem i držanje međunarodne zajednice
Internacionalizacijom jugoslavenske krize protiv vojnog puča i velikosrpske dominacije
Stjecanje međunarodnog priznanja Hrvatske od
Uključivanje međunarodne zajednice u jugoslavensku krizu.
Kontroverzije posjeta američkog državnog tajnika Jamesa
Europska zajednica preuzima inicijativu
Mirovne konferencije u
Vanceov plan i međunarodno priznanje Hrvatske
Razdoblje utvrđivanja suvereniteta i pozicioniranja Hrvatske u međunarodnoj
zajednici
Međunarodno priznanje Hrvatske
Pristupanje KESS-u i UN-u i priznavanje državne samostalnosti od SAD-a
Političke prilike u Hrvatskoj i međunarodna zajednica nakon međunarodnog priznanja.„332
Međunarodna zajednica, Hrvatska i prenošenje rata u BiH
Postavke hrvatske službene politike prema BiH
Prilike u BiH i pozicije bosanskohercegovačke vlade početkom
Mirovne inicijative EZ-a i sukobi unutar međunarodne zajednice
Pogoršavanje međunarodnog položaja Hrvatske
Poklapanje hrvatsko-američkih interesa
Aktiviranje američke diplomacije i Hrvatska
Prijetnja sankcijama Hrvatskoj, američka inicijativa i „povijesni preokret" početkom 1994.368
Washingtonski
Međunarodne okolnosti i inicijative nakon
PlanZ-4
Najava otkaza UNPROFOR-u
Ofenziva Hrvata i Bošnjaka u BiH i operacije Bljesak i Oluja
Hrvatska
Daytonski
Međunarodni položaj Hrvatske od
Podunavlja
Međunarodni položaj Hrvatske nakon
Suradnja Hrvatske
Problemi demokratizacije i međunarodni položaj Hrvatske
Vanjska politika Republike Hrvatske
DRAŽEN
DOMOVINSKOG RATA I PORAĆA
Uvodne napomene
Metodologija istraživanja demografskih gubitaka i izvori podataka.«»».·.«.·.
Pojmovno određenje demografskih gubitaka.·.
Osvrt na prijeratna demografska kretanja u Hrvatskoj
Etnička struktura stanovništva kao odrednica rata.
Prijeratne demografske značajke područja Hrvatske zahvaćenih srbijanskom agresijom
Izravni demografski gubitci (ratni mortalitet)
Nedobrovoljne ili prisilne migracije stanovništva.
Čisti demografski gubitci (gubitci nataliteta)
Ukupni demografski ratni gubitci i neke njegove posljedice
Sažetak
PRILOZI
KRONOLOGIJA: HRVATSKA
SUMMARY
Literatura
popis kratica
kazalo osobnih imena
kazalo zemljopisnih imena
bi lješke
Summary
Essential factors that had brought about the disintegration of Yugoslavia as a
state were the fall of the authoritarian powers and the end of the Communist
Party dictatorship, Croatia and Slovenia's striving for independence, the
strengthening of the Great Serbian forces in Serbia, Montenegro and among a
large portion of Serbs living in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina who had
found its leader in the person of Slobodan Milosevic, the general demise of
the world communist system and the deterioration of the economic situation.
The loss of monopoly the Yugoslav Communist Party had over the society and
a deep economic crisis favoured the development of political pluralism whose
forces strove to maximise the different interests of the individual republics, with
national issues and the question of state independence as chief agenda, especially
in Croatia, Slovenia and Serbia,
Conflict-ridden nations and republics pushed the issues of democracy into the
background, and their resolution would be directly related to the manner in
which the crisis was resolved. This meant that the solution would be found either
by negotiations or in a military conflict. Events that had marked the years up
to
for as great an autonomy as possible, even for a full independence, whereas
Serbia was determined to maintain a situation in which all members of the
Serbian nation would live in the same state. It is now clear that five decades of
communist rule had not had any greater effect on the resolution of the national
issues, with everyone, including the multi-party supporters and those opposed
to it, aware that in the conditions of a multi-party democracy the paramount
issue to be discussed would be that of national independence.
The manner in which Yugoslavia fell apart at the seams and the bloody war
proved that not only were the fifty-year old goals of the Communist Party not
realised, but that their solution was not even a matter of consideration in the
conflict. It was evident that the war had not broken out because of the issues
plaguing communism and the structuring of a classless society, but because
of the national issues and issues of statehood, which were as old as Yugoslavia
itself.
In the
position of Serbia within Yugoslavia. Slobodan Milosevic became the leader of
Serbia's Communist Party and his chief efforts were to centralise Yugoslavia and
514
SUMMARY
enforce Serbian domination. As part of this effort, Belgrade established firm
control in Kosovo and
to espouse the theory that Serbs were endangered in Croatia. As a consequence,
many Serbs in Croatia joined Milosevic's mass movement in
Milosevic enjoyed a growing support of the Yugoslav Army in which the greatest
number of higher staff were of Serbian nationality. The Army, too, was uneasy
about the immanent downfall of communism and held a view that Yugoslavia
should be structured as a centralised state.
Early in
attempt to take control over the Party failed, opposed by the delegates from
Slovenia and Croatia. The result was that the Party was disbanded, which meant
a rapid forming of non-communist political parties in the whole of Yugoslavia
and elections in all the republics. In continuation of these events, Milosevic
altered his politics and, instead of attempting to take control over the entire
territory of Yugoslavia, he began enforcing his idea of'all Serbs in one state'.
His condition was that if the republics wished to remain in a loose Yugoslav
federation or become independent, they would not be allowed to keep as part
of their territory those regions inhabited by Serb population. This condition,
of course, applied to Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The victory of the Croatian Democratic Union, headed by
in the
that Serbs were an endangered nation in Croatia. It is true that certain political
moves of the new Croatian government did antagonise the Serbs, but they used
even most minor pretexts to justify their aggressive actions.
Soon after the coming into power of the Croatian Democratic Union, the
leaders of the Serbian Democratic Party, supported by Belgrade, initiated the
institution of a Serbian autonomy in Croatia. In effect, the intention was not
to have an autonomy within Croatia, but to prepare for a future, new Croatian-
Serbian demarcation. Territories under Serbian autonomy in Croatia were
to remain, in the event of Croatia's independence, in a new Yugoslav state
structured to enable Serbian domination. In
in north
union would be organised as the Serbian Autonomous District called
Early in
of
Babić
president of the
515
Stvaranih hrvatske države i Domovinski rat
Banija,
in the course of
Krajina.
up, smaller local Serbian communities within municipalities were annexed to
municipalities with Serbian majority.
A similar process was in progress in Western
Autonomous District called Western
the same occurred in the eastern part of Croatia where, eventually, Serbian
District Eastern
1991,
and annexed them to the Republic of Serbia, thus opting to stay in the future
Yugoslav state.
Faced with an ever-growing pressure from Serbian leaders and the Yugoslav
Army, and unable to negotiate a solution to the Yugoslav crisis, Slovenia
and Croatia proclaimed their independence on 25th June
government based the proclamation on the referendum held in May
when the majority of Croatian citizens declared their desire for independence,
i.e. for a transformation of Yugoslavia into an alliance of independent states.
After a brief military intervention in Slovenia in the summer of
of the Yugoslav Army spread to Croatia, already plagued by a Serb uprising.
Croatia became the victim of a terrible ethnic cleansing and of an unprecedented
destruction of Croatian territories.
By the end of
of the future Republic of Serbian
internationally recognised as an independent state, with its territory marked by
the borders established in the period of Yugoslav federation. The decision of the
international community to recognise Yugoslav republics, territorially defined
by their existing borders and adhering to the principle that borders cannot be
changed by force, thwarted Belgrade's attempts to annex the territories under
Serb control to the new Yugoslav state.
The war, lasting between
Army and a majority of Serbs living in Croatia, with direct support extended by
Serbia. In the war every possible means was used to achieve ethnically cleansed
territories.
The first part of the war, from May
1992,
new territory for Greater Serbia. In the first phase, from mid-May
516
SUMMARY
the beginning of March
units and strategically deployed its forces. In August
revolution broke out, arising after Croatia's police forces attempted to relocate
part of the police arms from police stations on the territories of Northern
Dalmaţia
questionable. This action caused the Serbs to place obstructions on the roads
connecting
Yugoslav Army prevented the intervention of the Croatian police and thus
fostered the forming and strengthening of
declared that it was preventing nationally based conflicts, but in reality it was a
shield for the Serbian rebels, frustrating Croatian police forces in their efforts
to protect the territorial integrity of Croatia. General
in this period the chief goal of Yugoslav Army was to protect Serbs in Croatia
'from attacks of Croatian armed formations', to assist them in their efforts to
Organise themselves for defence' and to prepare 'Yugoslav Army for the war with
Croatia when Croatia starts a war against Yugoslav Army'.
The second phase continued from early March to the beginning of July
In this phase Serb rebels tried to extend
were a majority or made up a significant segment of the population. Yugoslav
Army forces became their protector and assumed another role, that of a chief
participant in the same undertaking. The Army was always there to help Serb
rebels and to thwart the actions of the Croatian forces. This phase of the war
was marked by fighting in
The third phase of the joint actions undertaken by Yugoslav Army and Serb
rebels against Croatia began in July
they called themselves, switched from verbal threats to efficiently organised
actions of crime and ethnic cleansing. Violent crimes proved most effective
in accomplishing the Serbs' chief goal to cleanse the territory of Croats and
other non-Serb population. The formula suited Yugoslav Army, too, but it
continued to declare itself as a neutral factor whose task was no more than to
create 'buffer zones'. In effect, the Army's involvement in supporting the rebels
and insurgent Serbian gangs grew to a generous assistance in their criminal
business. In September
enforcement of the ethnic cleansing policy. Attacks on Croatia began in mid-
September with the aim to withdraw the Army's forces from the territories that
were not in the plans for Greater Serbia, and to deploy them along the planned
future borders.
517
Stvaranje hrvatske države i Domovinski rat
In early October, it was clear to the Yugoslav Army command that the offensive
on Croatia had failed. Future would show that this was the beginning of the
end of the idea of a Serb state on Croatian territory. In addition to poor and
insufficient mobilisation, another crucial cause of the defeat was the failure to
deploy a mechanised division along the line connecting
division was to bring victory to Serbs on the Eastern
Army gave up the plan to defeat the Croatian Army and opted for the occupation
of the 'Serb' territories. It was painfully obvious that its role was not to 'prevent
nationally based conflicts'. The excuse that it was fighting for the de-blocking
of its barracks made no sense in
existed and where there were no endangered Serbs to protect', as lord Carrington
observed.
was the largest obstacle for the Army, taking two months to seize. Aware of
its defeat, Yugoslav Army kept emphasising in its promotional activities that
Vukovar
is today shared by a segment of the Croatian public, which continues to believe
that if
According to them, the fall of
taken at the highest level. They also tend to expound the conviction that top-
level political forces in Croatia had influence not only over what was happening
on the Croatian side, but also controlled the attackers' side.
Despite the fact that, with the exception of
until late August
during the short war in Slovenia, mass desertions continued from Yugoslav
Army, greatly reducing its fighting power. This facilitated attacks on the
barracks and confiscation of arms and military equipment, which amounted
to quantities sufficient to outfit a corps. The captured arms were sufficient to
stop Yugoslav Army and establish new relations which would force Yugoslav
Army to undertake a great reorganisation. No reorganisation in fact took place
due to the irreconcilable differences in the views held by the Army and those
held by Serbia's top politicians on strategic goals to be accomplished. The happy
consequence was that, even with a short supply of equipment and ammunition,
Croatia won its international recognition undefeated. This victory and the
Sarajevo cease fire marked the end of one of the phases of the war.
The second part of the war covers the period from Sarajevo Agreement in
January
this period (involving Croatian side and uncontrolled actions of some of its local
commanders), with periods of cease fire of relatively long duration. The focus
518
SUMMARY
of the crisis had moved to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Croatian Army continually
provided assistance to Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and one of the
strategic consequences of their activity was the survival of the Muslims in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. The greatest successes of the Croatian Army in this period
include the stabilisation and maintaining of the defence line at
and in the
At the same time, the greatest defeat of Croatian armed forces took place in
Bosanska Posavina
people, was lost through a political decision and not in field fighting.
In this stage of the war, Croatian forces liberated the south of Croatia and
stopped Serbs from Bosnia and. Herzegovina in their attempt to take over the
positions held until then by Yugoslav Army. In the course of
Army carried out two major operations. It demonstrated its power in the
Maslenica operation, but in the
esteem of the influential members of the international community.
In the second half of
Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bosnian Army, which initiated
the conflict at the beginning
different views on the political structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina and in
the desire to gain military predominance. Although small in number, these
forces played a significant psychological role and caused a perception on the
international scene that Croatia's military actions were equal in intent to those
undertaken by Serbia. Until the end of
the most part, busy building up its professional forces and training its reserve
outfits.
In December
that continued until the end of
district forces defeated at
of the Serbian Republic forces, and seized
This helped to create a more favourable situation for the liberation of
The operation Flash completely defeated Serbs' 18th corps, and in the Storm
operation most of the occupied and rebelling territories were brought once
again under Croatia's control. After the Storm followed a series of operations
in Bosnia and Herzegovina in which Croatian Army, Croatian Defence Council
and Bosnian Army occupied the territory, which, according to the stand of
the influential international circles, belonged to the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina,
S
Stvaran¡t hrvatske države i domovinski rat
On 19th
incorporating Serbian Autonomous District
Serbian District
the creation of the Serb rebels residing in Croatia. The above territories were
under a direct control of Serbia, i.e. Yugoslavia, as Belgrade continually sent
aid to Serb rebels whose para-state could not have survived without assistance
from Serbia.
Late in
the deployment of the UN peace forces on the territories in Croatia occupied
by Yugoslav Army and Serb rebels. The peace plan brought an end to the
fighting, but it did not offer a political solution that would be a base for future
negotiations. Yugoslav Army leaders and Milosevic gave a green light to this
plan, assured that with the arrival of the UN forces their territorial acquisitions
in Croatia would be cemented. Zagreb hoped that the peace plan would help
return Croatian refugees and displaced persons to the territories under Serb
control, which were also to be demilitarised under the supervision of the UN
forces. These would be the steps required to reintegrate the occupied territories
and bring them under Croatia's control.
The peace plan gave rise to a sharp disagreement between Milosevic and the first
president of the Republic of Serbian
representative of Eastern Slavonian Serbs, would take his place. Babies stand
was that the acceptance of the peace plan meant a betrayal of Serbs' interest in
the area, but the truth was that, under the circumstances, Milosevic had, in fact,
secured a maximum for Serb rebels in Croatia. As it turned out, the UN forces
had no power to alter the status quo and they, in effect, helped to continue it.
The peace plan was realised only in so far as it referred to the cease fire, while
nothing was done to bring back Croatian refugees and displaced persons. Serbs
could entertain the hope that Croatia would become another Cyprus and that
the status quo would continue indefinitely.
During the cease fire in Croatia and the deployment of the UN forces, conflicts
were in
new Yugoslav state, Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, in the aggression
on Bosnia and Herzegovina forced the international community to bring
economic sanctions against Yugoslavia. This made Belgrade re-examine the
political aspects of unlimited aid to the Serbs in Croatia and those in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. Milosevic was forced to make compromises and give up the
maximum of the previously defined Serbian goals. In early
liberated part of the
520
Summary
Zagreb that the status quo would not change during the inefficient mandate of
the UN forces. At this time, Serb rebel leaders rejected any serious negotiations
with Croatia, The only acceptable solution for them was that the Republic of
Serbian
with Bosnian Serbs, Serbia and Montenegro into a new Serbian state. In the
course of
Serb rebels, which, to a great extent, depleted the rebels' modest strengths.
Milosevic understood well that international sanctions brought against
Yugoslavia posed a threat to his power and would be lifted only if Serbs in Bosnia
and Herzegovina were to accept initiatives to bring an end to the war. This
entailed that they would have to leave the territories they had seized in
Milosevic was in a permanent disagreement with Serb leaders in Bosnia and
Herzegovina who refused to comply with this scheme. Milosevic also understood
that the leaders of
renewed fighting between the Serbs and the Croatian forces in Croatia had
exhausted their strengths. In late
elections were held in
to those loyal to Milosevic. Milan
became the new president of
prime minister. The more rigid circles among the rebels would continually
accuse
it into Croatia, In fact,
compromises. Milosevic encouraged Bosnian Serbs to accept international peace
plans which would bring an end to the fighting in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Mikelić
fire was signed again between Zagreb and Serb rebels, and
the mission to negotiate with Croatia the reconstruction of the infrastructure.
The Serbs' readiness to cooperate with the international community would
rob Croatia of the opportunity to carry out the
territories through military action, enabling the Serbs to maintain the status quo
or to gain a wide-based autonomy within Croatia. In such a sequence of events
Milosevic would not need to fight another war with Croatia to defend
which he, squeezed by the international sanctions, had no intention of doing. If
Bosnian Serbs agreed to the international peace initiatives, sanctions would be
lifted and Krajina's readiness to negotiate would reduce the chance of a military
confrontation with Croatia. All this, with a certain amount of compromise,
would secure for the Serbian side a more favourable position.
STVARANJE HRVATSKE DRŽAVE
Many of the rebels could not comprehend that, by sending
was in fact trying to help. Their firm intent was to reject all solutions except
that of an independent
Martie,
In May
leadership was swayed by the dominance of those supporting a union with the
Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
In late
Plan Z'4 that would grant many rights to the Serbs who had been living before
the war in regions where Serbs constituted the majority of the population.
However,
defeat.
From the economic point of view, the Republic of Serbian
of a long-term survival. It was ripped out of the established economic routes
that were now directed to other parts of Croatia. Krajina's western territory was
almost totally isolated, both in terms of economy and in communications. Lack
of resources in
and justice system, leading to a complete breakdown. As the population had no
employment and thus no income, many turned to smuggling and robbing, and
living, for the most part, on humanitarian aid. Widespread crime was proof
that Krajina's social tissue was deteriorating. The situation being what it was,
the few Croats still living in rebel zones were exposed to many different forms
of terror exercised by individuals and uncontrolled groups, who were not and
could not be stopped by
For the entire duration of the Republic of Serbian
continued to receive substantial aid from Yugoslav Army, but a terrible economic
situation that forced many young people, subject to conscription, to leave the
territory, lead to the dissipation of the army and a general lack of enthusiasm.
Krajina's Serbs were disappointed with Milosevic, not because he had
encouraged them to start the war against Croatia but because he could not or, as
they erroneously believed, did not wish to help any longer. Their dissatisfaction
grew and their firm faith in the survival of
not mean that the Serb population was entertaining the thought of returning
within the borders of Croatia, Many Serbs were brainwashed into thinking of
Croats as enemy and Ustasha, not fit for co-existence. This was the reason that
in
zones into Croatia, Serbian population left the territory, with the evacuation
masterminded by Krajina's authorities. The resistance to the insurgence of much
522
Summary
stronger Croatian forces, determined to re-establish territorial integrity, was
weak and it was further decreased by the confusion among Krajina's Serbs.
Following the fall of the Republic of Serbian
agreed on in late
and Western
The independence of Croatia and its positioning within the international
community progressed in extremely complex circumstances in the region, in
Europe and world-wide. The fall of communism and the affirmation of political
pluralism in Eastern Europe led to the disintegration of the USSR and the
Warsaw Pact. The demolition of the Berlin Wall made redundant the bipolar
block constellation, while the announcement of a 'new world order', after the
American intervention in the Persian Gulf, made evident the need to redefine
international relations. In this new framework, Yugoslavia lost the importance
it had had during the cold war, and the chief goal of the leading European
states was to prevent the geo-political fragmentation of the Yugoslav state,
characterised as a dangerous precedent for the re-tailoring of borders and a
beginning of nationalist conflicts in post-communist Europe. The disintegration
of Yugoslavia coincided with the gathering of Western European states into the
European Community and with the emergence of strong, global integration
processes. Such diametrically opposed developments made the West view as
dangerous nationalist aspirations in Yugoslavia that would potentially run
against the OESS goals.
Faced with Serbia's nationalist and communist ambitions and the international
community's unfavourable stand regarding the compromised territorial
integrity of Yugoslavia, Croatia and Slovenia strove to bring Yugoslav crisis
to the international attention. Independent, albeit informal, appearances
of the democratically elected new governments became frequent and the
republics began presenting themselves as independent geo-political entities,
Yugoslav Army's attack on Slovenia and the war in Croatia gradually turned
the international community's sympathies to the obvious victims of Yugoslav
conflicts.
The ethnic cleansing policy carried out by Serb rebels, Yugoslav Army and
paramilitary formations from Serbia and Montenegro, and a strong Croatian
resistance resulted in the end in the tipping of the scale in favour of national
self-determination, which was opposed in idea to the preservation of Yugoslavia.
It was clear that the proclaimed non-involvement in the internal affairs of a
sovereign state had only encouraged extremism and terror. The international
community was divided on the subject of Yugoslav crisis. The USA was
523
Stvaranje hrvatske države i domovinski rat
displaying a sort of withdrawal and isolationism, so the initiative to resolve the
conflicts was taken by the European Community states. Germany, Austria
and the Vatican supported Slovenia and Croatia, whereas Great Britain and
France were more inclined to support the Serbian and Yugoslav Army block.
International recognition of the independent Croatian state was acceptable
under the condition that Vance's peace plan was accepted and UN peace forces
deployed on Croatia's occupied territories.
When the fighting moved to Bosnia and Herzegovina and the efforts to round up
ethnic Serbian territories' were under way, the international community could
not effectively stop the war. Despite its new status of independence, Croatia
did not fully realise its sovereignty because Vance's plan was not implemented.
Croatia's political decisions had to respect international policies towards
Bosnia and Herzegovina. From
in Bosnia and Herzegovina was substantial, its key agents being the president
of Croatia,
Democratic Union. Negotiations with Serbs and Muslims-Bosnians, conducted
simultaneously with the inconsistent peace initiatives of the International
Conference on Former Yugoslavia, brought no results. To make matters worse,
the second half of
and Bosnians,
This sequence of events suited the Great Serbian strategy of chaos manufacture,
i.e. of describing the fighting as 'the war of all against all'. Such a view of the war
was desired and even encouraged by international mediators. Their reason for
doing so was clearly to justify their inefficiency and to confirm the thesis that
it was a civil war, based on ethnic and religious differences in which all sides
bore equal responsibility, and thus a military intervention would mean taking
a side. Only after the USA had gradually joined the peace-making process,
Croat-Muslim alliance was renewed and military victories in Croatia and Bosnia
and Herzegovina followed, ending with the Dayton Peace Agreement in
Despite the fact that none of the sides were satisfied with the Dayton solution,
the three-year-long war was stopped and the process of stabilisation in the region
could begin.
After Dayton, where an agreement was reached on a peaceful
of Croatia's Danube region, Croatia, being a chief American ally, earned
favourable international esteem. However, a lack of will exhibited by the
Croatian government to accept the values of political pluralism became more
than evident. In the post-Dayton period, from
community, headed by the USA, exerted a strong pressure on Croatia to accept
524
SUMMARY
democratic standards and, in particular, to opt for an active cooperation with
the International Tribunal in the Hague, Acts of opposition to these general
guidelines brought on the isolation of Croatia and slowed down its efforts to
join the Euro-Atlantic integrations.
Franjo
politics in the
democratic changes was a decisive factor in the creation of the Croatian state
and in the resistance to the Serbian aggression. However, some aspects of
his activities exhibited ideological elements directed against the West, They
constituted a synthesis of inherited communist values and traces of nationalist
radicalism, justified as an effort to achieve national conciliation. He was not
perceived by the West as a democrat, American political circles did not have
a great regard for him, stamping him with a seal of eager nationalism. Be that
as it may,
American political goals on the post-Yugoslavia territories and a reliable ally,
especially after the signing of a military cooperation agreement between Croatia
and the USA, In accepting an alliance with the Bosnians, assisted by American
mediation, the conflict between Croats and Bosnians was brought to an end.
This meant a radical turn in Croatia's foreign policy, which led to peace in
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the establishment of Croatian rule and its full
sovereignty on all Croatian territories.
Loss of life in the war in Croatia came close to
9,500
persons. The overall demographic loss was close to
demographic loss had short-term demographic consequences, but in the long
run it will be difficult to overcome. In early
with a great natural depopulation, and from
drop in population of as many as
Natural depopulation, emigration caused by war and economic situation, and
loss of life during the war brought about a decrease in the number of population.
Between
figures by
loss was
criterion it was
a corrective, making the depopulation figures less alarming. Between
2001,
232,966
that even before the war displayed unfavourable demographic tendencies. Of
Stvaranu hrvatske države i Domovinski rat
the
in the overall population was recorded only in Zagreb County, Brod-Posavina
County,
was recorded in the war-ridden Lika-Senj, Sisak-Moslavina,
Osijek-Baranja,
Demographic losses greatly affected Croatia's ethno-demographic picture.
One of the changes was an ethnic homogenisation, with a strengthening of the
Croatian ethnic majority. Despite a strong overall depopulation, the percentage
of Croats in the country's overall population is higher. It has increased from
78.10%
to
movements, i.e. for the most part by Serb emigration, while the absolute
demographic growth is the consequence of the streams of Croatian refugees and
immigrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina and from Serbia. This immigration
compensated for the population migration and other demographic losses caused
by the war. The increase in the number of Croats can also be explained by the
assimilation of other ethnic communities and de-Yugoslavisation of a segment
of the population.
526 |
| adam_txt |
Uvodna napomena
zdenko
Komunistička vlast
Partizanski pokret
Komunistička diktatura
Komunisti i religija
Komunisti i tradicija
Socijalna revolucija
Federalizam i centralizam
Međunacionalni odnosi
Samoupravljanje
Granice
Razilaženja
Gospodarske reforme 1960-ih
Nacije i jugoslavenstvo
Nacionalna struktura državnih i partijskih tijela
Pad Aleksandra Ranko vica
„Stara" i „nova" ljevica
Hrvatsko proljeće
Hrvatska otvara pitanje ravnopravnosti u Jugoslaviji
Ústavnoprávna
Nacionalna ravnopravnost
Jezik i identitet
Gospodarsko pitanje
Migracije u inozemstvo.
Kraj hrvatskog proljeća
Posljedice hrvatskog proljeća
Konfederalizacija,.,.,,.,,.,.,.
Ustav
Zakon
Gospodarska i politička kriza
Jugoslavenski socijalizam: rezultati i usporedbe,.
Gospodarski pokazatelji odnosa među republikama.
Demografsko-kulturološki pokazatelji odnosa među republikama
Raspad
Centralisti i ustavorušitelji
Znakovi promjena i ustavobranitelji u Hrvatskoj.
Nacionalni sastav partijsko-državnih struktura
„Politički kriminal" i progoni.
Raspad Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije
Suverena i samostalna Hrvatska
Г
Staatsbibliothek
I
DAVOR
Zemljopisno okružje.
Sudionici.
Hrvatske snage
Jugoslavenska narodna armija
Vojna sila pobunjenih Srba
Ratni planovi.
Jugoslavenska narodna armija.
Hrvatska vojska.
Srpska vojska Krajine
Od demokratskih izbora do Sarajevskog primirja
Istočnoslavonsko bojište
Zapadnoslavonsko bojište
Banovinsko-pokupsko bojište
Pokupski pravac
Karlovačko-kordunsko bojište
Ličko bojište
Sjevernodalmatinsko bojište
Pomorsko bojište.
Južno bojište
Od Sarajevskog primirja do operacije Zima
Južno bojište
Posavsko bojište
Operacija Gusar {Zima
Medačka operacija
Hrvatska i Bosna i Hercegovina.
Hrvatska i rat u Bosni i Hercegovini
Angažman Hrvatske vojske u bošnjačko-hrvatskom ratu
Od operacije Zima
Operacija
Operacija. Oluja
Sektor Banovina.
Sektor Kordun
Sektor Lika
Sektor Dalmacija
Djelovanje zrakoplovstva
Obavještajni rad
Odlazak Srba i rad Vojne policije protiv nedoličnog ponašanja.
Završne operacije.».,···.··.··.,,,.,.,.,.,.,,,,.,.,.,.,,
NIKICA BARIĆ
Srpska manjina u Hrvatskoj i njezino pristajanje us politiku Slobodana Miloševića.,,,.,.,
Temeljni podatci
Instrumentalizacija dijela hrvatskih Srba za Miloševićevu politiku tijekom
Višestranački izbori u Hrvatskoj
Povećanje napetosti nakon prvih višestranačkih izbora u Hrvatskoj
Osnivanje Zajednice općina sjeverne Dalmacije i Like.
Amandmani na hrvatski Ustav kao novi povod srpskog nezadovoljstava
Pobuna u kninskoj policiji
Srpski sabor u Srbu i Deklaracija
Balvan-revolucija
Izjašnjavanje
Srpsko protivljenje novom Ustavu Republike Hrvatske.
Osnivanje i ustroj srpskih autonomnih oblasti na teritoriju Republike Hrvatske
Djelovanje vodstva
Srpska oblast Slavonija, Baranja i zapadni Srijem.
О
1991. -
Proglašenje Republike Srpske Krajine i Vanceov mirovni plan.
Vanceov mirovni plan
Sukob M. Babica i S. Miloševića oko prihvaćanja Vanceova plana
Još neka razmatranja
Glavni politički i vojni događaji
Raspoređivanje UNPROFOR-a i stanje do kraja
Novi sukobi tijekom
RSK i rat u Bosni i Hercegovini.
Planovi ujedinjenja RSK i Republike Srpske
Slučaj Veljka Džakule
Kraj
Obilježja političkog života u RSK
Skupštinski, predsjednički i općinski izbori
Prekid oružanih sukoba
Obilježja unutarnjeg ustroja RSK
Srpska vojska Krajine
Stanje javne sigurnosti u RSK
Gospodarski i društveni problemi u RSK
Slom Republike Srpske Krajine
Sukobi u vodstvu RSK tijekom
PlanZ-4
Sukobi u vodstvu RSK tijekom
Hrvatske vojne akcije Bljesak
Još neka razmatranja
Odlazak pobunjenih Srba tijekom Oluje i
Kretanje broja Srba u Hrvatskoj
ALBERT
Uvodne napomene
Međunarodne prilike uoči raspada Jugoslavije
Jugoslavija početkom devedesetih godina
i jačanje republika
Pregovori jugoslavenskih čelnika
Prijetnje vojnim pučem i držanje međunarodne zajednice
Internacionalizacijom jugoslavenske krize protiv vojnog puča i velikosrpske dominacije
Stjecanje međunarodnog priznanja Hrvatske od
Uključivanje međunarodne zajednice u jugoslavensku krizu.
Kontroverzije posjeta američkog državnog tajnika Jamesa
Europska zajednica preuzima inicijativu
Mirovne konferencije u
Vanceov plan i međunarodno priznanje Hrvatske
Razdoblje utvrđivanja suvereniteta i pozicioniranja Hrvatske u međunarodnoj
zajednici
Međunarodno priznanje Hrvatske
Pristupanje KESS-u i UN-u i priznavanje državne samostalnosti od SAD-a
Političke prilike u Hrvatskoj i međunarodna zajednica nakon međunarodnog priznanja.„332
Međunarodna zajednica, Hrvatska i prenošenje rata u BiH
Postavke hrvatske službene politike prema BiH
Prilike u BiH i pozicije bosanskohercegovačke vlade početkom
Mirovne inicijative EZ-a i sukobi unutar međunarodne zajednice
Pogoršavanje međunarodnog položaja Hrvatske
Poklapanje hrvatsko-američkih interesa
Aktiviranje američke diplomacije i Hrvatska
Prijetnja sankcijama Hrvatskoj, američka inicijativa i „povijesni preokret" početkom 1994.368
Washingtonski
Međunarodne okolnosti i inicijative nakon
PlanZ-4
Najava otkaza UNPROFOR-u
Ofenziva Hrvata i Bošnjaka u BiH i operacije Bljesak i Oluja
Hrvatska
Daytonski
Međunarodni položaj Hrvatske od
Podunavlja
Međunarodni položaj Hrvatske nakon
Suradnja Hrvatske
Problemi demokratizacije i međunarodni položaj Hrvatske
Vanjska politika Republike Hrvatske
DRAŽEN
DOMOVINSKOG RATA I PORAĆA
Uvodne napomene
Metodologija istraživanja demografskih gubitaka i izvori podataka.«»».·.«.·.
Pojmovno određenje demografskih gubitaka.·.
Osvrt na prijeratna demografska kretanja u Hrvatskoj
Etnička struktura stanovništva kao odrednica rata.
Prijeratne demografske značajke područja Hrvatske zahvaćenih srbijanskom agresijom
Izravni demografski gubitci (ratni mortalitet)
Nedobrovoljne ili prisilne migracije stanovništva.
Čisti demografski gubitci (gubitci nataliteta)
Ukupni demografski ratni gubitci i neke njegove posljedice
Sažetak
PRILOZI
KRONOLOGIJA: HRVATSKA
SUMMARY
Literatura
popis kratica
kazalo osobnih imena
kazalo zemljopisnih imena
bi lješke
Summary
Essential factors that had brought about the disintegration of Yugoslavia as a
state were the fall of the authoritarian powers and the end of the Communist
Party dictatorship, Croatia and Slovenia's striving for independence, the
strengthening of the Great Serbian forces in Serbia, Montenegro and among a
large portion of Serbs living in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina who had
found its leader in the person of Slobodan Milosevic, the general demise of
the world communist system and the deterioration of the economic situation.
The loss of monopoly the Yugoslav Communist Party had over the society and
a deep economic crisis favoured the development of political pluralism whose
forces strove to maximise the different interests of the individual republics, with
national issues and the question of state independence as chief agenda, especially
in Croatia, Slovenia and Serbia,
Conflict-ridden nations and republics pushed the issues of democracy into the
background, and their resolution would be directly related to the manner in
which the crisis was resolved. This meant that the solution would be found either
by negotiations or in a military conflict. Events that had marked the years up
to
for as great an autonomy as possible, even for a full independence, whereas
Serbia was determined to maintain a situation in which all members of the
Serbian nation would live in the same state. It is now clear that five decades of
communist rule had not had any greater effect on the resolution of the national
issues, with everyone, including the multi-party supporters and those opposed
to it, aware that in the conditions of a multi-party democracy the paramount
issue to be discussed would be that of national independence.
The manner in which Yugoslavia fell apart at the seams and the bloody war
proved that not only were the fifty-year old goals of the Communist Party not
realised, but that their solution was not even a matter of consideration in the
conflict. It was evident that the war had not broken out because of the issues
plaguing communism and the structuring of a classless society, but because
of the national issues and issues of statehood, which were as old as Yugoslavia
itself.
In the
position of Serbia within Yugoslavia. Slobodan Milosevic became the leader of
Serbia's Communist Party and his chief efforts were to centralise Yugoslavia and
514
SUMMARY
enforce Serbian domination. As part of this effort, Belgrade established firm
control in Kosovo and
to espouse the theory that Serbs were endangered in Croatia. As a consequence,
many Serbs in Croatia joined Milosevic's mass movement in
Milosevic enjoyed a growing support of the Yugoslav Army in which the greatest
number of higher staff were of Serbian nationality. The Army, too, was uneasy
about the immanent downfall of communism and held a view that Yugoslavia
should be structured as a centralised state.
Early in
attempt to take control over the Party failed, opposed by the delegates from
Slovenia and Croatia. The result was that the Party was disbanded, which meant
a rapid forming of non-communist political parties in the whole of Yugoslavia
and elections in all the republics. In continuation of these events, Milosevic
altered his politics and, instead of attempting to take control over the entire
territory of Yugoslavia, he began enforcing his idea of'all Serbs in one state'.
His condition was that if the republics wished to remain in a loose Yugoslav
federation or become independent, they would not be allowed to keep as part
of their territory those regions inhabited by Serb population. This condition,
of course, applied to Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The victory of the Croatian Democratic Union, headed by
in the
that Serbs were an endangered nation in Croatia. It is true that certain political
moves of the new Croatian government did antagonise the Serbs, but they used
even most minor pretexts to justify their aggressive actions.
Soon after the coming into power of the Croatian Democratic Union, the
leaders of the Serbian Democratic Party, supported by Belgrade, initiated the
institution of a Serbian autonomy in Croatia. In effect, the intention was not
to have an autonomy within Croatia, but to prepare for a future, new Croatian-
Serbian demarcation. Territories under Serbian autonomy in Croatia were
to remain, in the event of Croatia's independence, in a new Yugoslav state
structured to enable Serbian domination. In
in north
union would be organised as the Serbian Autonomous District called
Early in
of
Babić
president of the
515
Stvaranih hrvatske države i Domovinski rat
Banija,
in the course of
Krajina.
up, smaller local Serbian communities within municipalities were annexed to
municipalities with Serbian majority.
A similar process was in progress in Western
Autonomous District called Western
the same occurred in the eastern part of Croatia where, eventually, Serbian
District Eastern
1991,
and annexed them to the Republic of Serbia, thus opting to stay in the future
Yugoslav state.
Faced with an ever-growing pressure from Serbian leaders and the Yugoslav
Army, and unable to negotiate a solution to the Yugoslav crisis, Slovenia
and Croatia proclaimed their independence on 25th June
government based the proclamation on the referendum held in May
when the majority of Croatian citizens declared their desire for independence,
i.e. for a transformation of Yugoslavia into an alliance of independent states.
After a brief military intervention in Slovenia in the summer of
of the Yugoslav Army spread to Croatia, already plagued by a Serb uprising.
Croatia became the victim of a terrible ethnic cleansing and of an unprecedented
destruction of Croatian territories.
By the end of
of the future Republic of Serbian
internationally recognised as an independent state, with its territory marked by
the borders established in the period of Yugoslav federation. The decision of the
international community to recognise Yugoslav republics, territorially defined
by their existing borders and adhering to the principle that borders cannot be
changed by force, thwarted Belgrade's attempts to annex the territories under
Serb control to the new Yugoslav state.
The war, lasting between
Army and a majority of Serbs living in Croatia, with direct support extended by
Serbia. In the war every possible means was used to achieve ethnically cleansed
territories.
The first part of the war, from May
1992,
new territory for Greater Serbia. In the first phase, from mid-May
516
SUMMARY
the beginning of March
units and strategically deployed its forces. In August
revolution broke out, arising after Croatia's police forces attempted to relocate
part of the police arms from police stations on the territories of Northern
Dalmaţia
questionable. This action caused the Serbs to place obstructions on the roads
connecting
Yugoslav Army prevented the intervention of the Croatian police and thus
fostered the forming and strengthening of
declared that it was preventing nationally based conflicts, but in reality it was a
shield for the Serbian rebels, frustrating Croatian police forces in their efforts
to protect the territorial integrity of Croatia. General
in this period the chief goal of Yugoslav Army was to protect Serbs in Croatia
'from attacks of Croatian armed formations', to assist them in their efforts to
Organise themselves for defence' and to prepare 'Yugoslav Army for the war with
Croatia when Croatia starts a war against Yugoslav Army'.
The second phase continued from early March to the beginning of July
In this phase Serb rebels tried to extend
were a majority or made up a significant segment of the population. Yugoslav
Army forces became their protector and assumed another role, that of a chief
participant in the same undertaking. The Army was always there to help Serb
rebels and to thwart the actions of the Croatian forces. This phase of the war
was marked by fighting in
The third phase of the joint actions undertaken by Yugoslav Army and Serb
rebels against Croatia began in July
they called themselves, switched from verbal threats to efficiently organised
actions of crime and ethnic cleansing. Violent crimes proved most effective
in accomplishing the Serbs' chief goal to cleanse the territory of Croats and
other non-Serb population. The formula suited Yugoslav Army, too, but it
continued to declare itself as a neutral factor whose task was no more than to
create 'buffer zones'. In effect, the Army's involvement in supporting the rebels
and insurgent Serbian gangs grew to a generous assistance in their criminal
business. In September
enforcement of the ethnic cleansing policy. Attacks on Croatia began in mid-
September with the aim to withdraw the Army's forces from the territories that
were not in the plans for Greater Serbia, and to deploy them along the planned
future borders.
517
Stvaranje hrvatske države i Domovinski rat
In early October, it was clear to the Yugoslav Army command that the offensive
on Croatia had failed. Future would show that this was the beginning of the
end of the idea of a Serb state on Croatian territory. In addition to poor and
insufficient mobilisation, another crucial cause of the defeat was the failure to
deploy a mechanised division along the line connecting
division was to bring victory to Serbs on the Eastern
Army gave up the plan to defeat the Croatian Army and opted for the occupation
of the 'Serb' territories. It was painfully obvious that its role was not to 'prevent
nationally based conflicts'. The excuse that it was fighting for the de-blocking
of its barracks made no sense in
existed and where there were no endangered Serbs to protect', as lord Carrington
observed.
was the largest obstacle for the Army, taking two months to seize. Aware of
its defeat, Yugoslav Army kept emphasising in its promotional activities that
Vukovar
is today shared by a segment of the Croatian public, which continues to believe
that if
According to them, the fall of
taken at the highest level. They also tend to expound the conviction that top-
level political forces in Croatia had influence not only over what was happening
on the Croatian side, but also controlled the attackers' side.
Despite the fact that, with the exception of
until late August
during the short war in Slovenia, mass desertions continued from Yugoslav
Army, greatly reducing its fighting power. This facilitated attacks on the
barracks and confiscation of arms and military equipment, which amounted
to quantities sufficient to outfit a corps. The captured arms were sufficient to
stop Yugoslav Army and establish new relations which would force Yugoslav
Army to undertake a great reorganisation. No reorganisation in fact took place
due to the irreconcilable differences in the views held by the Army and those
held by Serbia's top politicians on strategic goals to be accomplished. The happy
consequence was that, even with a short supply of equipment and ammunition,
Croatia won its international recognition undefeated. This victory and the
Sarajevo cease fire marked the end of one of the phases of the war.
The second part of the war covers the period from Sarajevo Agreement in
January
this period (involving Croatian side and uncontrolled actions of some of its local
commanders), with periods of cease fire of relatively long duration. The focus
518
SUMMARY
of the crisis had moved to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Croatian Army continually
provided assistance to Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and one of the
strategic consequences of their activity was the survival of the Muslims in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. The greatest successes of the Croatian Army in this period
include the stabilisation and maintaining of the defence line at
and in the
At the same time, the greatest defeat of Croatian armed forces took place in
Bosanska Posavina
people, was lost through a political decision and not in field fighting.
In this stage of the war, Croatian forces liberated the south of Croatia and
stopped Serbs from Bosnia and. Herzegovina in their attempt to take over the
positions held until then by Yugoslav Army. In the course of
Army carried out two major operations. It demonstrated its power in the
Maslenica operation, but in the
esteem of the influential members of the international community.
In the second half of
Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bosnian Army, which initiated
the conflict at the beginning
different views on the political structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina and in
the desire to gain military predominance. Although small in number, these
forces played a significant psychological role and caused a perception on the
international scene that Croatia's military actions were equal in intent to those
undertaken by Serbia. Until the end of
the most part, busy building up its professional forces and training its reserve
outfits.
In December
that continued until the end of
district forces defeated at
of the Serbian Republic forces, and seized
This helped to create a more favourable situation for the liberation of
The operation Flash completely defeated Serbs' 18th corps, and in the Storm
operation most of the occupied and rebelling territories were brought once
again under Croatia's control. After the Storm followed a series of operations
in Bosnia and Herzegovina in which Croatian Army, Croatian Defence Council
and Bosnian Army occupied the territory, which, according to the stand of
the influential international circles, belonged to the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina,
S
Stvaran¡t hrvatske države i domovinski rat
On 19th
incorporating Serbian Autonomous District
Serbian District
the creation of the Serb rebels residing in Croatia. The above territories were
under a direct control of Serbia, i.e. Yugoslavia, as Belgrade continually sent
aid to Serb rebels whose para-state could not have survived without assistance
from Serbia.
Late in
the deployment of the UN peace forces on the territories in Croatia occupied
by Yugoslav Army and Serb rebels. The peace plan brought an end to the
fighting, but it did not offer a political solution that would be a base for future
negotiations. Yugoslav Army leaders and Milosevic gave a green light to this
plan, assured that with the arrival of the UN forces their territorial acquisitions
in Croatia would be cemented. Zagreb hoped that the peace plan would help
return Croatian refugees and displaced persons to the territories under Serb
control, which were also to be demilitarised under the supervision of the UN
forces. These would be the steps required to reintegrate the occupied territories
and bring them under Croatia's control.
The peace plan gave rise to a sharp disagreement between Milosevic and the first
president of the Republic of Serbian
representative of Eastern Slavonian Serbs, would take his place. Babies stand
was that the acceptance of the peace plan meant a betrayal of Serbs' interest in
the area, but the truth was that, under the circumstances, Milosevic had, in fact,
secured a maximum for Serb rebels in Croatia. As it turned out, the UN forces
had no power to alter the status quo and they, in effect, helped to continue it.
The peace plan was realised only in so far as it referred to the cease fire, while
nothing was done to bring back Croatian refugees and displaced persons. Serbs
could entertain the hope that Croatia would become another Cyprus and that
the status quo would continue indefinitely.
During the cease fire in Croatia and the deployment of the UN forces, conflicts
were in
new Yugoslav state, Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, in the aggression
on Bosnia and Herzegovina forced the international community to bring
economic sanctions against Yugoslavia. This made Belgrade re-examine the
political aspects of unlimited aid to the Serbs in Croatia and those in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. Milosevic was forced to make compromises and give up the
maximum of the previously defined Serbian goals. In early
liberated part of the
520
Summary
Zagreb that the status quo would not change during the inefficient mandate of
the UN forces. At this time, Serb rebel leaders rejected any serious negotiations
with Croatia, The only acceptable solution for them was that the Republic of
Serbian
with Bosnian Serbs, Serbia and Montenegro into a new Serbian state. In the
course of
Serb rebels, which, to a great extent, depleted the rebels' modest strengths.
Milosevic understood well that international sanctions brought against
Yugoslavia posed a threat to his power and would be lifted only if Serbs in Bosnia
and Herzegovina were to accept initiatives to bring an end to the war. This
entailed that they would have to leave the territories they had seized in
Milosevic was in a permanent disagreement with Serb leaders in Bosnia and
Herzegovina who refused to comply with this scheme. Milosevic also understood
that the leaders of
renewed fighting between the Serbs and the Croatian forces in Croatia had
exhausted their strengths. In late
elections were held in
to those loyal to Milosevic. Milan
became the new president of
prime minister. The more rigid circles among the rebels would continually
accuse
it into Croatia, In fact,
compromises. Milosevic encouraged Bosnian Serbs to accept international peace
plans which would bring an end to the fighting in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Mikelić
fire was signed again between Zagreb and Serb rebels, and
the mission to negotiate with Croatia the reconstruction of the infrastructure.
The Serbs' readiness to cooperate with the international community would
rob Croatia of the opportunity to carry out the
territories through military action, enabling the Serbs to maintain the status quo
or to gain a wide-based autonomy within Croatia. In such a sequence of events
Milosevic would not need to fight another war with Croatia to defend
which he, squeezed by the international sanctions, had no intention of doing. If
Bosnian Serbs agreed to the international peace initiatives, sanctions would be
lifted and Krajina's readiness to negotiate would reduce the chance of a military
confrontation with Croatia. All this, with a certain amount of compromise,
would secure for the Serbian side a more favourable position.
STVARANJE HRVATSKE DRŽAVE
Many of the rebels could not comprehend that, by sending
was in fact trying to help. Their firm intent was to reject all solutions except
that of an independent
Martie,
In May
leadership was swayed by the dominance of those supporting a union with the
Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
In late
Plan Z'4 that would grant many rights to the Serbs who had been living before
the war in regions where Serbs constituted the majority of the population.
However,
defeat.
From the economic point of view, the Republic of Serbian
of a long-term survival. It was ripped out of the established economic routes
that were now directed to other parts of Croatia. Krajina's western territory was
almost totally isolated, both in terms of economy and in communications. Lack
of resources in
and justice system, leading to a complete breakdown. As the population had no
employment and thus no income, many turned to smuggling and robbing, and
living, for the most part, on humanitarian aid. Widespread crime was proof
that Krajina's social tissue was deteriorating. The situation being what it was,
the few Croats still living in rebel zones were exposed to many different forms
of terror exercised by individuals and uncontrolled groups, who were not and
could not be stopped by
For the entire duration of the Republic of Serbian
continued to receive substantial aid from Yugoslav Army, but a terrible economic
situation that forced many young people, subject to conscription, to leave the
territory, lead to the dissipation of the army and a general lack of enthusiasm.
Krajina's Serbs were disappointed with Milosevic, not because he had
encouraged them to start the war against Croatia but because he could not or, as
they erroneously believed, did not wish to help any longer. Their dissatisfaction
grew and their firm faith in the survival of
not mean that the Serb population was entertaining the thought of returning
within the borders of Croatia, Many Serbs were brainwashed into thinking of
Croats as enemy and Ustasha, not fit for co-existence. This was the reason that
in
zones into Croatia, Serbian population left the territory, with the evacuation
masterminded by Krajina's authorities. The resistance to the insurgence of much
522
Summary
stronger Croatian forces, determined to re-establish territorial integrity, was
weak and it was further decreased by the confusion among Krajina's Serbs.
Following the fall of the Republic of Serbian
agreed on in late
and Western
The independence of Croatia and its positioning within the international
community progressed in extremely complex circumstances in the region, in
Europe and world-wide. The fall of communism and the affirmation of political
pluralism in Eastern Europe led to the disintegration of the USSR and the
Warsaw Pact. The demolition of the Berlin Wall made redundant the bipolar
block constellation, while the announcement of a 'new world order', after the
American intervention in the Persian Gulf, made evident the need to redefine
international relations. In this new framework, Yugoslavia lost the importance
it had had during the cold war, and the chief goal of the leading European
states was to prevent the geo-political fragmentation of the Yugoslav state,
characterised as a dangerous precedent for the re-tailoring of borders and a
beginning of nationalist conflicts in post-communist Europe. The disintegration
of Yugoslavia coincided with the gathering of Western European states into the
European Community and with the emergence of strong, global integration
processes. Such diametrically opposed developments made the West view as
dangerous nationalist aspirations in Yugoslavia that would potentially run
against the OESS goals.
Faced with Serbia's nationalist and communist ambitions and the international
community's unfavourable stand regarding the compromised territorial
integrity of Yugoslavia, Croatia and Slovenia strove to bring Yugoslav crisis
to the international attention. Independent, albeit informal, appearances
of the democratically elected new governments became frequent and the
republics began presenting themselves as independent geo-political entities,
Yugoslav Army's attack on Slovenia and the war in Croatia gradually turned
the international community's sympathies to the obvious victims of Yugoslav
conflicts.
The ethnic cleansing policy carried out by Serb rebels, Yugoslav Army and
paramilitary formations from Serbia and Montenegro, and a strong Croatian
resistance resulted in the end in the tipping of the scale in favour of national
self-determination, which was opposed in idea to the preservation of Yugoslavia.
It was clear that the proclaimed non-involvement in the internal affairs of a
sovereign state had only encouraged extremism and terror. The international
community was divided on the subject of Yugoslav crisis. The USA was
523
Stvaranje hrvatske države i domovinski rat
displaying a sort of withdrawal and isolationism, so the initiative to resolve the
conflicts was taken by the European Community states. Germany, Austria
and the Vatican supported Slovenia and Croatia, whereas Great Britain and
France were more inclined to support the Serbian and Yugoslav Army block.
International recognition of the independent Croatian state was acceptable
under the condition that Vance's peace plan was accepted and UN peace forces
deployed on Croatia's occupied territories.
When the fighting moved to Bosnia and Herzegovina and the efforts to round up
ethnic Serbian territories' were under way, the international community could
not effectively stop the war. Despite its new status of independence, Croatia
did not fully realise its sovereignty because Vance's plan was not implemented.
Croatia's political decisions had to respect international policies towards
Bosnia and Herzegovina. From
in Bosnia and Herzegovina was substantial, its key agents being the president
of Croatia,
Democratic Union. Negotiations with Serbs and Muslims-Bosnians, conducted
simultaneously with the inconsistent peace initiatives of the International
Conference on Former Yugoslavia, brought no results. To make matters worse,
the second half of
and Bosnians,
This sequence of events suited the Great Serbian strategy of chaos manufacture,
i.e. of describing the fighting as 'the war of all against all'. Such a view of the war
was desired and even encouraged by international mediators. Their reason for
doing so was clearly to justify their inefficiency and to confirm the thesis that
it was a civil war, based on ethnic and religious differences in which all sides
bore equal responsibility, and thus a military intervention would mean taking
a side. Only after the USA had gradually joined the peace-making process,
Croat-Muslim alliance was renewed and military victories in Croatia and Bosnia
and Herzegovina followed, ending with the Dayton Peace Agreement in
Despite the fact that none of the sides were satisfied with the Dayton solution,
the three-year-long war was stopped and the process of stabilisation in the region
could begin.
After Dayton, where an agreement was reached on a peaceful
of Croatia's Danube region, Croatia, being a chief American ally, earned
favourable international esteem. However, a lack of will exhibited by the
Croatian government to accept the values of political pluralism became more
than evident. In the post-Dayton period, from
community, headed by the USA, exerted a strong pressure on Croatia to accept
524
SUMMARY
democratic standards and, in particular, to opt for an active cooperation with
the International Tribunal in the Hague, Acts of opposition to these general
guidelines brought on the isolation of Croatia and slowed down its efforts to
join the Euro-Atlantic integrations.
Franjo
politics in the
democratic changes was a decisive factor in the creation of the Croatian state
and in the resistance to the Serbian aggression. However, some aspects of
his activities exhibited ideological elements directed against the West, They
constituted a synthesis of inherited communist values and traces of nationalist
radicalism, justified as an effort to achieve national conciliation. He was not
perceived by the West as a democrat, American political circles did not have
a great regard for him, stamping him with a seal of eager nationalism. Be that
as it may,
American political goals on the post-Yugoslavia territories and a reliable ally,
especially after the signing of a military cooperation agreement between Croatia
and the USA, In accepting an alliance with the Bosnians, assisted by American
mediation, the conflict between Croats and Bosnians was brought to an end.
This meant a radical turn in Croatia's foreign policy, which led to peace in
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the establishment of Croatian rule and its full
sovereignty on all Croatian territories.
Loss of life in the war in Croatia came close to
9,500
persons. The overall demographic loss was close to
demographic loss had short-term demographic consequences, but in the long
run it will be difficult to overcome. In early
with a great natural depopulation, and from
drop in population of as many as
Natural depopulation, emigration caused by war and economic situation, and
loss of life during the war brought about a decrease in the number of population.
Between
figures by
loss was
criterion it was
a corrective, making the depopulation figures less alarming. Between
2001,
232,966
that even before the war displayed unfavourable demographic tendencies. Of
Stvaranu hrvatske države i Domovinski rat
the
in the overall population was recorded only in Zagreb County, Brod-Posavina
County,
was recorded in the war-ridden Lika-Senj, Sisak-Moslavina,
Osijek-Baranja,
Demographic losses greatly affected Croatia's ethno-demographic picture.
One of the changes was an ethnic homogenisation, with a strengthening of the
Croatian ethnic majority. Despite a strong overall depopulation, the percentage
of Croats in the country's overall population is higher. It has increased from
78.10%
to
movements, i.e. for the most part by Serb emigration, while the absolute
demographic growth is the consequence of the streams of Croatian refugees and
immigrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina and from Serbia. This immigration
compensated for the population migration and other demographic losses caused
by the war. The increase in the number of Croats can also be explained by the
assimilation of other ethnic communities and de-Yugoslavisation of a segment
of the population.
526 |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| any_adam_object_boolean | 1 |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV022400340 |
| classification_rvk | KW 1017 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)238830459 (DE-599)BVBBV022400340 |
| discipline | Slavistik |
| discipline_str_mv | Slavistik |
| era | Geschichte 1990-1999 gnd Geschichte 1945-1991 gnd Geschichte 1990-1995 gnd |
| era_facet | Geschichte 1990-1999 Geschichte 1945-1991 Geschichte 1990-1995 |
| format | Book |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>00000nam a2200000 c 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV022400340</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20080530</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">070424s2006 b||| |||| 00||| hrv d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9530608330</subfield><subfield code="9">953-0-60833-0</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)238830459</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV022400340</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">hrv</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-473</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-Re13</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">KW 1017</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)86483:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">7,41</subfield><subfield code="2">ssgn</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Stvaranje hrvatske države i Domovinski rat</subfield><subfield code="c">Zdenko Radelić ...</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Zagreb</subfield><subfield code="b">Hrvatski Inst. za Povijest</subfield><subfield code="c">2006</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="b">Školska knjiga</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">575 S.</subfield><subfield code="b">Kt.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Biblioteka XX. stoljeće</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Zsfassung in engl. Sprache</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="648" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Geschichte 1990-1999</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="648" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Geschichte 1945-1991</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="648" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Geschichte 1990-1995</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Politik</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4046514-7</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Außenpolitik</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4003846-4</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Bürgerkrieg</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4008784-0</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Auflösung</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4193468-4</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Gründung</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4020642-7</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Kroatien</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4073841-3</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Jugoslawien</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4028966-7</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Jugoslawien</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4028966-7</subfield><subfield code="D">g</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Auflösung</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4193468-4</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="2"><subfield code="a">Gründung</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4020642-7</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="3"><subfield code="a">Kroatien</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4073841-3</subfield><subfield code="D">g</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Geschichte 1990-1999</subfield><subfield code="A">z</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Kroatien</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4073841-3</subfield><subfield code="D">g</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="1" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Außenpolitik</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4003846-4</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="1" ind2="2"><subfield code="a">Geschichte 1990-1999</subfield><subfield code="A">z</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="2" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Kroatien</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4073841-3</subfield><subfield code="D">g</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="2" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Politik</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4046514-7</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="2" ind2="2"><subfield code="a">Geschichte 1945-1991</subfield><subfield code="A">z</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="2" ind2=" "><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="3" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Jugoslawien</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4028966-7</subfield><subfield code="D">g</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="3" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Auflösung</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4193468-4</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="3" ind2="2"><subfield code="a">Bürgerkrieg</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4008784-0</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="3" ind2="3"><subfield code="a">Kroatien</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4073841-3</subfield><subfield code="D">g</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="3" ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Geschichte 1990-1995</subfield><subfield code="A">z</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="3" ind2=" "><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Radelić, Zdenko</subfield><subfield code="e">Sonstige</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="m">Digitalisierung BSBMuenchen</subfield><subfield code="q">application/pdf</subfield><subfield code="u">http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015609012&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA</subfield><subfield code="3">Inhaltsverzeichnis</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="m">Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen</subfield><subfield code="q">application/pdf</subfield><subfield code="u">http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015609012&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA</subfield><subfield code="3">Abstract</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="940" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="n">oe</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="942" ind1="1" ind2="1"><subfield code="c">909</subfield><subfield code="e">22/bsb</subfield><subfield code="f">09049</subfield><subfield code="g">4972</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="942" ind1="1" ind2="1"><subfield code="c">355.009</subfield><subfield code="e">22/bsb</subfield><subfield code="f">09049</subfield><subfield code="g">496</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="942" ind1="1" ind2="1"><subfield code="c">909</subfield><subfield code="e">22/bsb</subfield><subfield code="f">09049</subfield><subfield code="g">496</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="943" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-015609012</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| geographic | Kroatien (DE-588)4073841-3 gnd Jugoslawien (DE-588)4028966-7 gnd |
| geographic_facet | Kroatien Jugoslawien |
| id | DE-604.BV022400340 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T17:18:10Z |
| indexdate | 2024-08-10T01:23:29Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9530608330 |
| language | Croatian |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-015609012 |
| oclc_num | 238830459 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR |
| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR |
| physical | 575 S. Kt. |
| publishDate | 2006 |
| publishDateSearch | 2006 |
| publishDateSort | 2006 |
| publisher | Hrvatski Inst. za Povijest Školska knjiga |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Biblioteka XX. stoljeće |
| spelling | Stvaranje hrvatske države i Domovinski rat Zdenko Radelić ... Zagreb Hrvatski Inst. za Povijest 2006 Školska knjiga 575 S. Kt. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Biblioteka XX. stoljeće Zsfassung in engl. Sprache Geschichte 1990-1999 gnd rswk-swf Geschichte 1945-1991 gnd rswk-swf Geschichte 1990-1995 gnd rswk-swf Politik (DE-588)4046514-7 gnd rswk-swf Außenpolitik (DE-588)4003846-4 gnd rswk-swf Bürgerkrieg (DE-588)4008784-0 gnd rswk-swf Auflösung (DE-588)4193468-4 gnd rswk-swf Gründung (DE-588)4020642-7 gnd rswk-swf Kroatien (DE-588)4073841-3 gnd rswk-swf Jugoslawien (DE-588)4028966-7 gnd rswk-swf Jugoslawien (DE-588)4028966-7 g Auflösung (DE-588)4193468-4 s Gründung (DE-588)4020642-7 s Kroatien (DE-588)4073841-3 g Geschichte 1990-1999 z DE-604 Außenpolitik (DE-588)4003846-4 s Politik (DE-588)4046514-7 s Geschichte 1945-1991 z Bürgerkrieg (DE-588)4008784-0 s Geschichte 1990-1995 z Radelić, Zdenko Sonstige oth Digitalisierung BSBMuenchen application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015609012&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015609012&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Abstract |
| spellingShingle | Stvaranje hrvatske države i Domovinski rat Politik (DE-588)4046514-7 gnd Außenpolitik (DE-588)4003846-4 gnd Bürgerkrieg (DE-588)4008784-0 gnd Auflösung (DE-588)4193468-4 gnd Gründung (DE-588)4020642-7 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4046514-7 (DE-588)4003846-4 (DE-588)4008784-0 (DE-588)4193468-4 (DE-588)4020642-7 (DE-588)4073841-3 (DE-588)4028966-7 |
| title | Stvaranje hrvatske države i Domovinski rat |
| title_auth | Stvaranje hrvatske države i Domovinski rat |
| title_exact_search | Stvaranje hrvatske države i Domovinski rat |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Stvaranje hrvatske države i Domovinski rat |
| title_full | Stvaranje hrvatske države i Domovinski rat Zdenko Radelić ... |
| title_fullStr | Stvaranje hrvatske države i Domovinski rat Zdenko Radelić ... |
| title_full_unstemmed | Stvaranje hrvatske države i Domovinski rat Zdenko Radelić ... |
| title_short | Stvaranje hrvatske države i Domovinski rat |
| title_sort | stvaranje hrvatske drzave i domovinski rat |
| topic | Politik (DE-588)4046514-7 gnd Außenpolitik (DE-588)4003846-4 gnd Bürgerkrieg (DE-588)4008784-0 gnd Auflösung (DE-588)4193468-4 gnd Gründung (DE-588)4020642-7 gnd |
| topic_facet | Politik Außenpolitik Bürgerkrieg Auflösung Gründung Kroatien Jugoslawien |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015609012&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=015609012&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT radeliczdenko stvaranjehrvatskedrzaveidomovinskirat |